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Abstract
This thesis addresses questions of political exclusion and violence through a 
consideration of the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben. 
Focusing on their theorizations of power and subjectivity, I argue that the 
conjunction of exclusion and violence reveals that a determination on life worth 
living operates as the constitutive decision of the political. In this determination, 
political life and biological life are brought into indistinction, a situation that is 
highlighted in Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics. Flowever, though a detailed 
examination of Foucault’s later work, I argue that his account of biopolitics suffers 
from two sets of problems. First, he overemphasizes the differentiation between 
sovereign power and biopower and thereby fails to consider the ways in which these 
modalities of power interact. Secondly, his account of subject-formation is ultimately 
overly reductive in its portrayal of subjectivation as violent imposition. I address 
these problems through Butler’s theorization of subjectivation and Agamben’s 
reconsideration of biopolitics and sovereignty. In doing so, I develop an account of 
political exclusion and violence that encompasses consideration of both political 
power and subjectivation. In addition to this, I consider questions of responsibility in 
relation to biopolitical subjection through examination of the conceptions of ethico- 
political response provided by Foucault, Butler and Agamben. I argue that neither 
Foucault’s ethics of the self nor Butler’s politics of the performative provide 
conceptions of responsibility adequate to yield an account of response to biopolitical 
subjection. Over and against their formulations, I show that the ethics of witnessing 
developed by Agamben provide a means of reconsidering ethical responsibility in 
light of the biopolitical determination of life worth living.
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1Introduction
Biopolitics, Subjectivation and Life Worth Living
I. Counting Lives! Lives that Count
In the past year, two of the most public and vehement debates that the Australian 
Government has been engaged in have been those concerning the political, legal and 
moral status of refugees and of the human embryo in stem cell research. On the face 
of it, these debates have little in common. One concerns various international 
agreements, questions of sovereignty and the duty of the state in the ‘global 
community’. The other concerns questions of bodily integrity, the doctrine of the 
sanctity of life and the social and moral implications of bio-medical technology. 
However, at another glance, it is possible to see that they are integrally related insofar 
as each reduces to contestation over the question of what — or perhaps who — 
counts. In its participation in diese debates, the Australian state is not simply 
grappling with questions concerning the moral fiber of the Australian political 
community, but is instead grappling with the determination of the borders of that 
community itself. That is to say, both of these debates centrally concern the 
delimitation of political community and the beings that attain legal and moral status 
within it. While the debate on stem cell research attempts to delimit synchronically 
when a living thing counts as a politically and morally significant life, the debate on 
refugees attempts the same task diachronically in terms of human lives — not when but 
which.
This thesis engages theoretically with this troubled political terrain through an 
investigation of the question of what counts and the relation that counting bears to 
life itself. One of the key arguments developed throughout is that the question of 
what counts is central to the constitution of the political: indeed, that it is the 
constitutive decision of the political. Jacques Ranciere has recendy offered such an 
account of the political, arguing that politics arises in the disjuncture established in 
counting and the possibility of miscounting that this introduces. 1 For Ranciere, the
1 Jacques Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, 5:3(2001), § 1.
2definitional characteristic of politics is the relation of part-taking. Politics cannot be 
seen simply as the exercise of or struggle for power, nor as the functions and 
institutions of the state, since it involves a specific subject that emerges in opposition 
to the citizen defined by Aristode as ‘he who partakes in the fact of ruling and the 
fact of being ruled’.2 The part-taking that this involves engenders the demos or ‘the 
people’ as supplement to the parts of the community counted in politics: ‘the demos’ 
is figured as ‘a supplement to the count of the parts of society, a specific figure of 
“the part of those who have no-part’” . 3 Thus, politics constitutively involves a 
struggle over who takes part and the ‘wrong’ that arises in the miscounting of parts 
that establishes the people as the subject proper to politics. Additionally, Ranciere 
claims that the partition between the citizen and the demos or the people cannot be 
analyzed through a prior designation of a specific way of life proper to politics — eu 
•gen in Aristode’s terms — which is opposed to the order of ‘mere living’ or gen. 
Rather, what is at stake in politics is precisely this designation: it is not the basis of 
politics but its object.4
Hence, it is crucial to consider the relation between political and biological or mere 
life, for as I argue, the decision on what counts is fundamentally a decision on ‘life 
worth living’, that is, the political determination of what constitutes a livable life.5 
Western political philosophy has long been concerned with the relation of politics to
2 Cited in Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, § 1.
3 Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, § 19.
4 Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, §2 and 3.
5 By this phrase, I seek to highlight the way in which normative reflections on ways of life and 
possibilities for living contribute to if not effectuate a determination on the question of what counts as 
a livable life within political community. With regard to the moral questions posed by euthanasia, 
Peter Singer distinguishes between the condemnation of life on the basis that it is a life ‘not worthy of 
being lived and what he argues is the proper object of moral concern, the question of whether a life is a 
‘'life worth living. Though apparendy semantic, the distinction that Singer poses attempts to hold off the 
slippery slope argument against euthanasia, that once assisted death is legalized, the situation will 
inexorably move toward the horror of Nazi Germany’s programs of killing the mentally ill or disabled, 
subsequendy extended to killing political prisoners, homosexuals, Jews, Gypsies and other maligned 
groups. What is important in Singer’s discussion though is not so much the distinction he draws 
between these phrases, but his point that a properly moral or ethical consideration of the 
determination of ‘life worth living’ attempts to address the question from the standpoint o f the 
legitimate interests and desires, and well-being, of the subject whose life is in question (Singer, Writings 
on an Ethical Life, p.205). In contrast to this, the political determination of ‘life worth living’ might be 
distinguished by its being made without regard to the legitimate interests and desires of the person 
whose life is in question. Instead, it entails the evaluation of the value of a life or way of life 
independently of those desires and interests and instead, evaluates that life in relation to a normatively 
applied regulative standard such as the wellbeing of a population. See Peter Singer, Writings on an 
Ethical Life (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), pp.203-205.
3life; however, it seems that today, this question should be asked with an increasing 
urgency. Recent literature suggests a transformation in our conceptions of life and 
death, largely wrought by biotechnology, such that traditional principles of ethics and 
politics are collapsing.6 However, this literature does not address the interaction of 
political rationality and conceptions of life, nor does it address the relations of power 
that constitute and impinge upon our notions of life and the ways in which lives are 
lived. It says little about the interplay of life, death and power, and as such, cannot 
adequately address the problematics of political exclusion. Conversely, political 
theorists and activists who seek to address perceived exclusions from the liberal 
political arena through the discourses of individual liberties, rights and citizenship 
seem to elide the fact that too often these very mechanisms are employed to enforce 
and justify exclusions. Further, these may well be the very means by which biological 
life is politicized, such that the question of the good life, of life worth living, becomes 
one of who lives and who dies.
In the context of contemporary political theory and philosophy, Michel Foucault’s 
work has been the most alert to transformations in the political status of biological 
life, suggesting that in the modern era, life enters into the political field in an 
unprecedented way. While there is an established industry of Foucault scholarship, 
one of the noticeable absences within this literature is sustained philosophical 
interrogation of the concept of biopolitics sketched out in the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality project. In this text, Foucault argues that the rationality of political 
power underwent a transformation at the end of the seventeenth century, such that 
power no longer operated through the right of the sovereign to ‘take life or let live’, 
but instead through the administration of life that fosters life or disallows it. For 
Foucault, this regime of biopolitics required a transformation of the Aristotelian 
precept that man is an animal with the additional capacity for politics to recognize 
that man is an animal whose politics place his existence in question. Thus, according
6 For instance, Peter Singer claims that the traditional ethical principle of the sanctity of life is being 
overturned, while Jeremy Rifkin has suggested that distinctions between the right and left in politics 
are collapsing in our ‘biological age’. In anthropology, Paul Rabinow has argued that the human 
genome project transforms our notions of life and human dignity, proposing the category of purgatory 
as a means of describing the current status of life and ethics. This is to say nothing of the increasing 
literature on the transformations of human life wrought by robotics and computer technology. See in 
particular Peter Singer, Rethinking Ufe and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics, (Melbourne: Text 
Publishing, 1994); Jeremy Rifkin, ‘Politics in the age of biology’ in The Guardian Weekly, 165:6, August 
2-8(2001), p .ll; Paul Rabinow, Trench DNA: Trouble in Purgatory, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999).
4to Foucault, in the era after the seventeenth century, the distinction between political 
and biological life collapses such that they are in fact co-extensive.
Taking up this rewriting of Aristode’s precept, Giorgio Agamben has recendy taken 
Foucault to task over his conception of biopolitics. Agamben argues against 
Foucault’s central historical claim that biopolitics emerged in the eighteenth century 
to claim instead that biopolitics and sovereignty are integrally related. Against 
Foucault’s collapsing of Aristode’s distinction between political life and biological 
life, Agamben proposes a third category of ‘bare life’ to describe the situation in 
which biological life is politicized through its exposure to sovereign violence. In 
doing so, Agamben’s characterization of the nexus between biopolitics and sovereign 
power rejects Foucault’s historical succession, to show the way in which the 
production of the biopolitical body is central to the operation of sovereignty. 
Correiatively, this allows an analysis of sovereignty that exceeds the characterization 
of centralized state power that Foucault so consistendy rejected. Further, the 
category of bare life and the corresponding analysis of sovereignty and biopower 
suggests that violence and the threat of death that it prefigures is central to the 
operation of biopolitics, such that the politics of life fade into and mesh with a 
politics of death, a ‘thanato-politics’ as Agamben suggests.
II. Violence and Subjection
Much of the emerging, largely sociological, literature on biopolitics is particularly 
concerned with the technical administration of life permitted through at least the 
perception of increasing control over life processes through bio-medical science. In 
this thesis, I depart from this literature by focusing on the role of violence within a 
politics of life. The difficulty that immediately arises then is that of defining violence. 
The principal definition that the Oxford English Dictionary gives for violence is: ‘the 
exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or 
property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or usage tending to cause 
bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom .’7 This definition reveals 
that violence constitutively involves the body, in both the senses that the body of the
7 O xford English Dictionary.
5perpetrator comports itself in relation to the other through violent actions and in the 
sense that those actions impinge upon the body of the other. This is doubly so when 
it is kept in mind that actions necessarily require a body and the mobilization and 
arrangement of bodily forces. An action always prefigures a body acting and acted 
upon and through that, prefigures the forces that pertain in the relation established in 
that acting of and on the body. However, the OED also gives several modifications 
in addition to the physicalist definition of violence.
These modifications include:
b. ...To inflict harm or injury upon; to outrage or violate. Also to make 
violence.
c. ...Improper treatment or use of a word; wresting or perversion of meaning 
or application; unauthorized alteration of wording.
d. Undue constraint applied to some natural process, habit, etc., so as to 
prevent its free development or exercise.
Thus, violence inflicts harm and violates, but now it is not only bodies that are acted 
upon, but words as well. That is, words might be used improperly, and in that 
misuse, have their meaning violated by perversion and unauthorized usage such that 
the effect on the term is that of violence. Importantly, violence can be done onto 
words, but it might also be the effect of a particular use of a word — that is, violence 
might be done by words. It is not just bodies that violence acts upon and through, 
but words and meaning. As recent considerations of hate speech and pornography 
argue, words might be said to act upon bodies with violent force; that is, words may 
be said to inflict injury upon bodies such that they violate the integrity of that body. 
What this suggests is not simply that violence can be either discursive or non- 
discursive, effectuated through words or actions or upon bodies or signs, but that 
violence brings the distinction between the discursive and non-discursive into 
question. This point can be made through an example.
In May 1993, in a small town in New South Wales, Australia, Malcolm Green 
confessed to killing his friend of six years, Don Gillies. Just before dawn, Green had 
turned up at the Mudgee police station in blood-spattered clothes and told the police
6‘Yeah, I killed him, but he did worse to me'.8 Apparendy, Don Gillies had drunkenly 
tried to fondle Green, touching him on the groin and around his lower back. Green 
told Gillies to stop, adding ‘I’m not like this’ and tried to push Gilles away. When 
Gillies continued to talk to him and touch him, Green started hitting him until in his 
words £he didn’t look like Don to me’. Then, he stabbed him ten times in the back of 
his chest with a pair of poultry shears that were nearby and left him lying on die door 
in a pool of blood. Green then made some perfunctory efforts to clean up the blood 
and remove his fingerprints, called his brother-in-law and asked him to drive over 
and get him, and eventually went to the police. Thus in an attack that was later 
described in the courts as ferocious, Green killed his friend for making a drunken 
pass at him. Importandy, Green never claimed that the advances made by Gillies 
were violent or that he felt frightened; in fact he subsequendy described the manner 
in which he was touched as ‘gentle’ and suggested that Gillies was attempting to 
‘sooth’ him when he started punching.
In the initial consideration of this case, a jury found Green guilty of murder and he 
was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Green appealed this in the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, but this court upheld the original conviction and 
sentence. Then, in 1997, Green appealed to the High Court of Australia and won.9 
Consequently, in the retrial Green’s conviction was reduced to manslaughter, with a 
sentence of about 9 years. The legal basis of this appeal was a ‘provocation defense’, 
that is the defense that the appellant was so provoked by the conduct of the deceased 
that he lost control of himself and consequently, killed the deceased.10 Technically,
8 Green v The Queen, High Court of Australia (7 November 1997); R v. Green, New South Wales Court 
of Criminal Appeal (18 May 1999); also see Bronwyn Statham, ‘The Homosexual Advance Defence: 
“Yeah, I killed him, but he did worse to me” Green v R’, University of Queensland Taw Review, 
20:2(1999), pp.301-11.
9 The High Court’s role and status is roughly equivalent to that of the US Supreme Court in that it is 
the final court of appeal in matters within federal jurisdiction and federal constitutional law. Its role 
differs from that of the Supreme Court in diat it is also the final court of appeal for issues within State 
jurisdiction, whereas in the US, the State Supreme Courts fulfills this function.
10 In s.23 of the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900, the provocation defense is stated as:
(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or omission causing 
death was an act done or omitted under provocation and, but for this subsection and the 
provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit 
the accused of murder and find die accused guilty of manslaughter.
(2) For the purposes of subsecdon (1), an act or omission causing death is an act done or 
omitted under provocation where:
7the applicability of the defense swung on the notional ‘ordinary' person’ invoked in it. 
The point of contention was whether this ‘ordinary7 person’ should be understood in 
an abstract sense, or whether it should be understood to allow for the particular 
experiences and character of the accused. In particular, Green claimed in the trial that 
Gillies’ advance evoked memories of growing up in a violent family situation and this 
contributed to his loss of control. Hence, the validity of the defense depended on 
whether Green’s testimony of this ‘flashback’ was admissible as a mitigating factor in 
the crime. * 11
However, what becomes apparent in the High Court judgment is that homosexuality 
is itself constituted as provocative, such that the violence at issue is not the vicious 
attack against the homosexual man who is now dead, but rather the pass that he 
made at the defendant, which is understood as a violation of the defendant’s sexual 
integrity. Further, the prior violence that the defendant had witnessed in his family 
multiplies and enhances that violence, such that it is now no longer the dead man 
who is understood as the victim of violence but the attacker. As Chief Justice 
Brennan argues in his judgment in Green v The Queen, the provocation legislation 
requires that the ‘sting of the provocation actually experienced by the accused’ be 
taken account of in jury considerations. 12 Brennan goes on to suggest that:
(a) the act or omission is the result of loss of self-control on the part of the accused that 
was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) 
towards or affecting the accused; and
(b) that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the 
position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, 
or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased.
11 Within legal debates this problem is addressed as subjectivist and objectivist approaches to the 
standard. There is also a substantial literature critiquing the notional ‘ordinary person’ invoked in the 
legislation, much of which emphasizes the gendered nature of this standard. See in particular, Adrian 
Howe, ‘More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and Sexed Excuses -  
Rejoining the Provocation Lawr Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual Advance Defence)’, Sydney haw 
Review, 19(1997), pp.336-365. It should be pointed out that the Green appeal has subsequently been 
cited as one of the principal cases in the institutionalization of the ‘homosexual advance defence’ in 
the Australian legal context. While a similar defense has been used in the U.S. legal context -  known 
as the ‘homosexual panic defense’ — the American defense explicitly psychologizes the homophobic 
response to an advance through the attempted identification of a latent homosexuality within the 
attacker as the cause of homophobic violence. In the Australian defense, no reference is made to 
latent homosexuality, although a ‘flashback’ to previous trauma is a common attribute of HAD cases, 
as is often extreme violence. Instead of latent homosexuality, the ‘trauma’ that is supposedly recalled 
by a homosexual advance is more generalized. For further discussions of these defenses see, Mison, 
‘More Folk’; Robert Mison, ‘Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient 
Provocation’, California haw Review, 80 (1992), pp. 133-178; also see the excellent discussion provided 
by Justice Michael Kirby in his judgment in the appeal, Kirby J. Green v The Queen.
12 Brennan CJ, Green v The Queen.
8The real sting of the provocation could have been found not in the force used 
by the deceased but in his attempt to violate the sexual integrity of a man who 
had trusted him as a friend and father figure, in the deceased’s persistent 
homosexual advances after the appellant had said “I’m not like this” . 13
In discussing the prior rejection of Green’s appeal in the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal, Brennan cites the dissenting opinion of Jusdce Smart, who 
describes Gillies’ non-violent, perhaps even gende, advance as ‘revolting’, ‘terrifying’ 
and a ‘serious and gross violation’. From this, Smart concluded that an ordinary man 
might ‘feel great revulsion at the homosexual advances being persisted with in the 
circumstances and could be induced to so far lose their self control as to form the 
intention to and inflict grievous bodily harm’, an opinion that Brennan concurred 
with.14
Thus, the corporeal homophobic violence of the attack is effaced through the 
invocation of other kinds of violence, understood to contribute to a sense of gross 
personal violation on the part of the attacker. Violence appears to proliferate 
throughout the scene of the trial, ultimately resulting in a double violation in which 
the dead homosexual body is on the one hand construed as dangerously threatening 
and on the other, is systematically effaced as the victim of violence. Judith Butler 
makes a similar point in her discussion of the 1992 trial following the police beating 
of Rodney King in Los Angeles. Butler highlights the way in which Rodney King was 
systematically construed as inherently threatening throughout the trial of the police 
officers, despite the video evidence to the contrary. She argues that this is a 
consequence and indication of a racial schema that precedes and structures the 
possibilities of seeing, that determines what counts as seeing. Butler argues that 
through a series of cross-identifications established through a racist imaginary 
schema, the vulnerability evident in the beaten body and helpless gestures of Rodney 
King is attributed to the white police officers, such that the black male body is 
construed as necessarily threatening and violent. To combat this reading and the 
repetition of the racist imaginary in operation, she argues that ‘it is necessary to read 
not only for the “event” of violence, but for the racist schema that orchestrates and
13 Brennan CJ, Green v The Queen.
14 Smart J. cited in Brennan CJ, Green v The Queen.
9interprets the event, which splits the violent intention off from the body who wields 
it and attributes it to the body who receives it. ’15
Butler’s point has several implications for reading the proliferation and mis- 
identification of violence in the case that I described. I do not mean to suggest that 
race and sexuality can be understood to be constituted in the same way or with the 
same effects, nor that racism and homophobia can be rendered equivalent. 
Nevertheless, several of Butler’s key points can be transposed to a consideration of 
the case described above. Such a transposition highlights the mis-identification of 
vulnerability in the body of the attacker and the correlative mis-identification of the 
homosexual body as threatening, violating and provocative. More importantly, within 
this analysis, the way in which violence undoes the distinction between the discursive 
and the non-discursive is brought to the fore. The violations effected in the Rodney 
King trial never settle in a body, — just as they do not in the Green appeal — which 
might be a consequence of the fact that bodies themselves are never entirely settled. 
The violations both precede and exceed the beating of a black body by white police 
officers or the beating and killing of the homosexual body by the body whose ‘sexual 
integrity’ has been violated, such that those bodies are effectively constituted in their 
violation. If it is the case that some bodies are constituted as injurious while others 
are constituted as injurable under the law, it seems pertinent to consider the 
conditions under which such constitution takes place and the determination that it 
entails. Additionally, it seems important to consider the normative exclusions 
effectuated in that constitution, such that some bodies are constituted as ‘bodies that 
matter, ways of living that count as “life” ’16 while others are not.
Hence, in considering the question of the role of violence within the determination 
of life worth living, it seems appropriate to take up Butler’s provocation that the task 
is not simply to read the event of violence per se, but to consider the schemas that 
allow for the attribution of vulnerability, violence and threat in some bodies and not 
others. To do this, it must first be recognized that the proliferation of violence does
15 Judith Buder, ‘Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia’ in Robert 
Gooding Williams, ed. Reading Rodney King/Reading Urban Uprising, (New York: Roudedge, 1993), 
pp.15-22 at 20.
16 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Roudedge, 1993), p.16
10
not stop with the rrus-identification of violation and vulnerability, since violence is 
again perpetrated in the enforcement of the law that ‘deal[s] pain and death’ against 
the body of the defendant, whose freedom is subsequently constrained through 
imprisonment. 17 This raises the question of the relation of the law to violence, and 
more specifically, the status of violence within the institution and maintenance of 
order. Indeed, it suggests that violence cannot simply be opposed to order, but is in 
fact integral to the constitution of it. This claim is made by Robert Cover in 
‘Violence and the Word’, in which Cover argues that the interpretation and effective 
enforcement of the law is necessarily dependent on acts of violence, such that law 
itself is an ‘organized, social practice of violence’ . 18 Law and particularly criminal law, 
he claims, inevitably and necessarily deals pain and death in the practice of judgment; 
as a practical activity that takes place within the institutional organization of violence, 
judgment aims to efficaciously ‘generate credible threats and actual deeds of 
violence’. 19
However, Cover’s argument is not simply that violence is an instrumental effect of 
the law; rather, his argument addresses the ontological foundation of the law, insofar 
as violence is one of the constitutive and inseparable conditions of it.20 As Pheng
17 Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, Yale Law Review, 95:1595(1986), pp. 1601-1629, passim.
18 Cover, Violence and the Word’, p.1601. It is perhaps not insignificant that Cover uses the example 
of martyrdom to initially limn the relation between violence and the law in his paper, a figuration that 
recalls Walter Benjamin’s crucial essay ‘The Critique of Violence’ and other literature on violence, the 
law and the sacred. See Walter Benjamin, ‘The Critique of Violence’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Shocken Books, 1978); Rene Girard, Violence 
and the Sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1977); Rene Girard, The 
Scapegoat, tr. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1986); Georges Bataille, The 
Accursed Share, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1988-1991); Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, tr. 
Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1989); Jacques Derrida, ‘The Force of Law: The “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David Gray Carson, eds. 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: Roudedge, 1992), pp.3-67; Jacques Derrida, ‘Before 
the Law’ in Derek Attridge, ed. Acts of Literature (New York: Roudedge, 1992), pp.181-220; Stathis 
Gourgouris, ‘Enlightenment and Paranomia’, in Hent De Vries and Samuel Weber, eds. Violence, 
Identity and Self-Determination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.199-149.
19 Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, p.1610.
20 In their considerations of the violence perpetrated in the name of order, Austin Sarat and Thomas 
Keams have observed that contemporary legal theory systematically denies and obfuscates the 
violence of the law, against which they claim that ‘law’s violence is hardly separable from the rule of 
law itself. Sarat and Kearns argue that the traditional or ‘official’ story told about the law, beginning 
with Thomas Hobbes’ characterization of the role of the Leviathan in erasing violence from social life, 
casts law as a domesticating, if not liberating force. Against this official narrative, they argue that the 
force of the law is intimately related to violence, not only instrumentally as it is conceived in debates 
on the legitimate use of violence within certain constraints of means and ends, but also, and more 
importandy, constitutively. See Austin Sarat and Thomas Keams, ‘A Journey Through Forgetting: 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Violence’ in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds. The Tate of Law (.inn
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Cheah and Elizabeth Grosz point out, Cover’s emphasis on the world-making capacity 
of the law means that his claim does not simply identify the contingent historical 
instances of violence effectuated by the law, but instead points to a fundamental 
force of the law to make the world in its image.21 Further, the world-making capacity 
of the law operates through the imposition of ideality on materiality. Cover argues 
that ‘law is never just a mental or spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent 
that there are commitments that place bodies on the line’.22 As an ontological 
violence, law constitutively ‘shapes the material processes of embodiment’: law in 
general is ‘an originary and inhuman violence operative in embodiment’ such that ‘a 
founding violence at the level of the body stands at the origin and limit of the law’.23 
The recognition of the centrality of corporeality in the formulation and foundation of 
the law as well as in its execution or effective interpretation, suggests that 
understanding the violence of the law requires understanding its relation to the body 
and, by extension, to subjectivity and ultimately, to life itself.
Foucault insists on this point in Iris analysis of the corporeal, material dimension of 
punishment and incarceration in Discipline and Punish. While claiming that the law no 
longer functions as a system of interdiction but as a normalizing apparatus of 
regulation, Foucault highlights the constitutive capacity of normalizing violence vis-a- 
vis the human body. The violence that Foucault focuses on in this text is no longer 
the right of the sword, the discontinuous, extractive violence of the sovereign so 
forcefully portrayed in the opening pages of the text, but instead, the continuous, 
anonymous violence of the norm. This is a violence that never lets go of the body; it 
inscribes the body not simply as a corporeal surface, but as a system of forces that
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp.209-273 at 210. Also see their critique of Cover in 
Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, ‘Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal 
Theory’, in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds. Law’s Violence (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992), pp.211-250. For a related argument against H.L.A Hart, see Stanley Fish, 
‘Force’, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice ofLiteraiy and Legal Studies (Durham: 
Duke University, 1989), pp.503-524, particularly his claim that ‘the force of the law is always already 
indistinguishable from the forces it would oppose’ (p.520) and Thomas Keenan’s discussion of this 
claim in Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 16-20.
21 Pheng Cheah and Elizabeth Grosz, ‘The Body of the Law: Notes Toward a Theory of Corporeal 
Justice’, in Pheng Cheah, David Fraser and Judith Grbich, eds. Thinking through the Body of the Law 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp.3-25 at 9; also see their comparison of Cover’s conception of the 
law with Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, p .ll.
22 Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’, p.1605.
23 Cheah and Grosz, ‘The Body of the Law’, p.10.
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can be re-arranged and re-assembled in accordance with the strategic organization of 
power relations and institutions that embody them. As a form of institutionalized 
violence, normalization subjugates and makes subjects as one of its principal effects. 
The individual subject, tied to the operations of power precisely in its identification 
as individual, emerges from the violating, forceful impositions of the demands of 
disciplinary capital upon and in the body. But for all the importance of Foucault’s 
analysis, it does simplify the problem somewhat in its formulation of the relation of 
violence and subjectivation.
For violence is double-edged in relation to the subject: on the one hand, violence 
subjugates, makes subject to, or indeed, simply makes subjects. On the other though, 
violence appears to destroy the condition of being a subject, not only insofar as it 
radically curtails the freedom of the subject, but also appears to destroy the 
possibility of entering into language and thereby the possibility of taking up the 
position of subject as such.24 In other words, violence bears an intimate though 
heterogeneous relation to subjectivation: on the one hand, violence subjectifies and 
on the other, it radically de-subjectifies. Violence signals a crisis for the subject in the 
threat of death that it prefigures and further, brings about that death through the 
crisis that it signals. This becomes clear in Butler’s analysis of injurious locution in 
Excitable Speech and it is also central to her formulation of the constitutive 
vulnerability of the subject in its dependence on recognition by others for securing 
intelligible identifications. Butler highlights the constitutive vulnerability in 
subjectivation, revealing the ways in which the threat of abjection or social death 
operates to regulate identity-formation, such that the violence of subjectivation 
operates through the constitutive exclusions that structure and enforce possibilities 
for living.
Hence, the inter-relation of law and violence opens into significant questions 
concerning constituent and constituted violence and the operation of sovereignty in 
the formulation and institution of the law. It also opens to important questions 
concerning the status of the body within political order, and through that, appears to
24 See Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
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return us to the question of what lives count within the political. In this thesis, I take 
up these questions through the work of Foucault, Agamben, and Buder, since their 
works present significant challenges to the obviation of violence within the 
constitution of political and legal order evident in liberal political theory and allow 
questions about violence to be posed in terms apart from those of legitimation and 
justification. In different ways, each argues that violence is integral to the constitution 
of political community and the determination of lives worth living that this involves. 
For Foucault, the violence of political order is unhinged from the sovereign’s power 
over death and instead effectuated through the processes of normalization and 
individualization that enforce biopolitical subjection. While Butler tempers Foucault’s 
understanding of subjectivation as violent imposition through an analysis of psychic 
attachments to subjection, she nevertheless sees violence in the constitutive 
exclusions that mark hegemonic, regulative apparatuses of subjectivation. For 
Agamben, the violence of political order is again the violence of the sovereign 
decision insofar as that decision founds law; however, he argues that the sovereign 
decision is dispersed beyond a centralized state form and effectively produces the 
biopolitical body in the moment of its occurrence.
III. An Ethics of Survival
In addition to the analyses of political community and violence mentioned, each of 
these theorists poses the question of what response is possible, even if the answer 
they give to this question does not amount to the formulation of a positive political 
project. Consequently, one of the questions addressed throughout this thesis is how 
might the violence of biopolitics be addressed? Such a question requires 
consideration not only of the responses suggested by each theorist, but also of the 
relation between ethics and politics and more specifically, what space or role the 
ethical takes when politics plays out through the determination of life worth living. In 
taking up these questions, I consider the ethical and political responses formulated by 
Foucault, Butler and Agamben to argue that recognition of a fundamental ethical 
responsibility is crucial to the delimitation of the political decision. Drawing on 
Derrida’s formulations of ethical responsibility, I argue that such a conception of the 
relation between ethics and politics cannot be one such that a determinate politics 
can simply be deduced from a moral foundationalism. Furthermore, as Derrida and 
others claim, the ethical responsibility that obtains in relation to the political decision
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is ineliminable, and as such, cannot be reduced to or deduced from legalistic notions 
of individual culpability. However, while drawing on Derrida’s formulation of ethical 
responsibility, I do not take up the Levinasian inflected ethics developed in his later 
work entirely. Instead, through discussion of Agamben’s Remnants of A u s c h m t I 
argue for an ethics of witnessing that emerges in the decision of who takes part in the 
political.
Through his engagements with Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida develops a conception 
of ethics that exceeds and overrides the deduction of responsibility from the 
determinable actions of an individual that underpins juridically defined notions of 
responsibility. To briefly gloss Derrida’s account, the conception of responsibility 
that he develops is an excessive responsibility that holds the subject ‘hostage’ to the 
Other, where that being hostage is itself the subjectivity of the subject.25 In other 
words, responsibility is an internal condition of the subject. As a consequence, the 
ethical responsibility that holds the subject is ineliminable; it cannot be turned away 
from or negated through recourse to individual culpability. At the same time, such an 
excessive responsibility is unassumable, in that it is not something that the subject can 
take up as a predicate or particular capability. The subject is not responsible to the 
other because of its actions toward the other or because of recognition of guilt. 
Rather, the subject is always already responsible, because that responsibility exceeds 
and precedes it. Importantly for Derrida, such a conception of ethical responsibility 
does not give rise to a determinate politics or law; rather, there is a hiatus between 
the ethical and the political, and it is this hiatus that makes the decision of the 
political both possible and in multiple senses, impossible.26 The ‘mad’ decision of the 
political in which responsibility takes hold because of the lack of ontological 
foundation underpinning the decision can only be made in the face of that hiatus.27 
Throughout this thesis, I critically juxtapose such a conception of ethics with the 
work of Foucault, Butler and Agamben to develop an account of the ethical
25 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, tr. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), p.55.
26 On the impossibility of the decision because the decision is always ‘the decision of the other’, see 
Paul Patton and Terry Smith, ed. Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars, (Sydney: 
Power Publications, 2001), p.103; on the ‘madness’ or undecidable condition of the decision, see 
Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.24; Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, tr. David Wills (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.25 and passim.
27 Derrrida, Adieu, p.21.
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responsibility that obtains in relation to the biopolitical determination of life worth 
living and the violence effected in it.
With regard to Foucault and Buder, I argue that the conceptions of ethics and 
responsibility yielded in their works are inadequate as elaborations of response to the 
violence of biopolitical subjection. In tracing the interdependency of political 
belonging and freedom in Foucault’s ethics of the self, I make two related claims to 
highlight the limits of concern for others within such a conception of ethics. First, I 
argue that the ethics of the self are at base an ethics of the free citizen subject, such 
that the practices of ethical self-formation elucidated within Foucault’s later work 
appear to be conditioned by belonging to political community; in this, they fail to 
broach concern for others beyond the borders of part-taking. To strengthen this 
claim, I consider the contingency of concern for others within Foucault’s ethics, and 
argue that the failure to elaborate an meliminable concern for others as an internal 
condition of a practice of ethical self-formation severely limits the value of such a 
conception of ethics for addressing biopolitical subjection. O f Butler’s work, I argue 
that Butler’s conception of intelligibility and social death fundamentally constrains 
the conception of responsibility that might be yielded in her work. While Butler 
indicates the necessity of developing a conception of ethical responsibility that 
cannot be deduced from individual culpability — given the linguistic constitution and 
hence vulnerability of the subject — to date, she has not provided an extended 
elaboration of a conception of responsibility. However, a concern with responsibility 
subtends her most recent work, Antigone's Claim. I read this text to highlight the ways 
in which her theorization of mis-recognition and regulatory interpellation 
undermines an elaboration of the responsibility of the subject for those whose 
address is rendered unintelligible within hegemonic regimes of identification.
Over and against Foucault and Butler, I argue that the conception of an ethics of 
witnessing developed by Agamben provides an important reconsideration of 
responsibility that cannot be rendered equivalent to individual culpability. In 
reference to the paradox of witnessing identified by Prirno Levi, in which the true 
witnesses of the concentration camps of Nazi Germany are those who died in the 
camps, Agamben argues that the aporia of testimony is that what is borne witness to 
is the impossibility of speech that inheres in subjectivation as a constitutive
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desubjectivation. Taking up the rhetorical figure of apostrophe, Agamben argues for 
a conception of ethics as being called to responsibility, to bear witness to the 
impossibility of speaking that conditions testimony. Agamben’s conception of 
witnessing is based on a rejection of juridically defined notions of responsibility to 
yield a conception of irresponsibility or non-responsibility that is simultaneously 
ineliminable and unassumable. However, while Agamben’s argument that 
responsibility cannot be equated to individual culpability is crucial, I also show the 
way in which his ethics of witnessing require a conception of responsibility as 
response to address. In doing so, I aim to bring out the importance of address and 
response and the intersubjective condition of ethics that is left implicit within 
Agamben’s account of witnessing. In this way, the ineliminable, unassumable 
responsibility of bearing witness takes hold in the scission between the community of 
the governed and the part-without-part and the determination of life worth living 
that defines the borders of political community.
Several points should be added here to elucidate the presumptions that inform the 
style of this thesis. First, my way of proceeding throughout the thesis has been 
influenced by one of the fundamental lessons of deconstruction that the task of 
philosophy is not so much that of providing answers and outlining political 
programs, but rather of opening up possibilities for thinking. As a theoretical and 
critical method, deconstruction -  along with Foucauldian genealogical politics — has 
been heavily criticized for the apparent failure to offer positive solutions or political 
projects in addition to the critiques offered by its practitioners. In response to this 
criticism, the partisans of deconstruction and genealogy have argued that the value of 
these theoretical projects lies elsewhere than in the formulation of normative political 
and ethical programs. In particular, it lies in the capacity of such methods of analysis 
to bring to light the conditions and presuppositions under which such programs are 
formulated. As Gayatri Spivak suggests, the point is not that deconstruction does not 
found a political project, but that it allows for consideration of the problematic 
foundations of politics.28 While this thesis is neither a deconstructive analysis nor a 
genealogical analysis, it does take theoretical and methodological inspiration from
28 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.121; 
also see Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, tr. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.264.
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these philosophical and political projects in its style and critical agenda. 
Consequently, the thesis does not attempt to outline a normative political project and 
nor does it work stylistically as a series of propositions leading to an indubitable 
conclusion. Instead, the following analysis follows a recursive path along which the 
problems of violence, subjectivity and political constitution are considered with the 
aim of highlighting aspects of those problems that have not yet been brought to 
light.
My way of reading the texts that I take up in the thesis is similar. Given the ready 
solidification of interpretation, the challenge in this thesis has been to provide a 
slightly different reading of the texts at hand, bringing out tensions that inflect the 
texts and exploring the limits of the conceptualizations that are developed in them. 
This has been particularly challenging in relation to Foucault’s work, given the 
already huge literature on it. In this context, one cannot but ask oneself the question 
of why another thesis on Foucault now? My justification for re-reading Foucault is 
two-fold: first, because little philosophical attention has been paid to the concept of 
biopolitics, and second, because the theoretical naturalization of a ‘Foucauldian 
analysis’ within academic debates makes it important to ask precisely what that 
amounts to. There is now a more or less hegemonic interpretation of Foucault as 
profoundly Nietzschean in his formulations of power, subjectivity and genealogy, 
Kantian in his formulation of critique and altogether too Greek in his formulation of 
an ethics of the self. While all these theoretical precedents hold to a greater or lesser 
extent in Foucault’s work, the established reading of Foucault has frequently 
neglected influences on Foucault’s thought that have not themselves been so 
prominent within the Anglo-American imaginary as it emerges in political theory and 
philosophy. Georges Canguilhem for instance, was undoubtedly of immense 
significance for Fouca.uk’s methodology of historical analysis of systems of thought 
and fundamental for Foucault’s later conception of norms and normativity, as well as 
for his critique of the subject. Yet, Canguilhem is still not widely read as a theoretical 
precursor to Foucault and little has been said of this influence.29 However, focusing
29 See the letter cited by Didier Eribon, in which Foucault explicitly acknowledges his intellectual debt 
to Canguilhem in Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 
p.103.
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on the conceptions that Foucault borrows from Canguilhem provides new means of 
responding to some of the apparendy intractable questions posed to Foucault’s work.
Part of the task of developing new readings of a text is learning how to ask new 
questions of it. Following this precept, I have not made the by now established 
debates around Foucault or Butler’s work the main foci of discussion. Instead, I have 
attempted to highlight within their work the conceptualizations that have received 
less attention, as well as the unstable, ambiguous formulations that open up 
questions without leading directly to more traditionally defined philosophical 
problems and modes of analysis. Of Foucault’s earlier work for instance, I focus on 
the concept of biopolitics, and ask what relation is posited between power, life and 
death. O f the later ethics, I ask what relation is established between ethics and 
political community; in other words, who participates in an ethics of self-formation 
and under what conditions? With regard to Butler’s work, I attempt to show the ways 
in which her work can be read within the terms of biopolitics, that is, within the 
normative determination of life worth living and the correlative political status of 
death. I emphasize her analyzes of subject-formation, violence and normative 
exclusion, particularly through the concept of social death. While the challenge posed 
by Foucault and Butler’s work is that of wresting those texts from already established 
readings, Agamben’s work provides a different challenge. While all of the texts I 
analyze in this thesis are deeply ambiguous and unstable in their formulations, 
sometimes deliberately so, none are more so than Agamben’s. The challenge of 
Agamben’s work has been to produce readings that attend both to the rigorous 
philosophical conceptuality and to the elusive gestures that simultaneously structure 
and undo the texts. In the absence of an established body of interpretative literature 
to refer to, and without a flourishing philosophical conversation around Agamben’s 
work in Australia, on more than one occasion it seemed that these readings wandered 
too far from what had already been said. I can only hope that that errancy has been 
productive.
TV. Chapter Summary
Two broad questions structure this thesis: the first concerns the role of violence 
within a politics of life and the second considers what response is possible to that
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violence. Chapters 1, 3 and 5 are given over to consideration of the first of these, 
through interpretative analysis of the work of Foucault, Butler and Agamben 
respectively. In these chapters, I begin with a consideration of the account of 
biopolitical subjection developed by Foucault in his work dating from the mid-1970s, 
specifically Discipline and Punish through to the first volume of The History of Sexuality 
and related essays. I argue in this chapter that Foucault’s conception of biopolitical 
subjection is beset by two sets of problems, the first relating to his account of the 
emergence of a political rationality of life over and against the rationality of death 
that he argues characterized sovereign power, and the second relating to his account 
of bodily subjection. I then consider the responses to these problems given by Butler 
and Agamben to show the ways in which they extend upon Foucault’s work, but also 
to develop an immanent critique of particular formulations or gestures within their 
work. The second question is taken up in Chapters 2, 4 and 6. In these, I consider 
the ethico-political responses proposed by each theorist, given their particular 
accounts of biopolitical subjection. Hence, rather than referring back to a theoretical 
problem in Foucault’s work, these chapters refer primarily to the preceding analysis 
provided by the theorist in question, although they also build upon each other 
consecutively. Throughout these chapters, I argue that neither Foucault’s ethics of 
self-formation nor Butler’s politics of mis-recognition and resignification provide 
wholly satisfactory conceptions of ethico-political response to biopolitical violence. 
Instead, I suggest that the ethics of impossible witnessing developed by Agamben 
provide a provocative starting point for rethinking ethics when politics plays out 
through the determination of life worth living.
The chapters are organized as follows:
In Chapter 1, I discuss Foucault’s concept of biopolitics with regard to normalizing 
violence and the production of subjects by operations of power to argue that the 
determination of life worth living operates as the constitutive decision of biopolitics. 
I discuss Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, volume 1 and related texts, 
with particular reference to the theoretical influence of Georges Canguilhem. I argue 
that while Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics and normalizing violence helps broach 
the question of the political determination of life worth living, it is limited in two 
particular ways. The first of these relates to the analysis of power that Foucault
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develops while the second pertains to his conception of subjectivation. O f the first, I 
argue that Foucault’s account of the transformation of sovereign power to biopolitics 
over-emphasizes the break between these regimes of power, such that sovereignty 
can only appear as ideological within contemporary regimes of power. O f the second, 
I argue that Foucault’s account of subjectivation is overly reductive in its association 
of subject-formation with violent, normalizing impositions upon the body. As such, 
he does not provide the theoretical means for an elaboration of why it is that bodies 
obey the compulsions of power and further, risks remaining tied to the discourse of 
liberation that he sought to move away from.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the later volumes of the History of Sexuality project and related 
texts in which Foucault develops his conception of an ethics of the self. In particular,
I discuss the claim that the later ethics provide a model of ethical practice as a form 
of political response to the problems of biopolitical subjection. The political value of 
an ethics of the self is frequently taken to He in an aesthetic and ethical practice of the 
self that allows the subject to work upon itself to ‘become otherwise’, or to free itself 
from the subjectivating effects of individuahzing and normahzing power through a 
practice of desubjectivation. In considering this claim, I show that if an ethics of the 
self can be understood as an ethico-poHtical response to subjectivation, they are 
limited in important ways. In particular, I consider the ambiguous status of freedom 
within the ethics, wherein freedom appears as both the condition and effect of 
ethical self-formation. That is, one must already be a free subject in order to engage 
in the practice of desubjectivation. In following the impHcations of this complexity in 
the status of freedom, I argue that ultimately the ethics of the self appear as an ethical 
practice of the citizen. In addressing the question of whether such an ethics can 
nevertheless be extended beyond the limits of the pohty to broach questions of 
pohtical exclusion, I argue that since such practices do not entail any necessary 
concern for others over and above concern for self then they are limited in the ways 
in which they can be taken to address biopohtical subjection.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the second set of problems identified in Foucault’s work, that 
is, those relating to his conception of subjectivation. In particular, I discuss Judith 
Butler’s extension of Foucault’s thesis on the normative production of subjects by 
operations of power, particularly in reference to Bodies that Matter and The Psychic Life 
of Pomr. I argue that while Butler’s work contributes to an understanding of
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biopolitical subjection by providing a fuller conception of the political emergence of 
the body and the subject than Foucault, her account nevertheless contains important 
ambiguities. In tracing these, I show that Butler does not always sustain the 
irreducibility of materiality and signification that she requires to hold off the charge 
of linguistic reductionism. One of the consequences of this is that her account of 
social death contains important ambiguities that undercut her conception of the 
agency of the excluded. In particular, insofar as Butler occasionally elides the 
distinction that she requires between biological survival and social survival, her 
conception of social death slides into death per se, such that her account of the agency 
of the socially dead is put into question. The equivocation identified here is further 
reinforced through an examination of Butler’s figuration of agency and social death, 
which consistently portrays freedom as ultimately yielded in suicide.
In Chapter 4, I extend this discussion through analysis of Butler’s discussion of 
speech and violence in Excitable Speech and A.ntigone’s Claim. I discuss her work in 
relation to J.L Austin’s theory of speech acts and debates on hate speech and 
pornography, as well as her theoretical and political commitments to the project of 
radical democracy. The first section of this chapter discusses Butler’s portrayal of the 
relation between violence and signification to consider the limits and limitations of 
speech as the privileged domain of political engagement. In addition, I consider the 
account of resignification and political agency that Butler develops to show the ways 
in which her political commitments entail a fundamental tension between 
understanding contingency as opening political possibilities and positing contingency 
as the foundation of political agency. Finally, I close my discussion of Butler’s work 
with a final comment on the question of responsibility as it is posed in Exdtable 
Speech and extended in Antigone ’s Claim. In this, I argue that even allowing that Butler 
has not yet provided an account of responsibility, it remains unclear that the dynamic 
of mis-recognition that structures her account of subject-formation will yield such an 
account either. Turning away from the question of whether the subject can be held 
responsible for speech, I ask of Butler’s work, what responsibility does the subject 
bear for those whose speech is ostensibly unintelligible. This question reveals 
fundamental problems with Butler’s emphasis on intelligibility within subject- 
formation, which ultimately stymies her account of ethical address and responsibility.
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In Chapter 5, I return to the problems of sovereign and biopolitical power that I first 
identified in my initial discussion of Foucault’s work. To do this, I discuss the recent 
work of Giorgio Agamben, particularly his reformulation of the concept of 
biopolitics developed in Homo Sacer. In the first section of this chapter, I argue that 
Agamben’s theorization of the fundamental interdependency of sovereignty and 
biopolitics offers an important corrective to Foucault in two particular ways. First, it 
allows for consideration of material operations of sovereignty that are no longer 
constrained by the centralized state form but instead arise as dispersed sovereign 
decisions on life worth living. Secondly, Agamben’s notion of bare life as natural life 
politicized through exposure to sovereign violence offers a means of thinking the 
relation of the biological and political that avoids the reductive moments in both 
Foucault and Butler, where the body is posited as either radically resistant or reduced 
to signification. In the second section of the chapter, I take up an extensive analysis 
of the gesture that Agamben makes to the notion of ‘happy life’ as the means of 
redemption from the biopolitical capture of bare life. I argue that this gesture 
emerges from Agamben’s commitment to a strong messianic position deduced from 
his theoretical debt to Walter Benjamin, and introduces several problems into 
Agamben’s political theory. In particular, the messianics of happy life forecloses a 
consideration of potentiality within bare life itself such that political transformation 
must derive from a transcendental source of redemption. Further, through this 
gesture, Agamben is committed to the necessity of a total solution to the perceived 
dangers of biopolitics. To make these claims, I discuss Agamben’s text in reference 
to Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin, as well as Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of 
Benjaminian messianics.
In Chapter 6, I discuss the ethics of witnessing that Agamben develops in reference 
to Primo Levi in Remnants of Auschmt^. I show that this text entails a move away from 
the strong messianic position of the earlier text in order to develop a conception of 
ethical response to biopolitical subjection through witnessing. I conclude that this 
allows for the development of a theorization of ethico-political response to the 
violence to which subjects are exposed in their constitution as bare life. In the final 
section of this chapter then, I turn to a consideration of rights to concretize the 
criticisms made against Agamben and to show the way in which an ethics of 
witnessing neither determines nor forecloses the formulation of rights-based political 
solutions to biopolitical subjection. In this, I develop a brief reading of Foucault’s
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docum ent ‘Confronting Governments: H um an Rights’ to m oderate the strong 
rejection o f rights that Agamben advocates and conclude that an ethics o f witnessing 
emerges in the schism of citizens and people that marks the boundary o f political 
community.
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Chapter 1
The Politicization of Life:
Foucault on Sovereignty, Biopower and Subjectivity
We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as the constitution of 
subjects. 1
1.1 Introduction
In formulating the concept o f biopower in the first volume o f the History of Sexuality 
project, Michel Foucault brought together questions o f political rationality and 
biological life in a highly provocative intervention. Foucault argues in this volume 
that in the eighteenth century the operative rationality o f power in the W est 
underw ent a radical reversal, such that power no longer focused on death, but 
instead operated through fostering the life o f  populations and individuals. In 
developing an analysis o f biopolitics, Foucault rejects an understanding o f power 
based on the model o f sovereignty and instead proposes an analytics o f power that 
focuses on the productive elements o f pow er’s operation. Further, he argues that a 
conception o f power should be based not on the hierarchy o f the prince, but rather 
on the tactics and strategies o f war. Reversing Clausewitz in order to criticize the 
social contract account o f political constitution, Foucault argues that politics is war 
carried out in the realm o f  civic peace. O ne o f the implications o f this theoretical 
reversal is the suggestion that violence is no t so m uch staved o ff or eliminated 
through the installation o f order, but is in fact central to its operation. However, 
within a biopolitical regime, the violence o f political order is no longer the violence 
o f the sword characterisdc o f sovereign power, bu t rather, that o f normalization.
Consequently, Foucault’s account o f biopower rests on a conception o f  the political 
that places subjectivation at the core o f political questioning. In his work addressed 
to the operations o f biopower, Foucault is constantly attentive to the m om ent in
1 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, ed. 
Colin Gordon, tr. Colin Gordon and others (Pantheon Press: New York, 1980) pp.109-133 at p.97.
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which power applies to and remolds the forces of the body to its own ends. Thus, he 
provides an analydcs of power that addresses the ‘most material’ aspects of power 
relations. Furthermore, in reformulating power as productive rather than prohibitive, 
Foucault claims that the individual is itself an effect and vehicle of power, not simply 
its point of application. In understanding individuality as an artefact of 
normalization, Foucault opens space for a consideration of the ways in which 
subjectivity is crucial to the biopolitical determination of life worth living. 
Nevertheless, Foucault’s account of subject-formation in biopolitics is ultimately 
limited in that he construes subjection as a one-sided imposition and constraint on 
the body and offers no substantial account of the positive political implications and 
consequences of subjectivation. Further, while Foucault does allow the theoretical 
space for an elaboration of the resistant capacities of the body, the account of 
subjection that he relies upon in this work means that he ultimately does not account 
for why it is that normalizing operations of power are effective, that is, why bodies 
obey.
In this chapter, I discuss Foucault’s account of the transformation of political 
rationality from sovereignty to biopower and the account of life and the body that he 
provides in work published during the early to mid 1970s, to the publication of the 
first volume of History of Sexuality. In particular, I focus on his characterization of 
violence within political order and the implications that this has for a consideration 
of life and death within biopolitics. The analysis I develop in this chapter traces a 
logic in Foucault’s work that problematizes recent discussions of biopolitics that 
focus only on ‘fostering life’ and seeks instead to consider what it means for 
technologies of power to ‘disallow life’ to the point of death. I argue that while 
Foucault’s account of the emergence of a biopolitical rationality is instructive for 
considering the operations of power and the political capture of life, it is limited by 
important theoretical foreclosures that diminish the extent to which it illuminates the 
biopolitical determination of life worth living. In particular, I identify two sets of 
ambiguities and problems in the account of biopolitics that Foucault gives. The first 
of these relates to the problem of sovereignty and particularly his refusal to engage in 
a theorization and analysis of sovereign operations of power. The second relates to 
his reductive formulation of subjection as an imposition on the body and refusal to 
elaborate a more substantial theorization of subjectivation and the attachments of the 
body to mechanisms of power.
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1.2 From Prohibitive to Productive Power: Sovereignty and Biopower
In the introduction to the planned volumes of the History of Sexuality project, 
Foucault proposes to undertake a genealogy of ‘the deployment of sexuality’ as a 
central axis in the operation of a regime of power he names ‘biopower’.2 He argues in 
this introductory text that sexuality is not a ‘natural given’ held in check by a power 
that operates through interdiction and rule, nor the secret and obscure domain of our 
selves that knowledge gradually discovers. Rather, ‘sexuality’ is the name of a 
‘historical construct... a great surface network’3 that links the body and its pleasures 
to the operation of power and knowledge, in continual circuits of incitement, 
intensification, regulation and discursive elaboration. As an historical construct, 
sexuality is deployed not simply as a means of prohibition and control, but as a 
means of harnessing the forces of the body, both of the individual and the 
population. Thus he claims that sexuality, understood as a discursive arrangement, 
provided the ‘pivot... along which developed the entire political technology of life’ 
since it was a ‘means of access to both the life of the body and the life of the 
species’.4
In elaborating the role of sexuality in the new regime of power, Foucault argues that 
biopower evolved in two basic forms, which constitute two poles of development 
that are intimately connected though a cluster of intermediary relations.5 Foucault 
refers to the first of these as the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’. This form of 
power focused on the human body as a machine, seeking to optimize its capabilities, 
appropriate its forces and insert it into systems of economic, political and military 
efficiency through the simultaneous increase of both its usefulness and docility. This 
mode of operation is characteristic of the disciplinary technologies traced in Discipline 
and Punish. The second pole, formed somewhat later, focused on the ‘species body’ 
and the mechanics of life that inhered in it, such as the reproduction of populations, 
mortality, health, life expectancy and the conditions that impinge on these and cause 
them to vary. It is essentially a form of power that turns around the management of
2 Michel Foucault, The History o f Sexually, vol.1: A .n  Introduction, [1976] tr. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1981), pp.105-114, 145.
3 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.105.
4 Foucault, History o f Sexuality /, pp. 146-147.
5 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.139.
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populations through the collection o f information, calculated interventions and 
regulatory controls: a ‘bio-politics o f populations’. Foucault claims that in the 
nineteenth century, these techniques conjoined at the level o f concrete arrangements 
to produce a regime o f power that was simultaneously individualizing and totalizing 
in its attempts to administer and harness the forces that inhere in the body o f the 
population and the individual.6
He goes on to argue that the entrance o f life into the mechanisms o f  power and 
correlative organization o f political strategies around the survival o f the species 
constitutes the ‘threshold o f m odernity’. Foucault claims that the eighteenth century 
witnessed an event nothing short o f the engagement o f life in history, that is, ‘the 
entry o f phenom ena peculiar to the life o f the hum an species into the order o f 
knowledge and power, into the spheres o f  political techniques’,7 an event which was 
inextricably caught up with the historical emergence and developm ent o f capitalism. 
To be clear, Foucault is not claiming that life and history had hitherto been 
completely separate and distinct in their spheres o f operation — which would be a 
strange claim given the biological pressure exerted on history through famines and 
epidemics for example. Rather, the eighteenth century saw the emergence o f 
knowledges that permitted a relative control over the immanence o f death and the 
correlative inauguration o f what could be called a politics o f biological existence. He 
argues that:
For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in 
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that 
only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its fatality; 
part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of 
intervention.8
6 It is worth noting that Foucault saw the deployment of sexuality not as an apparatus of control 
imposed on the working class by the bourgeoisie but as a ‘self-affirmation’ on the part of the 
bourgeoisie. Sexuality, addressed through the composite system of ‘perversion-heredity- 
degenerescence’ (Foucault, History of Sexuality /, p.l 18) was the means by which the bourgeoisie sought 
to protect and strengthen itself, and only later came to be applied as a means of ‘social control and 
political subjugation’ (Foucault, History of Sexuality /, p.123). For Foucault, this is an important 
empirical point in countering a view of power as repressive.
7 Foucault, History of Sexuality /, pp.141-2.
8 Foucault, History of Sexuality /, p.142.
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Hence, the administration of life has become the central characteristic and defining 
rationale of the regime of power operative in the modem world. For Foucault, this 
means that the Aristotelian conception of man as a ‘living animal with the additional 
capacity for a political existence’ gives way to the suggestion that ‘modern man is an 
animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question’ .9
Additionally, Foucault argues that this indicates that the regime of power that 
emerged from the seventeenth century onward involved a fundamental reversal of 
the principle of power’s operation. 10 Whereas sovereign power operated on the 
principle of the right to commit its subjects to death in order to enhance the strength 
of the sovereign, modern power reverses this axis and works through the 
multiplication and intensification of the focus on life. Insofar as life is the target of 
power, the rationale of power is no longer to ‘take life or let live’ but rather, to ‘foster 
life or disallow it to the point of death’ . * 11 The state, Foucault suggests, no longer lulls 
immediately and directly in an extractive fashion, but fosters life — produces and 
enhances it — or disallows its continuation, which is different still from simply letting 
die. In the rationale of the sovereign, the state acts directly on the body to take the 
life that inheres in it, or alternatively, removes itself from the scene, allowing subjects 
to live their lives without interference. Under a biopolitical rationality though, the 
state is always present, enhancing the life of the population in order to strengthen 
itself and ‘disallowing life’: the state does not simply withdraw from life, but actively 
works toward its extinction in such a way that it does not necessarily kill directly. 12 
Such a disallowing of life occurs at the level of ‘the species, the race and the large- 
scale phenomena of population’, but also at the level of the individual; indeed, it is
9 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.143.
10 Foucault, History of Sexuality 7, p.136.
11 Foucault, History of Sexuality 7, p.138.
12 On a world scale, an example of such a strategy would be the imposition of economic sanctions that 
do not seek to kill the population of another state directly but which nevertheless have the effect of 
disallowing life, whether intentionally or not. Interestingly, in his discussion of the sanctions imposed 
on Iraq by the United States of America, (‘Sanctions, Ignorance and Morality’, presented at the Centre 
for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics Seminar, Australian National University (October 24, 
2001)), Ramon Das suggests the category of ‘not letting live’ is a morally significant category apart 
from the more traditional distinction between ‘killing and letting die’ in moral philosophy. He argues 
that such a category is necessary to describe courses of action taken that, while not intentionally 
directed at killing, nevertheless make the continuation of life impossible. While he makes no 
connection between the necessity of this moral category and political rationality, we might suggest 
here that it has become necessary as a consequence of the emergence of biopolitical regimes of power.
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often the case that the body o f the individual is approached through the 
governm ental field o f the population. Foucault claims, then, that death reveals not 
the power o f the sovereign as it did in the spectacle o f public executions, but rather 
the limit o f power; death evades and underm ines the regime o f power that has 
assigned itself the interminable task o f administering life. I will return to this 
characterization o f death and the strong opposition between a power o f life and 
power o f death that Foucault suggests shortly. First, though, it is im portant to get a 
fuller account o f Foucault’s conception o f power.
The reversal o f Aristotle that Foucault offers involves both  a transform ation in 
political rationality and a correlative transform ation in the relation o f biological life 
and political life. Whereas the Aristotelian schema excludes biological life from the 
field o f the political, Foucault’s formulation posits biological life as the target o f the 
political, such that it becomes increasingly difficult to m aintain a distinction between 
biological and political life. In the regime o f biopower, the biological is co-extensive 
with the political. The importance o f this is that if biological existence is reflected in 
political existence then questions concerning the good life appear to be inextricably 
entwined with the determination o f who lives and who dies. In other words, the 
determination o f life w orth living is central to the processes by which power ‘fosters 
life or disallows if. However, as I show, for Foucault this determination does not 
take tire form o f a sovereign decision but is rather effected through die ‘anonym ous’ 
operations o f exclusion, confinem ent and the constitution o f  the ‘abnorm al’. In the 
conception o f power that he developed during the early 1970s, Foucault casts the 
violent operation o f political exclusion as an effect o f order itself, thereby providing a 
means o f thinking through the political determ ination o f life w orth living that 
exceeds liberal questions o f the legitimacy and limits o f the state.
Drawing on a Nietzschean account o f force relations, Foucault develops a 
conception o f power that takes the tactical confrontations o f  warfare rather than the 
determinations o f the sovereign as its m odel.13 The conception o f the state and
13 One could question the efficacy of this shift with reference toJean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion that war 
is the technique par excellence of the sovereign, such that the demand for war ‘carries the sovereign 
exception within itself and also exposes it’. Nancy’s deconstructive strategy’ is illuminating for the way 
in which it considers the operations of sovereignty, war and the techne of power to operate in 
conjunction. Before taking up this discussion further though, it is first necessary to trace the specific
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political order that Foucault develops is cast in direct opposition to Thom as H obbes’ 
theory o f the state, in which the sovereign acts as the creator and defender o f peace 
and security rather than as a threat and source o f danger. H obbes imagined the 
constitution o f the state on the figure o f Leviathan, an ‘artificial m an’ constituted 
through and on the basis o f the body o f the citizen. Leviathan is created through 
man giving up his natural freedom for a greater security, a security guaranteed by the 
state henceforth imposed on the citizenry. Against Hobbes, Foucault argues that a 
concrete analysis o f power m ust reject the m odel o f sovereignty and begin from a 
conception o f power based on the model o f warfare, where the operations o f power 
are analyzed in terms o f tactics, strategies and adversarial confrontation. In ‘Society 
M ust be D efended ’, 14 Foucault sets aside the ‘false paternity’ that attributes such a 
conception o f power to Hobbes, — for Hobbes ‘it was nonwar that founds the state 
and gives it its form ’15— and argues that the m odel o f warfare has two im portant 
implications for an analytics o f power.
First, according to Foucault, such a m odel o f power undercuts claims to occupy the 
position o f the universal subject, since any position taken will place the speaking 
subject on one side or another within a general strategy o f confrontation and struggle 
for victory. Correlatively, claims to right and truth are perspectival and strategic. In 
other words, if theories o f sovereignty presuppose an individual endowed with rights 
as the basis o f  the state, then the model o f war dismantles this presupposition and 
places the claims made by rights-bearing individuals within a general strategy o f 
struggle .16 Second, Foucault argues that a m odel o f warfare generates an analytics o f
relation that Foucault posits, as this is not as clear as his initial distinction suggests. See Jean-Luc 
Nancy, *War, Right, Sovereignty — Techne’ in Being Singular Plural, tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne 
E. O Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.101-141.
14 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must be Defended’ [1975-6] in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works 
of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Press, 1997), p.59-65; also see Michel 
Foucault, II faut defendre la societe: cours au College de France, 1975-1976 (Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997); 
John Rajchman, The Deleave Connections (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2000), pp.105-107.
For a further discussion of the Course lectures with particular reference to warfare and the problems 
of race and constitution see Stuart Eiden, ‘The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: 
Foucault’s IIfaut defendre la societe and the Politics of Calculation’, boundary 2, 29:1(2002), pp.125-151.
15 Foucault, ‘Society Must be Defended’, p.63.
16 I have emphasized the conditional here in reference to Pasquale Pasquino’s critique of Foucault on 
this point, where he claims that Foucault is mistaken in the view that Hobbes understood the 
sovereignty of the state to be based on individual rights. Pasquino suggests instead that Hobbes was 
more concerned with establishing a minimum right for individuals, that is, the right to live. See
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power ‘from below’ that does not seek to rediscover a radonality necessarily linked to 
‘the just and the good’ beneath the ‘visible brutality o f bodies and passions, but 
instead, finds ‘beneath the form o f institutions or laws, the forgotten past o f real 
struggles, o f masked victories or defeats, the dried blood in the codes’.17 Foucault’s 
work during the 1970s thus seeks to elaborate on these two implications, leading to 
the developm ent o f a critique o f the sovereign subject and an understanding o f 
power in terms o f tactics and strategies, where war is ‘the cipher o f peace’. I will 
return to the first o f  these later, but first, it is necessary to examine the model o f 
power as warfare further.
While Foucault often claimed during the 1970s that he was presenting an ‘analytics o f 
power’ rather than a theory o f  power, it is nevertheless true that these analytic tools 
are informed by a more general model o f power as warfare. Foucault comes closest 
to developing a theory o f power in the History of Sexuality and related texts, where he 
asserts that politics is war pursued through other means. In the first o f  the ‘Two 
Lectures’ presented in 1976, Foucault claims o f his work to date that it has employed 
a schema o f ‘struggle-repression’ for understanding relations o f  power, a schema that 
finds its purchase in a model o f power as war. In countering what he takes as the 
orthodox association o f power with economic relations, alienation and interdiction, 
Foucault suggests that power should be understood as a relation o f force, and thus, it 
should be analyzed in terms o f ‘struggle, conflict and war’.18 The suggestion that 
politics is war pursued by other means implies that politics be understood as 
‘sanctioning and upholding the disequilibrium o f  forces... displayed in war’, that all 
the alterations o f relations o f force be understood as a continuation o f war within the 
civil and political sphere. This model, which ‘for convenience’ he attributes to 
Nietzsche, understands the power relationship as ‘the hostile engagement o f forces’19 
in which repression is the ‘realization... o f  a perpetual relationship o f force’.20
Pasquale Pasquino, ‘Political Theory of War and Peace: Foucault and the History of Modern Political 
Theory’, Economy and Society 22:1(1993), pp.77-88 at 83.
17 Foucault, ‘Society Must be Defended’, p.62.
18 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, p.90.
19 Foucault, Two Lectures’, p.91.
20 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, p.92. For a further discussion of the conceptions of politics and power 
developed by Nietzsche and Hobbes see Paul Patton, ‘Politics and the Concept of Power in Hobbes
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Foucault elaborates on this model of power in the first volume of the Histoiy oj 
Sexuality.21 He argues that power is not a matter of individual resources or strengths, 
but is rather a name that designates the concatenated effect of a ‘moving substrate of 
force relations’. He states that:
Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute 
their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and 
confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which 
these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or 
on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from 
one another; and lastly as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general 
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.22
It is through the qualitative and quantitative differences or inequalities between 
forces that the ‘complex strategical situation’ that we typically call ‘power’ arises, as 
the stabilization and historical sedimentation of the effect of force on force. In 
outlining this model further, Foucault provides a number of general propositions 
about the nature, form and unity of power. Power is not possessed but exercised in 
‘nonegalitarian and mobile relations’; power relations are ‘internal conditions’ of 
other forms of relationships, operating in a productive rather than prohibitive way; 
power comes from below in the sense that relations of force provide the basis for 
social cleavages and hegemonic consolidations in the form of domination; power 
relations are both ‘intentional and non-subjective’, meaning that in its ‘local 
cynicism’, power is always exercised with tactical aims and objectives, but the strategy 
that co-ordinates them has no immediately visible origin or point of articulation.
and Nietzsche’, in Paul Patton, ed. Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1993), pp.144-16.
21 True, Foucault may have been reconsidering this conception of power around the same time as the 
publication of History of Sexuality 1, however ,pace Barry Hindess’ suggestion that Foucault’s conception 
of power underwent a transformation after Discipline and Punish and before History of Sexuality 1, the 
model of power as warfare informs the conception of power used in both these volumes. Foucault 
himself characterized the relation between these volumes as the development of this model of power 
in the former and application of it in the latter (Michel Foucault, ‘Power Affects the Body’, Foucault 
Live, ed. S. Lotringer (New York: Semiotexte, 1996) p.207). The shift in Foucault’s conception of 
power comes after the first volume of History of Sexuality and I discuss it in detail in the following 
chapter. See Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power. From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p.98- 
99; also see Pasquino, ‘Political Theory of War and Peace’, esp. his comments on p.79 to which 
Hindess refers.
22 Foucault, History of Sexuality /, pp.93-4.
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Power, which for Foucault is always shorthand for ‘power relations’, is engendered 
on the basis o f a substrate o f perm anendy unequal and shifting force relations and is 
thus omnipresent, perm anent and infinitely repeated and re-inscribed in local tactics. 
Power is the overall effect o f arrested force relations; it is the consolidated effect o f 
concatenated tactics and strategies o f war carried out in the arena o f ‘civic peace’. 
Thus, power is ‘the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society’.23 This insistence on a certain nominalism regarding power 
highlights that the substrate o f force relations can only ever be named 
catachrestically, through its dissimulated effects in the social field .24 Force is not 
understood simply as violence or strength, but as a pure relationality, intelligible only 
in its effects. The name power attempts to capture the effects o f force relations, but 
it is perhaps the wrong name, a partial name or a w ord in misuse. The im portance o f 
Foucault’s catachrestic use o f the term  power should not be underestim ated; it 
indicates that power in a substantive sense does not exist. There is no power as 
object that can be sought after, held, or transferred from one party to another in a 
relation o f exchange. Power does not have interests and intentions o f its own, but 
instead, inappropriately names the consolidated set o f  relations that arise from the 
exercise o f force on force — where this indicates differences in strength, capacity, 
opportunity and so on between parties in a relationship — in the pursuit o f local 
interests and intentions.
Furtherm ore, this view o f power catachrestically naming the effect o f force relations 
ensures that Foucault’s insistence on genealogical analysis is m ore than coincidental 
or pragmatic. As Gilles Deleuze suggests in his discussion o f N ietzsche’s doctrine o f 
the ‘will to power’, genealogy derives from the inequalities o f forces, or their 
qualitative and quantitative differences, and is primarily a practice o f tracing the 
effects o f force on force .25 Foucault’s description o f  genealogy as an ‘effective 
history’, concerned not with lofty origins but rather with the dual concepts o f 
descent and emergence, bears out this relation between force and genealogy and
23 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.93.
24 Pheng Cheah, ‘Mattering’, Diacritics, 26.1(1996), p.126. Also see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside 
in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.37.
25 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.52-54; Gilles 
Deleuze, ‘Active and Reactive’ in D.B. Allison, ed. The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation 
(MIT Press: Cambridge, 1985), pp.80-106.
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points to his concern with the material operations of power. Thus Foucault claims 
that ‘the body and everything that touches it — diet, climate, and soil — is the domain 
of the Herkunft [descent] ’ .26 Within this, the body is understood as a system of forces 
actualized and arranged in corporeality. Simultaneously,
emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis 
of the Enstehung must delineate this interaction, the struggle these forces wage 
against each other or against adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid 
degeneration and regain strength by dividing these forces against themselves.27
With this in mind, and recalling Foucault’s methodological precaution that power 
should be analyzed from the ‘bottom up’, starting from its ‘infinitesimal 
mechanisms’28 and techniques and drawing out their specific histories and modes of 
operation, Foucault’s analysis of power evinces a deliberate emphasis on the material 
operations of power as local codifications of force relations or ‘micro-powers’.29
This means that an analytics of power cannot assume a necessary overarching unity 
in the techniques of power such that one can identify a singular goal of domination. 
Rather, ‘although there is continuity... there is neither analogy or homology, but a 
specificity of mechanism and modality’.30 Furthermore, amongst the complex of 
‘micro-powers’, there are ‘innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, 
each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary 
inversion of power relations’ .31 Consequently, a specificity of analysis that traces the 
effects of force on force, that is, the operation of a multiplicity of material techniques 
and mechanisms that act on the body is required. Additionally, this local analysis aims 
to draw out the points of instability, change and potentiality within a ‘micro-physics 
of power’ focused on the production of docile bodies and its correlate of the
26 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp.139-164 at 148.
27 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p.148-149.
28 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, p.99.
29 See Cheah, ‘Mattering’, p.126 and Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Sean Hand (London: Athlone Press 
1988).
30 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 
1977), p.27.
31 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.27.
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‘modern soul’. The importance of this conception of power in Foucault’s work is 
that it drew him from the earlier focus on rules of discourse-formation and allowed 
for a sustained analysis of social practices and institutions as the ‘meticulous rituals of 
power’. It also provided the means for an analysis aimed at ‘deciphering a layer of 
reality in such a way that the lines of force and the lines of fragility come forth.. .[and 
identifying] the points of resistance and the possible points of attack’. 32
In this sense, Discipline and Punish is exemplary of the practice of genealogy, since it 
traces the operations of force on force in the historical emergence of the prison and 
the production of docile bodies. What Foucault describes is not the ideational 
development of notions of incarceration, but the historical constitution and 
emergence of material technologies geared toward the production of bodies that give 
over their own force toward the regime of power that governs them. In outlining the 
methodological and analytic suppositions that guide Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
argues that the prison technologies which he is analyzing operate through a ‘micro­
physics of power’ that takes as it object the constitution and control of the forces of 
the body; as he states ‘it is always the body that is at issue — the body and its forces, 
their utility and docility, their distribution and submission’.33 This is of course not the 
first time the constitution of the body has been the object of historical analysis, but 
Foucault wishes to give to it a decidedly political tone through analyzing the 
investments of the body within the political field through consideration of the 
material effects of technologies of power. Further, he claims that the political 
technology of the prison is inextricably caught up with the economic imperative of 
productivity. The investment of the body with disciplinary relations of power is 
directed toward the production of a subjected population suitable for economic 
exploitation and the development of a biopolitical regime of power was crucial to the 
emergence and successful installation of capitalistic economic relations.34 Thus, 
Foucault seeks to explicate a ‘political economy of the body’ through analysis of the 
investments of the body in the operation of power relations.35
32 Michel Foucault, ‘Clarifications on the Question of Power’ in Foucault Lave, ed. Sylvere Lotringer 
(New York: Semiotexte, 1986), p.261.
33 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.25.
34 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p. 141.
35 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.25
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The reformulation o f power that Foucault thus provides has generated a num ber o f 
analyses o f the ways in which technologies o f power operate to foster the life o f the 
population and the individual. These projects have focused on the importance o f 
health within governmental strategies, and m ore recently, on micro-molecular 
governm ent and the concern with genomic ‘health ’.36 For instance, Nikolas Rose has 
recently argued that two state-sponsored biopolitical strategies took shape in the 
nation-states o f Europe and N orth  America, as well as many o f their colonies, in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries .37 The first o f  these sought to maximize the 
fitness o f a population by conjoining individualized attention to the habits o f subjects 
with earlier programs such as town planning, sewerage systems and so on that sought 
to guarantee external conditions o f health . 38 The second sought to maximize the 
fitness o f the population through the privileged site o f reproduction and particularly 
eugenics. The result o f these two strategies is an ‘etho-politics’ that operates through 
tying the lifestyle concerns o f individuals with biological health, a notion not 
dissimilar to Paul Rabinow’s notion o f  ‘biosociality’, such that ‘biopolitics now 
addresses hum an existence at the molecular level: it is waged about molecules, 
amongst molecules, and where the molecules themselves are at stake’.39 Rose 
concludes his discussion o f biomedical technologies with the suggestion that these 
confront us with ‘the inescapable task o f  deliberating about the w orth o f different 
hum an lives’ .40 While this conclusion is correct, it is shortsighted to limit the decision 
on ‘lives w orth living’ to this domain, since the normative adjudication and 
determination o f lives w orth living permeates legal, social and political structures well 
beyond biomedical technology. For the rem ainder o f  this section, I clarify the ways in 
which Foucault’s account o f biopolitics contributes to considering the ways in which
36 Also see Paul Rabinow, French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999); Paul Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociology’ in Essays 
on the Anthropology of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Melinda Cooper, ‘Transgenic 
Life: Controlling Mutation’, Theory and Event, 5:3 (2001).
37 Nikolas Rose, ‘Politics of Life Itself, Theory, Culture and Society, 18:6(2001), pp. 1-30.
38 See Thomas Osborne, ‘Security and Vitality: Drains, Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth 
Century’ in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, eds. Foucault and Political Reason: 
Uberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
pp.99-122; Alan Hunt, ‘Governing the City: Liberalism and Early Modern Modes of Governance’ in 
Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, eds. Foucault and Political Reason: liberalism, Neo­
liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp.167-188.
39 Rose, ‘Politics of Life Itself, p.17; also see Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment’, p.102.
4(1 Rose, ‘Politics of Life Itself, p.22; Incidentally, this point has also been made in normative bioethics 
in, for instance, Peter Singer, Rethinking life and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics, (Melbourne: 
Text Publishing, 1994).
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biopolitics fades into and finds support in a ‘thanato-politics’ that disallows certain 
lives. I also identify several limitations in Foucault’s account of biopolitics for such 
considerations.
Several points can be made about Foucault’s conception of biopower. First, as I 
mentioned previously, Foucault’s reformulation of power in the 1970s was intended 
to replace an understanding of power based on the model of sovereignty and right. 
As he famously suggested at one point, political theory had not yet ‘cut off the kings 
head’41 and was therefore unable to illuminate contemporary operations of power. By 
not presupposing a model of sovereignty, Foucault was able to avoid questions of 
legitimacy and justification of the state and instead investigate the peripheral 
operative technologies of power. Importantly though, this is not the same as saying 
that biopolitics itself replaces sovereignty as a technology of power. The point is that 
an analysis of power cannot simply presuppose the model of sovereignty as its 
starting point, though it may be that one of the technical forms that power takes in 
its operation is that of sovereignty. The difference is that the former is a 
methodological claim and the latter an ontological claim. While the former sets out a 
means of proceeding in an analysis of power, the latter indicates what such an 
analysis may find, which is why the presupposition of sovereignty is an exercise in 
question begging.
Yet, making this distinction between an analysis of power and the concrete 
arrangements that power takes brings out an important ambiguity in Foucault’s own 
conception of the historical relation between sovereignty and biopolitics. While 
Foucault consistently opposed an understanding of power as sovereign right and law, 
it remains unclear precisely what historical and theoretical status he wants to give to 
sovereignty. On the one hand, the characterization of a transformation of techniques 
of power from the deductive mechanisms of sovereignty to the productive 
mechanisms of biopower suggests a radical transformation of power such that 
sovereignty disappears. Thus, Foucault suggests that sovereignty is diametrically 
opposed to the mechanisms of biopower; within a sovereign regime, power was 
‘essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it
41 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.89.
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culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it’ .42 Biopower is 
a power that ‘exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, 
optimize, and muldply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive 
regulations’ .43 Further, Foucault at the very least implies that the era of sovereignty 
has passed away when he claims that ‘wars are no longer waged in the name of a 
sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of 
everyone’ or again, ‘the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of 
sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population’ .44 This point is even 
clearer in the claim that ‘one might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was 
replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ .45
On the other hand, Foucault does offer some qualification to the characterization of 
sovereignty as no longer operative in the claim that “deduction’ has tended to be no 
longer the major form of power but merely one element among others’.46 Again, ‘this 
formidable power of death now presents itself as a counterpart of a power that exerts a 
positive influence on life’.47 Flowever, even with these caveats, it remains unclear 
what the actual status of sovereignty is, for what does it mean that the ancient power 
of death ‘presents itself as a counterpart’ to a power of life? Foucault addresses this 
problem much more explicitly in his article ‘On Governmentality’, published shortly 
after The History of Sexuality. Here he claims that ‘we must consequently see things not 
in terms of the substitution for a society of sovereignty of a disciplinary society and 
the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a governmental one; in reality 
we have a triangle: sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target 
the population and as its essential mechanism apparatuses of security’ .48 Yet, even 
here there is little explication of the precise status that sovereignty might have 
following the ‘governmentalization’ of the state.
42 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.136.
43 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.137.
44 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.137.
45 Foucault, History o f Sexuality /, p.138.
46 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.136; emphasis added.
47 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.137; emphasis added.
48 Michel Foucault, ‘On Governmentality’, I & C  6(1979), p.19; republished as Michel Foucault, 
‘Governmentality’, in Power Essential W orks o f Foucault, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: New 
Press, 2000), pp.201-222.
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However, in ‘Two Lectures’ Foucault discusses the relation o f sovereignty and 
discipline m ore explicidy, claiming that sovereignty persists as an ideology. He states 
that a ‘system o f right [comes] to be superim posed upon the mechanisms o f 
discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element o f 
dom ination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue o f the 
sovereignty o f the state, the exercise o f his proper sovereign rights’.49 Thus, it appears 
that while sovereignty does not have the status o f an operative technology o f power, 
it nevertheless functions as a discursive residue that covers over or masks the real 
operations o f a power focused on life. In other words, discourses o f sovereignty 
operate ideologically to cover over and thereby perm it the effective operation o f 
technologies o f discipline. The ideological status that Foucault gives to sovereignty 
means that it is too simplistic to say either that biopolitics succeed the apparatus o f 
sovereignty in a historical ‘revolution’ in regimes o f power, or that sovereignty and 
biopolitics co-exist as operative apparatuses o f  power. Rather, sovereignty and 
disciplinary techniques constitute two irreducibly heterogeneous elements in the 
operation o f biopower, the former as the ideological supplem ent that aids and abets 
the material operation o f the latter.
Consequently, the position o f sovereignty as ideological complicates Foucault’s 
apparent opposition between a productive, administrative power focused on life and 
a prohibitive, extractive power focused on death. In the transform ation o f the 
rationality o f power from sovereignty to biopower, Foucault suggests that the 
respective positions o f life and death in relation to pow er also change. He argues that 
in sovereignty, death reveals the power o f the sovereign: if the formula m ost 
appropriate to sovereignty was that o f the ‘power o f life and death’, the sovereign’s 
power over life was evinced ‘only through the death he was capable o f  requiring ’.50 In 
biopower however, death does not reveal the pow er o f the sovereign but is the limit 
o f power; death evades and undermines the regime o f pow er that has assigned itself 
the interminable task o f administering life. This is precisely why, he suggests, death 
becomes the ‘m ost secret aspect o f existence, the m ost “private” ’.51
49 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, p.105.
50 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.136.
51 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.138.
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However, if sovereignty as the power of death operates ideologically in an era of 
biopower, then it would seem to follow that death is not so much the limit of a 
power of life, but rather an internal element in its operation. It is precisely by 
recalling the risk of death, its immanence in life, that biopower operates.52 It is the 
ever-present threat of death that justifies and rationalizes governmental intervention 
in the name of the life of populations and individuals. Therefore, radier than 
attempting to eliminate or privatize death, biopower presupposes it for its operation; 
death is not the limit of biopower but its precondition. Against Foucault, we might 
say that it is not so much that ‘a relative control over life averted some of the 
immanent risks of death’,53 but diat an increasing control over death averts the 
immanent risks of life and permits its administration. This does not mean that 
biopower does not focus on life, but simply that, at times, the focus on life may be 
achieved through the control and ‘ideological’ or discursive deployment of death. In 
this, Durkheim’s study of suicide, which Foucault cites as evidence that death 
constitutes the limit of power, can be understood instead as an indication of the fact 
that within biopolitics ‘death becomes a social institution.’54
Indeed, Foucault’s comments regarding the status of death within the operation of 
biopower could be understood as a transposition of the repressive hypothesis from 
sexuality to death. In suggesting that ‘death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes 
it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence, the most “private” ’,55 Foucault 
echoes the theoretical fallacy that he accuses his opponents of with regard to 
sexuality. To posit death as the new limit of power, as that which escapes and 
undermines power’s exercise over the unfolding of life, merely repeats vis-a-vis death 
the theoretical fallacy that sexuality opposes power in its privacy and secret force. 
Additionally, it could be said that in speaking of death against its supposed denial
52 This point is similar to the argument made by Brian Massumi, ‘Everywhere You Want to be: 
Introduction to Fear’ in Brian Massumi, ed. Tie Politics of Everyday Tear (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), p.vii-x. Massumi argues that fear — of accidents, risks, o f ‘falling’ -  operates as 
a discursive and phenomenal support to capital and more or less explicitly links that with the 
immanent fatality of contemporary life. Also see Beverly Clack, Sex and Death: A  Reappraisal of Human 
Mortality (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), particularly her claim that ‘death has been removed from its 
rightful place in the midst of life and is viewed increasingly as an abberation to be avoided’ (p.l 31).
53 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.142.
54 Herbert Marcuse, ‘The Ideology of Death’ in Herman Feifel ed. The Meaning of Death (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1959), p.73.
55 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.l 38.
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within biopolitics, Foucault also seeks a certain ‘speakers benefit’ in which ‘the mere 
fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression’, 
such that one ‘anticipates the coming freedom’.56 It is also then possible to say that 
rather than becoming the most private aspect of existence, there has in fact been in 
the West a proliferation of discourses on death and dying in a regime of biopolitics. 
Hence, one does not find one’s truth in death; nor does one oppose power in 
speaking of it; rather, one deploys and reproduces the very means of power’s 
operation.
Foucault’s claim that death is the most private aspect of biopolitical existence and the 
limit of power might be understood to derive from sympathy for the characterization 
of ‘being-toward-death’ posited by Martin Heidegger, in which the confrontation of 
death constitutes the condition of authentic being. This characterization of death 
rests on a distinction between proper and improper death, in which the former 
entails dying in one’s own being, and as such posits a kind of individualizing heroics 
of death. Against diis though, one could point to Herbert Marcuse’s stringent 
comments on the ideological transformation of biological necessity into ontological 
virtue that such a view entails. In his article on the ideology of death, Marcuse sees 
Heidegger’s conception of death as ‘the latest and most appropriate ideological 
exhortation to death, at the very time when the political ground was prepared for the 
corresponding reality of death— the gas chambers and concentration camps of 
Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, and Bergen-Belsen’.57 Without fully taking up 
Marcuse’s understanding of ideology, there is clearly some correspondence between 
his critique of Heidegger and the point that I am making against Foucault.
The second point to make about Foucault’s formulation of biopower is that just as 
there is a certain ambiguity in the historical relation of sovereignty and biopower, so
56 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.6.
57 Marcuse, ‘Ideology of Death’, p.69. Similarly, one might re-pose Alfonso Lingis’s question: ‘What 
possibility of dying on our own subsists for us today — we who have now invested in our knowledge 
and our will the power and the arsenal to send down a Hiroshima disaster upon a city every day for 
the next five hundred years? We who address one another not with exposed faces but neurological, 
chemical and biological contagions?’ See Alfonso Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), p.18. I return to a discussion of some of the problematic implications brought 
to light by Lingis’ question in the final chapter in reference to Agamben’s discussion of the 
Heideggerian conception of death.
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there is an equivalent ambiguity in Foucault’s understanding of the operation of the 
law and norms. One of the crucial claims that Foucault makes in discussing the 
relation of sovereignty and biopower is that after the eighteenth century, power no 
longer works primarily through law, but rather, through normalization. Thus, in The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault states that ‘a normalizing society is the historical 
outcome of a technology of power centered on life’.58 However, just as biopower 
does not simply replace sovereign power, neither do norms simply replace law and 
legality. Instead, it appears that Foucault means that the law increasingly operates as a 
norm, such diat the power of the law is normalizing, a position more in keeping with 
the claim that legal institutions increasingly operate in conjunction with regulatory 
apparatuses such as medicine. In other words then, rather than operating as the 
sovereign rule that deals death, the law is increasingly infiltrated by a rationale of 
normalization suited to the distribution of lives in ‘the domain of value and utility’. 
Hence, the apparent proliferation of legislative activity since the French Revolution 
does not indicate the predominance of the juridical, but instead, provides the means 
by which an ‘essentially normalizing power’ was made acceptable.59
The distinction between the juridical and the law that Franc^ois Ewald makes in 
reference to Foucault’s discussions of norms and law is helpful for clarifying this 
point further.60 Ewald rightly points out that Foucault does not mean that the 
historical development of biopower has been accompanied by a general decline in 
the importance of the law; in fact, he says, a normalizing society tends to be 
accompanied by ‘an astonishing proliferation of legislation’. Hence, he concludes, the 
norm is not opposed to law itself, but to the juridical, by which he means the 
understanding of the law as an expression of sovereign power. The juridical is a 
‘code’ by which law is linked to the institution and expression of monarchical power 
in the form of violence and death. But, Ewald argues, this link is not necessary as law 
can also operate through norms; the law is no longer characterized by simple force or 
violence but by ‘an implicit logic that allows power to reflect upon its own strategies 
and clearly define its objects... that enables us to imagine [both] life and the living as
58 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.144.
59 Foucault, Histoy of Sexuality /, p.144.
60 Francois Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’, Representations, 30(1990), pp.138-161; for a further 
discussion of norms and law in relation to liberal governmentality and of Ewald’s argument, see 
Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999), esp. pp.118-123.
44
objects of power and the power that can take “life” in hand, creating the sphere of 
biopower’ .61 In other words, the law has undergone a transformation, such that the 
mode of its operation is no longer the power of death, emblematized in the sword of 
the sovereign, but rather the calculadve and standardizing force of the norm. From 
this then, it becomes clear that as a ‘code’ or model for understanding the operation 
of the law, the juridical presupposes a link between the law and sovereign power and 
thus operates as an ideological correlate to the presupposition of sovereignty in 
understanding power.
However, if this is the case several problems arise. For if Foucault understands tire 
juridical code of law as an ideological remnant of a sovereign regime of power that 
covers over the contemporary fact that ‘the law operates more and more as a norm’, 
then he runs the risk of missing the ways in which the juridical and sovereignty 
operate not as ideology but as operative technologies within the contemporary world. 
In other words, while Foucault does concede the contemporaneousness of 
biopolitical and sovereign operations of power, in casting the latter as ideological, he 
risks a reductive opposition to sovereignty and the juridical that obscures the ways in 
which a biopolitical regime of power is fundamentally and materially reliant on the 
‘power of the sword’ characteristic of sovereignty.62 Furthermore, as both Ewald and 
Duncan Ivison have pointed out, it remains unclear what role Foucault understood 
legal institutions to have beyond being the ‘epiphenomena of discipline and 
normalization’63 after the integration of such institutions within regulatory 
apparatuses. And as Ivison goes on to argue, the question concerning the role of the 
juridical and the sovereign within contemporary politics becomes particularly 
pertinent in the context of Foucault’s ambivalence on discourses of rights. On the 
one hand, Foucault appears to reject recourse to a discourse of rights on the basis 
that rights talk is a theoretical and political ‘blind alley’ .64 On the other though, he
61 Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and Law’, p.139.
62 This is a difficult point to make at this stage, and I return to it in detail in later chapters where I 
discuss Giorgio Agamben’s critique of Foucault. Suffice to say here that the power of death is not in 
contradiction with a power of normalization but is instead a permanent support for it. The 
conjunction of sovereign violence and biopolitics is in fact suggested in Foucault’s discussion of state 
racism and the death penalty, but he does not develop this.
63 Duncan Ivison, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997) p.40; Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’, p.159.
64 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, p.108.
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frequently made recourse to rights discourse himself, suggesting at several points that 
a new form of right was required. This is particularly the case in his document in 
response to the predicament of Vietnamese boat people, but also on occasion, in 
relation to sexuality.65 But, if Foucault does want to reject the juridical code that links 
sovereignty and right, then how does he conceive of a new form of right that does 
not re-instate that code? 1 will return to a further discussion of Foucault’s call for a 
new form of right in the final chapter; here it is enough to simply mark the ambiguity 
in his position.
These two points bring us to a third regarding the role of violence in political order. 
Clearly, Foucault’s position on violence within the contemporary political order is 
not without ambiguity. Not surprisingly though, little has been said concerning 
Foucault’s understanding of the relation between violence and the political order 
within secondary literature. This is not surprising because Foucault rejects both the 
concern with the constitutive spirit of sovereignty and the notion that violence is the 
principal means of governing in the modern world, at times claiming that violence is 
only the extreme points of biopower’s operation, a last resort and sign of its 
weakness rather than its strength.66 Because of this double exclusion, theorists 
following Foucault have focused not on the violence of the state, but on the state as 
a conglomerate of technologies of government that operate less through coercion 
that through ‘making up people’.67 While the analyses that this has generated are 
important and instructive in numerous ways, there is nevertheless a sense in which 
they overstep the mark in the exclusion of violence from an analytics of biopower.
65 See in particular Michel Foucault, ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’, in Power Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, vol.3, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and others (New York: 
New Press 2000), pp.474-475; Michel Foucault, ‘The Sexual Triumph of the Social Will’ in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin 
Press, 1997), pp.157-162; Foucault, Two Lectures’, p.108. I take up a fuller reading o f ‘Confronting 
Governments: Human Rights’ in the final chapter.
66 The ambiguity in Foucault’s position on violence is evident throughout Discipline and Punish, where 
he frequently suggests that discipline ‘operates outside these sudden, violent, discontinuous forms [of 
power] that are tied up with sovereignty’ (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.208). Conversely, he also 
claims that ‘there remains, therefore, a trace of “torture” in the modern mechanisms of criminal justice 
— a trace that has not been entirely overcome, but which is enveloped, increasingly, by the non­
corporal nature of the penal system’ (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.16). The displacement of the 
object of violence will be discussed further in the next section; suffice to say here that this means that 
violence is not eliminated, but rather operates through different techniques with different aims and 
objects.
67 Ian Hacking, ‘Making Up People’ in Thomas C. Heller and Christine Brooke-Rose, eds. 
Reconstructing Individualism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp.222-236.
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For while Foucault rejects the tendency to treat certain forms of violence as 
paradigmatic models of the raison d'etre of power, he does not exclude violence from 
an analysis of biopower altogether. His attempt to understand power relations 
through the model of warfare and the associated genealogical task of revealing the 
‘blood drying in the codes’ should be sufficient to bring that to light. But one can 
also consider Foucault’s statement in reference to Nietzsche that, ‘humanity does not 
gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, 
where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences 
in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’ .68 Or 
similarly, ‘the law cannot help but be armed’.69
The question then should not be whether or not violence plays a role within a 
biopolitical order, but rather, how violence operates within biopolitics, or more 
specifically, what is the armature of die law? For Foucault, it appears that the 
violence of biopolidcs is not that of ‘the sword’ and the sovereign’s right to take life, 
but rather, the ostensibly less spectacular — though perhaps because of that, more 
effecdve — form of normalization. Importantly, the violence of normalization cannot 
simply be understood as a ‘symbolic violence’ dissociated from corporeal pain, injury 
and deatii. Rather, normalization is crucially linked to the rationality that Foucault 
argued was characteristic of biopolitics: to foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death. As Mitchell Dean makes clear, the re-inscription of the relation of power and 
life that biopolitics involves does not eliminate death and violence from political 
operations. Instead, it transforms the conditions of the determination of who lives 
and who dies, such that it no longer takes the form of a sovereign decision to kill the 
enemies of the state but is instead, a ‘right to disqualify the life of those who are a 
threat to the life of the population, to disallow those deemed “unworthy of life’” .70
68 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p.151.
69 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.144; also see Beatrice Hanssen, ‘On the Politics of Pure Means’, in 
Hent De Vries and Samuel Weber, eds. Violence, Identity and Self-Determination (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), pp.236-252.
70 Dean, Governmentality, p.139; Dean’s analysis is one of the few that take up the problem of death and 
violence within biopolitics; he also addresses the continuity and disparity between liberal and non­
liberal forms of biopolitical government. He argues that while these both operate through biopolitical 
determinations and the optimization of life, the combinations of sovereign and biopolitical rule that 
they involve differ greatly. For further discussions of racism within biopolitics, see in particular, Ann 
Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
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As Foucault’s own com m ents on genocide suggest, within a normalizing society in 
which technologies o f power are directed toward the administration o f life, 
‘massacres have become vital. It is as the managers o f life and survival, o f  bodies and 
the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars’.71 Hence, one 
can conclude that the pre-em inent determ ination o f a biopolitical regime is that o f 
what constitutes life worth living and the means o f  making that determination today 
are technologies o f normalization.
If  this is the case, then another im portant point begins to emerge. If  normalization 
operates as the means for a determination o f life w orth living, then it seems that this 
determ ination has m uch to do with questions o f subjectivation and subjectivity. That 
is, since normalization operates as one o f the principal axes o f subjectivation within 
biopolitics, subjectivation can be considered one o f  the means by which power takes 
hold o f life. Indeed, as I discuss in the following section, in understanding 
subjectivation — or the processes by which subjects are constituted — as coterminous 
with subjection, Foucault appears to portray subjectivation itself as a form o f 
violence. As a point o f reference then, we might say here that Foucault’s account o f 
biopolitics contains more than a residue o f N ietzsche’s proclamation that ‘the state is 
the coldest o f all cold m onsters... the state lies in all languages o f good and evil; and 
whatever it says, it lies — whatever it has, it has stolen. Everything about it is false; it 
bites with stolen teeth. Even its belly is false... only there, where the state ceases, 
does the m an w ho is not superfluous begin ’.72 In this section, I have discussed the 
‘stolen teeth’ o f juridical codes and the ‘false belly’ o f sovereignty; in the following, I 
discuss the forms o f subjection that appear to stymie the emergence o f a ‘man w ho is 
not superfluous’. In this though, I focus not on any form o f  heroic individualism that 
Foucault might take from Nietzsche, but rather, on the technical forms o f subjection 
that produce individuals as subjects o f the state.
71 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.137.
72 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1961), p.75, 77.
48
2.3 Subjectivation and the Life of the Body: Violence, Norms and 
Resistance
Foucault’s critique o f H obbes’ Leviathan and the problem  o f the political sovereignty 
o f the state necessitate not only a reformulation o f power, but also a reconsideration 
o f the subject o f polidcs. Foucault’s cridque o f the subject effecdvely attem pts to 
reverse the project o f political theory, from the focus on the constitution o f the state 
to the constitution o f the subject; he states ‘rather than worry about the central 
sp irit...w e must attem pt to study the myriad o f bodies which are constituted as 
peripheral subjects as a result o f effects o f pow er’ .73 By linking the question o f the 
constitution o f the subject with a critique o f political theory’s focus on the problem  
o f the sovereign spirit, Foucault established a rhetorical link between the sovereignty 
o f the state and o f the subject. In other words, Foucault’s critique o f  political 
sovereignty speaks directly to a critique o f the sovereign subject. O ne o f  the effects 
o f this is that the critique o f the subject is cast as a political project. As such, 
Foucault’s genealogical critique o f the subject focuses on the technologies by which 
the subject is produced, where that production is taken as a form o f  subjection and 
subjugation. In short, subjection appears as the principal form  o f the violence o f 
political order. In this section o f  the chapter then, I argue that Foucault casts 
subjection as a form o f violence, such that subjectivity itself m ight be seen as ‘the 
prison o f the body’. If this is the case, Foucault’s formulation o f the relation between 
power and the subject is overly reductive in that it casts subjectivation as entirely 
negative, without consideration o f the positive political implications o f being a 
subject.
The conception o f power as warfare has its correlate in the reformulation o f the 
individual as an effect and vehicle o f power rather than simply its origin or target. 
Thus in ‘Two Lectures’ Foucault claims that individuals are nodal points in a net-like 
web o f power relations, such that they are
73 Foucault, Two Lectures’, p.98.
49
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. 
They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the 
elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application... it is already one of the prime effects of 
power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, 
come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is 
not the vis-ä-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The 
individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent 
to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual 
which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle’.74
I have quoted this passage at length because it contains a number of important keys 
for understanding Foucault’s account of subjection as the process of the constitution 
of subjects. First, and most obviously, in rewriting the individual as a nodal point in a 
web of power relations, Foucault is not simply saying that all individuals are in a 
position to exercise power at one moment or another, which would be a banal 
suggestion. While this is one consequence of his understanding of the position of the 
individual vis-a-vis power, it is not the only, nor the most important one. N or does 
the claim that individuals are effects and vehicles of power simply refer to the multi- 
dimensionality of an individual’s position within power relations, such that they both 
undergo a certain constitution by power and then, once constituted as individuals, 
subsequently exercise power over others and thus carry the operations of power 
upon themselves.
The point is more subtle and hangs on the ‘simultaneously’ or ‘at the same time’ that 
relates the individual as effect and as vehicle of power. For it is precisely at the same 
time that the individual is an effect of power that it is a vehicle of power, such that 
there is no temporal or causal disjuncture between undergoing and articulating power 
in its subjectivating effect. This is in a way a small point, but it does have 
consequences for the way in which subjection is understood. For one, the erasure of 
a temporal disjuncture in subjection forecloses the strategy for articulating modes of 
resistance and agency adopted by more deconstructive theorists such as Judith 
Butler. As I discuss in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, it is precisely the temporal break 
between the subject’s constitution within power and its reiterative articulation of
74 Foucault, Two Lectures’, p.98.
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power that constitutes the particular vulnerability o f power in Butler’s account. As 
she states in The Psychic Life of Power,
in the very act by which the subject reproduces the conditions of its own 
subordination, the subject exemplifies a temporally based vulnerability that 
belongs to those conditions, specifically, to the exigencies of their renewal. 
Power considered as a condition of the subject is necessarily not the same as 
power considered as what the subject is said to wield.75
The temporal immediacy that Foucault posits between the individual as effect and 
vehicle o f power does not allow this position, but at the same time, it does not lead 
to the conclusion that the individual is the ‘passive recipient’ o f the operations o f 
power, as a num ber o f feminist and critical theorists have argued .76 As Ewa Ziarek 
points out, such a conception o f the relation o f the individual vis-ä-vis power 
presupposes a continuous cause-effect relation, where the m om ents o f cause and 
effect are necessarily synchronous and determined, ‘as if causes could manifest 
themselves in their effects without reserve ... [as if] disciplinary power could be 
actualized in the m odern docile individual’.77 But as this quote suggests, Ziarek also 
oversteps the mark in defending Foucault on this point, as she bases her reading o f 
Foucault on the notion o f the necessary incom pletion and failure o f power to 
actually manifest in the bodies o f individuals. But the point appears not to be that 
these m om ents are either continuous or disjunctive, but that they are immediate or 
co-extensive: the m om ent o f causality in which the individual is constituted as the 
effect o f power is simultaneous with the m om ent in which the individual is the 
element o f articulating the power that constitutes it.
O ne o f the implications o f the simultaneity o f the individual’s being an effect and 
vehicle is that power cannot be considered to be wholly external to the body, a 
resource that the subject takes up in its own exercising once it has been constituted
75 Judith Butler, The Psychic IJ fe  o f Power Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), p.12.
76 See for instance Lois McNay, Foucault: A  Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p.102; 
Lois McNay, Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000), p.8.
77 Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, The Ethics o f Dissensus: Postmodernity, Feminism and the Politics o f Radical 
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p.17. I discuss her argument in more detail in 
the following chapter.
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as an individual by that power. Rather, the power that constitutes the body as 
individual is in an important sense internal to the body. The question though is how 
that internality should be construed and under what conditions the body is produced 
as individual rather than say, as a multiplicity. The claim that individuals are 
simultaneously effects and vehicles of power suggests that power manifests in bodies, 
and it does so through the constitution of those bodies as individuals. For Foucault, 
the individual thus emerges as a material artefact of a particular operation of power, 
which he calls normalization. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that 
normalization is simultaneously totalizing and individualizing in its operation; it 
simultaneously establishes a common standard and forces those placed in relation to 
the norm to reveal their own irreducible particularly through the identification of 
individual divergences from that standard: in this, it simultaneously establishes 
equality and inequality. It also produces certain identifications to that irreducible 
particularity, which are subsequently fixed in the notion of the individual and 
repeated in the claim to be an individual. Hence, it is only in relation to the norm that 
the individual emerges, and it is in that sense that the individual is simultaneously 
both an effect and vehicle of power. Individuality ties the body to a normalizing 
common standard through the identification of its irreducible particularity and the 
identification of oneself as individual both rests on and reinstates the operation of 
the norm.
To get a fuller understanding of the operations of normalization in subjection then, it 
is first necessary to get a clearer picture of what Foucault means by norms. This is 
best done through a discussion of Georges Canguilhem’s conception of norms, 
which Foucault draws upon .78 Canguilhem’s work has a broader bearing for
78 See Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological.\ tr. Carolyn R. Fawcett (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991). To get some measure of the significance of Canguilhem’s work for Foucault, it is worth 
considering that in writing the introduction to Canguilhem’s best-known text, The Normal and the 
Pathological.\ Foucault claims that Canguilhem was a crucial figure in the development of a philosophy 
of rationality, knowledge and the concept against the subject-centred philosophy of phenomenology. 
Foucault claims that instead of the philosophy of meaning, the subject and lived experience, 
Canguilhem ‘has opposed a philosophy of error, concept and the living being’ (Foucault, 
‘Introduction’, The Normal and the Pathological, p.24). Of the intellectual and political rebellions of the 
1960s, Foucault states, ‘everything that took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfaction with the 
phenomenological theory of the subject’, thus positioning Canguilhem as a central figure within them 
(Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Post-Structuralism’, in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984, vol.2, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and others (Penguin: London, 
1998), p.438). Given Foucault’s own oft-stated opposition to phenomenology, it is not hard to see 
that the philosophy of life that Canguilhem developed would be an important reference for Foucault. 
In keeping with this, Foucault asks at the end of his discussion of Canguilhem, ‘Should not the whole
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understanding the concept of biopower than just the formuladon of norms that he 
develops, since his understanding of biological life is an important reference for the 
conception of life that Foucault uses. Two of Canguilhem’s claims are particularly 
important to Foucault’s own understanding of life and its relation to power: the first 
of these is the claim that life is fundamentally normative and the second that life is 
characterized by an internal capacity for error.79 Flere though, I am particularly
theory of the subject be reformulated, seeing that knowledge, rather than opening onto the truth of 
the world, is deeply rooted in the “errors” of life?’ (Foucault, ‘Life: Experience and Science’ in 
Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, vol.2, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. 
Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1997), p.477). Also see Alain Badiou, ‘Is there a theory 
of the subject in Georges Canguilhem?’ Economy and Society, 27: 2 and 3(1998), pp.225-233.
Foucault’s relation to Canguilhem has been documented in more detail by Gary Gutting, Paul 
Rabinow, Pierre Macherey, Peter Dews and others. Of these authors, Gutting specifically excludes 
discussion of Foucault’s social and political thought to focus on the historical epistemology that 
Foucault draws from Canguilhem in works such as The Order of Things and Archeology of Knowledge. 
Rabinow is most particularly concerned with the conception of life developed in Canguilhem and 
taken up by Foucault. In ‘French Enlightenment’ for instance, he compares the conceptions of life 
and norms in Canguilhem and Foucault, arguing that their common concern with life and knowledge 
locates them firmly in the category of the French Modern. Paul Rabinow, ‘French Enlightenment: 
Truth and Life’, Economy and Society, 27:2-3(1998), pp.193-201; Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and 
Forms of the Social Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gary Gutting, Michel 
Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Dews, 
The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995); Pierre 
Macherey, In a Materialist Way: Selected Essays, ed. Warren Montag, tr. Ted Stolze (London: Verso, 
1998); Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, eds. Economy and Society, 27:2 and 3(1998), Special Issue on 
Canguilhem; also see Camile Limoges, ‘Errare Humanum Est: Do Genetic Errors Have a Future?’ in 
Carl F. Cranor, ed. Are Genes Us?: The Social Implications of the New Genetics (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994), pp.113-124 esp. 122-124. In this, Limoges points out that The Normal and the 
Pathological remains the classic study of the concept of the normal. Also see Elisabeth A. Lloyd, 
‘Normality and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type’ in the same 
volume for a discussion of biological normality that resonates with Canguilhem’s position. 
Canguilhem’s claims also seem to be at least partly reiterated by a recent study of the concept of 
normality in child psychology, which concludes that ‘concepts of normality should be calibrated to the 
ecosystemic conditions that constitute organism-environment states. The attribution of normality is 
never a categorical statement in which fact is simply noted, but is always a theoretically derived 
hypothesis that directs examination of salient organism-environment transactions... norms are value 
derived and not neutral transcontextual absolutes’ (Eugene. S. Gollin, Gary Stahl, Elyse Morgan ‘On 
the Uses of the Concept of Normality in Developmental Biology and Psychology’, Advances in Child 
Development and Behavior, 21(1989), pp.49-71 at 68).
79 As Paul Rabinow’s clarification of Foucault’s relation to Canguilhem shows, Canguilhem and 
Foucault share a conception of life as grounded in errancy. The concept of error is crucial for 
Foucault’s interpretation of Canguilhem, providing the key moment in Canguilhem’s work according 
to Foucault. Foucault argues in his essay ‘Life: Experience and Science’ that ‘a chance occurrence... 
like a disturbance in the information system, something like a “mistake”, in short, “error” resides at 
the centre of the problems that preoccupy Canguilhem’ (p.476). Further, the error that is borne within 
life as its necessary potentiality provides the radical contingency around which the history of life and 
the development of human beings are intertwined for Canguilhem, which enabled him to identify and 
draw out the relation of life and knowledge and to trace ‘the presence of value and the norm within it’. 
Hence, the permanent potential for error in life underpins the generation of concepts and the 
distinction between truth and falsehood that organizes them today. Foucault states,
if one grants that the concept is the reply that life itself has given to that chance process, 
one must agree that error is the root of what produces human thought and its history. ‘Hie 
opposition of the true and false, the values that are attributed to the one and the other, the 
power effects that different societies and different institutions link to that division — all this
53
concerned with the former o f these, which substantially informs Foucault’s 
conception o f norms. Canguilhem develops the thesis that life is fundamentally
may be nothing but the most belated response to that possibility of error inherent in life 
(P-476).
Thus, it is through the notion of error that life is placed in a relation of contiguity and contingency 
with truth and the structures within which it is told. ‘Error’, or the inherent capacity of life to ‘err’ 
both establishes the relation of life to truth and undermines that relation by disentangling it from the 
structures of truth and power that respond to the potential for error. Foucault concludes that ‘life — 
and this is its radical feature — is that which is capable of error... with man, life has led to a living 
being that is never completely in the right place, that is destined to “err” and to be “wrong”’ (p.476). 
See Rabinow, ‘French Enlightenment’ for a further discussion of Foucault’s essay on Canguilhem.
It is worth noting here that while Canguilhem’s characterization of error as central to biological life 
might have been an important move in the development of a philosophy of life, the concept of error 
that he is offering actually has a longer philosophical history. In his history of the concept of error in 
the French Enlightenment, David Bates has recently argued that the idea that error was not simply a 
negative hindrance but also productive was present in Enlightenment thought. Bates shows that in 
Enlightenment epistemological texts, error was often cast as a necessary risk of enquiry and search for 
truth; error was not only logically necessary for truth, but was cast as the topological space in which 
truth might emerge. It is important to note here that historically and etymologically, the term ‘error’ is 
in fact more closely linked to the action of wandering than with discrete mental mistakes. Bates points 
out that the Latin root — errare — of error in all its forms originally had two distinct meanings: first, ‘to 
go this way and that, to walk at random’ and second, ‘to go off the track, to go astray’, a variation 
which is then extended to being mistaken (veds-taken). Bates concludes then that ‘there is... an 
ambivalence at the heart of error... between merely aimless wandering and a more specific aberration 
from some path’. This ambivalence does not disappear in the course of historical usages of the term in 
France and can still be found to be pertinent today. Hence, error is historically and etymologically less 
closely related to the idea of discrete mental mistakes, die opposite of truth, than with a process of 
‘wandering’, either a ‘ceaseless travelling’ or deviation from a particular path. See David W. Bates,
JEnlightenment Aberrations: Error and Revolution in France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p.19-20. 
Heidegger’s conception of the relation of truth and error also make use of this semantic ambivalence, 
evident in for instance, Martin Heidegger, ‘The Essence of Truth’ [1930] in Fathmarks, ed. William 
McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.136-154.
Without delving too far here, this conception of errancy may cast an important light on Foucault’s 
conception of resistance, for errancy could be understood as the contingency that underwrites 
resistance to the normalizing operations of biopower. Foucault suggests in Discipline and Punish that 
normalization is essentially a power that fixes; it is an ‘and-nomadic technique’ (p.218), which implies 
that errant wandering may provide an important avenue of resistance. This understanding of the 
possibility of resistance in error throws light on Foucault’s important caveat in History of Sexuality 1 
that life has not been totally administered and controlled within the purview of biopower; rather, life 
constantly escapes or exceeds the techniques that govern and administer it. His comment specifically 
refers to the capacity of life to escape power and not to the internal limitations of power’s exercise per 
se. He states that ‘it is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and 
administer it; it constantly escapes them (p.143; emphasis added), making life the active subject of the 
sentence. In the French original, the term that Foucault uses is ‘la vie', which can be taken to mean life 
in general (Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualit'e 1, I m  volonte de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p.188). 
To the extent that Foucault relies on Canguilhem’s account of life, that escape is made possible by the 
wandering errancy that undergirds biological life. Paul Rabinow also makes the suggestion, without 
developing it, that Foucault’s conception of resistance might be explicated through the notion of 
errancy. The particular importance of doing so is that it may provide a counter to some of the more 
extravagant renditions of resistance in terms of transgression and ‘a pure experience of rupture’. On 
this, also see Gary Gutting, ‘Foucault’s Philosophy of Experience’ boundary 2, 29:2(2002), p.69-85 and 
Martin Jay, ‘The Limits of the Limit Experience’, Constellations 2:2(1995), pp.155-174 and particularly 
Jay’s point that the term ‘experience’ derives from the Latin root ‘ex-periri’, which also gives us the 
word ‘peril’ such that ‘experience’ suggests a dangerous journey without assurance of home-coming. 
The connotations of this are clearly not far from those of wandering in error. Bates’ brief discussion 
of errancy in Heidegger and Nietzsche in the final chapter of Enlightenment Aberrations also points to a 
fruitful way of approaching Foucault.
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normative through a consideration of the concepts of ‘the normal’ and ‘the 
pathological’ in the history of medicine. Against the nineteenth century medical 
doctrine that the states of normality and pathology were simply quantitatively 
different, Canguilhem argues that they are in fact qualitatively different, expressing 
different modes of existence for an organism. In conjunction with this, he claims that 
life is fundamentally a polarized activity, a claim that rests on the conviction that 
there is no such thing as biological indifference: even at the simplest level, ‘living 
means preference and exclusion’.80 For Canguilhem, this fact alone is enough to 
establish the fundamental normativity of life. He states that ‘life is polarity and 
thereby even an unconscious position of value; in short, life is in fact a normative 
activity. ’81 By this, he means that life itself ‘establishes norms’ and, because of that, an 
organism establishes the state that can be considered ‘normal’ for it in both the 
senses of habitual and ideal states.
There is no doubt that Foucault took Canguilhem as a reference point in formulating 
his conception of normalization in Discipline and Punish, as well as the early volume of 
History of Sexuality? 1 Ewald’s specification of three characteristics of norms helps to 
illuminate the conception of normalization that Foucault develops from 
Canguilhem’s work. Ewald argues that norms can be understood as ‘a way for a 
group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous 
principle of self-referentiality’, which implies both ‘a rule for judgment’ and ‘the 
means of producing that rule’.83 Their defining characteristics can be identified as 
positivity, relativity and polarity. The first of these indicates that norms need only 
consider the facticity of things without reference to cause or essence since for the 
norm facts only refer to other facts; the operation of the norm does not rest on 
interpretation or unmasking, but instead on recording the ‘sheer phenomenality of 
phenomena’.84 This allows the norm to establish its appearance of objectivity, 
exemplified in the techniques and practices of statistics. Second, the relativity of the
80 Canguilhem, The Norm a/ and the Pathological.p.136
81 Canguilhem, The N orm al and the Pathological, p.126.
82 Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) p.232; also see Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology o f Scientific Reason.
83 Ewald, Norms, Discipline and the Law’, p.154.
84 Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’, p.156.
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norm ensures that it can be neither absolute nor universal. Norms necessarily operate 
in relation to other norms and each presents a rule of judgment internal to a group 
such that its efficacy as a rule of judgment is limited to that group. As such, the norm 
cannot bind anyone indefinitely as the law can. Importantly though, this does not 
indicate that norms are ephemeral or weak; it is rather a source of strength and 
durability, in that the flexibility of the norm allows it be adjusted to changing 
conditions and modes of application.
With the variability of the norm in mind, the third characteristic of polarity has 
important implications for the determination of normality and abnormality. For if the 
norm is entirely variable and only applies within a given group, then it becomes 
unclear how a distinction between the normal and the abnormal can be made. 
Recalling Canguilhem’s comment that the relationship between the normal and 
abnormal is not ‘a relationship of contradiction and externality, but one of inversion 
and polarity’,85 Ewald points out that the abnormal is not external to the normal but 
is presupposed by it, and can in fact become normal. Hence, the abnormal is 
distinguished from the normal not because of its permanent impossibility, but rather 
because of the possibilities for existence that it yields in a particular scenario. Or as 
Ewald puts it ‘if all possible forms are not normal, it is not because some forms are 
naturally impossible but because the various possible forms of existence are not all 
equivalent for those who must exist in them’.86 This means then that the normal and 
abnormal can only be determined within a particular set of environmental or 
administrative requirements, and if these change, then so does the boundary of the 
normal and the abnormal. Understood politically, this means that ‘the relationship 
between the normal and the abnormal thus becomes an unstable threshold... [and] 
the political stakes in the fixation of this boundary become increasingly apparent’.87
85 See Canguilhem, The Norma/ and the Pathological.\ pp.239-240.
86 Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’, p.157.
87 Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline and the Law’, p.158. It is also possible to identify a point of 
disagreement with Ewald’s analysis here. He claims that a normalizing society is in direct contradiction 
with sovereignty, since there can be no sovereign who fixes norms (p-155). However, as these 
comments show in conjunction with Carl Schmitt’s analysis of sovereignty in Political Theology, it is 
precisely the determination on the normal and the exception, or the fixing of the boundary between 
the normal and the abnormal, that constitutes the character of sovereignty. The exception not only 
reveals the rule in its infraction but is also necessary for the establishment of the rule, since it 
provokes the sovereign decision that determines the rule. Interestingly, this possibility emerges in 
Canguilhem, particularly in his claim that the ‘polarity of the experience of normalization... builds into
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Given this explication of the conception of norms that Foucault employs, it should 
be clear that the co-incidence of norms and normalization does not indicate a 
‘normative confusion’ in Foucault’s work, though it does indicate why it is that 
Foucault was wary of posing ‘alternative norms’ .88 Foucault consistently questions 
the derivation of normative positions from a presupposed universal, but this does 
not mean that his position is either one of relativism or of crypto-normativity as 
Jurgen Habermas claims.89 Rather, the conception of norms given here suggests that 
knowledge claims are ‘internally’ normative,90 in the sense that insofar as they derive 
from and partake in the fundamental polarity of life, they express or indicate a 
position taken in relation to one’s environment or conditions of existence. Further, 
resistance arises as a central expression of the evaluative polarity of life and the 
struggle to establish normal conditions. This means that the claim to universality 
made within the attempt to establish alternative norms is itself a part of that struggle, 
but one that seeks to deny or eliminate the struggle.91 Hence, as Paul Patton argues in 
response to the question ‘why ought domination to be resisted?’ posed by Habermas 
and Nancy Fraser,92 while Foucault does not ‘provide any basis for a single universal 
answer to the question’ resistance is nevertheless ‘inevitable’ within relations of 
power and domination.93
the relationship of the norm to its area of application the normal priority of the infraction... a norm 
cannot be original. Rule begins to be rule only in making rules and this function of correction arises 
from infraction itself (Canguilhem, The Norma/ and the Pathological, pp.239-240). It appears then that 
despite the difference in their political commitments, there is a parallel in the theorization of the norm 
and the exception that Canguilhem and Schmitt offer, the former with regard to the biological and the 
latter to the political. I address Schmitt’s characterization of this later in Chapter 5. See Carl Schmitt, 
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, tr. George Schwab (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).
88 See Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Minneapolis: University7 of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp.17-33; for a further discussion of Foucault’s 
wariness regarding the postulation of alternative norms, see Mitchell Dean, ‘Normalising Democracy: 
Foucault and Habermas on Democracy, Liberalism and Law’, in Samantha Ashenden and David 
Owen, eds. Foucault Contra Habermas (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 166-194.
89 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 
1987) pp.276-286.
90 Jay Bernstein, Recovering Fthical IJfe: Jurgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (London: 
Routledge, 1995) p.166.
91 As Nietzsche suggests of the law, ‘a legal order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means 
in the struggle between power-complexes, but as a means of preventing all struggle in general... 
would be a principle hostile to life’ (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], ed. Walter 
Kaufman, tr. Walter Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1989) p.76).
92 Habermas, Philosophical Discourses of Modernity, p.284; Fraser, Unruly Practices, p.29
93 Paul Patton, ‘Foucault’s Subject of Power’, Political Theory Newsletter 6(1994), pp.60-71 at 61.
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However, even with the strong conjunction between Foucault and Canguilhem’s 
conception of norms there is nevertheless an important difference between them. 
For while Canguilhem understands vital norms as the generative motor of social 
norms, Foucault effectively reverses this in his formulation of the productive capacity 
of power relations. As Pierre Macharey points out, for Foucault ‘the living has ceased 
to be the subject of normativity in order to become no more than the point of 
application’.94 The hinge for this crucial reversal is the introduction of the 
terminology of power into the field of analysis, a vocabulary and concern that was 
largely absent from Canguilhem’s work.95 Further, as I show, this reversal turns the 
question of the operation of norms toward exposure of the political stakes of 
normalization and the correlative determination of die normal and abnormal, 
without however, losing site of the constitudon and regulation of the body — the 
‘most material’ operations of power — and the normative exclusions these entail.
For Canguilhem, the relation of social and vital norms is one of differential 
generation, whereby the technical and normative impulse of knowledge derives from 
the technical and normative impulses of life itself such that the social and biological 
cannot be seen as simply opposed ontic states.96 He states ‘human technique extends 
vital impulses, at whose service it tries to place systematic knowledge which would 
deliver them from much of life’s cosdy trial and error’.97 Importantly though, this 
does not mean that social norms replicate vital norms. Canguilhem gives at least two 
reasons why this is so: first because the systems of organization are different, in that 
for the living being norms are internal to the organism, while in social organization 
they are externally generated. Canguilhem claims of social organizations that society
94 Pierre Macherey, ‘From Canguilhem to Canguilhem by way of Foucault’ in In a Materialist Way: 
Selected Essays, ed. Warren Montag, tr. Ted Stolze (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 108-115 at 111.
95 Notwithstanding the influence of Foucault and Althusser, which led Canguilhem to develop the 
notion of scientific ideology, but even here, the notion of ideology is used in such a way that it does 
not directly link to the effects of power within knowledge and the production of truth. See Georges 
Canguilhem, Ideology and Nationality in the History of the Life Sciences, tr. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, 
Ma.: MIT Press, 1988); also see Thomas Osborne, ‘Medicine and Ideology’, Economy and Society 27: 2 
and 3(1998), pp.259-273; Pierre Macherey, ‘Georges Canguilhem’s Philosophy of Science: 
Epistemology and the History of Science’, in In a Materialist Way: Selected Essays, ed. Warren Montag, tr. 
Ted Stolze (London: Verso, 1998), pp.191-187.
96 See Monica Greco, ‘Between Social and Vital Norms: Reading Canguilhem and ‘Somatization”, 
Economy and Society, 27: 2 and 3(1998), pp.234-248; Dominique Lecourt, ‘Georges Canguilhem on the 
Question of the Individual’, Economy and Society, 27: 2 and 3(1998), pp.217-224.
97 Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p.100, 130.
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has no ‘intrinsic finality’ or teleology that binds the various parts or organs together 
as there is in a biological organism. In a living organism, there is no externality of 
parts and although different organs might fulfill the needs of the organism, its 
immanent regulation is expressed in the integration of parts within a whole by means 
of a single nervous and endocrine system. In social organization however, the 
integradon of its parts is itself expressed as a need — ‘regulation is a need in search of 
its organ and its norms of exercise’ — such that social organizations are construed as 
‘both machine and organism ’ .98
Second, it cannot be assumed that vital norms structure social life without mediation. 
The disjuncture of social and vital norms is revealed for Canguilhem in the simple 
fact that an individual may question the needs and norms of the society he or she 
inhabits. He concludes that:
In a social organization, the rules for adjusting the parts into a collective... are 
external to the adjusted multiple. Rules must be represented, learned, 
remembered, applied, while in a living organism the rules for adjusting the parts 
amongst themselves are immanent, presented without being represented, acting 
without deliberation nor calculation. Here there is no divergence, no distance, 
no delay between rule and regulation. The social order is a set of rules with 
which the servants or beneficiaries, in any case, the leaders, must be concerned. 
The order of life is made of a set of rules lived without problems.99
Hence, while the norms of technical activity might derive from vital norms, it is not 
the case that the norms of the living organism are identical with the norms of social 
organization. Ultimately then, the normative organization of society cannot be 
understood either metaphorically or analogically through the model of the body and 
its norms.
However, the problem here is that Canguilhem does not elaborate the mechanisms 
or mediating factors that account for such differentiation. While he recognizes a 
disturbance or distortion in the transmission of the norms of the human body into 
social organization, he does not ultimately account for it and the differentiation
98 Canguilhem, The N orm al and the Pathological, p.252.
99 Canguilhem, The N orm al and the Pathological, p.250.
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between social and vital norms remains inexplicable. Relatedly, he does not address 
the question of the effect of social norms upon biological norms either: the 
generative capacity of biological norms is not attributed to social norms, so any 
correlative effect of the social on the biological is occluded in his schema. We might 
read Foucault as being concerned with precisely these problems in his accounts of 
normalization given in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, the crucial 
difference between Canguilhem and Foucault is that the latter has recourse to a 
vocabulary of power to explicate the link between the social and the vital. Power, and 
especially biopower, mediates the link between vital norms and social organization by 
making the life of the body a crucial nexus in the operation of socio-political 
relations. This also means that the order of generation of norms is at least partially 
reversed: for Canguilhem, technical norms derive from bodily norms, but for 
Foucault, power relations produce bodily norms.
Foucault’s thesis that power operates productively can be understood to mean that 
power does not produce bodies per se, but that it produces and enforces bodily 
norms. Foucault claims that ‘the body itself is invested with power relations’, 100 
meaning that to the extent that biopower is normalizing, it creates and establishes 
norms or new modes of existence that correlate with new environments and new 
needs. Foucault’s position on the status of the body vis-a-vis power is well 
summarized in his comments in Discipline and Punish that the history of the body 
demands a ‘political economy’ that takes note of the body’s investiture in power 
relations. He argues that within disciplinary regimes, ‘it is always the body that is at 
issue — the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and 
submission... the body is directly involved in a political field; power relations have an 
immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out 
tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. ’101 Power ‘masters’ the body in a political 
economy that does not simply aim at conquering the forces of the body but at the 
management and controlled enhancement of them, since ‘the body becomes a useful 
force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body’ . 102 Thus, in the 
factory, the classroom and the prison, bodies are produced along normative lines that
100 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.24.
101 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.27.
102 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.26.
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maximize efficiency, productivity and obedience or docility. The bodies that thrive in 
such environments are those most able to incorporate and reproduce the norms 
imposed upon it by strategic techniques of power. In modern societies then, 
Foucault argues, power does not simply inscribe the surface of the body, but reaches 
to its vital rudiments, that is, to the biological norms of human existence.103
But this does not mean that power is determining in its hold on the body. While the 
body is necessarily and immediately invested in relations of power such that the 
forces of the body are brought to submission, emit signs and perform tasks, the body 
also provides the point of resistance to disciplinary technologies. Just as such forces 
can be composed into productive arrangements, they can also produce their own 
resistances. Such resistances cannot be understood as a ‘great revolt’, but rather, as 
the interplay of force on force, where these forces contradict and overcome through 
various subterfuge, tactics and errors. In this then, the immanent forces of the body 
continually present and confront the opportunity for obedience or resistance. What 
was important in Discipline and Punish was precisely the manner in which power 
relations managed the forces of the body. The phrase ‘docile bodies’ was not meant 
to indicate that bodies were in fact docile, but that the aim of disciplinary power is to 
produce ‘docile bodies’, an aim predicated on the assumption that bodies were 
composed of intrinsic, active forces that could be harnessed to increase productivity. 
The body of the prisoner is the materialized nexus of force relations, forces that are 
immanent to the body itself and which operate on it through the material 
arrangements of the prison. Hence, the aim in producing docile bodies was that of 
‘composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine’ . 104
This understanding of the status of the body counters one of the principle criticisms 
made against Foucault’s conception of the operations of power vis-ä-vis the body in 
Discipline and Punish. Numerous critics have argued that Foucault understood the 
body as the passive material upon which power inscribed the habits, strictures and
103 The most obvious way this occurs, which has received much attention in postmodern literature, is 
through the integration of the body and technology. For an explicitly biopolitical consideration of this 
see Eugene Thacker, ‘The Thickness of Tissue Engineering: Biopolitics, Biotech and the Regenerative 
Body’, Theory and Event, 3:3(1999).
104 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.164.
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rituals of discipline. In this critique, the operations of power upon the body are 
understood to be not unlike the operations of Franz Kafka’s writing machine in ‘In 
the Penal Colony’.105 In this regard, Elizabeth Grosz’ reading of Foucault is 
instructive for considering feminist responses to Foucault’s work, as she explicitly 
criticizes his perceived ‘inscriptional’ model of the body as the passive material upon 
which power writes in terms of feminist politics. However, Grosz perpetuates a 
misreading of Foucault in suggesting that the body is passive. This point can be made 
succinctly with regard to her reading of Foucault’s account of the execution of 
Damiens in 1757, with which he opens Discipline and Punish. Grosz claims that 
‘Damiens’ body is quite literally torn to pieces in the most calculated and precise way, 
in full public view, with all the ceremony and ritual of a public spectacle. His torture 
and execution are not unlike the descriptions both Nietzsche and Kafka use in 
outlining the law’s inscription on bodies’.106
But it does not take an especially close reading of the opening pages of Discipline and 
Punish to see that what Foucault’s description reveals is that the state’s attempt to 
‘write’ on the body through its destruction fails. The destruction of Damiens’ body is 
far from ‘calculated and precise’; while the program or decree to destroy the body 
might be such, the actual attempt to carry out the task is stymied by the resistances of 
the body. Thus, Damiens’ execution signified something more of the order of the 
difficulty the law faces in writing on the body, such that it is only through the 
transformation of its tactics that the body is destroyed. This is one moment in which 
the difference between Foucault and Kafka becomes very clear; for Kafka, the body 
is destroyed through the ineluctable repetition of law’s effect on the body; for 
Foucault, the body demands that the law transform its own tactics, such that a battle 
is staged between the body and the law. As I mentioned previously, this flexibility of 
tactics is one of the defining characteristics of normalization, where it is manifest in 
the articulated operations of techniques of totalization and individualization, against 
the constrained operations of sovereign law.
105 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), 
pp.134-137, 145-151; Franz Kafka, ‘In the Penal Colony’ in The Collected Short Stories of Fran% Kafka, ed. 
Nahum N. Glatzer, tr. W. Muir and E. Muir (London: Penguin, 1988), pp.140-167.
106 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p.150.
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Yet, the analogy with Kafka is instructive in another sense, in that it does help bring 
out the element of violence in subjection through normalization. However, the 
violence of normalization does not lie solely and immediately in the inscription of the 
body, but rather, in the constitution of the individual within a general matrix of the 
determination of the normal and abnormal and the correladve determination of life 
worth living that this entails. Foucault claims that the analyses he undertook in 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality were directed toward an analysis of a 
technology of power that acts directly on the body without mediation through 
consciousness. He claims, ‘what I am trying to do is show how power relations can 
get through to the very depths of bodies, materially, without having been relayed by 
the representation of subjects. If power affects the body, it is not because it was first 
internalized in people’s consciousness’.107 In this, Foucault’s account of the 
normalizing operations of power are similar to the operations of Kafka’s ‘harrow’, 
which acts directly on the body of the condemned without mediation through the 
psychic circuits of guilt, remorse and retribution. Rather, the recognition of guilt and 
the subjectivating circuits that this entails follow from the harrow’s operations on the 
body.108
Similarly, according to Foucault, the investment of the body in disciplinary 
technologies of power produces subjectivity and the soul of the prisoner as an 
artefact of the operations of normalization. At the same time though, individuality 
operates as a means of ‘mastering’ the forces of the body, tying the body to the norm 
by locating it within the identification of calibrated particularities and the 
determination of normality and abnormality. Unlike Kafka’s machine then, 
disciplinary normalization operates through precise examinations and comparisons, 
and the simultaneous location and constitution of the individual in relation to a 
flexible common standard or rule for judgment. As I pointed out earlier, this 
underpins and permits the identification of the normal and the abnormal, which in 
turn is tied fundamentally to the political determination of life worth living. Given 
this, the subjection effected through normalization appears as one of the means by 
which power takes hold of life, since norms ‘through their idealized expression,
107 Foucault, Tower Affects the Body’, p.209.
108 Nietzsche’s narrative of the emergence of conscience and memory through the infliction of pain in 
On the Genealogy of Morals is also an important reference for this formulation of subjectivation. See 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, esp.the ‘Second Essay’.
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speak of nothing but suffering and death, that is, of the threat that reminds [the 
individual as a] living thing of itself, both of its individuality of living, and of its living 
of living’.109
Several critical points can now be made to bring this chapter to conclusion. First, it is 
now possible to see the way in which Foucault casts subjection as a form of violent 
imposition upon the body within his work during the late 1970s. This does not mean 
that normalization is necessarily efficacious such that the body is wholly passive in 
relation to the operations of normalizing power. But it does mean that the 
subjectivity that emerges through the totalizing and individualizing operations of 
normalization appears as an imposition and constraint on the body, which of course 
is not simply exterior to the body but all the more pernicious because it invests the 
body through and through in the generation of bodily norms. Further, to the extent 
that the body is conceived of as a materialized nexus of force relations, it also 
appears as the site of resistance to the impositions of subjection. The importance of 
this point is twofold; first, it reveals the re-emergence of a liberationist discourse in 
that the body is idealized as the point of disruption from the normalizing operations 
of power and identity. Second, it reveals a theoretical failure to elaborate why it is 
that bodies obey or submit to the operations of power. The provocation toward the 
end of The History of Sexuality that resistance to the deployment of sexuality should 
not take the form of recourse to sex-desire but to ‘bodies and pleasures’ provides a 
useful means of bringing these points out further.
I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that Foucault argued in The History of 
Sexuality that sexuality provides a privileged axis in the intermingling of two 
techniques of biopower, as it provides access both to the life of the individual and of 
the population. The former of these occurs in techniques such as the minute 
examinations and self-exegesis in the technology of the confessional, while the latter 
occurs through eugenics, reproductive health programs and the regulation of modes 
of subsistence and habitation and so on.110 In other words, sexuality operates as the 
nexus of normalization and individualization, giving rise to a ‘hermeneutics of the
109 Macherey, ‘From Canguilhem to Canguilhem by way of Foucault’, p.114.
110 Sexuality was ‘employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis of regulation’ (Foucault, 
History of Sexuality 1, p.146).
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self that demands continual elaboration of one’s sex and sexual desires as the 
immanent secret dimension of oneself. As such, sexuality is central to the integration 
of bodies within the circuits of power and knowledge and the formation of subjects 
within the regime of biopolitics. In this, sexuality is analogous to the soul in Discipline 
and Punish, where Foucault claims that the soul should be understood as
the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would 
be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the 
contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within 
the body by the functioning of power... [the soul] is the element in which are 
articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference to a certain 
type of knowledge... the soul is the effect and instrument of a political 
anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body. 111
Analogously, as a discursive formation, sexuality is produced in and around the body 
as the articulated effects of a particular regime of power and knowledge. For 
Foucault, sexuality is not the most secret aspect of ourselves, but rather, an element 
in the hold that biopower has over the body of the individual and the population: ‘an 
effect and instrument of a political anatomy’. Nor does this does not mean that 
sexuality is illusory; Foucault states, ‘it is a very real historical formation; it is what 
gives rise to the notion of sex, as a speculative element necessary to its operation’. 112 
Thus, sexuality operates as a mode of subjection in the regime of biopower, allowing 
access to the life of the body and as such can be seen as another means of 
imprisoning the body.
Foucault concludes from this that the political response required to combat the 
subjection effected through the discursive deployment of sexuality should not take 
the form of a Überation of desire, but the mobihzation of pleasures. He states, ‘we 
must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one 
tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality... the rallying 
point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuahty ought not to be sex- 
desire, but bodies and pleasures’. 113 Foucault reiterates the sentiment of this
111 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp.29-30.
112 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.157.
113 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 7, p.157.
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provocation in a related interview, where he states that ‘we should be striving... 
toward a desexualization, to a general economy of pleasure that would not be 
sexually normed’ . 114
judith Butler has rightly pointed out that this indicates that Foucault understands the 
body and its pleasures to operate as the site of radical resistance to power. Butler 
claims that in Foucault’s work, the body maintains a status analogous to the 
unconscious in psychoanalysis, ‘that is, as that which exceeds and confounds the 
injunctions of normalization’ . 115 Similarly, she claims elsewhere that ‘for Foucault, it 
sometimes appears that the body exceeds its discursive construction at every instant 
(instance), posing a limit to discursive construction precisely at the surface of its 
application’. 116 She goes on to suggest that the body is diereby ‘idealized as a 
principle of necessary and permanent disruption’ . 117 Buder’s point is particularly 
targeted against Foucault’s ‘Introduction’ to the Memoires of Herculine Barbin, where 
Foucault appears to take die body as a natural ground of resistance, and finds 
freedom in bodily pleasures without identities, indicated in the extraordinary image 
of ‘grins [hanging] about without the cat’. 118 But it also holds for the analysis of the 
body presented in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of History of Sexuality.
What Butler’s critique reveals is the extent to which Foucault risks a liberationist 
discourse that re-instates rather than undermines the liberation-domination dyad that 
he was at pains to reject. If the body and its pleasures are understood as the 
wellspring of a savage intransigence against the operations of power, then Foucault 
would have simply replaced the notion of transgressive desires with that of 
subversive pleasures. Further, without a clear explication of the effective difference 
between these two characterizations, it is not clear how bodies and pleasures evade
114 Foucault, ‘Power Affects the Body’, p.212.
115 Butler, Pychic Ufe of Power, p.94.
116 Judith Butler, ‘Revisiting Bodies and their Pleasures’, Theory, Culture and Society, 16:2(1999), p.11-20 
at 14.
117 Butler, ‘Bodies and Pleasures’, p.14.
118 Michel Foucault, ‘Introduction’, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoires of a Nineteenth 
Century Hermaphrodite, tr. R. McDougall (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p.xiii.
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and confront the operations of power in ways that sex and desire do not. 119 While 
Foucault suggests that the notion of desire is wholly tied to sexual subjection in 
biopolitics, it is not yet enough to simply replace that notion with that of pleasure to 
erase the difficulties. Further, taking into account the principle of the ‘tactical 
polyvalence of discourse’, by which Foucault asserts the reversibility and tactical 
variability of discursive elements vis-a-vis operations of power, 120 it becomes unclear- 
why it is that, a priori, the discourses of sex and desire cannot be mobilized against 
biopolitical subjection. Ultimately then, it seems that Foucault’s understanding of 
subjection in biopolitics leads to a problematic valorization of non-identity, ‘a refusal 
of identity... symptomatic of a utopian desire to step outside power, discourse, 
history and subjectivity’ . 121
If this is the case, then Foucault’s conception of subjectivation and subjectivity runs 
into a further problem in that if the body is cast as the site of permanent disruption, 
then it seems that the critical question to be posed is not how it is that bodies resist, 
but why it is that they obey. Under what circumstances do the forces of the body 
submit to the operations of normalization and subjection and why is the condition of 
submission apparently so persistent? Foucault claims that he aimed to account for 
the operations of power that acted directly on the body, without a prior mediation 
through consciousness and ‘the representations of subjectivity’. In doing so though, 
he elides the question of psychic attachments to the constitutive operations of 
discourse and power, for even if the individual is seen as an effect and vehicle of 
power, it is still necessary to give some account of the persistence of such effects and 
why they are as effective as they appear to be . 122 Why, that is, is de-subjectivation 
such an apparently complicated and difficult task and why are the constraints of 
normalizing individuality so persistently re-installed? While the account of 
subjectivation as the production of bodily norms goes some way toward addressing
119 Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices, p.60. I do not mean to endorse Fraser’s call for a return to humanist 
discourses against Foucault’s critique here, since her argument rests on a number of simplifications of 
Foucault’s work, but she is right to note this tension in Foucault’s claims.
120 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.100.
121 Steven Angelides, A  History of Bisexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001), p.157; also see 
Paul M. Cohen, Freedom’s Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to Foucault (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997).
122 See Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Fate Modernity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), esp. the chapter Wounded Attachments’ for a further discussion of the role 
of attachments in subjection and identity politics.
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these questions, it does not respond to them completely, since it is not at all clear 
how one proceeds from the materialist account of subjection that Foucault provides 
to an account of hegemonic consciousness and its reverse of critique, though he 
clearly wants both of these.
In addition to this, the complexity of compulsive attachments to submission and 
subjection is further reduced by Foucault’s failure to maintain a qualitative distinction 
between forces, which has the consequence that subjection appears to be assured 
only through contingent tactical advantages that rest on little more than quantitative 
differences in forces in any given confrontation. While I have argued that Foucault 
draws heavily on Nietzsche’s ontology of forces, he does not employ the notion of 
force in the same way. For Nietzsche, forces must always be seen as active or 
reactive, depending on whether they strengthen and affirm life or whether they 
weaken and undermine it; in short, whether they are ‘yes’ or ‘no’-saying forces. This 
will in turn depend on the will to power that guides and determines the directionality 
of forces: is it negative, resentful and obedient or affirmative, masterly and directed 
toward overcoming? However, Foucault does not adopt the distinction between 
active and reactive forces, nor does he offer an equivalent principle to the will to 
power, which offers the very possibility of evaluation in Nietzsche’s account. 123 As 
we have seen, for Foucault, ‘power’ is the name given to the consolidated effect of ‘a 
moving substrate of force relations’. Here, forces are purely relational, with no 
internal qualitative differences by which they could be distinguished or evaluated. 
Therefore, the theoretical foreclosure of either an account of psychic attachments or 
a principle of qualitative differences in relations of force prevents Foucault from 
providing a convincing account of the compulsive obedience to operations of power 
that seems to characterize normalizing subjection.
Taken together, these critical points reveal that while Foucault’s understanding of 
normalizing subjection offers an important opening to considering the role of 
subjectivity within biopolitics, particularly vis-ä-vis violence and political exclusion, it
123 For further discussion of the evaluative dimension of the will to power, see Gilles Deleuze, ‘Active 
and Reactive’, in David B. Allison, The New Nietzsche, (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1985), pp.80-106 
esp at 91; Paul Patton, Detente and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000), p.65; also see Alan D. 
Schrift, Nietzsche’s French Fegacy: A  Genealogy of Poststructuralism (New York: Routledge, 1995), p.43.
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is ultimately overly reductive. Foucault’s account of subjectivation is limited to 
considering the negative impositions of subjectivation, without consideradon of the 
positive political implication of being a subject. This means that in his work during 
the mid 1970s, Foucault remains too closely aligned with a repressive model of 
power, despite his efforts to dissociate from that through a critique of sovereign 
models of power. Furthermore, in critiquing this model of power, Foucault 
introduces a number of ambiguities into his own account of the transformation of 
technologies of power, particularly with regard to the historical and analytic relation 
of sovereignty and biopower. This ambiguity is evident in his positing a break 
between a power that operates through the extraction of life to one that administers 
and fosters life. Even so, Foucault’s conception of biopower and normalization does 
offer a constructive means of thinking through the political determination of life 
worth living, which allows that determination to appear as the constitutive decision 
of the political.
To conclude then, in this chapter I have discussed Foucault’s conception of 
biopower and violence to draw out the way in which one might approach an analysis 
of political exclusion through the determination of life worth living. In doing so, I 
have identified two sets of problems within the work that Foucault undertook during 
the early to mid 1970s on biopower, subjection and sexuality. The first of these arise 
in his conception of power, particularly from ambiguities in his account of the 
transition from sovereign power to biopower. The second set of problems emerges 
in the conception of subjection that Foucault develops in correlation with the 
reformulation of power. I have argued that Foucault relies on a conception of 
subjection as violent imposition, and thereby casts subjectivity as a ‘prison of the 
body’. I take up these problems further through discussing the responses of Giorgio 
Agamben and Judith Butler in depth in the following chapters. First though, I want 
to turn to a discussion of Foucault’s later work, largely published during the early 
1980s, which can and has been read as a form of auto-critique and attempt to resolve 
the theoretical difficulties that I have identified here. This allows me to extend the 
critical points that I have raised here, as well as to cast new light on Foucault’s ethics 
through placing these later developments in the context of the problematics of 
biopolitics.
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Chapter 2
From Biopolitics to Ethics: Subjectivation, Freedom and
Care of the Self
2.1 Introduction
The first volume of the History of Sexuality project, published in France in 1976, was 
initially intended as an introduction to a lengthy genealogy of the deployment of 
sexuality, the other 5 volumes of which were projected to appear in quick succession. 
However, the second volume, entitled The Use of Pleasure, did not appear until 1984. 
And then, the conceptual apparatus put into play by Foucault appeared to bear little 
relation to that of the introductory volume. While opening the question of the 
relation between life and politics in the first volume, in the following volumes, 
Foucault appeared to turn away from it in order to investigate the means by which 
individuals participate in their own formation as desiring subjects. Rather than the 
examining the concept of biopower and the deployment of sexuality this regime of 
power was said to occasion, the second volume focused on the emergence of the 
desiring subject in games of truth and error and the self-formation of the ethical 
subject. From this, Foucault developed the concept of an ‘ethics of the self 
grounded in a practice of liberty. Despite, or indeed because of, the differences 
between these volumes, interpreters have frequently seen the later ethics as providing 
at least the outline of a response to the political problematics that Foucault makes 
clear in the first volume, and particularly the discussion of biopolitics that it contains. 
This claim is well stated by Georges Canguilhem, one of Foucault’s colleagues who 
was in a privileged position to comment on his work. He suggests that ‘what could 
be taken as a rupture in the last work of Michel Foucault would only be at its core a 
completion precipitated, perhaps, by a premonitory anxiety... It was normal, in the 
properly axiological sense, that Foucault would undertake the elaboration of an 
ethics. In the face of normalization and against it, Ue Souci de soi.
1 Georges Canguilhem, ‘On Historie de la folie as an Event’ in Arnold I. Davidson, ed. Foucault and His 
Interlocutors (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997) pp.28-32 at 32.
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In this chapter, I extend the discussion of biopolitics initiated in the first chapter by 
considering the claim that the later ethics offers a means of response to and 
resolution of the problems of biopolitics. There are two ways in which Foucault’s 
ethics might be considered a response to the earlier work, first as a theoretical 
response in which conceptual developments address problems that emerge in the 
earlier work, and second, as the formulation of an ethico-political response to the 
political problems described by the earlier work. While these positions cannot be 
entirely distinguished, it is nevertheless important to not collapse them wholly into 
each other, since the theoretical shifts that emerge between the first and second 
volumes are sufficiently complex to undermine any attempt to simply read the latter 
project as the development of an ethico-political response to the dangers of 
biopolitical subjection. In the previous chapter, I discussed the concept of biopower 
that Foucault develops in the first volume of the History of Sexuality project. I 
identified two sets of ambiguities in Foucault’s earlier conceptions of power and 
subjection that diminish the ways in which his understanding of biopolitics 
illuminates the operations of violence within political order and the determination of 
life worth living. In considering the later ethics as a theoretical and political response 
to biopolitics, I argue that the status of freedom within the later ethics is more 
complex than is often recognized in that freedom appears as both a condition and 
consequence of an ethical practice of the self. In following the implications of this, I 
show that there is a fundamental interdependence between freedom and political 
community within the ethics of the self that Foucault describes and advocates such 
that an ethics of the self are ultimately an ethics of the free citizen.
This chapter is organized in four sections. In the first, I consider the theoretical shifts 
effected in the intervening period between the first and second volumes of the 
History of Sexuality project. I show that the conceptual shift that emerges in The Use of 
Pleasure can be read as an attempt to move away from the problematic valorization of 
the body that I identified in the previous chapter, through a theorization of 
subjectivation itself as the site of political resistance. Within the terms of biopolitics, 
Foucault effectively transposes the potential for resistance and transformation from 
biological life to political life. I also show in this section that an interesting ambiguity 
emerges in Foucault’s account of an ethics of the self, where freedom appears as 
both the condition and consequence of a practice of the self. In the second section, I 
develop an interpretation of Foucault’s account of the ethical practices of the
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Ancient Greeks to highlight the interdependency between an ethics of the self and 
political participation. This highlights Foucault’s implicit recognition that the Greek 
ethics of the self were effectively an ethics of the citizen — of free men. In the third 
section, I examine the implications of this for the claim that an ethics of the self 
provides an ethico-political response to biopolitical subjection through a 
consideration of the relation between practices of liberty and political community. I 
conclude from this that if an ethics of the self are ultimately an ethics of the citizen, 
they are limited in the ways in which they broach questions of biopolitical exclusion 
and the relation to the other that this entails. In the final section, I address the 
question of whether an ethical practice of the self can be extended to yield a relation 
to others beyond the limits of political community. I argue that the inherent 
contingency of the relation to others in the ethics of the self undermines attempts to 
secure such, a relation and suggest that Foucault’s ethics should be supplemented 
with recognition of a fundamental ethical responsibility. This latter claim is 
developed through Ewa Plonowska Ziarek’s recent account of an ethics of dissensus 
that seeks to reconcile a Foucauldian ‘ethos of becoming’ with a Levinasian ‘ethics of 
alterity’.
2.2 Power, Subjectivation and Freedom
Before I begin a critical discussion of the ethics of the self that Foucault develops in 
The Use of Pleasure, it is first instructive to consider the conceptual shifts that occur in 
his theorization of subjectivity, power and resistance between this volume and the 
earlier discussion of biopolitics developed in The History of Sexuality. In a reflection 
characteristic of his self-interpretation in the interim between the volumes of History 
of Sexuality, Foucault claims that the ‘modus operandi’ of his work was to analyze the 
relation of experiences like madness, death, sexuality, and crime to technologies of 
power, and the problem that emerged during the 1970s was that of individuality or 
the experience of ‘self-identity in relation to the problem of individualizing power’.2 
At the end of this same lecture -  ‘Omnes Et Singulatim’ — he proclaims that the state
2Michel Foucault, ‘Omnes et Singulatum: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’ Power Essential Works 
of Foucault, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and others (New York: New Press, 2000), 
pp.298-325 at 300; Originally published as ‘Omnes et Singulatum: Toward a Critique of Political 
Reason’ [1979] in Tanner Tectures on Human Values, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp.225-254 at 227.
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is both individualizing and totalizing ‘right from the start’ and the only possibility of 
liberation comes from attacking ‘not just one of these two effects but political 
rationality’s very roots’.3
The provocation of this lecture, presented at Stanford in 1979, is reinforced by a 
similar formulation in the crucial essay ‘The Subject and Power’, published in 1982. 
Here, Foucault claims that:
The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to 
liberate the individual from the state, from the state’s institutions, but to 
liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is 
linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the 
refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries.4
These statements bring to the fore the central problem that Foucault claims 
preoccupied him from the early 1970s, that is, the forms of subjection produced 
through techniques of individualization and the correlative political opposition 
required by them. As he claims, ‘it is not power, but the subject, which is the general 
theme of my research’.5 Nevertheless, what this necessitated for Foucault was a 
critique of the rationality of state power, an analysis that accounts for its specificity 
and generality by tracing its points of operation and the means by which it infiltrates, 
produces and constrains the fundamental experiences of our existence, tying ‘us’ to 
operations of power through the imposition of individuality.
While Foucault attempts to establish the continuity of his concerns in this 
reformulation of his project, this also begins to indicate the underlying conceptual 
shifts that took place during this time. For while there is clearly an element of 
continuity in the formulation of individuality as an imposition that ties ‘us’ to the 
operations of the state, there is also an important shift in the conceptualization of 
power and subjectivity that Foucault offers after the publication of The History of
3 Foucault, ‘Omnes et Singulatum’, p.325.
4 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp.208-226 at 216.
5 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.209.
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Sexuality. At the end o f the first lecture o f ‘Two Lectures’, Foucault admits that the 
understanding o f power as war carried out in the arena o f civic peace was not, or was 
no longer, satisfactory for his purposes. This model, he claims, was still tied to a 
conception o f the operation o f power as repression, a notion that he was particularly 
distrustful of, especially given that the task o f genealogy was to show that the 
operations o f power do not take the general form o f repression but o f production .6 
To overcome the attachm ent to a notion o f repression as the raison d'etre o f  pow er’s 
operation, a num ber o f displacements are required; o f these, the decisive one in 
Foucault’s account is that the object or target o f  power relations is no longer the 
body and its forces, but rather acts themselves. This has a num ber o f implications for 
the conception o f subjectivation and resistance that Foucault develops in his later 
work.
As I argued in the previous chapter, the formulation o f  power as warfare that 
Foucault relied upon in the genealogical analyses undertaken in Discipline and Punish 
and The Histoty of Sexuality had as one o f its core precepts that power operates 
immediately on and within the body, w ithout m ediation through the psychic 
operations o f consciousness, conscience and so on. Foucault states that ‘it is always 
the body that is at issue — the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their 
distribution and their submission’7, such that the psyche, soul and subjectivity itself 
are produced as artefacts o f the operations o f  normalization on the body. Flowever, 
in ‘The Subject and Pow er’ Foucault suggests that the exercise o f  power does not 
involve acting on bodies, since ‘a relationship o f violence acts upon the body or upon 
things’, but instead on actions. The exercise o f power should be understood as ‘an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present 
or the future... it is... always a way o f acting upon an acting subject or acting 
subjects by virtue o f their acting or being capable o f action. A set o f  actions upon 
other actions . ’8 He goes on to say that the term  m ost appropriate to describe the 
specificity o f the exercise o f power is that o f ‘conduct’, understood as both a way o f 
leading and o f behaving within a given field o f possibilities. The exercise o f  power
6 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ [1976] in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972- 
1977, ed. Colin Gordon, tr. Colin Gordon and others (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p.92.
7 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 
1977), p.25.
8 Foucault, The Subject and Power’, p.220.
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then takes the form of ‘government’, understood as ‘the conduct of conduct’,9 or as 
‘guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’. 10 
Foucault concludes from this that:
The relationship proper to power would not therefore be sought on the side of 
violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at 
best, only be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the singular 
mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. * 11
Hence, in this essay, Foucault posits government as an alternative to the earlier 
understanding of power as warfare that he had earlier posed in opposition to the 
juridical conception of power.
However, the shift in understanding the exercise of power on the model of warfare 
to that of government does not mean that Foucault wholly reject his earlier thesis on 
biopolitics. Instead, there is a broad congruence between biopolitics and 
governmentality, not only conceptually but also empirically. 12 As we saw in the
9 Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 
pp.1-51 at 2. The phrase ‘conduct of conduct’ is suggested as a definition of governmentality here. For 
Foucault’s earlier discussion of governmentality see Michel Foucault ‘On Governmentality’, I&G  
6(1976), pp.5-21; Reprinted in The Foucault Effect and as Nüchel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in Power: 
Essential Works of Foucault, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: New Press, 2000), pp.201-222.
10 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.221. In the version of this essay reprinted in Power, this 
statement is rendered as ‘the relationship proper to power would therefore be sought not on the side 
of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary contracts (all of which can, at best, only be the 
instruments of power) but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action, neither warlike nor 
juridical, which is government’. (Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in Power Essential Works of Foucault, 
vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and others (New York: New Press, 2000), pp.326-388 
at 341) The only appreciable difference is that the reference to contractualist accounts of the state is 
more explicit in the Power version.
11 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.221. The concept of governmentality has generated one of the 
most substantial and well-developed bodies of literature on Foucault’s work, such that it may be 
considered one of the core concepts in contemporary sociological and political analysis. Its main 
discussants include Mitchell Dean, Barry Hindess, Nikolas Rose, Mariana Valverde, Pat O’Malley, 
Thomas Osborne, Colin Gordon and Graham Burchell and others. See in particular Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991); Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, Foucault and Political Reason: 
Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rode in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999); Barry Hindess, 
Discourses of Power. From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Mitchell Dean and Barry Hindess, 
eds. Governing Australia: Studies in Rationalities of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Nikolas Rose Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Economy and Society, 22:3(1993).
12 Also see Thomas Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the College de 
France on Neo-liberal Governmentality’, Economy and Society, 30:2(2001), pp.190-207.
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previous chapter, biopolitics is a political rationality directed toward the 
administration of life both at the level of populations and individuals, which operates 
through mechanisms of normalization and individualization. Thus, in course lectures 
on governmentality and biopolitics, Foucault remarks that biopolitics must itself be 
understood against the background of the increasing problematization of sovereignty 
and ‘the management of state forces’ that the development of ‘an arts of 
government’ entailed. 13 With this as the background, he defines biopolitics as ‘the 
endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to 
governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human 
beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race. . . ’14 
As this suggests, biopolitics and governmentality are neither mutually exclusive nor 
co-extensive but present interdependent aspects of the operation of power from the 
eighteenth century onwards.15 Keeping within the parameters of Foucault’s 
framework, one might say that while biopolitics provides the rationality of governing, 
the ‘governmentalization of the state’16 provides the state with the capacity for 
biopolitical intervention.
One of the important consequences of this substitution of actions rather than the 
body as the target of power is that the correlative conception of resistance also alters. 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault had argued that power relations are dependent 
upon a ‘multiplicity of points of resistance’, present everywhere in a network of 
power, which ‘play the role of adversary, target, support or handle in power 
relations... inflaming certain parts of the body, certain moments in life, certain types 
of behaviors’. 17 This position is summed up in the pithy claim that ‘where there is
13 Michel Foucault, ‘Security, Territory and Population’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of 
Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, tr. Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1997), 
pp.67-71 at 71.
14 Michel Foucault, ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, tr. Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1997), pp.73- 
79 at 73.
15 For a further discussion of the interdependence of biopolitics and governmentality, with regard to 
both liberal and authoritarian modes of rule, see Dean, Governmentality, especially chapters 5, 6 and 7.
16 Foucault, ‘Govermentality’, p.220; the thesis on the governmentalization of the state that Foucault 
develops in this lecture is posed in implicit opposition to the understanding of the state as a ‘cold 
monster’, which I suggested could be at least partially taken as the metaphor that informed Foucault’s 
earlier formulation of state power.
17 Foucault, History of Sexuality 1, p.96.
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power, there is resistance’. 18 As we saw in the previous chapter, this led to a 
problematic valorization of the body as the ground of resistance, wherein the forces 
that inhere in ‘the body and its pleasures’ are presented as a locus of intransigence 
against the normalizing operations of power. In ‘The Subject and Power’, however, 
the vocabulary of resistance is replaced with that o f freedom, although the role that 
Foucault gives to freedom is formally similar to that o f resistance. As he states:
Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free... 
there is no face to face confrontation of power and freedom that is mutually 
exclusive... in this game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the 
exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist 
for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the 
possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical 
determination [and therefore not a relationship of power])... at the very heart 
of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of 
the will and the intransigence of freedom.19
Thus, freedom is posited in the place of resistance, as the permanent support and 
necessary precondition for the exercise of power, not only in the sense that a subject 
must be free in order to exercise power, but also and more importantly, that power 
can only be exercised over free subjects. But what is invested in the transition from 
the term ‘resistance’ to that of ‘freedom’? For all their affective force, Foucault’s 
comments on freedom are perhaps the most difficult aspect of his later work to 
understand.
What does seem clear is that it is insufficient to simply argue that while Foucault 
initially provided a negative or ‘reactive’ conception of opposition to power in 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality for instance, in the later work he 
elaborates a positive, active conception .20 Such arguments either tend to obscure the 
other significant conceptual shifts that attend this terminological transposition or, 
contradictorily, lend credence to the claim that Foucault reinstates a metaphysical
18 Foucault, History oj Sexuality 1, p.95.
19 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.221-222.
20 For a version of this argument, see Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, A n  Ethics o f  Dissensus: Postmodernity, 
Feminism and the Politics o f Radical Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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conception of the subject in his later work by overstating those shifts.21 But what is 
curious about the conception of the subject that Foucault suggests in ‘The Subject 
and Power’ is its striking continuity with his earlier understanding of individuality and 
subjectivity as effects of normalization. For as Foucault defines it in this essay, to be 
a subject means to be ‘subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied 
to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ .22 Both these meanings, he 
claims, ‘suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to ’.23 In this 
sense then, Foucault maintains the position that individuality is produced through the 
operations of power, such that subjection is itself a form of imposition and 
constraint. It is precisely because of this that Foucault proclaims the necessity of 
‘refusing’ the subjectivity constituted through the ‘simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures’24 and valorizes the ‘struggles against 
individualization’ that he takes certain social movements such as feminism to be. But 
at the same time, Foucault’s definition of power raises the possibility and indeed 
necessity of there being ‘free subjects’, such that one might be led to understand that 
the constitution of freedom is itself part of the process of becoming subject: in other 
words, freedom is itself, or at least risks becoming, an artefact of the operations of 
power.25 The apparent tension in these claims also points to a more substantial 
ambiguity in Foucault’s later work.
The conjunction of the introduction of the terminology of freedom into an analytics 
of power and the maintenance of a conception of subjectivity as imposition effected 
through normalization and individualization highlights an important aspect of 
Foucault’s later work that has only been brought out indirectly in secondary 
literature. What occurs in this conjunction is an effective transposition of the 
potential for political opposition vis-a-vis individualizing political rationalities from
21 See for instance Lois McNay, Foucault: A. Critical Introduction (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994); Peter 
Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995); 
also see C. Collwell, ‘The Retreat of the Subject in the Late Foucault’, Philosophy Today (Spring 1994), 
p.56-69.
22 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.212.
23 Foucault, The Subject and Power’, p.212.
24 Foucault, The Subject and Power’, p.216.
25 See Rose, Powers of Freedom, p.63; Barry Hindess, ‘Politics and Governmentality’, Economy and Society 
26:2(1997), pp.257-272 at 266-269; Hindess, Discourses of Power, p.128; also see Dean, Governmentality, 
p.13.
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the body to subjectivity itself. In effect, Foucault moves away from the problematic 
conception of the body imprisoned by individuality presenting a raw intransigence 
against operations of power to a formulation that predicates strategies of political 
opposition on the freedom that inheres in being a subject. Interestingly, the ethics of 
self-formation that Foucault develops in The Use of Pleasure and related texts rely on 
this predication for their apparent political potential while simultaneously posing 
freedom as the effective consequence of the de-subjectivation effected through the 
ethics of self-formation. There is then a fundamental ambiguity in the later ethics in 
that in order to engage in the process of de-subjectivation and the supervening 
practice of liberty that this entails, one must already be constituted as a free subject. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I explore some of the implications of this, 
particularly with regard to the political potential of an ethics of self-formation as a 
response to the dangers of biopolitics. First, then, further explication of the notion of 
an ethics of the self is required.
2.3 The Citizen-Subject of the Ethics of the Self
The analytic shift undertaken for the later volumes of History of Sexuality is indicated 
in Foucault’s comment that a ‘history of desiring man’ required that he focus not 
only on the ways in which subjection is produced through the operations of regimes 
of power and knowledge, but also on ‘the forms and modalities of the relation to self 
by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject’.26 While the 
earlier texts had been concerned with the production of subjects through techniques 
of power, Foucault claims that in the investigations he undertook for The Use of 
Pleasure, he became increasingly aware of the significance of a different type of 
technology involved in the process of subject-formation or sub jectivation.27 He calls 
these technologies of the self, which he defines as
26 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, vol. 2 [1984], tr. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin Books, 1985), p.6.
27 Michel Foucault, ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at 
Dartmouth’, Political Theory 21:2(May 1993), pp.198-227 at 203.
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techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain 
number o f operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own 
thoughts, on their own conduct... so as to transform themselves, modify 
themselves, and to attain a certain state o f perfection, o f happiness, o f purity, o f 
supernatural power and so on.28
In short, technologies o f the self encompass the practices and means by which 
individuals subjectify themselves as ethical subjects, that is, in making themselves 
subject to particular moral codes, modes o f being, or aesthetic or ethical criteria. 
Foucault’s analyses in the later volumes o f Histoty of Sexuality are thus a genealogical 
analysis o f the practices by which individuals bring themselves into relation with 
moral codifications and values and thereby constitute themselves as subjects o f 
ethical codes, that is, as ethical subjects .29
The crucial dimension o f technologies o f the self then is the relation that individuals 
establish with themselves. This determines the way in which individuals constitute 
themselves as subjects o f their own actions through certain practices and associated 
matrices o f knowledge .30 Foucault claims that the practices o f ethical self-formation 
that he came to recognize through the focus on the various problem atizations o f sex 
in Antiquity were closely related to a technique or art o f  living, an ‘aesthetics o f 
existence’. In classical Greece, he argues, ‘sexual activity and sexual pleasures were 
problematized through practices o f the self, bringing into play the criteria o f an 
aesthetics o f existence’ .31 Foucault defines the ‘arts o f existence’ as ‘those intentional 
and voluntary actions by which m en not only set diemselves rules o f conduct, but 
also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and 
to make their life into an oeuvre, that carries certain aesthetic values and meets
28 Foucault, ‘Hermeneutics of the Self, p.203; Foucault, The Use of Pleasure.
29 See Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990).
30 It should be noted that the relation to oneself established through technologies of the self 
instantiates a particularly ethical subject, and while there are definite links between the domains of the 
ethical and the political in Foucault’s work, it would be overly hasty to collapse the ethical into the 
political. Nevertheless, what we can say is that an aesthetics of existence establishes a passage between 
these domains wherein the ethical problem of self-relation becomes political through the practice of 
liberty.
31 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.12.
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certain stylistic criteria’. 32 In other words, an arts, or aesthetics o f existence involves 
establishing a particular relation to oneself that requires the adoption o f certain 
ethical principles and associated practices which allow individuals to act upon their 
bodies, souls, thoughts and conduct in order to transform  themselves and attain a 
certain state o f happiness, wisdom, purity, health or personal fulfillment. It is a 
m atter o f developing a certain reflexive relation to oneself that constitutes oneself as 
an ethical subject o f one’s own actions, through the selection o f a certain action or 
form o f being as the object o f ethical concern and transform ation, according to 
voluntarily applied aesthetico-ethical criteria.
Importantly, this is not simply a m atter o f maintaining an ethical relation to oneself, 
which would be deeply narcissistic, but rather a m atter o f how one forms oneself as 
an ethical subject. This means that the ethics o f the self does not simply involve a 
return to a voluntarist conception o f the subject that retreats from the anti-humanist 
critique o f the earlier work as some critics have claimed .33 As Foucault explains, while 
‘the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices o f the self, these 
practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are 
models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him 
by his culture, his society, his social group ’.34 Thus, practices o f the self are given by 
the culture in which an individual lives, but in taking up such practices, the subject 
actively constitutes its own identity and ethical capacity. Certainly, there is room  to 
question Foucault’s formulation here, since the im position o f a m odel o f behavior in 
the constitution o f the subject is different from  that model being found by the 
subject or indeed, being suggested or proposed by the culture or social group o f the 
subject. Furtherm ore, there is an element o f the paradox o f referentiality that Butler 
identifies in her discussions o f the subject in Foucault’s formulation, insofar as one 
m ust refer to a subject before it can be said to have come into being . 35 Nevertheless,
32 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.10-11.
33 See further, Pierre Macherey, ‘Foucault: Ethics and Subjectivity’, in In a Materialist Way: Selected 
Essays, ed. Warren Montag, tr. Ted Stolze (London: Verso, 1998), pp.96-107; also see McNay, Foucault,
p.162.
34 Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth, Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, tr. Robert Hurley and others 
(London: Penguin, 1997), pp.281-302 at 291.
35 Judith Butler, The Psychic IJfe of Power Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997), p.4.
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the important point is that the process of ethical self-formation requires a relation to 
oneself and to power and knowledge that permits the constitution of oneself as an 
ethical subject. It entails a kind of transitive relation of auto-affection, although it is 
true that Foucault gives little elaboration to this relation.36
Nor does Foucault’s ethics of the self simply entail a retreat to an elitist or nihilistic 
aestheticization of one’s life and body away from the politically engaged critiques of 
biopower and forms of domination undertaken in earlier work.37 The notion of an 
aesthetics of existence has given rise to a great deal of misunderstanding of 
Foucault’s later work. What should be kept in mind is that the notion of an aesthetics 
of existence is not a retreat from ethical practice, but rather, an elaboration of it. The 
aesthetics or arts of existence that an ethics of the self entails are not simply a matter 
of treating oneself well or with concern for one’s physical beauty. Nor is it simply a 
question of a ‘synergy between the ethical and the aesthetic’38 as certain sociological 
approaches tend to emphasize, but rather a stylization of life itself, of human being. 
It is a matter of living one’s life according to an aesthetic or ethical code that 
operates as an overriding principle of existence, which gives coherence to one’s life 
and actions and to which the minutiae of everyday living is subsumed. One’s life is 
given an internal teleology, a coherence of signification, which is observed and 
reinstated in one’s daily practices and modes of conduct. In short, it is a matter of 
making of one’s own life and self a ‘work of art’, of participating in a practical 
process of self-formation guided by an overriding principle of ethical concern.
36 For an excellent discussion of the conception of the relation of self to self that Foucault relies upon 
and the tensions that it introduces into his work see Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the 
Transcendental and the Historicaltr. Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), esp. pp.149- 
187. Unfortunately, I came across this text too late to incorporate Han’s discussion into the arguments 
of this chapter in a more substantial way, although her discussion of the ambivalence in Foucault’s 
later conception of the self-constituting subject — simultaneously autonomous and subjected within 
regimes of power and knowledge — clearly has implications for my argument though at least on the 
face of it they are supporting ones.
37 Rainer Rochlitz, ‘The Aesthetics of Existence: Post-Conventional Morality and the Theory of 
Power in Michel Foucault’ in Tim Armstrong, ed. and tr. Michel Foucault: Philosopher (New York: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p.248-258; See McNay, Foucault, p.147 for a critical discussion of this 
claim. One presupposition that informs this argument is that a concern with beauty or aesthetics is 
necessarily opposed to and leads away from a concern with politics and justice. For a recent critical 
discussion of this see Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and Being just (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999).
38 Michel Maffesoli, The Ethic of Aesthetics’, Theory, Culture and Society, 8:1(1991), pp.7-20 at 18.
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However, it is im portant to specify the object o f concern here. While such an ethics 
o f the self has a concern for others as an effect, it is always the case that concern for 
the self is ethically prior to concern for others, since tire relation that one has with 
oneself is ontologically prior .39 Foucault explains that for the Ancient Greeks, the 
care o f oneself produces an ethical subject w ho is then able to act correctly toward 
others, since ‘self-rule moderates rule over others ’ .40 W hat underpins this correct 
acting toward another is the question o f dom inadon and liberty, for an ethics o f the 
self involves a self-reflexive reladon to one’s own freedom  that makes o f that 
freedom both a practical exercise and the object o f ethical concern. In short, an 
ethics o f the self entails a ‘problem atization o f freedom ’ .41 By this, Foucault means 
that the elaboration and maintenance o f one’s freedom form the guiding principles 
o f  the practices upon oneself; in other words, the ethos or aesthetics o f existence that 
one develops is predicated on and directed toward the elaboration o f one’s freedom. 
This is then a ‘practice o f liberty’, in that freedom  is not given once and for all, but 
requires a practical exercise upon oneself to be m aintained and elaborated. Concern 
for the other emerges as an epiphenom enon o f the concern for maintaining one’s 
freedom, since acting tyrannically toward another is indicative o f the slavishness o f 
one’s own person vis-ä-vis one’s desires and will. However, the relation that one has 
with others is not the object o f  ethical concern but an effect and limit upon the care 
that one has for oneself, such that ruling another is not unethical in itself but modes 
o f ruling might be indicative o f  a failure to care for oneself.
Contrary to John  Rachjman’s position then, the central problem atic for Foucault is 
no t community but freedom .42 While Rachjman is right to say that the emphasis on 
subjectivation does not entail a retreat to an individualistic or private practice o f 
aestheticizing one’s life, his claim that what is im portant in an ethics o f the self is the 
‘bonds’ o f community, oversteps the mark somewhat. While community does play an 
im portant role in the elaboration o f freedom, it does so in a particular way, which 
does not supplant the priority o f freedom. If  there are consequences for community
39 See Foucault, The Ethics of Concern for Self, p.287.
40 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.81.
41 Foucault, The Ethics of Concern for Self, p.286.
42 John Rajchman, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Eacan and the Question of Ethics (New York: Routledge, 
1991), p.99.
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within Foucault’s ethics, they are ultimately epiphenom enal vis-a-vis the practice o f 
liberty. But nevertheless community, and especially political community, also 
operates as the presupposed condition o f an ethics o f the self and the practice o f 
liberty that it entails. W ithin the analysis o f Greek ethics that Foucault develops, 
freedom is only assured within political community, since participation in the polis is 
the condition o f freedom, though it is not thereby freedom itself. Conversely, 
freedom conditions political participation, such that the relation o f freedom and 
governing can be understood as one o f reinforcing interdependence.
As Foucault points out in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, the ethical practices 
he examines were directed at men, and particularly free men. Fie states ‘it was an 
ethics for men: an ethics thought, written, and taught by m en and addressed to m en 
— to free m en obviously ’ .43 The ostensible purpose o f this com m ent is to justify the 
focus on m en and male sexual behavior in the later volumes o f the History of Sexuality. 
It was not an ethics directed toward the sexual practices o f wom en, Foucault says; 
rather, it was ‘a male e th ics... in which w om en appeared only as objects or, at m ost, 
as partners that one had best train, educate and watch over when one had them  
under one’s power, but stay away from when they were under the power o f som eone 
else (father, husband, tutor) ’ .44 W hether or no t this focus is justified, this com m ent 
has two other implications. First, it establishes liberty as the empirico-historical 
ground o f  an ethics; thus when Foucault states elsewhere that ‘freedom is an 
ontological condition o f ethics. But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes 
when it is informed by reflection ’,45 the empirical trace should be read in this 
statement. Furtherm ore, the identification o f an ethics o f the self with the practices 
o f free men in Ancient Greece brings into focus that these ethics are closely related 
to the status o f citizenship and participation in the polis, the place o f politics.
W hen pressed on this last point, Foucault suggests that for the Greeks, an ethics o f 
the self immediately coincides with the political insofar as both  are grounded in 
liberty, where liberty is understood both as the collective freedom o f the citizen and a
43 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.22.
44 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.22.
45 Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for Self, p.285.
85
matter of the power that one has over oneself, that is, as a form of positive 
freedom.46 As Foucault states ‘the freedom that needed establishing and preserving 
was that of the cidzens of a collectivity of course, but it was also, for each of them, a 
certain form of relationship of the individual with himself.47 This statement suggests 
that the latter of these freedoms is more important to Foucault. It also shows that 
the practices of the self that Foucault describes are effectively predicated on the 
freedom that obtains through participation in the polis. That is, for the Ancient 
Greeks, being a free citizen was a necessary condition of participation in an ethics of 
self-formation and a practice of liberty geared toward the correct governing not only 
of oneself but also of those outside the status of citizen.
2.4 Ethics Against the Politics of Life and Death
The inter-relation of individual freedom maintained through practices of the self on 
the freedom given through citizenship that Foucault identifies as one of the 
conditions of ethical self-formation in Ancient Greece has received little attention in 
discussions of his later work. Nevertheless, it does have important implications for 
how his ethics can be understood and for their utility as an ethico-political response 
to biopolitical subjection. Flowever, in drawing out these implications, it is 
insufficient to simply argue from the model of the free citizen as it appears in 
Foucault’s description of Ancient Greece, not least because the terms of citizenship, 
freedom and the polis do not operate in the same way in the contemporary world as 
they did in Ancient Athens.48 More importantly, the question that arises is whether 
the genealogical analysis of practices of ethical self-formation can be normativized to 
provide a model of ethical practice that simultaneously brings into question standard 
moral codifications and establishes a new form of ethical practice and relation to
46 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.78-80.
47 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.79.
48 For a recent consideration of the differing ways in which citizenship operates as a technology in the 
constitution of alterity in Ancient Greece and contemporary politics, see Engin F. Isin, Being Political: 
Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Isin argues that ‘when 
social groups succeed in inculcating their own virtues as dominant, citizenship is constituted as an 
expression and embodiment of those virtues against those that lack them’ (Isin, Being Political, p.275). 
Taking up the normativity that such a conception of citizenship brings to light, my argument in this 
section suggests that freedom can itself be seen as one of the ‘virtues’ of citizens, a virtue that is 
lacking in those excluded from the status of citizen. However, the added complexity here is that 
freedom is itself an effect or artefact of citizenship.
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oneself and others. Within this, a distinction can also be made between two 
theoretical tendencies, the first of which is the extent to which Foucault himself 
intended such a model of ethical practice to provide a model of ethical practice today 
and the second of which concerns the way in which other theorists have 
normativi2ed Foucault’s genealogical account of ethical self-formation, apart from 
Foucault’s own aims.
On the first of these points, the question of the relevance of such an ethics for 
contemporary politics was frequendy posed to Foucault in discussions leading up to 
the publication of the later volumes of the Histoty of Sexuality project. Despite this 
though, it remains unclear precisely what role Foucault saw such an ethics having, 
though it is clear diat he was not urging a simple return to the Greeks as a liberatory 
or utopic move in itself, nor urging the full adoption of their ethics.49 Foucault 
frequently rejected such a return to the Greeks: as he stated, ‘The Greek ethics of 
pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an 
obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own 
energy... all that is quite disgusting!’50 Yet, he apparendy also saw an ethics of self­
formation as potentially opening a space for re-treating the forms of subjectivity 
available to us today and for creating new ways of living and relating. This is amply 
clear in the comments he makes on homosexuality in a several interviews, where he 
proclaimed for instance, that the work that one does on oneself to transform oneself 
may allow one to ‘invent... not discover — a manner of being that is still 
improbable’.51
49 The ambiguity of Foucault position on the contemporary relevance of an ethics of the self is well 
indicated in the comments he makes in the interview ‘The Ethics of Concern for Self as a Practice of 
Freedom’, where he suggests both that a practice of freedom is a necessary accompaniment to post­
colonial liberation and that the relevance for a care of the self for contemporary politics is a problem 
he has not made much progress with, but would ‘like to come back to’. See Foucault, ‘The Ethics of 
Concern for the Self, p.282, 294.
50 Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’ Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth, Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, tr. Robert Hurley and others 
(London: Penguin, 1997), pp.253-280 at 258.
51 Michel Foucault, ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, tr. Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin, 1997), pp.135- 
140 at 137.
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Hence, analysis of the formation of the ethical subject effected through the notion of 
a practice or care of the self appears to provide Foucault with a means of explicating 
the process by which subjects act upon themselves to form themselves as ethical 
beings. It simultaneously provides a way of articulating a capacity or potential to 
undo or reconfigure those relations through a self-reflexive ‘practice of freedom’ that 
did not posit an essential resistance in the body. Perhaps we could say then that while 
Foucault rejected the substance or content of the Greek ethics, he nevertheless saw 
ethical and political potential in their form, as a way of undertaking the intellectual 
and political task of ‘getting free of oneself.52 While it would be injudicious to simply 
transpose the political and ethical formuladons of the Ancient Greeks to 
contemporary ethical and political theorizing for several reasons then, Foucault does 
appear to take some inspiration from them and at least occasionally suggests that 
such a conception of ethical practice might provide a model for a reconsideration of 
ethics and politics today.
This inspiration is particularly well encapsulated in the notion of an ‘ascescis’ ([askesis), 
defined as ‘an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought’55 that Foucault links to 
the practice of liberty and political potential of self-formation. In this light, 
Foucault’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ can be read as an attempt to elaborate a 
particularly modern ascesis through the conjunction of a Kantian-inspired historico- 
philosophical ‘ontology of ourselves’ and a Baudelairian-inspired modern ‘aesthetics 
of the self. In this essay, Foucault isolates a critical attitude of modernity, not unlike 
‘what the Greeks called an ethos1,54 which behooves the modern man to ‘invent 
himself through an ascetic elaboration in which a ‘practice of liberty simultaneously 
respects [the reality of modernity] and violates it’.55 Foucault thus casts die critical 
ethos of modernity as a work of ascesis or activity of thought, directed toward the 
identification of the contemporary limits of being and their possible transgression; as 
he states ‘the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves [is] 
a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work
52 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.8.
55 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.9.
54 Nüchel Foucault ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in The Foucault Reader A n  Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, 
ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984), pp.32-50 at 39.
55 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p.41.
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carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings’ .56 It is worth noting here that 
this formulation also clearly evinces the ambiguity in the status of freedom in an 
ethics of self-formadon, in that it is precisely as a ‘free being’ that one engages in the 
‘possible transgression’ of the historical limits of being.
The formulation of practices of the self as ascesis provides the philosophical 
backdrop to Foucault’s claim that what is required within gay politics is not the 
affirmation of homosexuality as identity, but rather, the development of a 
homosexual ascesis or work upon oneself and the limits of being to produce new 
‘modes of life’.57 Taking cue from this, a number of theorists have understood 
Foucault’s ethics of the self to provide an account of a means of resistance to forms 
of domination, particularly those based on sexual identity, and have thus 
normativized the model of ethics that he discusses. This project is further reinforced 
by the opposition Foucault posits between an arts of the self and the hermeneutics of 
the self that he claims characterizes the operation of biopolitical subjection. As he 
states, the themes of sexual austerity that characterized the ethics of the self of 
Ancient Greece should not be understood as ‘an expression of, or commentary on, 
deep and essential prohibitions, but as the elaboration and stylization of an activity in 
the exercise of its power and the practice of its liberty’. 58 The contrast of an ethics of 
the self with the ‘hermeneutics of the self is also present in the claim that ‘this kind 
of ethics was [not] an attempt to normalize the population’. 59 From this, the ethical 
practice of an arts of the self appears to provide a model for an ethico-political 
response to the problematic of the political technology of individualization, as a 
means of promoting ‘new forms of subjectivity though the refusal of this kind of 
individuality which has been imposed upon us for several centuries’ .60 It is precisely 
on this basis that queer theorists such as David Halperin have taken Foucault as
56 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?’, p.47.
57 Foucault, ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’, p.137.
58 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.23.
59 Foucault, ‘Genealogy of Ethics’, p.254.
60 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p.216.
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celebrating the ‘transformative power of queer sexual practices’, aimed not at 
liberation but at the formation of a queer practice of the self and way of life.61
Regardless of whether such a normative derivation was actually intended by 
Foucault, a significant problem emerges in such projects. For normative derivations 
from Foucault’s later work tend to reduce the ambiguity of the status of freedom in 
the ethics by presupposing a one-sided analysis of freedom as the consequence of a 
practice upon oneself. In doing so, they fail to recognize the way in which such 
practices are predicated on freedom. The politics of self-formation that underpins 
this position rest on the more or less explicit presumption of a political value and 
efficacy in ‘becoming otherwise than one is’ in order to tear oneself from normalizing 
and individualizing technologies of subjectivation. The value and efficacy of political 
intervention in subject-formation is taken to lie in the formation of non-hegemonic 
identifications and practices and the correlative breakdown of hegemonic 
identifications such that self-formation is understood as an exercise upon oneself in 
the struggle for liberty. In short, it understands liberty as an unproblematic political 
good to be sought after and fought for. As such, this position effectively replaces the 
notion of freedom as the object of ediical problematization that Foucault argued 
animated practices of the self of the Ancient citizens with a more contemporary 
conception of freedom as the goal of political transformation and struggle, and 
moreover, as the bulwark of the individual citizen against the State, or in Foucauldian 
terms, against governmental technologies of individualization and normalization. 
Flowever, this misses the ambiguity involved in Foucault’s formulation, which takes 
ethical self-formation as a means by which freedom is elaborated and maintained, 
such that freedom appears as both a condition and consequence of working on oneself. 
To return to the statement from ‘What is Enlightenment?’ that I cited above, it is as a 
free being that one works upon oneself in order to reconstitute, in both the 
connotations of re-establishing and transforming, the limits of one’s being.
To clarify this further, a more specific understanding of what Foucault means by 
freedom is required, as it may be that there are different kinds of freedom that
61 David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Toward a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p.96.
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condition or arise from an ethics of the self. Although the distinction between 
positive and negative liberty elaborated by Isaiah Berlin does not sit entirely easily 
with Foucault’s account of freedom, it may nevertheless help heuristically in 
clarifying the nature and status of freedom within Foucault’s ethics.62 Talcing up and 
revising this distinction, Paul Patton has argued that the account of freedom that 
Foucault develops emphasizes ‘the importance of individual capacities as 
preconditions for the exercise of freedom’63 and two forms of constraint on those 
capacities. The first of these, which is closely related to Berlin’s conception of 
negative liberty, are external constraints imposed upon the individual that constrain 
the paths of action they may undertake. The second are internal limits, such as ‘the 
psychological effects of insecurity, dependence or trauma’64 on one’s capacity to 
formulate and undertake paths of action, such that the degree to which an individual 
is constrained by such internal limits indicates a diminution of positive freedom. 
Patton’s account of positive freedom differs from Berlin’s then in the way in which it 
de-emphasizes the desire or will for self-government and emphasizes internal 
constraints upon individual capacities. That is, for Berlin, positive freedom derives 
from a ‘wish on the part of an individual to be his own master’,65 whereas for Patton 
positive freedom refers simply to the individual’s capacity to formulate and follow 
paths of action regardless of external constraints — but with regard to internal 
constraints on that capacity.
While there is still clear overlap between the conceptions of negative and positive 
freedom in Berlin’s sense and the reformulation that Patton offers, the important 
difference is that for Patton, there is no need to posit two different kinds of freedom 
as such. All that is required is recognition of different constraints on the capacities of
62 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), pp.118-172.
63 Paul Patton, ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom’, Political Studies, 37(1989), pp.260-276 at 
262.
64 Patton, ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom’, p.262; also see Patton’s use of the notion of 
‘critical freedom’ -  initially suggested by James Tully in Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of 
Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) — in relation to the Deleuzian notion of 
becoming in Paul Patton, Deleu^e and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000), p.85. Tully’s concept of 
critical freedom is not altogether dissimilar to the way in which Foucault develops the notion of 
ascesis. Further, Tully’s claim that ‘the goods of belonging and freedom support rather than oppose 
each other’ (Tully, Strange Multiplicity, p.207) in contemporary constitutionalism gives support to the 
argument I make here.
65 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p.l 31.
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the individual to act: that is, negative or external constrains, and positive, or internal 
constraints. Consequently, his account also requires a thinner conception o f the 
subject, in that all that is required is that the subject o f freedom be seen as an 
individual with the capacity to act, not as having a particular desire or will for a 
specific kind o f freedom. Patton goes on to argue from this that Foucault’s concern 
with resisting the individualizing technologies that produce subjects tied to an 
identity is a concern with the enhancem ent o f positive freedom and the possibilities 
o f  what people might be. Thus, ‘the “work o f freedom ” may be regarded as a process 
o f cultural self-creation, one which seeks to expand the space o f possibilities for 
personal identity’.66 Hence, Foucault’s account o f freedom  minimally presupposes a 
thin conception o f the subject having the capacity for acting, for responding in one 
way or another in any given situation and for self-form ation .67
Patton’s characterization o f Foucault’s conception o f the freedom involved in self­
form ation as positive freedom is an im portant clarification o f Foucault’s arguments. 
In particular, it helps to bring out that there are not different kinds o f  freedom  per se, 
but that the realization o f capacities through either the absence o f internal and 
external constraints is fundamentally interrelated. As he points out, making use o f 
one’s negative freedom depends on the exercise o f positive freedom in the sense that 
it requires the absence o f certain internal limitations. In addition to this, the 
realization or exercise o f positive freedom in the sense o f the lack o f internal
66 Patton ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom’, p.266.
67 Patton, ‘Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom’, p.268. While Patton’s understanding of 
freedom as a capacity for acting does help explicate a sense in which Foucault is able to avoid 
returning to a humanist subject in which freedom is essentially freedom of the will, problems can 
emerge with this formulation. In Christopher Falzon’s treatment of freedom as capacity in Foucault and 
Social Dialogue: Beyond Fragmentation (Routledge: London, 1998) for instance, freedom and power 
effectively become co extensive. Falzon claims that ‘freedom for Foucault is our capacity or power to 
act’ (p.52). However, this fails as a definition of freedom, in that further specification of the act is 
required: not all capacities to act could possibly be understood as free, since having a gun held to one’s 
head still allows one to act, but it does not allow one to act in the way that one might want to act if 
that goes against the commands of die gun-holder. Thus, an element of interest and will appears to 
sneak back in. Falzon’s way of delimiting the actions that might count as free is to suggest that a 
further sense of freedom is ‘the capacity to transgress socially unposed limits’ (p.52). Hence, 
Foucault’s conception of freedom amounts to a ‘non-normative notion of freedom, freedom 
understood simply as the human capacity for transgression’ (p.53). But tying freedom so strictly to 
transgression raises substantial problems, not only in that it is not clear that Foucault is as committed 
to the notion of transgression as this equation suggests but also because freedom is essentially equated 
with desubjectivation. Consequently, this position fails to fully address what is entailed in being a ‘free 
subject’. Avoiding these difficulties requires that the distinction between positive and negative liberty 
be emphasized. Hence, while I do not fully endorse the understanding of freedom as capacity, the 
revised distinction between positive and negative freedom that Patton provides does help to elaborate 
the status of freedom within Foucault’s ethics.
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constraints upon the capacities of the individual also depends upon the existence of a 
degree of negative liberty. In other words, the freedom entailed in self-formation and 
the development of an ethos of living necessarily requires the prior existence of an 
arena or area in which a person can act without interference and coercive limitation 
of the paths of action or modes of being available to them. The interrelation of 
negative and positive liberty might then be taken to inflect Foucault’s suggestion that 
‘freedom is an ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered form drat 
freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. ’68 In this statement, we can 
understand the freedom that provides the ontological condition of ethics as negative 
liberty and the considered form that that takes as positive freedom, as self-formation 
or ethics understood as ethos, such that negative liberty appears as a precondition of 
positive liberty within Foucault’s formulation of an ethics of the self.69
In this context, it is worth considering the claim that freedom is itself a technology of 
government and particularly of liberal government made by a number of theorists 
engaged in analyzes of liberalism as an arts of government in the wake of Foucault’s 
account of the governmentalization of the state.70 The starting point for this claim is 
that as a form or mode of governing, liberalism presupposes and circumscribes an 
arena of freedom as the domain of the free actions of the individual beyond the 
purview of the state. However, governmentality theorists argue that the 
circumscription of this arena of freedom is not thereby opposed to the governmental 
strategies, but provides the means of their operation. Freedom itself provides the 
means and techniques of governmental intervention, and as such, liberal 
governmental strategies establish and rest on the constitution of its subjects as free. 
In a sense then, the notion of a ‘free subject’ is not so much descriptive as 
performative, constituting freedom as the domain and reality of the liberal subject 
while simultaneously bolstering the operation of liberal techniques of governing. As
68 Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for Self, p.285.
69 I am not addressing the degrees of freedom that might be required for a practice of liberty to take 
hold here. On tins point, it is worth noting that Foucault’s formulation of power suggests that a power 
relation requires at least a minimal degree of negative freedom on the behalf of the agent over which 
power is exercised. On the face of it though, the practice of liberty that an ethics of the self entails 
seems to require a higher degree of negative liberty.
70 For discussions of tins claim, see in particular the contributions of Nikolas Rose, Graham Burchell 
and Barry Hindess in A. Barry, T. Osborne, N. Rose, eds. Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo- 
Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); also see Hindess, 
Discourses of Power, p.128-134.
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Nikolas Rose states, ‘the importance of liberalism is not that it first recognized, 
defined or defended freedom as the right of all citizens. Rather, its significance is that 
for the first time the arts of government were systematically linked to the practice of 
freedom’.71
As dris quote from Rose suggests, the claim that freedom is produced as an artefact 
of government goes to both negative and positive liberty in the senses outlined by 
Patton. While the former is the most easily recognizable in that the delimitadon of 
the domain of the free subject against the more or less coercive intervention of the 
state has been central to the project of liberalism, the latter is indicated in the 
suggestion that there is a ‘systematic link’ between arts of government and a practice 
of freedom. Empirically, this link is borne out through recent work that analyzes the 
practical, governmental enhancement of the subject’s positive capacities for 
autonomy and perhaps a little paradoxically, for self-government.72 Barbara 
Cruickshank has argued, for instance, that the ‘self-esteem movement’ aimed at the 
enhancement of personal autonomy and capacities for socially valuable action 
effectively links subjectivity and self-analysis to liberal arts of government, such that 
‘self-esteem is a technology of citizenship and self-government’.73 Effectively, the 
raising of self-esteem is taken to be an enhancement of the positive freedom of an 
agent, and its operation as a technology of government suggests that the 
enhancement of positive freedom is not alien to the concerns of liberalism. This 
concern with positive freedom is also borne out logically given the interdependence 
of positive and negative freedom indicated above.
To be clear, my point is not that the practice of freedom that Foucault urges in his 
ethics of the self is simply an uninterrupted repetition of an illusory liberty. The 
constitution of the subject as free means that while freedom might emerge as an
71 Rose, Powers of Freedom, p.68.
72 This suggests an interesting reversal from the situation of the Greeks, in which working upon 
oneself in a practical exercise of freedom was aimed toward the task of governing well; today, it is 
apparently geared toward being governable.
73 Barbara Cruikshank, ‘Revolutions Within: Self-Government and Self-Esteem’, in A. Barry, T. 
Osborne, N. Rose, eds. Foucault and Political Reason: Uberalism, Neo-Fiberalism and Rationalities of 
Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.234
94
artefact and support of government, it is not simply an illusion.74 Rather, 
paraphrasing Foucault, one might say that it has a reality in that it is permanently 
produced on, around and within the body of the subject who enacts that freedom in 
their choices, practices and modes of being.75 Consequently, in taking freedom as a 
condition of an ethics of the self, Foucault effectively limits such an ethics to the 
practical domain of the free subject — that is, of the citizen.76 Both negative and 
positive liberty are inaugurated and circumscribed within a liberal arts of government 
as freedoms of the citizen, in the sense that both are produced as artefacts of 
government, but also in the sense that each is central to participation in the polity.77 
An ethics of the self entails a problematization of the freedom given in the 
emergence of a citizen subject, a practical exercise of that freedom directed toward 
its maintenance and elaboration through an ascesis or work upon oneself in the 
exercise of thought. Furthermore, given that ‘the citizen is unthinkable as an 
“isolated” individual, for it is his active participation in politics that makes him 
exist’,78 then working upon oneself as citizen subject presupposes at least a minimal 
inclusion and (opportunity for) participation within political community.
Strictly speaking then, an ethics of the self based on the practice of liberty is an ethics 
of the citizen.79 In other words, an ethics of the self rests on the presupposition of 
inclusion within political community, a point that is crucial for clarifying the limits of 
Foucault’s ethics of the self in the context of biopolitical subjection. If practices of 
the self are predicated on the freedom that obtains within the limits of political 
community, they are effectively an ethics of the free citizen subject, not of the
74 Rose, Powers of Freedom, p.63.
75 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.29.
76 Etienne Balibar, ‘Subjection and Subjectivation’ in Jean Copjec, ed. Supposing the Subject (London: 
Verso, 1994), pp.1-15.
77 Also see James Tully, ‘The Agonic Freedom of the Citizen’, Economy and Society 28:2(1999), pp.161- 
182. On the point that Foucault’s work provides an agonic conception of the political and of ethics, 
see in particular William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralisyition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995).
78 Etienne Balibar, ‘Citizen Subject’, in E. Cadava, P. Connor and J-L Nancy, eds. Who Comes After the 
Subject (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.33-57 at 51.
79 iLis claim is not the same as the charge made in feminist critiques that an ethics of the self is the 
providence of a privileged elite. The extension of the status of citizenship from its limited version in 
Ancient Athens to contemporary nation-state citizenship means that the breadth of subjects able to 
engage in ethical practices of the self has also changed.
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foreigner, or the ‘part without part’ as jacques Ranciere puts it.80 And if Foucault’s 
ethics of the self reach their limit with the limit of the polity, it is difficult to see how 
such an ethics yields an account of response to and responsibility toward those 
others excluded from the polity, constituted in ways other than as free subjects. In 
light of this, the claim that the ethics of the self provide an oudine of a response to 
biopolitical subjection takes on a particular ambivalence, for it is not clear that an 
ethics that does not critically broach the political determination of life worth living 
can yield a relation to die excluded part of the political that can be considered 
ethical.81
80 Jacques Ranciere, Disagreements: Politics and Philosophy, tr. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p.9; Also see Jacques Ranciere, On the Shores of Politics (London: Verso, 1995); 
Jacques Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, 5:3(2001).
81 It should be kept in mind here that exclusion from political community does not equate to being 
‘outside power’. Rather, it indicates a more limited exclusion from governance, or die ‘community of 
the governed’, and as Foucault’s earlier work makes clear, the limits of governance are not the same as 
the limits of power. In this perspective, governance is a particular set of technologies of power that do 
not exhaust all the possible and actual mechanisms and technologies by which relations of power 
operate. While governance is crucial to the constitution and maintenance of political community, it is 
not the only, or even necessarily the most important, technology in operation in any given situation. 
Similarly, exclusion from the polity is not equivalent to exclusion from politics per se, since the political 
is not reducible to the polity, although participation in each is fundamentally inter-related widi 
participation in the other. What is at issue though is precisely this inter-relation, for as Jacques 
Ranciere suggests, ‘it is through the existence of this part of those who have no part, of this nothing 
that is all, that the community exists as a political community’. See Ranciere, Disagreement, p.9; also see 
Isin, Being Political, p.275-285. Also see Jean-Luc Nancy’s comment in his book, The Experience of 
Freedom, tr Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) against Foucault that 
‘politics does not primarily consist in the composition and dynamics of power... but to the opening of 
a space... by freedom’ (p.78). Nancy follows up this comment with a footnote on Foucault’s ‘Omnes 
et Singulatum’. As he says, ‘in reality, we have a choice of defining politics between two poles: either 
the Aristotelian definition of the “political animal” in terms of the disposition of logos insofar as it 
involves justice, good and evil, etc. and in terms of the nonuselful finality of “living well” (eu %en); or at 
the other pole, the technology of power’ (p,193n.ll). Nancy links these poles through the freedom 
that is essential at each. In addition, it can be said that an investigation of biopolitics is in itself an 
attempt to think these poles together. It is also worth noting that there is an ambiguity in Foucault’s 
conception of ‘the political’, where on the one hand politics appears to be coterminous with 
governmentality, and on the other, to be essentially anti-governmental. See Barry I Iindess, ‘Politics 
and Liberation’ in Jeremy Moss, ed. The Eater Foucault: Politics and Philosophy (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
1998), pp.50-63; Barry Hindess, ‘Politics and Governmentality’, Economy and Society, 26:2(1997), 
pp.257-272; also see Ranciere’s critique of Foucault’s conception of the political in Disagreements, p.32. 
The potential distinction between power and politics in Foucault’s work is also evinced by his initial 
distinction between biopower and biopolitics, where the latter designates one of the poles of the 
development of the former. However, this is not a distinction that Foucault rigorously maintains. 
Further, to the extent that Foucault associates biopolitics with the governmental apparatuses of 
administering life, a slight shift is required to see biopolitics as the form of the decision of the political, 
taking effect between the poles of the good life and power. The importance of Foucault’s discussion 
then lies in bringing these poles together in thinking through the interaction of the adjudications of 
life and the operations of power in a non-reductive way.
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2.5 Beyond the Citizen-Subject: Contingency and Responsibility
If an ethics of the self is at base an ethics of the free citizen subject, the question of 
whether such an ethics can generate sufficient ethical concern for others who are 
excluded, for one reason or another, from that status still remains. In this secdon 
then, I ask whether Foucault’s ethics can be extended beyond the limits of political 
community to yield an ethical relation to the ‘part without part’. Two questions need 
to be taken up in order to establish this: first, whether Foucault’s ediics of the self 
yield an ethical concern for the other, and second, whether that concern can broach 
the problems of political exclusion. Underpinning these questions are broader issues 
concerning the normative content of Foucault’s formulation of an ethics of the self 
and the contingency of the relation to the other that may or may not be yielded in the 
acting upon oneself in the exercise of one’s freedom. In addressing these issues, I 
argue that the later ethics founder on the lack of an elaboration of necessary ethical 
obligation to others. From this, I suggest that Foucault’s ethics require 
supplementation with recognition of necessity of concern for others, a claim that I 
draw out through discussing Eva Ziarek’s recent articulation of an ethics of 
dissensus.
I mentioned previously that while concern for oneself takes precedence in an ethics 
of the self according to Foucault’s descriptive account of ethical self-formation in 
Ancient Greece, concern for others is nevertheless an important aspect of such 
practices. Foucault’s discussion of the ethical practices of the Ancient Greeks 
describes concern for others primarily in terms of good governing and the avoidance 
of domination that this entailed. As Foucault describes it, the Greek ethics of the self 
were intimately tied to the question of governing, in the sense that self-rule 
moderates rule over others. Yet there is litde indication within Foucault’s work that 
this descriptive claim can be understood normatively, nor does it seem on the face of 
it that such a model, even if normatively construed, would be adequate to yield an 
intersub jective ethics. But if this relation cannot be understood as a normative model 
for ethical elaboration, it remains fundamentally unclear what kind of relation to 
others an ethics of self-formation generates for ethico-political practice today. For 
the relation to others that an ethics of the self entails is conditioned by an inherent 
contingency, which means both that the particular form that that relation takes is
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subject to historico-cultural variability and more importantly, that concern for others 
is not in itself a necessary aspect of an ethics of the self.
Thus, there are two levels to the contingency that inheres in Foucault’s formulation 
of an ethics of the self, the first of which addresses the historical contingency of 
particular forms of ethical self-formation and the relation to others this may or may 
not entail. The second, more fundamental sense goes to whether such an ethics 
entails concern for others at all. The first of these is evident in the descriptive 
account of ethical self-formation that Foucault develops in the later volumes of 
History oj Sexuality, where he genealogically traces the historical variation of 
techniques of the self geared toward the formation of oneself as a an ethical subject. 
In this, Foucault argues that historical changes in morality can be traced at two levels, 
first at that of moral codification and secondly at the level of the practices by which 
one subjectifies oneself in relation to moral codes. While the latter of these appears 
to Foucault to be subject to great variation, he finds in the former a surprising 
‘poverty and monotony of interdictions’ .82 What is important here is the double 
aspect of Foucault’s analysis, in diat it emphasizes the historicity of practices by 
which one establishes a relation to an over-riding moral injunction or delimitation of 
behavior.
While a number of theorists emphasize Foucault’s distinction between moral 
codification and ethos as the basis of a reconsideration of ethics and politics, in The 
Use of Pleasure and elsewhere Foucault does recognize a fundamental interdependency 
of ethos and moral codification.83 As he argues, ‘every morality, in the broad sense, 
comprises the two elements... [of] codes of behavior and modes of 
subjectivation.. .[which] can never be entirely dissociated, though they may develop
82 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.250.
83 Han, Foucault's Critical Project, p.158-161. As Han points out, the implicit refutation of the Kantian 
moral a priori that underlies the distinction that Foucault makes between moral codes and ethos or 
modes of self-formation does not amount to a return to ‘pre-“codified moralities”, but offers instead 
‘a rereading or reinterpretation of what it means to be moral, which reveals, even at the heart of the 
moralities of the law, the need for ethical problematization’ and self-formadon (Han, Foucault's Critical 
Project, p.161.). The distinction between ethos and moral code is important for William Connolly in 
particular; See William Connolly, ‘Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault’, 
in Jeremy Moss, ed. The Tater Foucault: Politics and Philosophy (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998); Connolly, 
The Ethos oj Pluralipation.
\
98
in relative independence from one another’.84 Hence, although it was not elaborated 
as a universal law compelling obedience by everyone, even the ethos or stylization of 
being of the Ancient Greeks was guided by a fundamental imperative. As Foucault 
states, ‘in antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of freedom has revolved around 
this fundamental imperative: “Take care of yourself” .85 The point of contrast 
between the Ancient Greek ethics of the self and later formulations of ethical 
practice for Foucault then is not stricdy the existence or not of a more or less 
codified moral injunction, but the scope of application of that injunction. For the 
Greeks, the rules of conduct applied only to an elite, whereas later formulations of 
moral codes were understood to apply universally. While Foucault himself does not 
always maintain adequate recognition of this fundamental interdependency, at times 
overemphasizing the differentiation between ethical practice as stylization of oneself 
and submission to a ‘universal law’,86 he was not advocating an ethics as ethos 
independent from any particular injunction upon self-stylization.
To the extent that he advocates reclamation of the Greek injunction to ‘take care of 
oneself as the delimiting principle of an ethics of the self, an element of normativity 
emerges in Foucault’s later work. This recalls the distinction that I suggested earlier, 
whereby Foucault’s relation to the Greeks might be understood as one of finding 
potential in the form of an ethics of the self but not in their determinate content or 
particular practices by which one places oneself in relation to the injunction to care 
for oneself. As I have argued, the particular value that Foucault appears to find in 
this form of ethical injunction is that it delimits an ethos of self-formation and 
practice of liberty, whereby one’s freedom is elaborated in a practical exercise of 
thought directed toward de-sub jectivation understood as the transgression of the 
limits of being enforced through sub jectivation. To be sure then, Foucault’s advocacy 
of an ethics of the self guided by the principle of taking care of oneself is limited: it 
does not amount to positing a universalizable moral principle but is instead a 
proposal for a non-universalized model of acting upon oneself in order to develop 
new ways of being. As Patton notes, ‘Foucault’s problem is not that of formulating 
the moral norms that accord with our present moral constitution, but rather the
84 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.29.
85 Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self, p.285.
86 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, p.250.
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Nietzschean problem of suggesting ways in which we might become other that what 
we are’ .87 Nevertheless, to the extent that a practical exercise upon oneself as ethical 
subject is fundamentally interdependent with a more or less codified moral principle, 
then ‘taking care of oneself appears as the delimiting injunction of an ethos of de- 
subjectivadon.
Foucault has frequently been criticized for the inadequacy of such a principle of 
delimitation, particularly on the basis that it generates an individualistic aestheticism. 
Without buying into the sometimes hyperbolic character of these critiques, there is 
something to the charge that Foucault’s ethics provide insufficient delimitation of the 
kind of practice and relation established in that practice that would count as ethical, 
not only in the sense of an ethos or style of being but also in the more familiar sense 
of duties and obligations in relation to others. Flowever, the problem goes deeper 
than the particular formulation of a prescriptive delimitation on an ethics of the self, 
for it raises the question of the necessity or contingency of concern for others per se. 
More particularly, it raises the question of the concern for the freedom of others and 
especially for those whose capacity to partake in an exercise of freedom is severely 
constrained by their exclusion from political community. For while an ethics of the 
self may take the elaboration of freedom as its central concern, without recognition 
of a fundamental responsibility or concern for others, there is no guarantee that the 
concern with the elaboration of one’s own freedom will extend to concern for the 
freedom of others. The problem is that without a necessary and prior responsibility 
for others, it may be that certain practices of the self yield a concern for others, but 
whether they do remains entirely contingent. The consequence of this is expressed in 
the worry that the elaboration of freedom in an ethics of the self may lead to little 
more than an individualistic concern with one’s own capacities and modes of being 
and a correlative disregard for those of others. This problem is well expressed in 
Berlin’s summary statement in regard to positive freedom that ‘freedom for the 
wolves has often meant death to the sheep’ .88
87 Paul Patton, ‘Foucault’s Subject of Power’, Political Theory Newsletter, 6(1994), pp.60-71 at 71.
88 Berlin, Four Essays on Eiberty, p.xlv.
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The potential danger of an ethics of the self that does not posit any necessary 
concern for others can be illustrated through a brief consideration of James 
Bernauer’s attempt to use Foucault’s conception of ethical pracdce to understand 
aspects of German Nazism. Bernauer opposes the ethics of the self to biopolitical 
subjection, and claims that an ‘aesthetics of existence is in contrast and resistance to a 
“science of life” ... Foucault’s history of sexuality points to the ethical task of 
detaching ourselves from those forces which would subordinate human existence 
(bios) to biological existence (^ö<?)’.89 Bernauer interprets Foucault’s ethics as an ethics 
for thought against ‘the crisis of a politics of life versus death’. On the basis of this, 
he develops a reading of the Nazi epoch that rejects die claim that Nazism was 
amoral or immoral, to show the way in which Nazism itself might be understood as 
an ethic. He claims that Foucault’s work on ethics provides an implicit cridque of 
such an explanadon and ‘indicates a promising reversal of perspecdves for future 
research and understanding: an examination of Nazism not as nihilism but as an 
intelligible ethic’.90
Bernauer’s use of Foucault is illuminating to the extent that it reveals aspects of the 
ethos, or way of being of Nazism. However, it is difficult to see how this lends itself 
to a ‘post-Auschwitz ethics — beyond the politics of life and death’. While the claim 
that Nazism can be understood as an ethic is etymologically accurate, insofar as an 
ethic is synonymous with an ethos, a way or style of being, there is something 
intuitively wrong with such a view. Something of this intuition is brought out in 
Giorgio Agamben’s study of Auschwitz, where he develops an ethics of witnessing 
based on the figure of the Muselman, ‘the living corpse’ that populated the German 
death camps, not yet dead, but without the sensate characteristics of the living. 
Commenting on the ethics of Primo Levi, Agamben suggests that:
89 James Bernauer, ‘Beyond Life and Death: On Foucault’s Post-Auschwitz ethic’, in Tim Armstrong, 
ed. Michel Foucault: Philosopher (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp.260-278 at 262.
90 Bernauer, ‘Beyond Life and Death’, p.273. It should be noted though that Bernauer’s use of 
Foucault’s analysis of ethical practices of the self to characterize Nazism as an ethic is not prescriptive 
but critical and analytic. To the extent that Bernauer is prescriptive, this lies in the notion of an ethics 
of critical thought. Nevertheless, his account does point to a problem in the claim that Foucault’s 
ethics constitute a response to the dangers of biopolitics.
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With a gesture that is symmetrically opposed to that of Nietzsche, Levi places 
ethics before the area in which we are accustomed to think of them [that is, 
before the judgment of responsibility and guilt]. And... we sense that that this 
“before” is more important than any “beyond” — that the “underman” must 
matter to us more than the “overman. ” 91
One implication of this is that Bernauer is looking in the wrong place for a ‘post- 
Auschwitz ethic’: it is not the masters to whom we should be looking but the 
enslaved. Importandy though, there is no condition internal to Foucault’s ethics that 
establishes and secures the necessity of the shift in focus suggested here; rather, at 
best, the contingency of concern for others over and against concern for one’s own 
self and the freedom elaborated in that concern leaves the question of what counts as 
ethical practice open.
In tight of this, a stronger recognition of responsibility appears necessary if ‘the agon 
of... politics... will all be instances of good and just democratic politics as opposed 
to being instances of fascism, xenophobic nationalism, right-wing populism . ’92 
However, this recognition does not necessarily entail the elaboration of a moral 
foundationatism to undergird political participation, such that a determinate politics 
can be simply deduced from moral codification. Rather, the point is that recognition 
of a fundamental and necessary ethical responsibility is required as a delimiting 
condition of the contingency of the political. As Simon Critchley has argued of 
Derridean deconstruction, recognition of an infinite ethical obligation to the other is 
a condition for the contingent political decision, wherein the decision of the political 
can the thought of as ‘the art of response to the singular demand of the other, a 
demand that arises in a particular context... and calls for political invention’.93 While 
the ethical demand of the other operates as a condition of the political, tire political 
decision cannot simply be read off from this demand. Instead, the passage from the 
ethical to the political is struck by a hiatus or indeterminacy, and rather than
91 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants o f Auschm ty. The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 
p.21. I discuss this text at length in the final chapter.
92 Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference’, in Seyla Benhabib, ed. 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996), p.8.
93 Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Eevinas and Contemporaiy French Thought 
(London: Verso, 1999) pp.254-286 at 276.
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underm ining the ethical delimitation o f the political, the indeterminacy o f this 
passage is itself the potential o f ethics and politics. As Derrida states, ‘ethics enjoins a 
politics and a law ... But the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains 
undetermined, still to be determ ined... singularly in the speech and responsibility 
taken by each person in each situation and on the basis o f an analysis that is each time 
unique ’.94 In other words, an ethical responsibility that obtains before the political 
decision operates as a necessary delimitation on that decision, though it does not 
thereby determine the content o f the decision itself or the circumstances in which it 
m ight be taken .95
The strong response from theorists concerned with establishing a necessary ethical 
element in the relation o f oneself to others can thus be traced to the contingency o f 
concern for others that Foucault’s ethics entails. In particular, a num ber o f  theorists 
have urged a return to a Levinasian ethics as a means o f articulating an ineliminable 
ethical demand given in the encounter with the other against Foucault’s form ulation 
o f an ethics o f the self. Barry Smart for instance, has questioned whether Foucault’s 
uncritical adoption o f the priority o f the relation o f self to self in ethical practice 
undermines the ethical value o f his later work, as it fails to provide an effective 
challenge to the contemporary ‘cult o f the se lf and moreover, obscures the necessary 
anteriority o f responsibility for the other vis-a-vis concern for oneself. Drawing on 
Em m anuel Levinas’s position that the asymmetrical face-to-face encounter is the 
essence o f ethics, Smart argues that ‘it is only possible for care for self to encompass 
care for others if there is from the beginning, if there is already, a responsibility for 
the other, an unmeasured non-reciprocal responsibility ’.96 Thus, he hopes to shore up 
ethical responsibility through positing an unimpeachable ethical obligation in the 
relation to the other. But in doing so, Smart does not give an indication o f  how such 
an obligation is related to political contingency. However, as Critchley suggests, this 
move is necessary in order to separate the ethical demand elaborated by Levinas 
from the determination o f the content o f the political decision.
94 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 115; also 
see Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, p.278.
95 See Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, p.283.
96 Barry Smart, ‘Foucault, Levinas and the Subject o f Responsibility’ in Jeremy Moss, ed. (1999) The 
Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998), pp.78-92 at 87.
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While Smart rejects Foucault’s ethics of the self and argues for returning to a 
Levinasian account of ethical responsibility against what he takes as individualistic 
indifference, other theorists have been less quick to draw such a strong distinction 
between Foucault and Levinas. Instead, they have sought to establish congruence 
between Foucault’s ethics of the self and an ineliminable ethical responsibility. Ewa 
Ziarek has recently taken up such a project in her attempt to integrate Foucauldian 
and Levinasian concerns in the development of an ethics of dissensus as the 
foundation of radical democratic politics.97 Ziarek argues that while Foucault’s ‘ethos 
of becoming’ is indispensable for a feminist ethics of dissensus, such an ethos 
‘reaches its limit in the context of the nonappropriative relations to the Other’98 and 
hence, turns to Levinas’s formulations of this relation in order to supplement and 
rework Foucault. While maintaining that an ethos of becoming is crucial to the 
radical democratic project, Ziarek also finds it necessary to supplement Foucault with 
an engagement with Levinas’s account of the ethical encounter with the Other and 
the rethinking of community and difference that this entails. She seeks to negotiate a 
path between the ethos of freedom that she finds in Foucault and an ethos of alterity 
found in Levinas, two forms of ethical theorizing that she understands to be opposed 
m the ‘seemingly irreconcilable dilemma of freedom and obligation’.99
For Ziarek, the particular value of Foucault’s account of an ethics of the self lies in 
the potential it opens for the creation of new modes of life through an experimental 
praxis of becoming. She draws upon Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault to 
elaborate the ways in which a practice upon oneself exceeds the enabling social 
conditions that ground it to achieve a certain ‘singularity’ and freedom through an
97 Ewa Plonowsky Ziarek, A n Ethics of Dissensus: Postmodemity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical 
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Foucault’s lack of specificity on the concern for 
others yielded in an ethics of the self has allowed for various characterizations of this concern. 
Reading Foucault in the terms of a politics of recognition has emerged as one of the main strategies of 
interpretation in recent years and Ziarek provides one of the more sophisticated renderings of this 
interpretation. For another less compelling version, see Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics 
of Freedom (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), p.l 53. Dumm claims that the concern for the other is 
principally recognitive, where ‘the cultivation of ourselves is no exercise in narcissism but involves a 
deeper engagement with others as we cultivate them and get them to recognize ourselves in response’. 
Apart from the infelicity of Dumm’s formulation, wherein the recognitive relation to the other is 
deeply narcissistic, there is little textual evidence within Foucault’s later work to support this 
formulation of the concern for others.
98 Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus, p.8.
99 Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus, p.2.
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‘experimental ethos of becoming’. 100 This, she argues, is ‘crucial for a redefinition of 
contemporary democratic struggles beyond the liberation of repressed identities’ . 101 
Through the conjunction of an ethics of self-formation and an ethics of alterity, then, 
Ziarek aims to develop an ethics directed toward the transformation of existing 
‘unjust power relations and [the assumption of] an infinite responsibility for violence 
and the oppression of others’ and the provision of ‘a new basis for democratic 
politics’. 102 Such an ethics, she claims, is crucial for intervention in and opposition to 
the biopolitics of contemporary technologies of power, in which power relations 
work through the disciplinary ‘materialization’ of sexed and raced bodies.103 Hence, 
Ziarek’s attempt to extend Foucault’s ethics focuses less on the particular relational 
matrix in which an ethics of the self were initially elaborated and more on the ethico- 
political potential for transformation that appears to attend working upon oneself in 
the exercise of freedom as a means of yielding an ethical relation to the other.
The importance of Ziarek’s argument is that it strives to bring out the 
interdependency of ethics and politics in a way that recognizes the contingent 
decision of the political and the ineliminable responsibility of the ethical. 
Nevertheless, her explication of the interdependency of the ethical and the political 
fails in important respects. Most importantly for this discussion, while Ziarek seeks 
to find a path between the apparent opposition of freedom and obligation this 
project is stymied by her interpretation of Foucault, particularly her failure to read 
the fundamental interdependency of freedom and political community within his 
later work. As I have argued, within Foucault’s ethics freedom and community are 
not so much opposed as brought into a relation of mutual interdependence and 
tension. It is not that the practice of freedom undertaken by a subject opposes it to 
community, but that immersion within political community conditions that practice 
and vice versa. However, the rendering of an ethics of the self as an ethos of
100 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988), esp. the 
chapter entided ‘Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation)’.
101 Ziarek, Ethics ofDissensus, p.42.
102 Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus, p.219.
103 The term ‘materialization’ is in fact taken from Judith Butler’s work rather than Foucault’s. I 
discuss this further in the following chapter, but suffice to say that for Butler ‘materialization’ indicates 
die process by which embodied subjects are brought into being by the operations of power. As I point 
out in the following chapter, it does does not operate in the same way as Foucault’s more limited 
notion of normalization.
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becoming takes liberty as the effective consequence of the practical work upon 
oneself. In doing so, the way in which such working upon oneself also presupposes 
liberty as a condition of an ethics of the self is occluded. This has two important 
consequences.
First, the ethos of becoming that Ziarek explicates repeats a failure within Foucault’s 
account of an ethics of the self to consider the risks of de-subjectivation.104 This 
problem arises as a result of the tendency to see subjectivation as an imposition, 
without considering the ways in which subjectivation is itself a positive political 
operation. After all, it is only as subjects that individuals partake in political 
community.105 Returning briefly to the example of Nazism discussed above assists in 
bringing this problem out more clearly. As Ziarek argues, a Foucauldian ethics 
emphasizes working upon oneself in an ethics of becoming or de-subjectivadon as 
the means of freeing oneself from individualizing and normalizing biopolitical 
techniques. However, as Agamben points out, ‘the Muselmann produced by 
Auschwitz is the catastrophe of the subject... the subject’s effacement as the place of 
contingency and its maintenance as existence of the impossible’. 106 Agamben’s point 
is complex and I return to it in the final chapter, but one of the implications of his
104 The significance of this point can be illustrated through a brief consideration of two examples of 
what could be understood as illustrations of becoming, or processes of de-subjectivation, the first 
taken from Renata Salecl, (Perversions of hove and Hate (London: Verso, 1998) and the second from 
Joao Biehl, ‘Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment’, Social Text 19:3(2001), pp.131-149. Salecl 
describes the Russian artist Oleg Kulik, in the following way: ‘he usually has a dog-house built for a 
performance, and lives in the gallery day and night totally naked, walking and barking like a dog. He 
became famous when he started biting visitors to two art shows in Zurich and Stockholm. In both 
cases, the organizers of the shows called the police, who enchained Kulik and took him to the police 
station for questioning’ (Salecl, (Pefversions of hove and Hate, p.104). Joao Biehl relates the second in a 
discussion of biopolitics in Brazil: ‘In 1998 some twenty homeless persons, including children, invaded 
an abandoned zoological garden in the city of Pelotas, 150 miles away from Porto Alegre. The 
squatters made their rooms in the cages. “Luiz Carlos Apio is one of the new residents of the Zoo, “ 
wrote the Brazilian Jornal da da ciecia (SBPC 1998). “He is handicapped and an unemployed auto 
worker. Luiz made his house in the place formerly destined to the rabbits. In order to enter, he has to 
go through a small door no more than half a meter high’”(Biehl, p .l41). While there are a number of 
important differences between these examples, one of the most crucial emerges in the fact that when 
questioned by police, Kulik stopped pretending to be a dog, and reinvoked a reliance on rights while 
attributing some of the blame for the incident to spectators, ‘who treated him as a dog’ (Salecl, 
(Perjversions of hove and Hate, p .l08). This suggests that the rights that obtain in subjection place a 
crucial delimitation on becoming and raise the question of responsibility in relation to rights, which I 
will take up further in the final chapter.
105 Indeed, as will become apparent in the following chapters, one can understand political struggles 
based on recognition as struggles for the status of subject rather than struggles against it.
106 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwits^ p .l48.
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discussion of the subject is that the politics of ‘making live’ or ‘letting die’ play out on 
‘the batdefield of subjectivity’, 107 and in doing so, destroy the claim to subjecthood.
Consequently, the radical incapacity of the individual to enter into the discursive and 
enunciative ‘vacant place’ of the subject suggests that it is insufficient to see de- 
subjectivation as essentially or necessarily liberatory. 108 This also means that the 
dangers or risks of de-subjectivadon are not simply the psycho-social risks of 
madness, depression or addicdon; nor are they simply the risks of re- 
territorializadon, the capture or blockage of becoming in the repeddon of the 
same. 109 Rather, the process of becoming carries with it the risk of exclusion, violence 
and abandonment. This means then that understanding subjecdvation as violent 
imposition and de-subjecdvation as a concomitant process or practice of liberation 
presents an overly reductive picture of the operations and conditions of 
subjecdvation. What needs to be brought out here is the double movement by which 
violence both constitutes political subjection and destroys the embodied subject, 
casting the body as ‘volumes in perpetual disintegration’110 while enforcing 
attachments to political subjection.
Second, the positing of freedom as a consequence of an ethos of becoming 
effectively blocks Ziarek’s attempt to overcome the opposition between freedom and 
obligation. For in positing freedom as the aim and consequence of an ethos of 
becoming, she ultimately reinscribes the opposition between freedom and obligation 
and reinstalls an individualistic characterization of ethico-political participation that 
takes political community as limiting rather than — in an important though 
ambiguous sense — as enabling and productive of political freedom. Textually, this
107 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz p.142.
108 See Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). Scarry’s analysis of physical pain and specifically torture reveals that the 
annihilating capacity of violence lies in die language-destroying attributes of pain, which can be 
understood as the destruction of one’s status as subject and political participant.
109 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A. Thousand Plateaus, tr. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press: 1987), pp.209-309; Brian Massumi, A  User’s Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleave and Guattari (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1992).
110 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139-164 at 148.
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point is evinced in her formulation of the obligation of response and responsibility as 
a ‘burden’ or limit upon freedom . 111 While recognizing the antagonism that attends 
negotiation between ‘the seemingly incompatible claims of freedom and 
obligation’, 112 Ziarek fails to consider a more fundamental interdependency between 
freedom and obligation. This interdependency is suggested in Etienne Balibar’s claim 
for instance, that ‘die value of human agency arises from the fact that no one can be 
liberated or emancipated by others, although no one can liberate himself without 
others’. 113
In this light, it is now possible to give a positive twist to the formulation of freedom 
and political community elaborated above. For this indicates not only that practices 
of the self are predicated on the freedom yielded within political community, but also 
that freedom is itself conditioned by political community. In other words, the 
freedom that is elaborated and maintained in an ethics of the self reveals a 
fundamental indebtedness of the subject to others, though one which is not brought 
out in Foucault’s formulation. This begins to indicate a more complex 
characterization of the relation between freedom and obligation than that posited by 
Ziarek, for here the social and political relations that the subject is necessarily 
embedded within condition practices of freedom. This suggests that the irreducible 
and ineliminable responsibility for the other may not be as incompatible with the 
claims of freedom as Ziarek supposes. Nevertheless, even with recognition of this, 
we are still theoretically within the boundaries of political community. For here, it is 
still the case that the others in relation to which freedom and obligation co-mingle 
are those other subjects within political community. Flow then, can a conception of 
freedom and responsibility be extended to recognize a political and ethical 
indebtedness to the foreigner, ‘the part without part’, the other whose presence 
brings the boundary of political community into relief? 114
111 Ziarek, Ethics ofDissensus, p.10.
112 Ziarek, Ethics ofDissensus, p.221.
113 Balibar, ‘Subjection and Subjectivation’, p.12
114 This question also opens into literature on cosmopolitanism, particularly that inflected by 
postcoloniality, poststructuralism and deconstruction, or what might be called a ‘new 
cosmopolitanism’. Of this emerging literature, see in particular, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds. 
Cosmopolites: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); 
Jacques Derrida, tr. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (New York: 
Routledge, 2001); Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, tr. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University
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To summarize then, I have argued that the theoretical shifts that Foucault effects 
between the first two volumes of History of Sexuality move away from the problematic 
valorization of the body that I identified in the previous chapter by shifting the locus 
of political agency from the resistances of the body to the subject’s practice of 
freedom. I have also argued that the elaboration of an ethics of the self that Foucault 
develops posits a relation of interdependency between freedom and political 
community. This reveals an important ambiguity at the heart of an ethics of the self 
in that the subject must already be constituted as free to engage in an ethics of the 
self and concomitant practice of liberty. In drawing out the implications of this, I 
argue that if the ethics of the self are effectively an ethics of the citizen, then it is 
unclear that such an ethics yields sufficient ethical concern for those beings excluded 
from political community, a criticism which I suggest is particularly pertinent in the 
context of biopolitics. In particular, such an ethics of the self seems limited in the 
face of systematic violence and the destruction of the subject that this entails. The 
scope of such an ethics is limited to considering the role of subjectivation within the 
borders of political belonging and as such, does not yield an ethico-political response 
to the dangers of biopolitical determinations on life and death beyond that. This 
means that the claim that the ethics of the self that Foucault develops in his later 
work constitute an ethical response to the political dangers of biopolitics needs to be 
tempered somewhat, not only through further specification of what those dangers 
are, but also through a consideration of what ethics might be possible beyond the 
boundaries of political community.
Press, 2000); Hakan Seckinelgin and Hideaki Shinoda eds. Ethics and International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001); for a recent consideration of the role of to the foreigner in the constitution of 
political community see Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001). Also see Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991).
109
110
Chapter 3
The Body of Signification: Butler on Materiality, 
Subjection and Social Death*
Without a repetition that risks life — in its current organization — how might we 
begin to imagine the contingency of that organization, and performatively 
reconfigure the contours of the conditions of life?* 1
3.1 Introduction
While Foucault refused to engage questions o f psychic attachments to subjection and 
the particular vulnerability that this engenders for the survival of the subject, these 
problems form the core of Judith Butler’s response to Iris work. In her work from 
Gender Trouble to Antigone’s Claim, Butler addresses two interconnected issues: first, 
the normative production of subjects and the correlative excluded domain of the 
abject by hegemonic relations of power and second, tire possibilities for social 
transformation engendered by the process of subjectivation and the peculiar agency 
of the abject. Explicitly framed as a response to Foucault’s work, Butler takes 
seriously his claim that the subject is produced by power, developing a critical 
account of constructivism that reconsiders questions of materiality, agency and the 
subject’s vulnerability to power’s abuses. This means that in responding to Foucault, 
Butler does not simply take up his problematic, but instead mobilizes several of his 
claims in order to provide, ultimately, a theorization of subjectivation and resistance 
that draws not only on Foucault, but also on Derridean deconstruction, 
psychoanalytic theory, speech act theory and the political claims made within 
literature on radical democracy.
This chapter draws on arguments previously published in Catherine Mills, ‘Efficacy and 
Vulnerability: Judith Butler on Reiteration and Resistance’, Australian Feminist Studies 15:32(2000), p. 
265-279.
1 Judith Butler, The Psychic Fife of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p.29.
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Given Butler’s concerns, it may not be immediately obvious what contribution her 
work makes to an understanding of biopolitics; her terms of analysis are gender, 
sexuality, abjecdon and reiteration, not the relation between biological and political 
life. Nevertheless, Butler poses reflection on the constitution of lives worth living as 
the central concern of her work. Indeed, die animating question of it appears to be 
that posed in the introduction to Bodies that Matter. ‘What challenge does that 
excluded and abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force a 
radical rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count 
as “life”, lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving? ’2 This 
question opens Butler’s work to a different set of concerns than she is usually taken 
to be addressing by highlighting the way in which a discussion of ‘bodies’ opens into 
a discussion of ‘life’, since lives and bodies are intricately connected through an 
inextricable interdependence of the political and the biological. The conceptual 
indistinction or ‘indiscernibility’ indicated in this statement might in fact be usefully 
exploited to examine the relations between biological and political life, relations that I 
argue are established through the process of subjectivation.3 Hence, in this chapter, I 
develop a ‘biased’ reading of her work that moves between the terminology of life, 
bodies and ways of life in order to bring out the contribution that Butler makes to a 
consideration of biopolitical subjection.4
In this chapter then, I develop a reading of Butler’s work that foregrounds her 
understanding of the normative constitution of lives worth living. I focus on Bodies 
that Matter and The Psychic Life of Power as these provide the most theoretically 
elaborated accounts of subjectivation and political exclusion. I argue that her work 
provides important insights into an analysis of biopolitics, particularly in its 
explication of the means by which the body enters into the political field. I examine
2 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.16; 
emphasis added.
3 For a discussion of conceptual indiscernibility, see Gilles Deleuze, What is Philosophy? tr. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 19-20. I take this notion to indicate that 
the borders or contours of concepts can never be rigorously distinguished, since their components are 
intrinsically and extrinsically linked to other concepts and conditions. It is not a term that Butler uses, 
but there is some resonance between this notion and the deconstructive strategy of identifying the 
points at which attempts to establish conceptual closure fail.
4 See Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ft hies and Politics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997) especially his chapter entitled ‘Reading Foucault on a Bias’. His use 
of the term ‘bias’ emphasizes the sense of a reading that traces a line across the grain of the text, not 
of one based on a pre-assessment.
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Butler’s critical claims concerning the necessarily normative constitution o f the body 
within exclusionary regimes o f  signification to draw out her understanding o f die 
relation between biological and political existence. In particular, I show that the 
process o f materialization that Butler elaborates initiates an understanding o f the 
relation o f materiality and signification as chiasmatic and therefore neither separable 
nor reducible. However, I also suggest that she is ultimately unable to maintain this 
figuration and occasionally slides into a reductive identification o f signification and 
materiality.
From  this, I develop a critical discussion o f her account o f  political exclusion 
understood as abjection and social death and her attem pt to explicate an agency o f 
the excluded. I argue that Buder’s account o f the agency o f the excluded is weakened 
by her tendency to understand power as singularly constitutive, a tendency that feeds 
into a crucial vacillation between the efficacy o f resistance and o f power such that 
resistance is cut through with failure from its emergence to its incapacity to produce 
the effects it seeks to produce. While Buder’s re-conception o f  exclusion as social 
death and the agency that this spawns in The Psychic Life of Power can be read as an 
attem pt to overcome the problems identified in Todies that Matter, I argue in  the final 
section o f this chapter that this problem atic vacillation reappears in this later text. I 
show that the m etaphorics o f death that Buder employs result in a figuration o f 
resistance as suicide, such that she establishes a rhetorical link between freedom and 
death that ambiguously wavers between understanding death as a m om ent o f 
liberation or a m om ent o f  destruction.
3.2 Subjectivation and Materialization
Butler’s engagement with the question o f life w orth living begins in her early text, 
Gender Trouble, where she examines the ways in which gender identity is constituted as 
fixed or essential through an exclusionary heterosexual matrix. In questioning the 
politics o f representation that are often taken as the sine qua non o f feminist politics, 
Buder develops the notion o f performativity to account for the constitution o f 
gender identification in and through regulatory apparatuses o f power. Taking 
inspiration from Nietzsche’s claim that ‘there is no being behind doing, effecting,
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becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything’,5 
Buder argues that gendered behavior is not expressive of an inner gender identity but 
is rather constitutive of it insofar as that behavior is itself performative. By 
performative, Butler does not mean that gender is a performance, thus recalling the 
problem of the actor who — more or less voluntarily -  assumes an identity, plays it, 
and hangs it up again at the end of the day. Rather, the notion of performativity 
points to the constitutive force of behaviors, behaviors that are simultaneously 
grounded on psychic identifications with hegemonic norms of gendered identity and 
constitute those identifications.
This also brings to the fore the claim that insofar as gender identity is performative, it 
is repeated and it is in this repetition that the possibility for agency appears. Thus, 
Butler claims that:
The subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern 
the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the rules 
through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather 
a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules 
precisely through the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all 
signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; “agency”, 
then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition.6
This means that in Gender Trouble, Butler saw the gendered subject neither as rule- 
bound to the extent of that there was no such thing as agency, nor as voluntarily 
enacting subversive performances. Instead, she attempted to locate the possibility of 
agency not in the subject per se, but in the necessary repetition of the rules that 
govern subject-formation .7
5 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), p.25. 
Also see Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, tr. Walter Kaufmann and R.J Holhngdale 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p.45.
6 Butler, GenderTrouble, p.145.
7 This attempt to undo the voluntarist-determinist opposition that had plagued debates on 
constructivism and political agency seemed, unfortunately, to be undermined by the discussion of drag 
performance in the final chapter of Gender Trouble, which prompted criticisms from both sides of the 
debates. Tire displacement of agency from the subject to the necessary repetition of the rules by which 
the subject came into formation seemed to be occluded in this debate.
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There is no need to rehearse the criticisms made against Butler’s conception of 
subjecdvation and agency given in Gender Trouble. Instead, two other claims outlined 
in this text are more important for the current discussion. First, Butler argues against 
the constructivist positing of ‘the body’ as a passive surface that exists prior to the 
cultural inscriptions necessary to attain cultural meaning and intelligibility. She claims 
that within constructivism,
the body is figured as a mere instrument or medium for which a set of cultural 
meanings are only externally related. But “the body” [is] itself a construction, as 
are the myriad “bodies” that constitute the domain of gendered subjects. 
Bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their 
gender.8
Secondly, she claims that the construction of gendered bodies occurs through 
exclusionary formations of discourse and power, a formation that rigorously 
demarcates the realms of bodily intelligibility. In particular, Butler argues that a 
compulsory ‘heterosexual matrix’9 structures the regulation and formation of bodily 
intelligibility. The operation of this regulatory matrix establishes the coherence and 
unity of gender identity at the expense of homosexuality, rendering homosexual 
identifications unintelligible, incoherent, and in a sense, unlivable. However, the 
exclusion of homosexuality is never complete, since the very distinction between the 
included and the excluded, the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’, founders on an inherent 
permeability of bodily borders taken as synecdochal representations of the social 
hegemony. 10 This means that gender identities contain an inherent instability, which 
opens them to a ‘constitutive failure’ to become natural or real, and hence, to the 
proliferation of gender norms.* 11 The questions opened up by these claims 
subsequently form the central concerns of Todies that Matter, a text that Buder 
explicidy frames as an attempt to clarify and rework the arguments made in Gender 
Trouble.
8 Butler, GenderTrouble, p.8.
9 See Butler, GenderTrouble, p.151, n.6.
10 See Butler’s discussion of Mary Douglas’ structuralist analysis of pollution, dirt and the socio­
cultural order in GenderTrouble, pp.131-134.
11 Butler, Gender Trouble, p.146.
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In both its questioning of the formation of identity through regulatory discourses 
and the commitment to intervention in that formation, bodies that Matter takes up 
concerns first approached in Gender Trouble. Bodies that Matter is Butler’s most 
explicidy ‘deconstructive’ text, working between the terms of sex and gender to 
reconsider the claims of constructivism and reassess the political import of them for 
feminism and queer theory. She argues against certain forms of constructivism that 
understand gender as the social counterpart of a naturalized sex and extends, it 
seems, the claims of construction to sex itself. At the same time though, she criticizes 
constructivism for its failure to address the constitutive effects of exclusion, and 
posits a limit to construction that is inarticulable within the domains of 
contemporary discourse, a ‘constitutive outside’ that reveals the limit of discourse 
itself. Buder’s difficult task then is to bring this outside into the discourses that 
constitute and constrain the possibilities of bodily intelligibility. This means that 
Bodies that Matter is not simply an attempt to reconsider constructivist arguments on 
the formation of the body and sexed identity, but rather, an investigation of the 
terms of intelligibility that govern sexual identification and, ultimately, an attempt to 
broaden the field of what counts as intelligible.
In Bodies that Matter,, Buder expands upon the theory of performativity initiated in 
Gender Trouble by introducing die concept of ‘materialization’. She also furthers her 
understanding of exclusion through the notion of abjection as die repudiated other 
of the subject in conjunction widi the Derridean notion of the ‘constitutive outside’. 
Buder’s guiding question in this is whether the ‘question of the materiality of the 
body’ can be linked to ‘the performativity of gender’. She takes as her starting point 
the claim that ‘the category of “sex” is from the start normative’ and operates as a 
regulatory ideal that ‘produces the bodies that it governs’ . 12 Reformulated as a 
regulatory ideal, sex cannot be seen as a natural bodily attribute upon which gender is 
constructed, but is itself materialized in the body through a forcible process of 
reiteration, in which the norms of sex performatively constitute the sexed materiality 
of the body. Performativity is understood ‘not as a singular or deliberate “act”, but, 
rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names’ . 13 Hence, ‘materialization’ is understood as the process by
12 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.l.
13 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.2.
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which bodies attain ‘the effect of boundary, fixity and surface we call matter’,14 such 
that materialization performadvely effects or engenders the materiality of the body. 
As a further specification or modality of performativity, materialization works 
through the enforced repetition of norms, which establishes one’s ‘being’ in 
complicity with power and operates to define and delimit the very possibilities of 
being.15
Specifically, Butler argues that regulatory norms operate to install a heterosexual 
hegemony that structures the process of materialization and hence die possibilities 
for bodily existence. This process entails a simultaneous fabrication of possibilities of 
identification and enforced dis-identifications through the operation of the 
heterosexual imperative. As such, the ‘exclusionary matrix’ through which the subject 
emerges also requires the ‘simultaneous production of a domain of abjected beings, 
those who are not yet “subjects” but who form the constitutive outside to the 
domain of the subject’.16 Buder links the notion of a constitutive outside with that of 
abjection, and asks what forms of exclusion operate within the materialization of 
bodies to produce a domain of bodies rendered unlivable within the matrix of 
normative heterosexuality. Buder argues that if materiality is understood as a 
productive effect of reiterated norms, then ‘once “sex” itself is understood in its 
normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart from the 
materialization of that regulatory norm. “Sex” is, thus, not simply what one has, or a 
static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the “one” 
becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of 
cultural intelligibility. ’17
14 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.9.
15 Butler intends the notion of materialization to supplant ‘constructivism’, on the basis that the 
former concept allows for a better grasp of the reiterative temporality of the process by which bodies 
come to matter. Butler notes that the notion of temporality in operation is not that of a progressive 
succession of distinct moments or acts, but rather, one in which the ‘moments’ of construction 
become indistinguishable through the sedimented historicity of such moments and the constitutive 
effect of that which is foreclosed in construction. See her footnoted discussion of temporality, p.244- 
246. For a critical discussion of her understanding of temporality see Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The 
Substance of the Corporeal (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.122.
16 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.3.
17 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.2.
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The turn to the notion of ‘viability’ and cultural intelligibility made in this statement 
begins to indicate not only what is at stake in Buder’s argument but also one of the 
crucial ambiguities in it. For coming to ‘matter’ carries the double resonance of 
attaining the status of matter and of entering into signification and intelligibility. For 
Buder, both these processes will be fundamentally underwritten by the normativity of 
‘constitutive constraint’, such that the attainment of materiality and intelligibility will 
be synonymous with the acquisition of value or worth. Hence, the question of ‘how 
bodies come to matter’ addresses the necessarily normative process of simultaneously 
attaining both a material status and a discursive status. In exploiting these 
ambiguities, Buder brings the divergent implications of ‘matter’ together in the 
concept of ‘materialization’. On the one hand, her argument on materialization 
appears to be an argument for the formative effect of power on the body per se, such 
that the corporeal fleshiness of the body is itself produced, that is, brought into the 
world by die operations of power. On the other hand though, Butler undercuts the 
strength of this claim by conceding the ‘irrefutability’ and accompanying necessity of 
such ‘primary’ experiences of eating and sleeping, living and dying. She argues 
though that ‘their irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them 
and through what discursive means’, thus inscribing matter into the realm of 
intelligibility or indeed, epistemology. As she explains, any attempt to describe such 
experiences as extra-discursive will itself engage a formative discourse even in the 
positing of them as extra-discursive. In other words, there is no reference to an 
outside of discourse that is itself outside of discourse such that the reference refers 
without calling upon a prior, formative discourse. All references to the body will 
themselves be formative or constitutive, thereby limiting the possibilities of 
intelligible bodily life. As Buder states then, ‘bodies only appear, only endure, only 
live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory 
schemas’.18
It is not possible to address the critical issues that arise from these claims completely, 
however, several points must be made.19 Butler appears to make two sets of claims,
18 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.xi.
19 The tension in these claims accounts for much of the confusion amongst Butler’s critics over 
whether Butler can be read as offering an argument for or against constructivism. On the one hand, 
she is clearly critical of constructivist arguments while on the other she also endorses some of its 
central claims. However, Butler’s position is more complicated than either of these positions, for
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the first of which is epistemological, where in addressing the question of referentiality 
vis-a-vis materiality, Butler claims that matter cannot be rendered apart from regimes 
of signification, and thus reduces the problem of matter to that of knowledge or 
intelligibility. In opposition to this, Butler refuses to cede the prerogative to make 
ontological claims in three ways. First, she argues against the criticism of linguistic 
monism, second, she concedes a certain ‘irreducibility’ of matter and third, she claims 
that the nature of bodies is that their materiality is brought into being through 
discourse. The apparent tension between these sets of claims has led to a number of 
responses on the part of Butler’s readers. First, it has been argued that in establishing 
a distinction between signification and matter, and ceding the irrefutability of matter, 
Butler maintains a notion of matter as the unintelligible, passive radical outside of 
discourse. Vicki Kirby for instance has suggested that Butler ‘denies the possibility 
that nature scribbles or that flesh reads’20 such that matter is unintelligible to itself, a 
passivity that which can only be remedied through language. Similarly, Timothy 
Kaufman-Osborne has identified a ‘residual Cartesianism’ in the claim ‘that all tilings, 
if not discursively intelligible, are so much nonsense’.21 Another, somewhat stronger 
response suggests that Butler seeks to distance herself from all ontological claims on 
the basis that such claims necessarily require the provision of naturalized grounds. 
Further, this criticism holds that Butler ‘believes that ontological claims are best 
subsumed in epistemological frameworks’ ,22 thereby forestalling the project within 
feminist science to reconsider ontology.
Yet what these criticisms fail to consider fully is the element of normativity involved 
in materialization and the fact that the ‘constitutive constraint’ that produces a 
regulated domain of bodies that do or do not ‘matter’ is Butler’s primary concern. In
Bodies that Matter is concerned precisely with the bind of constructivism on materiality and language, 
but in such a way that it resides in the paradox rather than resolving it. As she clarifies: ‘Just as no 
prior materiality is accessible without the means of discourse, so no discourse can ever capture that 
prior materiality; to claim that the body is an elusive referent is not the same as claiming that it is only 
and always constructed. In some ways, it is precisely to claim that there is a limit to constructedness, a 
place, as it were, where construction necessarily meets its limit’ (Butler in Irene Costera Meijer and 
Baukje Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler’, Signs, 23:2(1999), 
pp.275-286 at 278.)
20 Kirby, Telling Flesh, p.127.
21 Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, ‘Fashionable Subjects: On Judith Butler and the Causal Idioms of 
Postmodern Feminist Theory’, Political Research Quarterly, 50: 3(1997), pp.649-674 at 673.
22 Jacinta Kerin, ‘The Matter at Hand: Butler, Ontology and the Natural Sciences’, Australian Feminist 
Studies, 14: 29(1999), pp.91-104 at 98.
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taking this as her focus, Butler effectively reinscribes the ontological claim as 
performative rather than descriptive — ‘the constative claim is always to some degree 
performative’23 — and suggests that such claims in fact constitute the domain of 
ontological intelligibility. Thus, it is not that Butler shies away from ontological 
claims — quite the reverse — but that in making such claims, she recognizes that the 
attempt to explain or describe the nature of matter has a constitutive force.24 
However, in doing so, she also recognizes that this constitution will never be 
complete, first, because the ontological claim ‘gestures toward a referent it cannot 
capture’25 and second, because any claim to ontology will also necessarily constitute 
its own outside, an outside that will continue to disrupt the claim to ontological 
closure. Thus, Butler is attempting to redraw the boundaries of bodily ontology by 
enacting a genealogical move of considering the ways in which the domain of 
ontological intelligibility is inscribed in and through discourse and power. 
Additionally, in attempting to bring into discourse that which has hitherto been 
excluded as its constitutive outside, she hopes to open further possibilities for 
making the claim to ontological intelligibility, for livability. As she states: ‘my work
23 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.l 1.
24 For a further discussion of the status of ontological claims in Butler’s work see Stephen K. White, 
Sustaining Affirmation: The Strenghts of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). My main disagreement with White’s analysis pertains to the valuation of ‘proliferation’ 
within Buder’s analysis of constitutive identifications in Bodies that Matter, since White overemphasizes 
the importance of this notion in Buder’s argument and this generates several further problems in his 
analysis. While Butler is concerned with the transfiguration of the boundaries of identification, this 
cannot simply be seen as a matter of the proliferation of identies — indeed, she explicitly rejects this 
interpretation at times. Correlatively, nor is Butler’s understanding of subject-formation as tied to 
seeing identity as oppressive as White argues. Butler’s position is more complicated than this, in diat 
she is well aware of the necessity of identifications, though she does hold open the possibility of an 
‘open future’, in which identifications are aligned differently and the abuses and exclusions of identity 
are reworked. Nor does her argument align with the claim that ‘the changing of one’s culture, even 
when it is not a particularly free choice, is thus taken as a relatively costless shift.’ (White, Sustaining 
Affirmations, p.97). Her arguments on abjection and the constitutive outside work against that position. 
Nevertheles, White is right to say that the risks involved in the transfiguration of identifications are 
made clearer in The Psychic Tife of Power.
25 Buder in Meijer and Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter’, p.279. This claim is consistent with 
Butler’s insistence that the performative is always open to failure, a claim she maintains as the basis of 
her arguments on reiteration. In discussing this, she states that ‘I also want to claim that the 
ontological claim can never fully capture its object... The “there is” gestures toward a referent it 
cannot capture, because the referent is not fully built up in language, is not the same as the linguistic 
effect. There is no access to it outside of the linguistic effect, but the linguistic effect is not the same 
as the referent that it fails to capture’ (Butler in Meijer and Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter’, 
p.279). It is this concession of a referent that cannot be captured by language that primarily concerns 
the first two criticisms and I will return to this later.
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has always been undertaken with the aim to expand and enhance a field of 
possibilities for bodily life’ .26
In the remainder of this section, then, I focus on the critical potential of Butler’s re­
inscription of claims to ontology in order to temper the force of the charges oudined 
above. Clearly, to do this Butler’s use of the notion of ‘the body’ requires furtiier 
explicadon. As Kirby points out, Buder’s interest in ‘the body’ does not extend to its 
deshy substance, but instead, remains at die surface of bodies. Kirby suggests that 
Buder’s analysis does not approach the ‘very meat of carnality that is born and 
buried, the stuff of decay that seems indifferent to semiosis... the commonsense 
understanding of bodily substance as the sheer insistence and weight of the body’s 
interiority’ .27 Kirby takes this absence in Buder’s work as indicative of the exclusions 
necessarily enacted by it, an exclusion that renders the substance of the body 
unintelligible to itself and hence subordinate to and dependent on language. 
However, in taxing Butler for not addressing die ‘substance’ of the corporeal, Kirby 
backs away from the critical point in Buder’s work that such a ‘substance’ cannot be 
elucidated without partaking in discourse and this discourse will be cut through with 
regulatory norms. Moreover, this critique underestimates the critical force of the fact 
that Buder’s target of discussion is not ‘flesh and blood’ bodies per se, but rather the 
very means by which such bodies might be understood, where this ‘understanding’ is 
itself formative of bodily contours and the possibilities for living. In explicating the 
operation of a constitutive intelligibility, Butler develops the notion of 
‘morphological imaginary’ to bring out the ways in which ‘normative heterosexuality 
shapes a bodily contour that vacillates between materiality and the imaginary, indeed, 
that is that very vacillation’.28 My contention then is that Buder’s concept of the 
‘morphological imaginary’, which describes the process by which ‘the body’ is 
brought into discourse and power, allows an opening to considering the relation
26 Butler in Meijer and Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter’, p.277.
27 Kirby, Telling Flesh, p.125-126.
28 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.17. This conception of the morphological imaginary is in part analogous 
to the conception of the soul suggested by Foucault in the introduction to Discipline and Punish but also 
bears some resemblance to the analysis of racial identity developed by Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White 
Masks, tr. C.L. Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
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between politics, bodies and life that is excluded by a more sustained focus on ‘the 
body per se’P
Butler begins developing the notion of a morphological imaginary through a 
discussion of Aristotle and Foucault with the aim of undoing the distinctions 
between form and matter, and correlatively, between the constructivist thesis and the 
concession of an irreducibility of bodily materiality. She asks whether the 
presumption of a necessary opposition between materiality and the constructed body 
prevents articulation of the matrix of power that orchestrates the scenography or 
topography of construction and thus questions the presumption of the irreducibility 
of materiality. Against this presumption, she claims that materiality only appears 
within a highly gendered matrix. Hence, she considers Foucault’s reworking of the 
Aristotelian distinction between the body and the soul, such that the soul becomes a 
‘normative and normalizing ideal’ under which the body is effectively materialized. 
To the extent that the body appears under the condition of its investiture in relations 
of power, ‘“materiality” designates a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its 
formative or constituting effect’.30
29 The relation of the imaginary or signification and materiality has of course been a central concern 
within contemporary feminist theory. For major contributions to this see in particular, Elizabeth 
Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994); Elizabeth Grosz, 
Space, Time and Perversion: The Politics of Bodies (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995); Moira Gatens, Imaginary 
Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (London: Routledge, 1996); Gail Weiss, Body Images: Embodiment as 
Intercorporeality (New York: Routledge, 1999); for feminist theoretical interventions that begin from a 
position more substantially inflected with understanding of biology and psychology, see Anne Fausto- 
Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 
and Elizabeth A. Wilson, Neural Geographies: Feminism and the Microstructure of Cognition (Routledge New 
York, 1998). This project is also closely aligned with debates on essentialism and the distinction 
between nature and culture, which predominated in feminist theory during the early 1990s. For major 
contributions to this debate see, among others, Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical 
Feminism, Deconstruction and the Taw (New York: Routledge, 1991); Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: 
Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1989); Denise Riley, “Am I That Name?”: 
Feminism and the Category of Women ’ in History (London: MacMillan: 1998); Luce Irigary, Speculum of the 
Other Woman, tr. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Margaret Whitford, Luce 
Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991) For Deleuzian renditions of the relation 
between signification and materiality vis-ä-vis femininity, see Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: 
Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994) and Camilla Griggers, Becoming-Woman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). Also 
see Karen Barad, ‘Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialization of Reality’, differences 
10:2(1998), pp.86-128 for an interesting extension of the concept of materialization from the human 
to a broader consideration of the ‘materiality of phenomena’ (p.108).
30 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.34.
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But, she warns, it is also necessary to ask whether there are ‘modalities of 
materialization’; she asks: ‘to what extent is materialization governed by principles of 
intelligibility that require and institute a domain of radical unintelligibility that resists 
materialization altogether or that remains radically dematerialized? ’31 In particular, 
Buder is concerned with the materialization of sex, a position that explicitly 
undercuts the presumption of sexual difference as the irreducible ground of feminist 
politics. Of Luce Irigaray’s ‘mimetic’ reading of Plato’s Timaeus, she suggests that 
what is required is not a return to the ‘matter’ of sexual difference, but, rather, a 
‘return to matter as a sign, which in its redoublings and contradictions enacts an 
inchoate drama of sexual difference’.32 Thus, in her own ‘rude and provocative’ 
reading of Plato, Butler argues that the body emerges as a site of ambivalence, where 
sexual difference ‘operates in the very formulation of matter’, not only in the 
formulation of the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’, but also in the formulation of that 
which is ‘outside these oppositional positions as their supporting conditions’ .33
There are thus two arms to the argument that follows in Bodies that Matter\ First, 
Butler seeks to establish that the materiality of sex is forcibly established through 
regulatory ideals, and second, she wants to understand matter as a sign. To address 
the first of these, Buder turns to psychoanalysis, particularly Freud and Lacan, to 
question the constitutive effect of prohibition for the relation of the psyche and 
body. Fler question is whether prohibition determines ‘a psychic experience of the 
body which is radically separable from something that one might want to call the 
body itself or whether ‘the productive power of prohibition in morphogenesis 
renderjs] the very distinction between morphe and psyche unintelligible’ .34 Deploying 
Freud’s concept of the ‘bodily ego’, Buder argues for the ‘indissolubility of a body 
part and the phantasmatic partitioning that brings it into psychic experience’.35 There 
is no need to follow Butler’s rendition of Freud in detail here; suffice to say that 
Freud’s speculations on narcissism, hypochondria and the libidinal investiture in a 
body part lead to the conclusion that prohibitions ‘in some sense, constitute
31 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.35.
32 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.49.
33 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.52.
34 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.55.
35 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.59.
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projected morphologies’.36 Without such ‘ideas’ of the body, there could be no ego, 
and hence, ‘to the extent that such supporting “ideas” are regulated by prohibition 
and pain, they can be understood as the forcible and material effects of regulatory 
power’.37 Hence, the psyche cannot be understood as an epistemic grid through 
which the body, figured as an ‘ontological in-itselP, is known. Nor can the 
morphological imaginary be understood as a ‘body image’ that stands in a (distorting) 
mimetic relation to the real body. Rather, Buder claims that ‘psychic projection 
confers boundaries and, hence, unity on the body, so that die very contours of the 
body are sites that vacillate between the psychic and the material’ .38
As provocative as it is, the claim that the contours of the body are sites that vacillate 
between the psychic and the material warrants further consideration. For what, 
precisely, is Buder aiming at in such a claim? Most obviously, Butler is attempting to 
recast the relation between the psyche and the body to argue that such a distinction is 
unsustainable; the body emerges then, not as the passive surface on which the psyche 
operates, but as a ‘constitutive demand that mobilizes psychic action from the start’.39 
In this, Buder concurs with a broader feminist project to rethink the relation between 
body and psyche in order to bring out the constitutive tension between them .40 
Perhaps less clearly, but more importandy for this discussion, Butler’s concern with 
the constitutive effects of psychic prohibitions on die body through the shaping of 
the morphological imaginary yields an insight into the position of the body within the 
political. For the morphological imaginary that emerges from materialization makes it 
clear that the body is political from its inception. As the process of the compelled 
repetition of regulatory norms, materialization brings into focus the political 
dimension of the formation of the body. The bodily contour yielded in 
materialization comes into being through the constitutive effects of prohibition and 
regulatory power; and further, as a material effect of regulatory power, the 
morphological imaginary vacillates between the psychic and the anatomical.
36 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.64.
37 Butler, Bodies that M atter, p.64.
38 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.66.
39 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.67.
4(1 See in particular Weiss, Body Images, Grosz, Volatile Bodies, Gatens, Imaginary Bodies.
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For Butler, this vacillation is also precisely the space of political operations. If we 
consider that politics occurs in the place of signification — Butler wants to ‘locate the 
political in the very signifying practices that establish, regulate and deregulate 
identity’41 — and that the anatomical is only ‘given’ in signification, specifically 
through the emergence or constitution of a morphological imaginary, then the 
morphological imaginary appears as the site of the political. In this sense, then, it is 
not bodies per se that she is concerned with, but rather, the appearance of bodies as 
sites of political operations and particularly, of operations of exclusion. This is not 
simply a matter of politics pertaining to the body, as the relation has been thought of 
in for instance, feminist debates on abortion and the notion that ‘the personal is 
political’. Rather, in their appearance or materialization bodies are constituted as sites 
of political operations through the effects of regulatory power. As such, the process 
of materialization, a process in which regulatory norms stabilize over time to produce 
the effect of ‘boundary, fixity and surface we call matter’42 brings the body into the 
realm of the symbolic, recast as the ‘the temporalized regulation of signification’,43 
and the realm of the political.
Importantly, throughout her argument, Butler tends to treat the terms of tire body 
and the subject as interchangeable,44 such that becoming ‘a body’ through the process 
of materialization is equivalent to becoming a subject. In other words, the 
morphological imaginary is itself a form of subjection, and hence, it is through
41 Butler, Gender Trouble, p.147.
42 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.9.
43 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.22.
44 For example, this interchangeability is clear in the following two formulations of her central 
question. First:
How does that materialization of the norm in bodily formation produce a domain of 
abjected bodies, a field of deformation, which in failing to qualify as die fully human, 
fortifies those regulatory norms? What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm 
produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies 
as ways of living that count as “life”, lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth 
grieving? (Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.16.)
Second:
[The] exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous 
production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet “subjects” but who form 
the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject. The abject designates here precisely 
those “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life which are nevertheless densely 
populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the 
sign of the “unlivable” is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. (Butler, Bodies 
that Matter, p.3.)
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subjectivation, here rendered as the process of materialization, that the anatomical or 
biological body enters into political operations. Furthermore, her understanding of 
‘the subject’ as ‘life in language’, suggests that the morphological imaginary can also 
be understood as life in language. But what then does Buder mean by ‘life’? The 
slippage in Butler’s terms does not help clarify this question, but to borrow a 
Wittgensteinian distinction, Buder is referring to a linguistically conditioned form of 
life, rather dian life per se. Furdier, for her, such forms of life are necessarily 
underwritten by normative valuation in order to ‘count as life’.
Flence, counting as life means the attainment of live-ability within the realm of the 
political, that is, within signification or, more tellingly, within the regulatory norms of 
morphological intelligibility. For a form of life to count as life, or to be clearer, to 
count as live-able, a certain adherence and repetition of regulatory norms is required, 
and it is because of this necessary adherence to regulatory norms that the judgment 
on whether a form of life counts as life is possible. Such an understanding connects 
‘life’ intimately with ‘the subject’, and through this, to a normatively materialized 
body, that is, the ‘morphological imaginary’. But to go back to an earlier point, 
because the morphological imaginary is neither distinct from nor coterminous with 
the anatomical or biological body but is rather the means of approaching it, it 
becomes clear that the politically conditioned form of life is neither distinct from nor 
coterminous with biological life. Instead, it would seem that the form of life gives 
access to life per se, or biological life, suggesting that counting as life within the 
political is crucial for survival since the judgment on political live-ability will be 
played out on the ground of biological life — of living and dying.
The importance of this reflection on the terms of life and its relation to the 
morphological imaginary in Buder’s work is twofold: first, it brings out the way in 
which Buder’s work gives itself to the concerns of an analysis of biopolitics, although 
it is not explicidy engaged in the terms of biopolitics. Buder’s concern with the 
regulatory constitution of the morphological imaginary moves into the question of 
the political valuation of forms of life and brings to the fore the political engagement 
of life per se. As I have argued, the concept of the morphological imaginary broaches 
the relation between the ‘natural’ or ontic body and discursive formations in a non­
reductionist way. Second, the question of the relation between forms of life, life and
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the normative inauguration of the morphological imaginary as a form of subjection is 
crucial for Butler’s discussion of political exclusion and the agency that it spawns. 
Her understanding of political exclusion engages the question of living and dying in a 
provocative, yet problematic way. I will take up a discussion of this in the following 
section, but first a further discussion of the second arm of Butler’s argument on the 
relation of signification and materiality is required.
The question of the relation of the body to signification is a vexed one within 
Butler’s work, not least because she ties it very closely to the question of agency such 
that the formulation of the relation between bodies and signification is made to carry 
significant theoretico-political weight. In addition to figuring the body as a sign, 
Butler also makes signification the site of agency in that the vulnerability of terms to 
performative resignification provides the possibility for the reconfiguration or re­
imagination of the terms of bodily intelligibility. Importantly, Buder makes this claim 
against a theoretical tendency to construe the body as the radical outside of 
signification, such that it becomes the irreducible site from which agency is spawned. 
This claim clearly introduces several important complexities into her argument. 
Butler is careful to allow a distance or separation between the body and signification, 
both to combat the charge of linguistic reductionism and so signification can be 
construed as the point of emergence of agency against the construal of the body as 
that point. Hence, she allows a certain referential excess to the body, such that the 
materiality of the body is a ‘demand in and for language’, but not language itself. At 
times though, this distance appears to be closed down by her initial claim that 
‘mattering’ describes both the body’s accession to language and its normative 
constitution within language, where the materiality of the body only appears through 
that accession and constitution. The questions that arise then are whether the terms 
of ‘mattering’ and materiality do the work that Butler wants them to do, and whether 
she is able maintain the distinction between materiality and signification that she 
requires. To respond to these questions, it is worth considering the status of the sign 
in Butler’s work, which can be done most effectively through a comparison of her 
constructivist thesis on the body with that of Foucault.
I argued in the first chapter that Foucault portrays the body as necessarily and 
immediately invested in relations of power, such that the forces of the body are
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brought to submission through the formation of bodily norms as a consequence of 
the operations of normalization. These are complicated claims, in that Foucault does 
not suggest explicidy that the body is itself constructed in its materiality by power, 
but nevertheless holds that there is no body outside of power relations. This 
ambiguity is reproduced in Butler’s arguments, where she simultaneously argues for 
the primacy of signification vis-a-vis bodily intelligibility and suggests an anatomical 
body distinct from signification.45 However, Butler extends Foucault’s claims 
considerably in claiming that the materiality of the body itself only emerges through 
the operations of regulatory regimes. In doing so, she wants to oppose the tendency 
within Foucault’s thought to construe the body as permanently resistant, which itself 
takes Butler some way from other feminists who have been concerned to rewrite the 
materiality of the body as active against a perceived passivity in Foucault’s account.46
Hence, in considering the relation between bodies and signification, Butler aims to 
avoid the need to posit the body as the material outside of structuration and as the 
site of resistance against it. But what does Butler mean by her insistence that £to 
return to matter requires that we return to matter as a sign’? This question is 
important because the central claims that Butler makes do not immediately support 
the apparent strength of her conclusion. Butler’s reconsideration of language and the
45 See Clare Colebrook, ‘Ethics, Positivity and Gender: Foucault, Aristotle and the Care of the Self, 
Philosophy Today 42:1(1998), pp.40-52 at n.2.
46 Notably both Foucault and Butler draw upon Nietzsche in theorizing the body as either invested in 
or constituted by operations of power; however, they take different elements from his work to make 
their claims. While Foucault emphasizes the ontology of force relations, Butler emphasizes the notion 
of the ‘sign-chain’ to explicate the operation and vulnerability of power. This has significant 
implications for their respective portrayals of the relation between power and the body and I draw 
these out throughout these chapters on Butler’s work. Interestingly, Jose Gil suggests that the 
opposition between understanding forces or signs as the operative means of power is one of the 
principle antinomies present in contemporary discourses of power. He claims that while the latter 
position holds that power operates through signification, since forces could only gain directionality 
through signs and thus would be subordinate to them, the former position claims that since only 
forces can operate on other forces, signs must be dissimulated or concealed forces and hence, only 
force can create power. The distinction Gil makes is a useful heuristic for clarifying the point that I 
want to make there. Certainly, Butler and Foucault cannot be taken as perfectly upholding this 
opposition, since the emphasis on performativity in Butler’s work enables an understanding of signs as 
forceful and Foucault’s understanding of discourse establishes a domain in which the force relations 
that engender relations of power operate through signification. Nevertheless, it is possible to see that 
they are approaching the question of power from antinomical positions, insofar as each privileges 
signs or forces respectively. Thus, while Foucault located the political purchase of his work in the 
delineation of force relations, Butler wants to ‘locate the political in the very signifying practices that 
establish, regulate and deregulate identity’ (Butler, Gender Trouble, p.147), thus giving political priority 
to the sign. Consequently, while Foucault sought to make a distinction between the discursive and the 
non-discursive, Buder questions the very possibility of such a distinction and conflates the operative 
logic of signification with that of power. See Jose Gil, Metamorphoses of the Body, tr. Stephen Meucke 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p.9-14.
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body targets a representational understanding of language on the basis that such a 
position fails to consider the constitutive effects of signification; on the other hand, 
she strives to avoid the charge of linguistic reductionism frequently made against 
constructivism. Thus she claims that the body is the ‘elusive referent’ of language, ‘a 
demand in and for language’, the ‘that which’ that conditions signification, claims 
that clearly differ from the identification of signification and matter in the earlier 
statement.
Ultimately, Butler limns the relation of signification and matter as one of chiasmatic 
interdependence. Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘flesh of the 
world’ and the figure of the chiasm,47 Butler claims that there is no necessary 
opposition between signification and materiality, since the sign itself is ‘always 
already material’, thus establishing a degree of ‘indiscernibility’ and reversibility 
between them . 48 As Butler argues,
the materiality o f the signifier (a “materiality” that comprises both signs and 
their significatory efficacy) implies that there can be no reference to a pure 
materiality except via materiality... every effort to refer to materiality takes 
place through a signifying process which, in its phenomenality, is always already 
material.49
Thus, materiality and signification maintain an interlocking interdependence, wherein 
language and corporeality are ‘never fully identical, never fully different’.50 While the 
anatomical body is only accessible or ‘given’ through signification, it also exceeds that 
signification, providing ‘the elusive referent in relation to which the variability of 
signification performs’.51 The morphological imaginary emerges in this crossing over 
of signification and materiality, produced in the vacillations of each; indeed one 
might say that it emerges as the crossing over and vacillation of the sign and the 
elusive referent of the corporeal.
47 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, tr. Alfonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968) esp. chp. 4, The Intertwining — The Chiasm’, pp.130-155.
48 See note 3, this chapter on indiscernibility.
49 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.68.
50 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.69.
51 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.91.
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Yet, while the morphological imaginary is produced through the chiasmatic 
interdependence of materiality and signification, such that the morphological 
imaginary is itself both significatory and material, there is nevertheless a body 
remaindered in Butler’s notion of the ‘elusive referent’. This appears to be the body 
that she refers to as anatomical, and we might also take it to be the irreducible 
‘primary experiences’ that are ‘affirmed’ in discursive arrangements. This construal of 
the relation between the body and signification re-appears in Butler’s more recent 
work, primarily in Excitable Speech, where the polidcal import o f this reladon is made 
particularly clear through the discussion o f language, violence and agency. In the 
introduction to this text, Butler discusses a number of accounts of the relation 
between the speech act and the body, notably that suggested in a parable related by 
Toni Morrison , 52 in Shoshana Felman’s discussion of Don Juan53 and Elaine Scarry’s 
impressive work on the irruptions of bodily pain vis-a-vis language.54 From this 
discussion, Butler concludes that:
There is a strong sense in which the body is alternately sustained and 
threatened through modes of address... Language sustains the body not by 
bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal way; rather, it is by being 
interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the 
body first becomes possible... one must imagine an impossible scene, that of a 
body that has not yet been given social definition, a body that is, strictly 
speaking, not accessible to us, that nevertheless becomes accessible on the 
occasion of an address, a call, an interpellation that does not “discover” this 
body, but constitutes it fundamentally... [therefore] if language can sustain the 
body, it can also threaten its existence.55
Thus, the strictly inaccessible body that we are asked to imagine becomes accessible 
through the interpellative constitution of a social body. It is this secondary, derivative 
social body that is sustained and threatened within language. But what happens to the
52 In this parable, offered in Morrison’s 1993 Nobel Lecture in Literature, a blind woman is asked by 
young children whether the bird they hold in their hands is living or dead. She responds ‘I don’t 
know... but what I do know is that it is in your hands. It is in your hands’. Morrison cited in Judith 
Butler, Excitable Speech: A  Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.6. I discuss the 
status of violence and signification within these claims in the following chapter.
53 Shoshana Felman, The Literary Speech Act: Don Juan with J.L  Austin or Seduction in Two Languages, tr. 
Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
54 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
55 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.5. I return to a further discussion of these claims in the following chapter.
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body that is stricdy inaccessible and what is its reladon to the social body that derives 
from it? It seems fair to suggest that the material, anatomical body provides the 
ground upon which the social body is constituted, insofar as that ground carries the 
body produced through interpellation. The corporeality of the body is not itself 
constituted in the address after all, but must exist sui generis in order for the social 
body to come into existence in the interlocking of corporeality and the signifying 
practices of regulatory norms. Hence, Butler’s use of the term the ‘body’ in this 
passage indicates two rather different statuses, one of which we can understand as 
the morphological imaginary or ‘social’ body while the other seems to be something 
like an anatomical or biological body, to the extent that it can be designated at all (it 
is, after all, an elusive referent).
The status of Butler’s concession of the corporeality of the body as an elusive 
referent of signification is undoubtedly ambiguous within the schema of 
materialization. This ambiguity provides the starting point for the critical arguments 
that I mentioned earlier, which I have argued can be tempered through a 
consideration of the necessary normativity of materialization. But while the emphasis 
on a necessary normativity counter-acts charges of a ‘residual Cartesianism’ in 
Butler’s work, it also brings to light the tendency toward linguistic reductionism 
within the notion of materialization. While at times Butler concedes a corporeal 
excess to signification, at other times, she reduces the materiality of the body to that 
of signification, such that the former is identified with the latter. The crux of Butler’s 
attempt to stave off the charge of linguistic reductionism is her claim that there is an 
unbroachable difference between the referent and the signified. As she states:
Apart from and yet related to the materiality of the signifier is the materiality of 
the signified as well as the referent approached through the signified, but which 
remains irreducible to the signified. This radical difference between referent 
and signified is the site where the materiality of language and that of the world 
which it seeks to signify are perpetually negotiated.56
Thus, in order to steer away from the reduction of the materiality of the world and 
more specifically of the body to that of language and particularly the signifier, Butler 
posits a referential relation between signification and corporeality, while maintaining
56 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.69.
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that that referentiality will never be complete or entirely accurate since the signifier 
never completely ‘captures’ that to which it refers.
However, the critical force o f Butler’s argum ent rests on a performative theory o f 
language, wherein the statement enacts or constitutes what it says. To borrow an 
example from J.L Austin’s theorization o f performative statements, the statem ent ‘I 
prom ise’ does not refer to the promising agent’s inner state nor to their capacity to 
promise, — although at least the latter o f these operates as an im portant condition o f 
felicity — but enacts the promise in its enunciation .57 In this schema, it becomes 
fundamentally unclear what the sigmfier-signified-referent relation is, such that the 
apparent irreducibility o f the signifier, signified and referent is brought into question. 
Importantly, for Butler, the performative capacity o f  language is not limited to first- 
person singular present indicative verb statements as it was for A ustin ,58 but is 
instead characteristic o f linguistic practice and signification per se, The question that 
arises then concerns the compatibility o f a Saussurian account o f the sign and 
referent with an Austinian account o f performative speech acts .59 This is surely a 
question and not one I can take up here; but, in the shadow o f this question, I do 
want to suggest that Butler’s attem pt to maintain a radical difference between the 
signifier and the referent is itself brought into question by her central thesis on the 
performative function o f discourse. I will take up this point further in the next 
chapter as it clearly requires further explication; for now though, let me approach the 
problem  of a potential reduction between corporeality and signification from a 
different angle.
57 See J.L Austin, How to Do Things with Words, J.O. Urmson and M. Sbisä, eds. (Cambridge Ma.: 
Harvard University Press: 1962), esp. pp.10-11; J. L. Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’ in Philosophical 
Papers, J. O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, eds. 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
pp.233-252.
58 Austin ‘Performative Utterances’, p.242. At times, Austin does extend performative speech acts 
beyond this, but these locutions might be taken as the ideal types of illocutionary performatives. I 
develop a fuller discussion of this in the next chapter.
59 The tension between these different accounts of linguistic practice in part informs Jacques Derrida’s 
reading of Austin in ‘Signature, Event, Context’ in Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University' 
Press, 1988) and more broadly, the ensuing debate between Derrida and John Searle. Importantly, 
these tensions are not so much resolved in the Derridean notion of citationality, but are effectively 
brought into play, in an important methodological derivation from Nietzsche.
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What is at stake in the charge of linguistic reductionism in Butler’s argument is not 
whether the body is constituted through signification precisely but the nature of the 
materiality of the corporeal vis-a-vis the materiality of the signifier. Butler insists on 
the materiality of the signified to hold off the potential charge of idealism that often 
accompanies that of linguistic reductionism. But to insist on the materiality of 
language is not yet to say that the materiality of the body is distinguishable from that 
of language, which is necessary to avoid a conflation of the corporeal and the 
significatory. In taking up this point, Butler implies that the notion of ‘modalities of 
materialization’ identified by Louis Althusser with regard to the operations of 
ideology provides a way of disarticulating the matter of the sign and the matter of the 
body. As such, it provides a useful starting point for an account of ‘how bodies 
materialize, how they come to assume the morphe, the shape by which their material 
discreteness is marked’ .60
However, Butler’s brief references to Althusser do not resolve the difficulty raised 
here. In ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ Althusser comments that
an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice or practices. This 
existence is material. Of course the material existence of the ideology in an 
apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material 
existence of a paving-stone or rifle... I shall say that “matter is discussed in 
many senses”, or rather, that it exists in different modalities, all rooted in the 
last instance in “physical” matter.61
In order to establish the material basis of ideology against an ideal or ‘spiritual’ 
portrayal Althusser posits the existence of different modalities of materiality, but 
does not resolve the question of the relation between such modalities. Instead, this 
question is subjected to a double deferral in both the reference to ‘the final instance’ 
and the quote marks on the ‘physical’, which problematize or put into question the 
very nature of the physical. But even if one ignores the movement of double deferral 
then problems nevertheless appear to arise, for if it is simply the case that different 
modalities of materialization are rooted in the physical in the last instance, then it
60 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.69; also see pp.35, 252 n.13.
61 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp.127-186 at 166; also see Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.252, 
n.13.
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would seem that Buder’s attempt to delineate a radical difference between the 
materiality of signification and of the body is stymied rather than secured through 
reference to Althusser.62
The reference to Althusser helps secure the materiality of signification against the 
charge of linguistic idealism, but in doing so, it also brings to the fore the moment in 
which the materiality of signification and the body coincide ‘in the last instance’. As we 
know, the acquisition of bodily materiality occurs through the compelled 
identifications and repetitions of normative regulation understood as the process of 
materialization. Within Butler’s account, coming to matter describes the process by 
which the bodily subject comes into being and attains a certain intelligibility within 
hegemonic regulatory norms or ideals. It describes the process of attaining an 
existence necessarily conditioned by intelligibility: both coming to be and coming to 
be intelligible at one and the same time. In a sense then, the conflation of 
corporeality and signification is necessary or unavoidable within materialization, an 
intrinsic aspect of materialization that is suggested in Butler’s initial proposal that 
what is required is to return to matter as a sign. This means that the identification of 
signification and materiality cannot simply be written off as a moment of rhetorical 
excess, for it indicates important tensions within Butler’s account of the constitution 
of bodies that matter, of life worth living. Furthermore, it has significant implications 
for Butler’s conception of agency and exclusion. In the following section, I draw out 
some of the theoretical implications that such a reduction of signification and 
materiality has for Buder’s account of exclusion, rendered as abjection and social 
death.
3.3 Risking Life: Abjection and Social Death
Throughout her work, Butler develops a theorization of political exclusion that 
focuses on the normative constitution of subjects, through, for instance, regimes of 
compulsory heterosexuality and ‘racialization’. Such regimes, she argues, necessarily
62 This is not the place to offer an analysis of the status of the phrase ‘in the last instance’ within 
Althusser’s work. What I am suggesting here though is that whether the ‘last instance’ is read as an 
infinitely deferred moment that never actually arrives, or whether it is read as an actual moment of 
congruence that could in fact be reached, problems will arise for Buder.
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produce a ‘constitutive outside’ or a domain of bodily and subjective life that is 
rendered unintelligible by the regulatory ideals of subjectivation, but which is 
simultaneously necessary for the constitution of the subject. She variously describes 
the risk of unintelligibility as the risk of ‘abjection’ or ‘social death’. The first of these 
terms is used in Bodies that Matter, where Butler links the Derridean notion of the 
constitutive outside with the more psychoanalytic concept of abjection to consider 
those bodies or subjects whose claims to life go unfulfilled.63 This has the effect of 
allowing an understanding of abjection in its political and systemic operations, not 
simply as a psychic phenomenon of visceral repulsion. Further, in analyzing the 
means by which the domain of exclusion is produced, Butler also aims to develop an 
account of the agency of the ‘outside’, wherein the beings excluded by hegemonic 
regimes of signification disrupt those regimes through a differential repetition of 
their terms.
However, I argue in this section that her attempt to base an account of agency on 
abjection founders on a vacillation between the efficacy of subversive repetition and 
its radical instability in the face of hegemonic discourse. Butler’s understanding of 
agency as reiteration is limited by a vacillation between vulnerability and efficacy in 
resistance, where she simultaneously affirms the necessity and efficacy of linguistic 
agency and undermines it by positing failure as the constitutive and defining
63 This differentiates Butler’s understanding of abjection from that proposed by Julia Kristeva in 
Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982). Kristeva understands abjection primarily as a psychic and bodily phenomenon without linking 
the repulsion of the abject to the political conditions in which subjects are constituted within 
normative discourses. Butler’s conception of abjection has the advantage of making this link, thus 
making abjection a more politically relevant notion. However, this is not so much the case with 
Kristeva’s later formulations of abjection, such as in Strangers to Ourselves, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Llarvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). Also see Iris Young’s political inflection of the theory of abjection 
in Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
esp. Ch.5. Similar to but extending on Young’s claims, Butler’s account of abjection aims to account 
for the way in which certain subjects, and particularly homosexual subjects, are constituted as abject. 
This entails a considerable movement from Kristeva’s account of the relation of abjection to sexual 
difference, in which femininity is associated with abjection through the maternal body. For additional 
criticisms of the conception of abjection and particularly the foreclosure of homosexuality in 
Kristeva’s account, see Judith Butler, The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva’ in Kelly Oliver, ed. Ethics, 
Politics and Difference in Julia Kristeva’s Writings (New York: Routledge, 1993); Elizabeth Grosz, ‘The body 
of signification’ in John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin, eds. Abjection, Melancholia and 1 u)ve: The work of 
Julia Kristeva (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.80-104; for a defense of Kristeva on this point see Kelly 
Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unravelling the Double-bind (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), esp. 
pp. 140-142. Either way, the Kristevan notion of abjection has been used to understand the exclusion 
of homosexuality, though it is unhelpful in developing an analysis of the state’s relation to hate 
violence. On the question of violence, Kristeva’s account of a sacrificial economy of violence has been 
used to understand violence against women in Martha J. Reineke, Sacrificed IJves: Kristeva on Women and 
Violence (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
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characteristic of subversive agency. In later work the notion of abjection is replaced 
by that of ‘social death’, which Butler uses to delineate a space or mode of existence 
‘between life and death’. I suggest that the account of subjection and the apparent 
intractability of regulatory norms offered in The Psychic Life of Power is in part an 
attempt to rethink the problems that emerge in the use of the notions of the 
constitutive outside and abjection. However, I argue that Butler ultimately fails to 
overcome these problems in Psychic Life, where resistance is again figured as a form of 
social suicide, such that a rhetorical link is established between death and freedom.
In developing an understanding of materialization as a form of subjectivation in 
Bodies that Matter, Butler argues that subjects produced by power attain their tenuous 
coherence through the exclusion of those bodies that fail to fully materialize, subjects 
who fail to attain the status of subjecthood. She argues that bodies that fail to fully 
materialize are the constitutive outside of the subject, simultaneously excluded from 
the domain of the subject and providing its necessary condition. The term Butler 
uses in Bodies that Matter to describe the condition in which bodies fail to fully 
materialize as subjects is ‘abjection’. Butler notes that abjection ‘literally means to cast 
off, away, or out, and hence presupposes and produces a domain of agency from 
which it is differentiated’ .64 She proposes to rethink abjection not simply as a 
‘degraded or cast out status within the terms of sociality’, but rather, in resonance 
with the psychoanalytic notion of foreclosure, as a ‘zone of uninhabitability which a 
subject fantasizes as threatening its own integrity with the prospect of a psychotic 
dissolution’.65
In order to secure this understanding of abjection, Butler draws on the notion of the 
‘constitutive outside’ given in Jacques Derrida’s work. She argues that recognition of 
the constitutive outside of the subject reveals the limit of constructivism; she claims 
that this project cannot account for the necessary exclusions enacted in the process 
of subjectivation, and hence, the ‘constitutive force of exclusion, erasure, violent 
foreclosure, abjection and its disruptive return within the very terms of discursive
64 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.243, n.2.
65 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.243, n.2.
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legitimacy’.66 Clearly, there is a double m ovem ent posited in Butler’s cridque that 
needs to be traced, for on the one hand the abject is cast out o f the terms o f sociality, 
but on the other, it returns within those terms. Further, in returning, the abject 
disrupts the coherence and integrity o f discursivity and the subjects sustained within 
it, and ultimately, allows for a ‘subversive’ reconfiguration. As we will see, this third 
move is the means by which Butler attempts to secure an account o f the agency o f 
the abject.
First though, a closer look at the means o f conjoining the concepts o f abjection and 
constitutive exclusion is required. In countering a constructivism that cannot 
recognize the radical outside o f constitutive discursivity ,67 Butler argues that the 
‘normalization o f (hetero)sexuality’ is instituted through a logic o f repudiation that 
posits desiring otherwise as a threat to the integrity o f the heterosexual subject. In 
rewriting the Oedipal scenario through which Freudian and post-Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory understands the assum ption o f  sexual identification, Butler 
claims that the threat o f castration that motivates sexual identification rests on the 
unintelligibility o f abjected homosexuality. W ithin the Lacanian schema in particular, 
the ‘terror’ over occupying the site o f abjected homosexuality compels the 
assum ption o f a sexed  position within language, ‘a sex ed  position that is sexcd  by
66 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.8.
67 Importantly though, Butler wants to see the constitutive outside as historically produced, not as an 
ahistorical feature of the symbolic, as she claims it is understood within Lacanian psychoanalysis. This 
caveat is developed through her discussion of Slavoj Zizek’s use of the Lacanian notion of the Real. 
As Ewa Plonowska Ziarek points out,
the “constitutive outside” is an inevitable effect of any identity claims, including the claims 
of queer identities, but the forms of these exclusions are neither invariant nor ahistorical. 
Undercutting the political neutrality and ahistorical permanence of “the constitutive 
outside”, Butler’s emphasis on the historicity of exclusion removes the threat of psychosis 
associated with it and opens the borders of intelligibility to political contestation.(Ewa 
Plonowska Ziarek, ‘From Euthanasia to the Other of Reason: Performativity and the 
Deconstruction of Sexual Difference’, in Ellen K. Feder, Mary C. Rawlinson and Emily 
Zakin, eds. Derrida and Feminism: Recasting the Question of Woman (New York: Routledge, 
1997), pp. 115-140 at 130).
However, several questions arising from this account of the constitutive outside remain undiscussed 
by Ziarek. First, it is unclear that Butler’s critique of Zizek holds, given that he has counter-argued 
that Butler consistently misreads ‘the real’ as ahistorical, whereas for him it is necessarily historical. 
Second, the formal inevitability of exclusion raises questions about the political commitment to 
combat exclusion: for one, why do some exclusions warrant investigation over others and relatedly, 
what motivates the critical engagement with structures of exclusion if exclusion is itself necessary and 
inevitable. This latter question is one of political ideals and normative commitments, and Butler 
responds to it by arguing that while the aim is to broaden the field of inclusion, the notion of 
complete inclusion is not only a fantasy but perhaps a dangerous one. Even so, this does not entirely 
obviate these problems.
137
virtue of its heterosexual positioning, and that is assumed through a move that 
excludes and abjects gay and lesbian possibilities’.68 The figures of homosexual 
abjection — for instance, the ‘feminized “fag” and the phallicized “dyke”’ — constitute 
the state of punishment, figuring a ‘gendered afterlife’, a ‘death sentence of sorts’.69 
While these figures remain inarticulate sites of identification, they nevertheless 
operate as organizing figures within the Lacanian symbolic. Further, as the limit- 
figures of binary identification, these ‘specters’ are ‘produced by that symbolic as its 
threatening outside to safeguard its continuing hegemony’.70
Butler’s point is not simply to affirm the constraints and exclusions by which the 
assumption of sexed identifications takes place, but to ask how their fixity is achieved 
and to work the possibilities for reconfiguring such constraints. She questions the 
notion of identification and suggests that identifications cannot be understood on the 
level of the event — happening once and for all — but are instead phantasmatic efforts 
of alignment that constitute and unsettle identity through the permanent installation 
of alterity within it. That is, if identification works through repudiation, that which is 
repudiated will be installed within identity as the enabling condition of identification. 
This logic can be made clear in the statement ‘I am not that’, which presupposes the 
‘not that’ as a definitional requirement of the ‘I’. Further, identifications are ‘never 
fully and finally made’ but are ‘incessantly reconstituted’ and hence, ‘subject to the 
volatile logic of iterability’.71 As citational, identifications are always made in relation 
to prohibitions that work through the threat of punishment, prohibitions which 
themselves can be rewritten as performative. As performative, prohibitions attain 
their authoritative force precisely in the identifications that simultaneously invoke the 
law as a prior authority and install the authority of it.
In rewriting the coerced assumption of sexed positions in terms of performative 
constitution and citational practice, Butler suggests that the symbolic is open to 
reinscription. If ‘assuming’ a sexed position is a repetitive process of citing norms, 
where ‘sexed positions’ are not spatial but citational practices within a domain of
68 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.96.
69 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.98, 10.
70 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.104.
71 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.105.
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constitutive constraints, and the citation of norms reinvests the symbolic law with 
authority, then the sheer repetition of norms will always present the risk of 
reinscription, as no repetition will be complete, exact or fmal. Furthermore, the 
alterity that conditions identification will haunt the subject, compelling the incessant 
repetition of norms, but also radically destabilizing the idendty thus produced. If 
homosexuality is the abjected other of normative heterosexuality, then it disrupts the 
claim to normative closure through its spectral return. In its disruption of citational 
practices of sexed identity, homosexuality opens the symbolic that sustains normative 
heterosexuality to a reinscription of the prohibition on homosexuality as the abject. 
As Buder states:
If the figures of homosexualized abjection must be repudiated for sexed 
positions to be assumed, then the return of those figures as sites of erotic 
cathexis will refigure the domain of contested positionalides within the 
symbolic. Insofar as any posidon is secured through differendadon, none of 
these positions would exist in a simple opposition to normative heterosexuality.
On the contrary, they would refigure, redistribute and resignify the constituents 
of that symbolic and, in this sense, constitute a subversive rearticulation of that 
symbolic.72
Hence, it is in this ‘subversive rearticulation’ effected through a spectral return that 
Butler locates the agency of the abject.
One of the crucial caveats that Butler makes in rewriting prohibition as performative 
is that the performative is consistendy open to failure; to be compelled does not 
ensure the necessary efficacy of the norm. Indeed, die necessity of repetition in this 
compulsion opens a radical instability in the performative whereby the failed, 
unfulfilled or catachrestic citation reinstates the norm, but reinstates it in such a way 
that the instability of the norm is revealed as a moment of political potential. As 
Butler states, ‘the resignification of norms is thus a function of their inefficacy, and 
so the question of subversion, of working the weakness in the norm, becomes a 
matter of inhabiting the practices of its rearticulation’.73 Agency then, is ‘the hiatus in 
iterability, the compulsion to install an identity through repetition, which requires the
72 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.109.
73 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.237.
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very contingency, the undetermined interval, that identity insistendy seeks to 
foreclose’.74 Significantly, this conception of agency has the rhetorical effect of 
linking subversion with failure, inefficacy and instability. This points to a serious 
equivocation within Butler’s understanding of political transformation.
If we return to Buder’s initial note that abjection means ‘literally to cast off, away, or 
out, and hence presupposes and produces a domain of agency from which it is 
differentiated’, it becomes clear that Buder is also bringing a different conception of 
agency to bear upon the abject, and perhaps one which undermines the agency of the 
abject. For here, agency is that which the abject is differentiated from, cast away from 
and hence the agency produced in that casting away is not the agency of that which is 
cast away. If the agency of the abject is considered a ‘hiatus in iterability’, we might 
consider the agency produced by and differentiated from the abject as the agency of 
iterability, an agency that is then simultaneously productive of the abject. As such, 
die agency of the abject would appear as a destabilizing gap in the operation of the 
agency produced against the abject, as an inevitable counterstroke that stymies the 
mechanical reproduction of exclusionary normative formations. But what is the force 
of this gap in the face of the compelled repetition of norms? While it might disrupt 
the reiteration of norms, this could only appear as a negative resistance and in order 
to make the step to positive subversion Butler urges resignification as a political 
strategy that works with the gap in reiteration.75 However, Buder also argues that the 
performative force of norms rests on their citadonal authority, an authority
74 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.220.
75I recognize that the claim that Butler urges resignification as a political strategy is not 
uncontroversial, and I discuss this in detail in the next chapter. Here though, suffice to say that for 
Buder subversion is ‘working the weakness in the norm’, thereby revealing the instability within 
regulative norms. Bringing this instability to the fore does not necessarily lead to a naive ‘proliferation 
of genders’ as the aim of political strategy. Yet for Butler, resignification of terms such as ‘queer’ is an 
attempt to deviate ‘the citational chain toward a more possible future to expand the very meaning of 
what counts as a valued and valuable body in the world’, and in an important sense, to make life 
bearable (Butler, Bodies that Matter, pp.237 and 22). In this, resignification operates as a political 
strategy. For a related discussion of ‘instability’ and ‘subversion’ in Gender Trouble, see Penelope 
Deutscher, Yielding Gender. Feminism, Deconstruction and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1997). Deutscher argues that while Butler establishes a rhetorical link between instability and 
subversion in Gender Trouble, ‘she is not discussing subversion as a political strategy, but rather as 
something which lies at the heart of all reproducibility’ (Deutscher, Yielding Gender, p.26). She goes on 
to note that in Bodies that Matter, Butler de-emphasizes the vocabulary of subversion in order to focus 
more on the operation of resignification within political discourse (Deutscher, Yielding Gender, p.32). 
Against this reading though, it is the instability identified in norms that allows for the later focus on 
resignification where resignification is the strategy of working that instability for its politically 
transfonnative effects. In other words, normative instability enables resignification as a political 
strategy; hence, at least in Butler’s later work, the opposition between political strategy and the 
inevitable instability of norms is not quite as stark as Deutscher is suggesting here.
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established through conventionality and sancdon. She states ‘no “act” apart from a 
regularized and sanctioned practice can wield the power to produce that which it 
declares. Indeed, a performative act apart from a reiterated and, hence, sanctioned set of conventions 
can appear only as a vain effort to produce effects that it cannot possibly produce, ’76
This clearly introduces a vacillation into Buder’s work on the question of the agency 
of the abject, for on the one hand, that agency is derived from the failed repetitions 
of norms, but on the other, it is also bound to fail in its attempt to ‘produce effects it 
cannot possibly produce’. Hence, while the agency of the abject is produced within 
the process of repetition, it is also bound to failure by that process, such that the 
agency produced against abjection undercuts the efficacy of the agency of the abject. 
This tension is also heightened by the fact that abjection is itself produced in the 
failure of repetition, since it is precisely the failure to fulfill the normative 
requirements of heterosexuality that establishes desiring otherwise as the abject. This 
vacillation in Buder’s account of agency no doubt arises as a response to those 
readings — both critical and celebratory — of Gender Trouble that saw Buder positing 
drag as necessarily subversive. But the effect diat this has in Bodies that Matter is that 
the account of agency is weakened by a vacillation between subversive efficacy and 
power’s intractability.77 Ultimately, the agency of the abject is cut through with failure 
from the scene of its emergence to its inability to produce the effects it strives to 
produce.
We might speculate here that it is precisely this problem of vacillation in the 
conception of agency derived from a constitutive outside that Buder attempts to 
address in The Psychic Life of Power. A terminological shift from constitutive exclusion
76 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p. 107; emphasis added. It should be noted though that this does not mean 
that the speech act does not have any effect, but simply that it does not have the effect intended. See 
Felman, The Literary Speech Act, p.84; Austin, Hour to do Things with Words, pp.16-17.
77 For a further discussion of this see Mills, ‘Efficacy and Vulnerability’, pp.265-279. In this article, I 
discuss this vacillation in relation to the arguments presented in Excitable Speech and The Psychic Tife of 
Power, however, my claims are also apposite to the arguments made in Butler’s earlier work. Slavoj 
Zizek has made a similar point — again in relation to The Psychic Life of Power — through a Lacanian 
framework. He argues that Butler is simultaneously too optimistic and too pessimistic, since on the 
one hand she ‘overestimates the subversive potential of disturbing the functioning of the big Other 
through the practices of performative configuration/displacement’, but on the other, she ‘does not 
allow for the radical gesture of the thorough restructuring of the hegemonic symbolic order in its 
totality’ (Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), 
p.264).
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and abjection to the notion of ‘social death’ indicates that Butler is aware of 
problems arising from Bodies that Matter, and is attempting to redress them. Even if 
this is the case though, the problem identified here does not get resolved, but instead 
reappears in the notion of social death. Given the concern in Bodies that Matter with 
the constitutive effect of sex as a normative regulatory ideal and the critical 
reformulation of the body that Butler effects through it, it should come as no 
surprise that she subsequently takes up questions about the durability of subjection 
and the difficulty of reconfiguring the subject’s attachments to relations of power 
again in The Psychic Life of Power. In doing so, she develops the notion of social death 
to describe the risk to the subject posed by a failure to properly reiterate hegemonic 
norms and identifications.
In this text, Butler elaborates on Foucault’s suggestion that the individual is both the 
effect and vehicle of power through combining recognition of the founding role of 
power with a psychoanalytic approach to the subject.78 Butler moves between the 
apparent paradox of referentiality posed by subjection, whereby one must refer to the 
subject to describe its very formation, thus presupposing its existence before it can 
be said to have come into being, and the paradox of subjection itself. ‘Subjection’, 
Butler claims ‘consists precisely in [our] fundamental dependency on a discourse we 
never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency’ .79 In order to do 
this, she invokes the figure of the ‘turn’, the figure of the subject ‘turning back upon 
oneself or even turning on oneself80 and finds this turn elaborated in the work of 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Althusser and Foucault. This turn, she suggests, functions 
as a ‘tropological inauguration of the subject, a founding moment whose ontological 
status remains permanently uncertain’,81 for finally, it is unclear whether the trope 
inaugurates the subject or whether subjection inaugurates tropology. Butler locates 
this ambivalence in tropological subjection at the heart of the subject, which brings 
into question the relation between the ‘internal’ world of the psyche and the 
‘external’ world of the social.
78 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and  O ther W ritings 1 9 7 2 -1 9 7 7 , 
ed. Colin Gordon, tr. Colin Gordon and others (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p.98.
79 Butler, Psychic Life, p.2.
80 Butler, Psychic Life, p.3.
81 Butler, Psychic Life, p.3-4.
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Briefly, Butler argues that the term ‘subjection’ signifies both the process of 
becoming a subject and of becoming subordinated to power. The incorporation of 
subordination is one of the founding conditions of the subject, since in order to have 
a social existence one must accept terms that are not of one’s own making. The 
subject emerges through a primary submission to the categories, terms and names 
established by the concatenations of power relations that precede and extend beyond 
the subject they hail into being. Thus, the subject is condemned to seek recognition 
of its own existence in a discourse that is both ‘dominant and indifferent’. The social 
categories through which the subject comes to exist signify subordination and 
existence simultaneously, such that ‘within subjection, the price of existence is 
subordination’ .82 The disturbing consequence of this primary submission to power in 
order to exist is that the subject comes to desire the conditions of its own 
subordination in order to persist as a social being,83 since one would rather exist in 
subordination than not exist at all.84 This opens the subject to a founding 
vulnerability to power’s abuses, since the necessity of subordination for its survival 
constitutes the subject as an exploitable being. In being constituted in the terms of a 
‘dominant and indifferent’ discourse and desiring the subordination thus instituted, 
the subject’s existence is tenuously broached upon the rough terrain of injury, 
oppression and dissolution. For Buder, this means that the urgency to oppose 
power’s abuses is redoubled and in this the terms of power bear their own 
vulnerability. The terms of discursive consdtudon are consigned to repetition, which 
breaches their intractability and efficacy by opening such terms to resignification, 
reappropriation and other semantic and performative abuses.
In order to maintain one’s existence then, one is forced to continually re-enact the 
conditions of power that make one’s existence possible. However, the assumption 
and re-enactment of power is not a straightforward process of mechanical 
reproduction. The constitutive character of power should be understood non- 
mechanistically and non-behavioristically, since ‘it does not always produce according 
to a purpose, or rather its production is such that it often exceeds or alters the
82 Butler, Psychic Life, p.20.
83 Butler, Psychic IJ/e, p.9.
84 But importantly, desiring one’s conditions of subordination cannot be seen as an after-effect of the 
constitution of the subject, but is instead the site at which the subject emerges through a tropological 
turning back of the desire to exist upon itself.
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purposes for which it produces’.85 Buder suggests that power acts on the subject in at 
least two ways, first, by making the subject possible, as the constitutive conditions of 
possibility of the subject, and second, as what is ‘taken up and reiterated in the 
subjects “own” acting’.86 Being a subject of power connotes both ‘belonging to’ and 
‘wielding’ power, and this temporal reversal consequently allows the subject to 
‘[eclipse] the conditions of its own emergence’87 by using power against power. In 
other words, the temporal shift of power from that which precedes and constitutes 
the subject to being the effect of the subject points to the paradoxical constitution of 
an agency that allows die subject to intervene in the reiteration of power. Hence, in 
being reiterated or re-enacted, the relations of power are susceptible to 
transformation.
While the subject is the necessary site of power’s renewal, the subject’s agency 
emerges precisely as a consequence of the founding subjection that one must endure 
in order to exist. Buder considers die subject as a necessary precondition for a 
‘radically conditioned’ form of agency, but if we keep in mind that die subject 
emerges through its primary subordination to power, it is precisely this subordination 
that makes agency possible. That is, if subjection consists in botii ‘becoming a 
subject’ and ‘being subject to’, it seems that the agency of the subject is intimately 
connected to die process of subjection whereby one becomes subordinate to power. 
As Butler states, ‘if subjection produces a subject and a subject is the precondition of 
agency, then subjection is the account by which a subject becomes the guarantor of 
its resistance and opposition’.88 From the paradox that agency is produced through 
subjection, Butler argues that ‘agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled’,89 
insofar as it works toward purposes that were not intended by power and are not 
historically or logically derived from it. Agency operates in a relation of ‘contingency 
and reversibility’ vis-ä-vis the power that constitutes it, presenting the subject with 
the opportunity to distort and destabilize relations of power in their reiteration. 
Hence, while efforts to oppose subordination will necessarily ‘presuppose and
85 Butler, Psychic L ife , p.18.
86 Butler, Psychic LJfe, p.14.
87 Butler, Psychic L ife , p.14.
88 Butler, Psychic L ife , p.14.
89 Butler, Psychic U fe , p. 15.
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reinvoke’ that subordination, the reiteration of power illuminates the temporal 
vulnerability of those conditions to the ‘exigencies of their renewal’.90
Significantly, Butler’s characterization of power as necessarily constitutive, producing 
subversive intervention in the reproduction of relations of power in its very 
operation, leads to a characterization of the risk of subversion as a risk that threatens 
the subject with ‘social death’. Simply, if the subject is dependent on the categories, 
names and norms of power for its survival, then a transgression or failure to properly 
reiterate these makes the subject vulnerable to dissolution. If one fails to reinstate 
social norms properly or completely, one’s own existence as a socially recognizable 
subject is brought into question, and one becomes subject to social castigation and 
sanction which threaten one’s future survival. As Butler remarks, ‘the risk of death is 
coextensive with the insurmountability of social life’ .91 Given that the subject desires 
its own subordination in order to persist in its own being, — since one would rather 
exist in subordination than not exist at all — a problem arises for formulating an 
account of agency in this scenario. For if the subject is fundamentally dependent of 
die terms of power for its survival, how does the subject turn against itself, thereby 
threatening its own existence by refusing those terms, or at least by failing to reiterate 
them properly or accurately?
Butler’s account of the emergence of conscience and melancholia provides some 
solution to the apparent quandary of the subject turned against itself, which allows 
the subject to survive the impasse of self-beratement and thwarted desire. Butler 
traces the turns of psychic life through the installation of reflexivity in conscience, a 
form of self-regulation and beratement that works in tandem with social regulation. 
While the emergence of conscience establishes the subject as being in recoil against 
itself, ‘recoiled at the thought of its desire’,92 the turning back on oneself also 
produces another order of desire, a desire for the very circuit of reflexivity and the 
subordination enacted by it. This melancholic desire marks the limit of reflexivity 
insofar as the subject cannot reflect on the loss that is foreclosed in the compelled 
identification with the subordination given in social existence. But importantly,
90 Butler, Psychic Life, p.12.
91 Butler, Psychic Life, p.28.
92 Butler, Psychic Life, p.81.
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melancholia can also be understood as a form of revolt:93 melancholia is an 
aggressivity improperly turned against oneself in order to maintain a lost love object 
and as such, constitutes a ‘“gathering place” for the death drives’.94 Eventually then, 
the melancholic is brought to the impasse of following the lost object into death or 
breaking the attachment in order to survive.
Thus, the loss of the loss becomes necessary for living: ‘Survival is a matter of 
avowing the trace of loss that inaugurates one’s own emergence’.95 We might say then 
that the turn against life in its current configuradon does not lead directly to death, 
but instead indicates a risk to life in order to live, a risk that breaks the shackles that 
initially inaugurated the subject. But, if this is the case, the avowal of the loss must 
then engender a transmogrification of the prohibition incorporated into the psyche — 
where that incorporation itself produces the psyche — such that the vulnerability of 
the subject is redoubled. For now the subject has not only lost the loss that sustains 
it, but, additionally, the prohibition that inaugurates the constitutive loss is itself 
exposed in its vulnerability. The radical vulnerability posed in this scenario exposes 
both the subject and the prohibitions that constitute it to an immanent 
transformation that cannot be determined in advance. We might understand this 
transformation as a moment of becoming, where ‘that “becoming” is no simple or 
continuous affair, but an uneasy practice of repetition and its risks, compelled yet 
incomplete, wavering on the horizon of social being’.96
Hence, while the emergence of self-reflexivity through conscience and melancholia 
allows an account of the subject turned against itself whereby that turning against
93 Butler takes the idea that melancholia can be understood as a form of revolt from Homi K. Bhaba, 
‘Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern Guilt’ in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. 
Triechler, eds. Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992), p.56-68 at 65; Bhaba develops the claim 
through a discussion of Freud and Frantz Fanon.
94 Butler discussing Freud, Psychic Life, p.194.
95 Buder, Psychic Life, p. 195.
96 Butler, Psychic Life, p.30. In this quote, Butler is using the notion of becoming to trace the temporal 
paradox in delineating the constitution of the subject. I am using it in a stronger sense, more akin to 
the process suggested by Deleuze. See in particular the discussions of becoming in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, tr. H. Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983), exemplified in the comment that 
‘multiplicity is the difference of one tiling from another, becoming is difference from self (p.189), and 
throughout Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatttari, A  Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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permits its survival beyond the impasse seemingly presented by resistance, in doing 
so, the vulnerability of the subject is not lessened but enhanced. The question then is 
whether the notion of social death can accommodate this vulnerability and the 
agency that it suggests. The answer to this question rests in large part on what Butler 
means by the ‘social’ nature of social death, and further, on the relation of the social 
to die natural or anatomical body that dies and decays, apparently resistant to the 
operations of linguistic agency. In other words, what is at issue here is the relation 
between a socially and linguistically conditioned form of life and life per se, the sheer 
fact of living.97 I pointed out previously that Butler posits a relation of chiasmatic 
interdependence between materiality and signification, between life per se and 
conditioned forms of life. But I also suggested that her work evinced a moment of 
reduction and identification of materiality and signification, which has particular 
significance for her conception of social death and the agency engendered within and 
by it. In light of this identification, it appears that the metaphorics of death that 
Butler mvokes actually work against the agency suggested in the scenario in which 
both the subject and the prohibitions that produce it are brought to crisis.
Butler understands the risks posed by such a reconfiguration as that of ‘social death’; 
but can this concept accommodate the vulnerability and immanent instability of this 
moment? While Butler does not provide an account of precisely what the notion of 
social death means in Psychic Life, she does indicate elsewhere that the term is taken 
from Orlando Patterson’s study of slavery.98 Patterson outlines two distinct 
characterizations of the phenomenon of social death that attends the status of slaves 
within widespread slavery systems. The first, intrusive mode of representing social 
death was determined by recruitment of slaves from outside the community in 
question. This figured the slave as a ‘permanent enemy on the inside’, living in a 
community without being of the community and thus without ancestral attachment 
while simultaneously symbolizing the vanquished enemy. In contrast, the extrusive 
representation of social death indicated slaves from within the community. In this
97 The Aristotelian terms for this distinction are bios and %oe respectively; I discuss these further in the 
following chapters on Agamben.
98 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A. Comparative Study (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1982). Butler uses Patterson’s conception of social death to understand the position of 
Antigone ‘between life and death’ in Judith Butler, Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Ufe and Death (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001). I discuss this text further in the following chapter.
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conception, slaves were members o f the community who had ‘fallen’ through a 
failure to fulfill ‘minimum legal or socio-economic norms o f behavior’.99 For 
Patterson, whether represented as intrusive or extrusive, the status o f social death 
ultimately reduces to a question o f liminality: while socially dead and hence marginal 
in social relations, the slave is nevertheless included in social relations, indicating an 
‘institutionalized marginality’ in which the slave exists as a degraded person without 
honor .100
The status o f institutional marginality or liminality within social relations should be 
appreciated here as it introduces a logic into Butler’s treatm ent o f political exclusion 
that was not present in Bodies that Matter. In  that text, Butler relied upon the logic o f a 
constitutive exclusion, whereby what is excluded returns as a spectral figure to 
provide both  the constitutive ground for the establishment o f identity and the 
disruption that prevents closure on identity. In employing a notion o f social death 
built through the concept o f liminality, the logic in operation is one o f threshold or 
an ambiguous passage between consolidated states o f social survival. Hence, to be 
socially dead is not exactly the same as being an outcast, or the abject that is cast out, 
for while the latter is excluded from social relations the former exists between social 
statuses; it is a transitory state ‘betwixt and between the positions assigned by law, 
custom, convention and ceremonial’. 101 The structuralist logic o f the anthropological
99 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, p.41. Further difficulties in using Patterson’s conception of social 
death for understanding the position of homosexuality are also evident. First, given the understanding 
of intrusive and extrusive understandings of ‘the socially dead’, it is unclear that these have an 
empirical purchase vis-ä-vis homosexuality. Patterson also makes the interesting point that while 
slaves were considered socially dead, they were not ‘outcastes’, primarily because they were not 
spatially segregated from the community and importantly, were not considered to be polluting (p.50). 
This final point reveals the difficulty of using his notion of ‘social death’ to understand homophobia 
since pollution and dirt are common themes in anti-gay and lesbian violence and hate speech. See Gail 
Mason, The Spectacle of Violence: Homophobia, Gender, and Knowledge, (New York: Routledge, 2002), for a 
recent discussion of the way in which homophobic violence is characterized precisely by a discourse 
of pollution and dirt.
10(1 Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, p.46. The notion of liminality derives from structuralist 
anthropology and was initially used by Arnold van Gennep in his typology of ritual processes and 
practices in Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, tr. Monika B. Vizeden and Gabrielle L. Caffee 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). It was developed further by Victor Turner in his classic 
study, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure (Ithaca: Cornell Publishing, 1977), particularly the 
chapter entitled ‘Liminality and Communitas’, pp.94-130. Interestingly, van Gennep links the status of 
liminality to that of sacredness, suggesting that liminal novitiates in a rituals of transition do not 
properly belong either to the sacred or die profane but are ‘held between heaven and earth... 
suspended between life and death’ (van Gennep, Rites of Passage, p.186.). I will return to a lengthier 
discussion of this status in the chapter on Homo Sacer, in which the status of the sacred as doubly 
excluded becomes important.
101 Turner, The Ritual Process, p.95.
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conception of liminality is certainly complicated by Butler, particularly in her 
suggestions that the authority of the law and social norms is established through their 
repetition and that this repetition is constitutive of the subject and its agency. 
Nevertheless, the general conception of liminality as a threshold or passage between 
consolidated states is maintained in Butler’s thought, where these states are 
understood as life and death.
Built through the concept of liminality, social death is the threshold state ‘between 
life and death’ and as threshold, the notion of social death seems to, on the one 
hand, open a space of radical indeterminacy and on the other, close that space 
through the recollection of death as the mark of finitude, 102 The question to be 
asked of Butler’s metaphorics of social death as threshold is whether the notion of 
death as a limit through which one passes into a life after death — a ‘gendered 
afterlife’ as Butler has suggested — can be sustained against the notion of death as the 
limit, beyond which no life, no agency, survives. In other words, can Butler sustain a 
notion of social death over and against death per se, the fundamental finitude of the 
human body and self. While the answer to this question might seem self-evident, it is 
actually not so, particularly given the slide toward the conflation of signification and 
materiality, writ large into a conflation between a socially conditioned form of life 
and life per se. Consider here Butler’s provocative comment noted earlier that ‘the risk 
of death is co-extensive with the insurmountability of the social’. 103 For Butler, life 
itself can only be brokered within the terms of sociality, through a primary 
subordination to a ‘dominant and indifferent discourse’. If life can only be brokered 
within the terms of the social, such that there is no life beyond the social, one might 
conclude that it is redundant to speak of ‘social death’, because death within the 
social will always necessarily equate to death per se.
If this is the case, then there is a sense in which resistance appears as a form of 
suicide for Butler, and insofar as this suicide is figured as the mark of finitude, there 
can be no agency beyond it. Butler claims that no transformation of the conditions of
102 For further considerations of death as threshold see Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘On the Threshold’, 
Paragraph, 16:2, pp. 111-121; Jacques Derrida Aporias, tr. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1993).
103 Butler, Psychic Life, p.28.
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life is possible without risking life itself, and the risk that attends the transformation 
of the conditions of (social) existence is that of (social) death. In a sense then, the 
transformation of conditions of existence might be understood as a form of suicide, 
insofar as the subject turns against itself, ready to stake its own existence on the 
possibility of transformation of social conditions in order, paradoxically, to survive. 
However, if the sense of suicide evoked here is not metaphoric, but literalized in die 
death of the body, then there will be no survival beyond the impasse of the subject 
turned back against itself, for while social death indicates die death of the subject, if 
the life of the subject is only yielded in the body’s accession to the social then death 
within the social plays out on the body itself. Interestingly, Buder’s explication of the 
subject’s death within the social frequendy return to die literal death of the body in 
suicide, a tendency which is not without significance for her theorization of social 
death.
To illustrate these points out more clearly, I want to return briefly to Butler’s reading 
of Willa Cather’s short story ‘Paul’s Case’. In this story, an ambiguously gendered — 
or ‘gender-liminal’ as Eve Sedgwick puts it104 — young man embezzles his father’s 
company to escape the oppressive strictures of everyday life, runs away to a suite at 
the Waldorf in New York and becomes, for a few short days, ‘exaedy the kind of boy 
he had always wanted to be’ . 105 When his dieft is discovered, rather than return to his 
hometown to face the risk that the ‘tepid gray waters of Cordelia Street were to close 
over him finally and forever’, 106 Paul throws himself in front of a train, ‘drop[ping] 
back into the immense design of things’ . 107 Buder concludes her reading of this story 
with these comments:
104 Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, Tendencies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) p.l 71.
105 Willa Cather, ‘Paul’s Case’ in Willa Gather's Collected Short Fiction 1892- 1912 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 1965), p.255.
106 Cather, ‘Paul’s Case’, p.258.
107 Cather, ‘Paul’s Case, p.261.
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Released from prohibitive scrutiny, the body frees itself only through its own 
dissolution. The final figure of “Paul dropped back into the immense design of 
things” confirms the ultimate force of the law, but this force unwittingly 
sustains the eroticism it seeks to foreclose: is this his death or his erotic release? 
“Paul dropped back”: ambiguously dropped by another and by himself, his 
agency arrested and perhaps, finally, yielded. 108
Butler’s final suggestion that it is in suicide that agency is finally yielded starkly brings 
out the ambiguity of her conception of agency. 109 In escaping the death by drowning 
evoked by Cather’s ‘tepid gray water of Cordelia Street’, freedom is found in a self- 
willed suicide, a sacrificing of oneself for the agency yielded in suicide. In this then, 
death is the limit that yields agency, but in its literalization as limit through the 
destruction of the body, death does not yield an agency that passes beyond death. 
Ultimately, the agency yielded in suicide is rendered obsolete in the face of the force 
of hegemony, figured as the train that obliterates Paul’s life.
If agency is thus yielded in suicide but does not pass beyond that suicide in the 
emergence of a new form of life, then we are clearly returning to the vacillation in 
Butler’s conception of agency that I identified in her account offered in Bodies that 
Matter, a vacillation that is heightened rather than reduced by the shift from abjection 
to social death. The effect of this is that Butler establishes a highly problematic 
conceptual link between death and freedom, where a suicidal resistance wavers 
between the figuration of death as the limit beyond which no life survives or of death 
as the limit beyond which one must pass in order to pass into a realm of agency and 
freedom — that is of death as destruction or liberation. Interestingly, Russ Castronova 
has argued that the association of death and freedom finds a particularly strong 
articulation within the American cultural imaginary particularly in relation to the 
historico-cultural portrayals of the institution of slavery. 110 He shows through his
108 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.166.
109 The number of times Butler returns to suicide as the moment in which agency is yielded is striking; 
also see her discussions of Nella Larsen’s ‘Passing’ (An Intimation of Things Distant: The Collected Diction of 
Nella Tarsen, ed. Charles Larson (New York: Anchor Books, 1992)) in Bodies that Matter, pp.155-185 
esp. at 172, and Antigone's Claim, which I discuss in detail in the following chapter.
110 Russ Castronova, ‘Political Necrophilia’ Boundary 2, 27:2(2000), pp.113-148; also see Robert C. 
Solomon, ‘Death Fetishism, Morbid Solipsism’ in Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon, eds. Death and 
Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.152-176 at 163. Solomon argues that much contemporary 
theory fetishizes death, understanding death as the definidve experience of life, and ultimately, as the 
experience through which ‘authenticity’ and hence autonomy are achieved, through a distillation of
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analysis of literary portrayals of citizenship and slavery that death is frequently 
understood to bring freedom from the responsibilities of the embodied citizen and 
the restrictive arbitration of social and political institutions. In this sense then, death 
secures an absolute freedom over and above the contingencies and struggles of 
existence. This sense of death securing freedom over and against the obligations and 
strictures of social and political life is further enhanced in portrayals of suicide, 
characterized as a self-willed, and therefore free, act of liberation. Such ‘political 
necrophilia’, to borrow Castronova’s phrase, clearly has important implications for 
theorizing subjectivation and agency in the context of a political rationality of life and 
death, some of which I take up in the next chapter.
I have argued in this chapter that Butler’s account of subjectivation moves on 
substantially from Foucault’s in its consideration of the material and psychic 
operations of power. In particular, her account of materialization usefully highlights 
the ways in which regulatory norms produce and constrain possibilities for bodily life 
and play into the determination of life worth living at the level of subject-formation. 
In interrogating the particular relation that Butler posits between the biological and 
the social or the corporeal and the significatory, though, I also show that while Butler 
strives to establish a rendering of this relation as chiasmatic, moments of reductive 
identification sometimes occur within Bodies that Matter. In the second section of the 
chapter, I go on to consider the effects of this reduction for Butler’s account of 
exclusion and agency, developed through the notions of abjection and social death. I 
argue that the identification of the social and the biological leads to a problematic 
figuration of resistance as suicide, which renders death as a form of freedom. To 
appreciate how deeply the difficulties that arise from this go in Butler’s work, further 
consideration of her commitment to the project of a ‘politics of recognition’ is 
required, as it is precisely the commitment to a reworked Hegelian dialectic of 
recognition that leads to the problems that I have identified. In the following
Heidegger’s understanding of ‘being-toward-death’ and the necessity of ‘making death one’s own’ as 
the condition of authentic existence. While Solomon’s identification of the heritage of this tendency 
within contemporary theory is somewhat restrictive, it is worth considering in this context Edith 
Wyschogrod’s critique of the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions of death from the perspective of 
a consideration of man-made mass death in which she claims that these are limited by an excessive 
focus on the effect of the individual’s own death for itself. See Edith Wyshogrod, Spirit in Ashes: Heget, 
Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); also see my discussion 
in Chapter 1 concerning the status of death with Foucault’s work and the later discussion in Chapter 
6 .
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chapter, then, I extend upon this discussion and draw out further ethical and political 
implications through an examination o f Butler’s theoretico-political commitments.
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Chapter 4
The Violence of Recognition: Performativity and 
Responsibility*
4.2 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I read Butler’s work with an emphasis on her contribution to 
questioning the normative exclusion of certain lives from the political arena. I argued 
that her understanding of subjectivation offers insight into the relation between 
biological and political life and the way in which normative operations of power 
constitute and constrain what counts as a livable life. Additionally, I discussed her 
understanding of political exclusion, developed through the concepts of abjection 
and social death, and particularly her aim of explicating the peculiar political agency 
of the excluded. In this chapter, I continue this discussion of political exclusion and 
agency through further consideration of the status of signification within Butler’s 
work, particularly with regard to locutionary violence. This requires focus on her 
most recent work, Excitable Speech and Antigone’s Claim, and discussion of the 
theoretico-political commitments that underpin the politics of the performative that 
Butler poses as a response to that violence.
Butler’s political commitments have been the source of much confusion amongst 
readers of her work, as she simultaneously commits to the project of radical 
democracy while distancing herself from it through a Foucauldian genealogical 
politics. While emphasizing the potential of critical re-appropriations of political 
signifiers, Butler also strives to develop a theoretical means of political critique that 
opens possibilities for transformation without establishing in advance how such 
transformation might in fact occur. Thus, in a recent interview, Butler underscores 
her commitment to a pragmatic politics on the basis that programmatic theory ‘pre­
empts the whole problem of context and contingency... political decisions are made 
in that lived moment and they can’t be predicted from the level of theory’ and
An earlier version of the arguments made in this chapter is to be published as Catherine Mills, 
‘Contesting the Political: Foucault and Butler on Power and Resistance’, The journal of Political 
Philosophy, Forthcoming.
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explicitly aligns herself with the ‘noble tradition’ of Foucault’s refusal to specify ‘what 
is to be done’ .1 She is of course not alone in attempting to establish a clear theoretical 
and political lineage between herself and Foucault and not without some justification 
either. However, the ostensible conceptual similarities between their positions are 
undercut by important differences such that it is obscurantist to suggest that their 
works give rise to the same difficulties, lead us into the same errors and offer only 
the same theoretical means for political critique.
For while Butler’s account of subjectivation and agency is underwritten by a political 
commitment to a genealogical analysis of hegemonic regimes of sexual 
subjectivation, which has as one of its aims the denaturalization and demystification 
of the operation of such regimes, much of the critical strength of Butler’s political 
project derives from the posited inherent instability of signification. In Butler’s view, 
political motivation and action derives from the failure of terms to fully capture that 
which they purport to name and the correlative potential for terms to be 
misappropriated and resignified. Thus in Excitable Speech she argues against calls for 
legal regulation of pornography and hate speech and affirms the strategy of 
resignification and the ‘insurrectionary speech’ that it permits as ‘the necessary 
response’2 to hate speech. However, I argue that the a prion designation of 
resignification as an insurrectionary political strategy stands in sharp contradiction 
with the political pragmatism that Butler takes from Foucault and indicates 
substantial tensions within her political commitments. In particular, I identify an 
important ambiguity in the status of contingency within Butler’s political 
formulations, in which contingency is understood as both the inevitable circumstance 
of political agency and as the foundation of it. This is particularly evident in Butler’s 
positing of resignification based on the inevitable instability and failure of political 
signifiers as a necessary response to hate speech.
1 Butler in Vikki Bell ‘On Speech, Race and Melancholia: An Interview with Judith Butler’, Theory, 
Culture and Society, 16:2(1999), pp. 163-174 at 169. However, this position is not new for Butler; in her 
previous article ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, Diacritics 23:4(Winter 1993), pp.3-11, she 
criticizes Ernesto Laclau and Drucilla Cornell for their adherence to a Derridean logic of deferral and 
failed ideals and aligns herself with a Foucauldian genealogical politics.
2 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A  Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.163.
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In tandem with the emphasis on the failure of political signifiers to fully capture that 
which they hail into being, Buder’s polidcal claims emphasize the importance of 
recognition in the constitution of the subject, which she critically reformulates 
through Althusser’s concept of interpellation as wA-recognition. A consideration of 
mis-recogmtion returns us to the notion of social death that I began to discuss in the 
previous chapter, and here, I extend this discussion through a consideration of 
Antigone’s Claim, a text that, in this context, usefully illustrates the ediico-political 
limits of Buder’s account of resignification, recognition and responsibility. I argue 
that Butler’s analysis of Antigone leaves her unable to broach questions of 
responsibility in the face of death. Against Buder’s arguments, I ask what 
responsibility is given in death and how might that condition the relation to others 
that underpins ethical concern. What demands are made in social death, and how 
might an ethical responsibility begin to be formulated within the constraints and 
possibilities of linguistic survival? I suggest in the final section of this chapter that 
Buder’s formulation of mis-recognition does not allow for consideration of these 
questions and, hence, for the development of an account of responsibility for those 
bodies that have not attained the status of subject.
4.2 The Linguistic Occasion of Political Agency
While Bodies that Matter and The Psychic Ufe of Power examined the ways in which 
discourse delimits and enforces constraints on what counts as livable life, Excitable 
Speech is more concerned with the delimitation and constraints on what counts as 
speech itself. Drawing on her previous theorization of the performative constitution 
of die subject in language, Buder turns to a consideration of the implications of the 
vulnerability and agency of the subject given in that constitution for debates on hate 
speech and the regulation of pornography. In doing so, she not only considers the 
violent effects of language upon the subject and body exposed to it, but also, the 
breach and contact between language and violence. In this, the threat stands as a 
privileged example, since as a form of enunciation or linguistic practice, threatening 
speech brings to the fore the nexus between speech and force, highlighting the force 
of address and the violence effected in it.
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To explicate the relation between force and speech, Butler takes up Toni M orrison’s 
parable o f a blind woman who responds to the question posed by a group o f small 
children whether the bird they hold is alive or dead, by refusing and displacing the 
question. The wom an responds, ‘I don’t know ... bu t what I do know is that it is in 
your hands. It is in your hands .’3 Buder reads the question posed to the wom an as a 
threat, a speech act that prefigures the transfer o f  violence done to the bird to the 
wom an herself, a figuration that is central to the operation o f the threat. The threat 
operates to register the force o f the speech act, ‘a force that both presages and 
inaugurates a subsequent force’.4 However, Buder notes that it would be wrong to 
see the force o f the speech act as belonging wholly to language while the subsequent 
force threatened belongs to the realm o f materiality and corporeal pain. Rather, the 
threat reveals the chiasmatic interdependence o f the speech act and the body:
the threat prefigures, or indeed, promises a bodily act and is yet already a bodily 
act, thus establishing in its very gesture the contours of the act to come... the 
first act, the threat, only makes sense in terms of the act that it prefigures.5
Hence for Buder, the force o f language and the force o f the body are interdependent 
bu t not thereby reducible. The force threatened in the speech act is distinguished 
from the bodily force that it prefigures since the prefiguration does not guarantee the 
inevitable fulfillment o f the threat. In other words, the threat is not necessarily 
efficacious in its promise o f violence.
Buder argues that the chiasm o f the speech act and the body means that speech is 
always already to some degree out o f the control o f the speaker. The body 
‘scandalizes’ the speech act, both anchoring it and disrupting it by preventing the 
speaker from ever gaining full control over the speech situation .6 Thus the relation 
between the speech act and the body is doubled, in the sense that that relation both 
establishes the peculiar force o f the threat and underm ines the efficacy o f  that force. 
As Buder goes on to state:
3 Morrison cited in Butler, E xcitable Speech, p.6.
4 Butler, E xcitable Speech, p.9.
5 Butler, Excitable Speech, p .ll.
6 This claim is drawn from Shoshana Felman’s provocative interpretation of J.L Austin in Shoshana 
Felman, The LJterary Speech A c t:  D on Juan with J .E  A u stin , or Seduction in Two Eanpuages, tr. Catherine 
Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); cited in Buder, E xcitable Speech, p.10.
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The notion that speech wounds appears to rely on this inseparable and 
incongruous relation between body and speech, but also, consequently, 
between speech and its effects. If the speaker addresses his or her body to the 
one addressed, then it is not merely the body of the speaker that comes into 
play: it is the body of the addressee as well. Is the one speaking merely 
speaking, or is the one speaking compordng his or her body toward the other, 
exposing the body of the other as vulnerable to address. As an “instrument” of 
a violent rhetoricity, the body of die speaker exceeds the words spoken, 
exposing the addressed body as no longer (and not ever fully) in its own 
control.7
Thus for Buder, the corporeal excess of the body confounds speech while 
simultaneously establishing its force insofar as that corporeality exposes the 
vulnerability of the body of the one addressed in or by the threat. I will return to the 
pardcular dynamic posited here later, but the point to note here concerns the ways in 
which speech is confounded by corporeality. The force of speech is exposed by the 
comportment of the speaker to the addressee, such that the speech act is founded on 
a constitutive possibility for failure.
The theory of language that Buder relies on in making this argument derives in part 
from the theory of performative speech acts developed by J.L. Austin. Buder offers a 
critical analysis of recent deployments of Austinian speech act theory by theorists 
such as Catharine Mackinnon and Rae Langton in pornography debates, as well as its 
appropriations within legal decision-making processes and suggests an alternative use 
of Austin. In How To Do Things With Words, Austin distinguishes three kinds of 
speech acts: locutionary, perlocutionary and illocutionary. While the first of these 
involves uttering a meaningful sentence, that is, saying something, the second refers 
to speech acts tiiat have certain consequences as a result of something being said. 
Illocutionary acts are those in which the utterance itself does something; for example, 
if a person says T promise’ then the saying of that constitutes die act of promising. 
As Buder outlines, the distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary speech 
acts lies in the temporal relation of the utterance and its effects.8 In perlocutionary 
acts, the utterance puts into effect certain temporally distinct consequences or in
7 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.12-13
8 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.17.
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other words, the act itself precedes its effect. In illocutionary acts though, there is no 
tem poral distinction between the act and its effect — the saying is the doing. 
Furtherm ore, Buder emphasizes that while perlocudonary acts operate through 
consequences, illocutionary acts proceed through conventionality, pointing to the 
‘ritual or ceremonial’9 dimension o f such performatives.
The conventionality o f illocutionary acts means that they invoke a pre-established set 
o f social traditions and institutional arrangements in their utterance. Furtherm ore, 
they work to the extent that they are repeated through time and become established 
conventions within themselves. In a sense then, the illocutionary act bo th  precedes 
and exceeds any particular utterance or speaker, constituting a ‘condensed 
historicity ’10 that cannot be limited to a singular m om ent o f utterance. While the 
illocutionary act is temporally indistinct from its effects, illocutionary force derives 
from the ritualization o f the act, from ‘prior and future invocations that constitute 
and escape the instance o f utterance ’ .* 11 The conventionality o f illocutionary acts also 
points to the contextual contingency o f the efficacy o f such acts. For utterances to 
have the effects they pronounce, certain ‘felicity’ conditions m ust be met. Thus, for 
the pronouncem ent ‘I sentence y o u ...’ to have legal efficacy, it m ust not only be 
made by som eone who is a qualified judge, bu t m ust also be made in a situation in 
which that statement can be considered to carry legal weight, that is, in a court o f 
law. If  the appropriate felicity conditions are not in place, then an illocutionary act is 
itself condem ned to failure.
It is precisely this vulnerability to failure that Butler makes m uch o f in her 
conceptualization o f resistance in lELxcitable Speech, since the incom pletion o f 
signification indicates an inherent vulnerability that exposes signification itself to a 
differential repetition and transform ation o f interpellative force. The phrase 
‘linguistic vulnerability’ carries two interrelated meanings for Butler; first, there is the 
linguistic vulnerability o f the subject, insofar as the subject is produced through 
language and hence is susceptible to its power to injure and wound. This means that 
the sovereign individual existing outside language is a fiction, and this leads directly
9 Austin cited in Butler, H xdtable Speech, p.3.
10 Butler, H xdtable Speech, p.3.
11 Butler, H xdtable Speech, p.3.
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to the second meaning o f the phrase. Linguistic vulnerability also refers to the 
vulnerability o f language to reappropriation and resignification, because there is no 
sovereign subject to fix the meaning o f terms and ensure the efficacy o f speech acts. 
The power o f words to injure in being spoken cannot be seen as direcdy arising from 
the position o f the speaker and their capacity to control language. Illocutionary force 
is to a large extent given by the conventional nature o f the terms and by the way in 
which relations o f power are embedded within and reproduced through the speaking 
o f terms. The double sense o f linguistic vulnerability begins to bring into focus the 
theoretical threads and stakes o f Buder’s argum ent, two o f  which require further 
discussion here.
The first o f these is the theory o f  subject-form ation that she develops. Buder’s 
critical reformulation o f the Hegelian dialectical scene o f desire and recognition 
through Althusser’s mis-en-scene o f  interpellation emphasizes the political potential o f 
wti-recognition as a central tenet o f the politics o f  the perform ative . 12 Perhaps the 
m ost innovative aspect o f Buder’s use o f  Austinian speech act theory is the 
association she establishes between illocution and interpellation, through which she 
inflects the problematics o f discursive construction with those o f  intersubjective 
dynamics o f recognition, a position that is particularly evident in her arguments in 
Excitable Speech. Butler recognizes the ostensible opposition between Austin and 
Althusser, insofar as the former assumes that the subject precedes speech, while for 
the latter speech brings the subject into existence. She suggests, in fact, that the 
constitutive interpellation that Althusser describes seems to constitute the prior 
condition for the subject-centred speech acts o f Austin’s analysis. She argues that if 
hate speech is to be seen as illocutionary in such a way that it injures the one it names 
in the act o f naming, then its interpellative function m ust also be recognized. For 
Buder, interpellation is the necessary precondition for the social existence o f a 
subject. She states that ‘it is by being interpellated within the terms o f  language that a 
certain social existence o f the [subject] first becomes possible ’. 13 O r in other words,
12 See her prefatory comments in the paperback issue of Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth 
Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), where she comments that ‘all my work 
remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian questions: What is the relation between desire and 
recognition, and how is it that the constitution of the subject entails a radical and constitutive relation 
to alterity?’ (p.xiv).
13 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.5.
161
‘to be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, but to have 
the very terms conferred by which the recognition of existence becomes possible. 
One comes to “exist” by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of 
the Other. ’14
Buder’s reference to an Althusserian conception of the emergence of the subject in 
discourse allows her to reformulate the Hegelian master-slave dialectic to emphasize 
die fundamental dependence of the subject on the regulatory norms animated 
through linguistic practices for its existence.15 To state it simply, in the dialectic of the 
master and slave, each participant in the confrontation confers recognition upon the 
other and that conferral inaugurates the emergence of the subjectivity of each. While 
drawing on this figuration of the subject’s emergence in relation to the other, Butler 
also takes up Althusser’s figuration of interpellation in the call of the police officer, 
understood by Althusser as the interpellative call of ideology. In doing so, she shifts 
focus from the constitutive engagement with the other to the constitutive force of 
signification, whereby the subject emerges through identification with the 
interpellations offered in the normative operations of a ‘dominant and indifferent’ 
discourse that both precedes and exceeds the subject. Thus recognition is mediated 
through the terms and names by which one is called into being as a subject, a 
condition of existence that exposes the subject to potentially debilitating injuries 
effected through language. As Butler argues, the social existence and recognition of a 
subject are facilitated by conventional terms, ‘the effects and instruments of a social 
ritual that decide, often through exclusion and violence, the linguistic conditions of
14 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.5.
15 That the notion of linguistic practice designates more than speech is evident in Butler’s critique of 
Aldiusser’s mis-en-scene of interpellation on the basis that it presumes a more or less sovereign voice 
that hails the subject into being (see Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), pp.5-6, 106-131). However, throughout the argument in Excitable Speech, 
Butler is primarily interested in the limits of speech itself. Further, Buder also claims to want to 
privilege speech in order to ‘struggle free of a narrow version of textualism’ (Butler in Bell, ‘Speech, 
Race and Melancholia’, p.169), by which she means the theoretical positing of the primacy of writing, 
by emphasizing the constitutive role of speech over that of writing. Thus, her argument in Excitable 
Speech is especially concerned with the borders of what speech is. While I will not develop this point 
here, this privileging of speech may engender a certain difficulty for Butler’s emphasis on 
resignification as a strategy of resistance to hate speech, since it is then difficult to imagine the scene 
of speaking back to anonymous graffiti, policy documents and other such discursive elements. In 
other words, as modalities of invective and hate, do speech and writing permit or necessitate the same 
response? One of the potential problems mooted here is whether Butler’s understanding of 
signification is overstretched in its reference, for it covers both the voice and the act of speaking, as 
well as writing and most broadly, ideology.
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survivable objects’.16 For instance, the utterances o f hate speech are an element in the 
continuous process o f discursive subjectivation, one that attempts to produce 
subjects through derogation in order to reproduce positions o f subordination. Thus 
the capacity o f hate speech to injure those it names rests on its interpellative force 
and the fundamental dependence o f the subject on language for social existence.
Furtherm ore, maintenance o f the status o f being a subject is only assured through 
the repetition o f the conditions o f power that inaugurate that status, such that these 
conditions themselves are reenacted or reproduced through their continued citation. 
Hence the performativity o f  sexual identity should be ‘understood not as a singular 
or deliberate “act”, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which 
discourse produces the effects it names’.17 O r in other words, performativity is 
‘always a reiteration o f a norm  or set o f  norms, and to the extent that it acquires an 
act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions o f which it is 
a repetition ’.18 This means that the site o f the subject, what Buder sees primarily as a 
‘linguistic category, a place holder, a structure in form ation ’19 is no t only the occasion 
by which the individual comes to acquire a level o f social intelligibility w ithout which 
they cannot survive, but is also the occasion for the reproduction o f conditions o f 
power. As Buder states ‘if conditions o f power are to persist, they m ust be reiterated; 
the subject is precisely the site o f such reiteration ’.20 Hence, the reproduction o f 
conditions o f power is never purely mechanical, but founders instead on the 
tem poral vulnerability o f power, whereby the repetition o f conditions o f power 
opens the way for their being re-inscribed or reiterated differently .21
16 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.5.
17 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.2.
18 Butler, Bodies that Matter, p.12.
19 Buder, Psychic Life, p.10.
20 Butler, Psychic Life, p.16.
21 Contra Lois McNay, ‘Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity’ 
Theory, Culture and Society 16:1(1999), pp.95-117 at 102. McNay claims that in Butler’s work ‘reiteration 
becomes a static rather than temporal act where the reproduction of the sex-gender system involves a 
ceaseless reinscription of the same. This notion of time as a succession of self-identical and discrete 
acts renders the dominant hermetic and self-sustaining and means that disruption can only come from 
the outside. This provokes the dualisms of ‘subjection-resistance, exclusion-inclusion that limit 
Butler’s work’. This clear misreading fails to appreciate the Derridean influence within Butler’s work, 
and particularly of the notion of citationality, which is not a matter of the incessant repetition of the 
same but rather opens the very possibility of difference. It is interesting to note that in the debate
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Hence, while Butler sees the subject as conditioned and given existence by language 
through die address of the other, it would be a mistake to see in this argument a 
denial of the agency of the subject. Instead, Butler wants to effect a repositioning of 
agency as a consequence of the linguistic constitution of the subject, stating that ‘the 
one who acts... acts precisely to the extent diat he or she is constituted as an actor, 
and hence, [operates] within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the 
outset’.22 The subject survives the impasse of subordinating recognition, since the 
interpellations by which the subject is brought into being also inaugurate the agency 
of the subject, enabling the subject to turn against the terms by which recognition is 
established. The incompletion of the signifier, which ensures that the signifier 
necessarily fails to fully capture that which it names and is thus stricken by the ever­
present possibility of mis-recognition, or the failure of the subject to find itself in the 
terms by which it is called. Thus, the agency of the ‘subject’ — to the extent that this 
term can be used here — emerges through the failure to identify, the failure to 
recognize oneself in the terms by which one is called into being as subject. It takes 
the form of a turning back upon the interpellation and recasting the term to give it 
new life, an appropriation and re-signification that works to untether the term from 
the effects of derogation and subordination.
In other words, if the subject who is named in derogation refuses that identification 
and returns the name to its initial speaker in a transmogrified form, the illocutionary 
and interpellative force of the original performative is destabilized. Correlatively, die 
transformation of interpellative force effected through resignification opens new 
possibilities for forms of life conditioned by the demands of linguistic survival.23 This 
is at least what Butler’s theory of resistance seems to suggest at times. But it would 
be inaccurate to over-emphasize the possibility and efficacy of this refusal, because as 
Buder remarks ‘speech is always in some way out of our control’24 and therefore also 
beyond the control of those who would refuse its power to injure. Furthermore, as
between Pierre Bourdieu and Butler, it is precisely this problem of providing a static model of 
hegemonic institutions and mechanical notion of social reproduction that Butler taxes Bourdieu for.
22 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.15-16.
23 Also see Butler’s development of the concept of resignification in Bodies that Matter, especially in the 
chapter entitled ‘Critically Queer’, pp.223-242. In her earlier work, Butler links the idea of 
resignification much more closely to parody, but this should be seen as one particular mode of 
resignification, and not necessarily as paradigmatic.
24 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.15.
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she points out, and as Althusser failed to draw out, the act of naming exceeds the 
existence of the one who is named. One can be named without being present in the 
occasion of being named, or without knowing that one is being named. While social 
existence is ensured through the constitutive capacity of naming, that social 
constitution may well be efficacious without the subject turning and identifying with 
the terms in which they are hailed. As Butler states: ‘the measure o f... constitution is 
not to be found in a reflexive appropriation of that constitution, but, rather in a chain 
of signification that exceeds the circuit of self-knowledge. The time of discourse is 
not the time of the subject’.25
A number of questions can be posed to this rendering of the subject’s emergence 
and survival within discourse, but for now, I want to hold questions concerning the 
dynamic of recognition and mis-recognition that underpin this in abeyance and 
return to them in the final section of this chapter. Here, it is important to pursue the 
implications of an agency that consists in recasting the terms by which one is given 
existence as a subject and Butler’s concomitant positing of resignification as a 
necessary strategy against the derogation of hate speech. This returns us to the 
second meaning of linguistic vulnerability and allows for a discussion of the political 
project of radical democracy that supports Butler’s performative politics.
Butler has recently provided an explicit discussion of her longstanding commitment 
to the central claims of the theoretical and political project of radical democracy in 
her engagement with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality. In this text, Butler situates herself in the terrain of political theorists who 
find radical democratic potential in the ‘incompletion of the political signifier and the 
relations between political signifiers’,26 while simultaneously marking her 
disagreements with other radical democracy theorists. The most substantial point of 
agreement between these theorists is a mutual commitment to the questioning of a 
politics of representation and insistence on the productive political possibilities that 
attend the necessary incompletion that marks signification and identification. Rather 
than bemoaning ‘what constitutes the failure of any claim to identity to achieve full
25 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.31.
26 Fiona Webster, ‘The Politics of Sex and Gender: Benhabib and Butler Debate Subjectivity’, Hypatia 
15.1(2000), p. 14.
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and final determ ination ’27 as the crisis o f the political, this failure becomes, in itself, 
the condition o f political possibility rendered as ‘democratic contestation’. The term  
‘democratic contestation’ is taken from the seminal articulation o f radical democratic 
theory by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and 
indicates the instability o f political articulation and the consequent agonism o f 
democracy .28 Laclau and M ouffe argued that political signifiers produce or constitute 
the political field in which they operate and are incomplete in the sense that they 
perpetually and necessarily fail to fully describe or represent that which they purport 
to name. Furtherm ore, since political signifiers are contingendy related to one 
another, a continual rearticulation o f these signifiers is required in order to produce 
new subject positions and political signifiers, thus leading to the developm ent o f new 
linkages that can operate as rallying points o f politicization .29
While Buder concurs with the theoretical claim o f a necessary or intrinsic failure o f 
signification and identification central to radical democracy theory, the principal 
point o f difference between her, Laclau and Zizek also emerges from this 
commitment. Specifically, their disagreements rest on how that failure is figured and 
the theoretical and political effects o f that figuration. That is, while all three theorists 
emphasize a constitutive failure in representation, a strong divergence emerges in 
how each accounts for it and the political effects o f  it. Against Zizek’s insistence that 
the Lacanian notion o f the Real operates as the ‘inherent limitation o f the Symbolic, 
the impossibility o f the Symbolic fully to “become itse lf ” ,30 Butler argues that 
recourse to the Real as that which resists signification is itself an effect o f 
signification, one which operates to consolidate die excluded other o f the hegemonic
27 Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek, ‘Introduction’, Contingency, Hegemony and Universality: 
Contemporary Dialogues on the Heft (London: Verso, 2000) pp.1-10 at 2.
28 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics 
(London: Verso, 1985); also see Buder, Laclau and Zizek, Contingeny, Hegemony and Universality.
29 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, especially chapter 4; Also see Butler, Bodies that 
M atter, p.193; for further discussions of the centrality of contestation or agonism within democratic 
politics see among others, William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political 
Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); William E. Connolly, The E thos o f Pluraliyition 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Chantal Mouffe, The Return o f the Political (London: 
Verso, 1993); Chantal Mouffe, ed. Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996); Chantal 
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the 
Displacement o f Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
30 Slavoj Zizek, ‘Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes Please!’ in J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek, 
Contingeny, Hegemony, Universality'. Contemporary Dialogues on the Heft (London: Verso, 2000), pp.90-135 at 
120.
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order as ahistorical and necessarily unintelligible.31 Not altogether dissimilarly, in her 
article ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, Buder criticizes Laclau on the basis that 
the necessary failure of political ideals provides no means of staving off political 
pessimism. She perceives in Laclau’s approach a tendency to isolate and valorize 
conceptual ideals from social formations and practices by ‘postulating a logic to 
which social practices are subject but which is itself subject to no social practice’.32 
Consequendy, he fails to recognize the ways in which the logic of failure is itself 
configured within operations of power. Further, Buder claims that ‘the assumption 
of a radical ontological divide between the logical and the social’ characteristic of 
Laclau’s approach ‘precludes from the start the realizability of a logical norm within 
die domain of the social’ and asks whether ‘the theoretical demarcation of ‘the 
logically possible’ can suffice as a normative ideal for social practice’.33
In response to this, Buder underlines her preference for a Nietzschean and 
Foucauldian approach to the political, which emphasizes the productive force of 
relations of power and knowledge on the formulation of logical ideals, and asks how 
it is that such ideals take hold in particular historico-cultural formations.34 Buder 
urges a Foucauldian analysis of the circumscription of logical possibilities that 
recognizes the ways in which those possibilities are produced through the regulative 
operation of power and the mechanisms by which this production is concealed. She 
argues that the abstraction of logical possibilities is an abstraction from the 
constitutive relations of power that regulate the borders between the intelligible and 
the unintelligible and limit the range of possibilities through the constitution of the 
impossible. For Buder, the domain of the logical operates as one of the mechanisms 
of regulation; it is an ‘instrument and effect of social power’. She argues that this 
comes to light in a Foucauldian analysis of the logical, through which one would
31 See in addition to her discussions in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, her chapter on Zizek in Bodies 
that Matter, entided ‘Arguing with the Real’, pp.187-222. It is not necessary to take up the question of 
whether Buder’s critique of Zizek is accurate here, though Zizek has defended himself against Buder’s 
criticism on a number of occasions, claiming that the Lacanian Real is historical. See in particular 
Christopher Hanlon ‘Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview with Slavoj Zizek’, New 
Uiterary History 32:1(2001), p.1-21 at 16; also see Slavoj Zizek The Abyss Of Freedom (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press: 1997) p.83-4.
32 Butler, ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.9.
33 Buder, ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.9.
34 It should also be noted though that Buder takes distance from what she perceives as a utopian 
impulse or moment of the notion of the sign-chain suggested by Nietzsche and utilized by Foucault.
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‘encounter the limits of the intelligible as controlled by strategies of social 
regulation’.35 Thus she underlines her preference for a genealogical approach directed 
toward the fabrication of ‘local ideals [that] enhance the sense of politically practical 
possibilities’36 where the context of both formulation and realization are 
indeterminate and locally contingent.
However, the theoretical and political status that Buder gives to contingency is 
double-edged and ultimately reveals important tensions within her political 
commitments. On die one hand, in aligning herself with a Foucauldian-inspired 
pragmatism, Buder understands that political strategy is of necessity constrained and 
made possible by the particular circumstances in which a political decision has to be 
taken. The strategies and tactics of political confrontation cannot be determined in 
advance of the conditions to which they must respond. On the other hand though, 
Buder posits contingency as the necessary ground of politics, not in the sense that 
political strategy is itself contingent, but in that political strategy derives from the 
inherent contingency of discursivity. For Buder, resistance arises through the 
inherent temporal vulnerability of power relations, figured in Excitable Speech and 
elsewhere as the vulnerability of signification to re-appropriation. This suggests then 
that despite her stated commitment to a pragmatic politics in the lineage of Foucault, 
Buder’s theoretical claims take her some way from this commitment.
This point can be clarified through a brief consideration of Buder’s criticism of both 
Pierre Bourdieu and Derrida on the performative force of speech acts in Excitable 
Speech. Buder attempts to negotiate a path between what she sees as the structural 
determinism of Bourdieu, and Derrida’s installation of iterability as a structural 
necessity of every linguistic utterance or mark.37 She takes issue with Bourdieu on the 
basis that if the performative force of illocutionary speech acts is said to derive from 
the pre-ordained authority of the speaker, an authority established through social 
ritual and convention, then opportunities for linguistic agency that exist ‘at the
35 Buder, ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.9.
36 Butler, ‘Poststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.10-11.
37 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context’ in Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), pp.1-23 and Pierre Bourdieu 'Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, tr. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
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margins of power’38 are foreclosed. In order to bring these opportunities to the fore, 
Butler draws on Derrida’s critique of Austin and his argument that iterability 
constitutes a condition of possibility of linguistic practice. However, Butler claims 
that in developing his argument for iterability as the basis of performative force, 
Derrida overemphasizes the capacity of the utterance to ‘break’ with any context 
because of an internal capacity, ‘thus paralyzing the social analysis of the forceful 
utterance’.39
But while Butler refutes Derrida’s position on the basis that it does not permit 
recognition of the ways in which context inheres in speech acts within the operation 
of hate speech and thereby both contributes to and undermines their efficacy, it is 
difficult to see the actual significance of how her position differs from Derrida’s. For 
in making power citational, Buder posits citationality and the vulnerability to 
misappropriation as a structural necessity of power in much the same way as Derrida 
makes iterability and the possibility of (mis)appropriation a structural condition of 
any utterance or linguistic mark. While she recognizes the way in which context 
conditions, and perhaps even undermines, the re-appropriations of language effected 
through resistance to hateful interpellations, thereby weakening the radical 
decontextualisation of deconstruction, citationality is nevertheless maintained as a 
logical possibility that necessarily conditions both linguistic practice and the 
operation of power. Several points can be made to bring out the implications of this 
and ultimately, to point toward a deep rift that runs through Excitable Speech. In 
particular, two closely related dimensions of Buder’s argument warrant further 
examination, these being the conception of the state that she relies on and her 
argument against casting hate speech as illocutionary. These fields of analysis find 
their conjunction in legality and law, and particularly in the attribution of sovereign 
power to the state, the law and speech acts.
The aims of Exci'table Speech are both theoretical and political; of the former, it can be 
said that Buder attempts to clarify the relation of speech and conduct, and through 
this, the relation between speech, violence and the body. She argues against the
38 Buder, Excitable Speech, p. 156; also see Judith Buder ‘Performativity’s Social Magic’ in R. 
Shusterman, ed. Bourdieu: A  Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Press: 1999), pp. 113-128.
39 Buder, Excitable Speech, p.150.
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characterization of hate speech and pornography on the model of illocutionary 
speech acts, doing what it says in the saying of it, evident in the work of Catharine 
Mackinnon, Rae Langton, and Mari Matsuda among others.40 Butler claims that it is 
necessary to understand such speech as perlocutionary — to the extent that 
pornography can be understood as speech at all — and thereby maintain a distinction 
between speech and conduct. From this theoretical explication, Butler makes the 
political claim that state power should not be extended to include legal regulation of 
pornography, and further, that the state cannot be relied upon for protection against 
hate speech. In fact, the appropriate response to hate speech for Butler is the 
adoption of a strategy of the misappropriation of hateful appellations and the 
restaging of them within different contexts in such a way that these terms necessarily 
take on different meanings. In other words, the best response to hate speech is more 
speech. Indeed, calls for legal regulation are not only doomed to failure through the 
necessary incompleteness of signification and the subject’s lack of sovereign control 
over language, but are in fact pernicious. This is both because the state itself is 
engaged in the production of hate speech, and because the attempt to regulate speech 
limits the opportunities for resignification. As Butler states: ‘the effort to tighten the 
reins on speech undercuts the political impulses to exploit speech itself for its 
insurrectionary effects’ .41
The first argument that Butler provides against the legal regulation of hate speech 
derives from a general mistrust of the state and wariness regarding the extension of 
state power. This is based on the ‘arbitrary use of... power’ in relation to racial and 
sexual speech that Butler claims is evident in recent US. Supreme Court decisions. In 
particular, Butler argues that precedents on hate speech are used in contrary ways to 
‘promote conservative political goals and thwart progressive efforts’.42 This 
arbitrariness means that extending the power of the state to regulate the uses of 
speech potentially empowers the state to invoke progressive legislation against the 
very movements that it was initially designed to protect. Hence, ‘the prosecution of
40 The relevant texts include: Catharine Mackinnon Only Words (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1993); Rae Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22:4(1993), 
pp.293-330 and Mari J. Matsuda, Richard Delgado, Charles R. Lawrence III, Kimberle Williams 
Crenshaw, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993).
41 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.162.
42 Buder, Excitable Speech, p.64.
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hate speech in a court runs the risk of giving that court the opportunity to impose a 
further violence of its own’.43 Additionally, Buder makes the stronger claim that ‘the 
state produces hate speech’44 by which she means that the ‘category cannot exist 
without the state’s ratificadon’. This means that the state actively intervenes in the 
production of what is considered publicly accepted speech, ‘demarcating the line 
between the domains of the speakable and the unspeakable, and retains the power to 
make and sustain that consequential line of demarcation’ .45 In so doing, it enacts a 
kind of violence that is not dissimilar to that enacted through racist or homophobic 
speech, that is, the violence of exclusion and interpellative derogation. What is at 
issue then is both the state’s capacity to produce and enforce the limit of acceptable 
linguistic practice and its ability to re-appropriate discourses and legislation in 
reactionary and dangerous ways.
Buder’s characterization of the state is posed in opposition to the portrayal of the 
state as a neutral arbiter of civil conflict that theorists who call for legal regulation 
tend to rely on and this corrective is surely important. But there is a sense in which 
Buder’s characterization of the state runs the risk of reproducing the logic of the 
argument she opposes. While Buder suggests that the operations of state power are 
‘arbitrary’, her argument assumes that the incursions of the state into the sphere of 
speech through legal regulation are necessarily reactionary. But this neglects the fact 
that various progressive movements have been importantly assisted by state 
intervention.46 The point that is elided is that a priori designations of state 
intervention as reactionary, neutral or even necessary miss the vagaries of the state’s 
position within relations of power and political contestation. Insofar as this is true, 
Butler’s position on the state is distinctly /^-Foucauldian, despite her explicit
43 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.65.
44 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.77.
45 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.77.
46 See Paul A. Pavassant and Jodi Dean ‘Laws and Societies’, Constellations 8:3(2001), pp.376-389 for a 
challenge to Butler’s opposition to legal redress that highlights the internal pluralism of the law. Also 
see the discussion between Elizabeth Povinelli, John Frow and Meaghan Morris in Lauren Berlant’s 
Intimacy, for a critical elucidation of the political and theoretical stakes of conflating the operations of 
juridical and state institutions in relation to tolerance and multiculturahsm. See Elizabeth Povinelli, 
‘The State of Shame: Australian Multiculturahsm and the Crisis o f Indigenous Citizenship’, in L. 
Berlant, ed. Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp.253-288; John Frow and 
Meaghan Morris, ‘Two Laws: Response to Elizabeth Povinelli’, in L. Berlant, ed. Intimacy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp.421-425; Elizabeth Povinelli, ‘The Cunning of Recognition: A 
Reply to John Frow and Meaghan Morris’, in L. Berlant, ed. Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), pp.426-432.
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commitment to his critique of understanding power as sovereign and centralized in 
the state. This divergence is further evinced by her suggestion that her concern is ‘not 
only with the protection of civil liberties against the incursions of the state, but with 
the discursive power given over to the state through the process of legal redress’.47 If 
we understand this to mean that it is at least partly concerned with the incursions of 
the state into the sphere of civil liberties, then Butler’s positing of a sphere of civil 
activity — indeed civil liberty — distinct from the proper sphere of state activity is 
problematic from a Foucauldian viewpoint. Foucault’s own work and the literature 
inspired by it on the govemmentalization of the state shows the difficulty in making 
such a distinction between the civil sphere and the proper sphere of state 
intervention, particularly since the notion of the civil sphere only makes sense in 
terms of the political and legal production of that sphere.48
It is perhaps unfortunate that Butler’s engagement with Foucault’s explication of 
genealogical analysis remains limited to theoretical critique. For the problem that 
Butler does not engage with in Hxcitable Speech is the historical interrelation of 
political subjectivity and language within a liberal arts of government. To put it 
simply, a more strictly Foucauldian intervention in the debates concerning legal 
regulation of speech would trace the historical problematization of speech within 
liberalism with the aim of bringing to light the techniques through which speech is 
able to be governed, the way in which it contributes to the governing of political 
subjects and the possible points of intervention that raise the possibility of being 
governed differently. This kind of genealogical analysis seeks to bring to light the 
historical particularity of forms of government and rationalization that present as 
universal, ahistorical and given. In doing so, it methodologically brackets the truth 
claims made by those forms of government and rationalization in order to trace the 
lines of force that constitute the conditions of their emergence and consolidation.
47 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.77; emphasis added.
*
48 See especially, Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in I& C  6(1979), pp.5-21, reprinted in Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.87- 104. For further elaboration of the relation of civil society 
to the state and law within a liberal rationality of government, see Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental 
Rationality: An Introduction’, pp.1-52 and Graham Burchell, ‘Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and 
Governing ‘The system of Natural Liberties”, pp.119-150 in the same volume.
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However, Butler’s methodological approach is a rhetorical and theoretical 
questioning, which, while attempting to challenge the claims of liberal political 
institutions, is nevertheless bound by the truth claims and problematics of liberalism. 
The shift to an Austinian theoretical articulation of the relation between violence and 
speech, whether one sees that relation as illocutionary or perlocutionary, is after all, 
still a matter of trying to establish the extent to which speech causes harm, and is 
thus played out on theoretical and political ground established by J.S Mill.49 My point 
though is not to criticize Butler for not being more strictly Foucauldian. Rather, it is 
to highlight the way in which her work diverges from this theoretical and political 
lineage against those critics who elide the differences between Butler and Foucault as 
well as Butler’s own attempt to place herself within that political tradition.
To return to the question of Butler’s position vis-ä-vis Foucault’s political pragmatism 
then, so far we have seen that Butler’s political claims are based on the inevitable 
instability of political performatives. From this claim, Butler goes on to advocate a 
strategy of resignification as a ‘necessary response’ to hate speech. Butler’s claim that 
this response is ‘necessary’ is somewdiat ambiguous here, since it could be taken to 
mean either that the response is inevitable or that it is indispensable, a strategy that 
cannot but be pursued or a strategy that must be pursued; it is I think this latter sense 
that is most appropriate here, since resignification is posed as an alternative to legal 
regulation and to make it inevitable would rob her argument of its force. However, 
there is a further ambiguity in that the instability of the signifier is necessary, or 
inevitable. This ambiguity is resolved by positing the inevitable instability generated 
by citationality as the condition for resignification as a potential political strategy, one 
that Butler sees as a necessary response to hate speech. However, in taking this 
approach, Butler forgoes a contextually contingent pragmatics and instead posits a 
logic of political action that precedes the conditions which it addresses. Her
49 For a similar, though more explicitly liberal and therefore less anti-juridical, argument against 
Mackinnon developed through deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, see Drucilla 
Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography, and Sexual Harassment (New York: Roudedge, 
1995) esp. pp.140-163. For further considerations of the harm principle and speech act theory see the 
discussion between Rae Langton and Leslie Green in the collection, Censorship and Silencing. Leslie 
Green, ‘Pornographizing, Subordinating and Silencing’ in Robert C. Post. ed. Censorship and Silencing: 
Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the 
Humanities, 1998), pp.285-311; Rae Langton, ‘Subordination, Silence and Pornography’s Authority’ in 
Robert C. Post. ed. Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research 
Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998), pp.261-283; also see Leslie Green, 
‘Pornographies’, The journal of Political Philosophy 8:1(2000), pp.27-52.
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Opposition to the legal regulation of hate speech and the correlative reliance on 
discursive resignification to contest the interpellative violence that hate speech enacts 
posits resignification as an a priori response, regardless of the contingent conditions 
of its realization.
To be sure, Butler does occasionally concede that she is not opposed to legal redress 
per se and that in certain situations it might well be called for. Butler concedes that 
legal regulation might be appropriate when she states that ‘this is not to say that 
subjects ought not to be prosecuted for their injurious speech; I think there are 
probably occasions when they should be’.50 But when she makes such concessions, 
Buder is engaging in a performative contradiction, or a speech act that actually 
produces a meaning that undercuts the meaning that it purports to make. This 
concession is made in the context of a critique of the attribution of responsibility for 
hate speech to a singular subject, which problematizes the prosecution of an 
individual for their injurious speech. In this scene then, there is considerable tension 
between the act of conceding the appropriateness of legal regulation and the 
argument against such regulation. This suggests that such concessions are made 
primarily for rhetorical effect, or perhaps indicate an anxiety that Butler has about 
the implications of her argument. This tension is further mcreased when we consider 
that Butler characterizes calls for legal circumscription of offensive or injurious 
speech as ‘dogmatic’51 and perniciously detrimental to extra-juridical attempts to 
combat such speech. Hence, the overwhelming impulse of Excitable Speech is to 
provide a theoretical argument that makes such redress illegitimate.
The divergence that this indicates from Foucault’s approach to the question of 
theoretical engagement with political problems becomes even clearer if Butler’s 
theoretical position is contrasted with a genealogical approach, for the aim of the 
latter would be to trace relations of force in order to bring to the fore the points of 
weakness and possible intervention. As such, these points of weakness cannot be 
designated in advance. However, this is precisely what Butler does in presuming that 
the structural instability of power qua language should be the privileged point of 
intervention in combating hate speech. In short, while resignification might well be a
50 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.50; cf. p.102.
51 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.102.
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logically possible mode of redress against the speech of hate, this does not ensure 
that it is necessarily the most efficacious one, since this could only be decided in loco, 
not a priori, if even then. Furthermore, such a presumption of the efficacy of 
resignification as a strategy of resistance is precisely what her considered arguments 
against the sovereign force of the speaker warn against. For just as the efficacy of 
hate speech cannot be assured through recourse to a notion of the sovereign subject, 
neither can the efficacy of reappropriation and resignification. The effectiveness of 
re signification will necessarily be conditioned not only by the ‘condensed historicity’ 
of the term, but also by the circumstances in which the attempt at resignification 
takes place, what might be called the conditions of felicity.52 This has the 
consequence that while resignification might be logically possible with all terms or 
utterances, the historical and discursive circumstances in which resignification is 
attempted will more or less severely limit the actual realizability or efficacy of a 
strategy of resignification.
Contrary to what some of her critics have suggested, Butler is not unaware that 
resignification is itself both subject to discursive limits and open to the possibility of 
failure. As she states ‘neither the radically new nor the subversive repetition can be 
logically guaranteed; there will be a necessary difference between what is shown to be 
logically possible and what in any given nexus of discourse and power is possible to 
realize’.53 Thus she does recognize that as a strategy of resistance to the interpellative 
force of hate speech, the success of resignification will vary. However, in developing 
her arguments against the legal regulation of hate speech, Butler seems to resile from 
this recognition by overemphasizing the progressive political potential of citationality 
and positing resignification as a necessary political strategy. If this is the case, Butler 
is, to use her own words, ‘postulating a logic to which social practices are subject but 
which is itself subject to no social practice’,54 by posing instability and contingency as 
the necessary ground of political engagement. However, to pose contingency as the 
ground or condition of political engagement is not the same as recognizing that the 
form that political action takes is contingent upon the circumstances in which such 
action is taken. In this light, Butler’s positing of resignification as a necessary strategy
52 Following Austin in How to do Things with Words.
53 Butler, Toststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.10.
54 Buder, Toststructuralism and Postmarxism’, p.9.
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of political response based on the inherent instability of signification direcdy 
contradicts her stated political allegiance to the genealogical pragmatism that she 
finds in Foucault’s work. Further, this suggests that the Derridean-inflected politics 
of democratic contestation that Butler develops are not so easily reconciled with a 
Foucauldian historical ‘ontology of ourselves’.55
Given this, several further points can be made about the politics of the performative 
that Butler elaborates, which relate to her analysis of illocution and the effects of the 
concept of sovereignty within the hate speech debate. In a second argument against 
recourse to legal regulation of speech, she notes that calls for such recourse typically 
rely on an illocutionary model of hate speech, wherein the speech act brings into 
being what it says in the very saying of it. This means that there is no temporal 
distinction between the speech act and its consequences or effects — the speaking is 
the doing. But she claims, such arguments for legal regulation of speech wrongly 
attribute a sovereign efficacy to speech acts, or more precisely to the subject that 
performs such acts. Such arguments presume that speech acts necessarily do what 
they say they will do, and thereby elide both the conditions necessary for such felicity 
and the potential for failure that conditions the speech act. This seems to be the case 
particularly with regard to hate speech, where the power to injure is located in the 
speaker of hate, thereby detracting from the recognition of a ‘condensed historicity’56 
that conditions the terms they use. This dimension of the speech act ensures that in 
fact their interpellative force is citational or iterative, deriving from the prior uses or 
conventionality of terms. As she states, ‘the iterability of hate speech is effectively 
dissimulated by the “subject” who speaks the speech of hate’.57 In contesting the 
presumption of efficacy, Butler argues that this wrongful attribution of sovereign 
efficacy also operates within the law, since it relies on the location of the origin of
55 It should be noted though that Buder’s conceptual borrowing from Derrida is quite specific in that 
while she takes the idea of significatory instability and citadonality from his essays ‘Structure, Sign and 
Play’ and ‘Signature, Event, Context’, she does not take up the ethical concerns of his later work. 
Indeed, ethical questions have not received much attention in Butler’s work to date, although political 
concerns have been central. In the following section, I consider the concept of responsibility in 
relation to Buder’s later work, particularly Antigone’s Claim, to show the way in which Butler’s 
formulation of mis-recognition works against an adequate conception of ethical response. See Jacques 
Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’, in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), pp.278-293.
56 Buder, Excitable Speech, p.3.
57 Buder, Excitable Speech, p.80.
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hate speech in an individual subject in order to maintain the legal requirement of 
culpability.
The attribution of sovereignty that characterizes illocutionary models of hate speech 
is for Butler a compensating fantasy that arises from an anxiety over the demise of 
sovereignty such that power is no longer constrained by its parameters.58 She argues 
that the figure of sovereignty is a fantasy that compensates precisely for the decline 
of sovereign power within the political field and which is manifest in the figure of a 
sovereign subject who performs speech acts as they intend. Displaced from 
considerations of state power, this fantasy returns in language, figuring the 
performative as necessarily efficacious and the subject who speaks hate as the origin 
of that speech. This fantasy simplifies the political field by reducing the complexity 
of current relations of power to a single utterance, thus ignoring the way in which 
racist and sexist practices exceed and condition that utterance and occludes the 
conventionality that gives utterances illocutionary force.59 More importantly, it 
ignores the vulnerability of speech acts to failure and reappropriation by those they 
are meant to injure and derogate.60 Thus, the constraints of legal language permit the 
attribution of responsibility for the injurious effects of speech to an individual who 
can be held culpable, thereby bringing speech and its effects within a controllable 
field of operation. She states, ‘by locating the cause of injury in a speaking subject 
and the power of that injury in the power of speech, we set ourselves free, as it were, 
to seek recourse to the law — now set against power and imagined as neutral — in 
order to control that onslaught of hateful words’.61
Butler concludes that the fantasy of the sovereign subject undercuts the possibility of 
extra-legal opposition to hate speech, evinced by her remark that ‘agency begins 
where sovereignty wanes’.62 Yet, there is a sense in which Butler herself fantasizes a
58 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.78.
59 Butler, Excitable Speech, pp.78-80.
60 This argument is particularly directed against the performative figure invoked by Mackinnon and 
Langton.
61 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.80.
62 Buder, Excitable Speech, pp.15-16. Buder’s comment echoes Hannah Arendt’s suggestion that ‘if men 
wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce’ (Hannah Arendt, What is Freedom?’ in 
between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York: Penguin, 1993), pp.143-172 at 165.
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certain sovereignty of the law in suggesting that the legal regulation of speech closes 
down or limits opportunities for extra-juridical opposition in the form of 
misappropriation and resignification.63 If legal regulation of speech has such an 
effect, it would be necessary that the law actually do what it says it will do, that is, 
demarcate the line of the speakable and the unspeakable and rigorously maintain that 
demarcation. In other words, to imagine the law as sovereign is not to close down 
such opportunities but to suggest that such opportunities are foreclosed by legal 
regulation is to imagine that the state and law is sovereign.64
More importantly, this highlights problems in Butler’s conception of sovereignty and 
particularly the elision effected between a critique of the sovereign subject and a 
critique of sovereignty as a form of state organization. Butler’s understanding of 
sovereignty derives primarily from Nietzsche’s discussion of the sovereign subject in 
Genealogy of Morals, in which he links the emergence of the sovereign individual with 
the capacity to make and fulfill one’s promises, or more broadly, to do as one wills. 
Thus, for Butler, sovereignty reduces to a necessary efficacy: the sovereign will is a 
will that is necessarily efficacious, able to overcome and forestall the contingencies 
that undermine or usurp the force of that will. In Excitable Speech, the spectral figure 
of the sovereign subject is a subject whose word always meets its mark, a subject with 
supreme control over its speech acts. Consequently, the recognition of the inherent 
instability of signification and the ways in which speech is always partially ‘out of our 
control’ is taken to undermine such a conception of the subject.65 No doubt, this 
conception of sovereignty also in part derives from Foucault’s own formulation, 
again partly following Nietzsche, of a critique of the sovereign individual as a direct
63 See my discussion in Mills, ‘Contesting the Political’; also see Fiona Jenkins ‘The Heeding of 
Differences: On Foreclosure and Openness in a Politics of the Performative’, Constellations 8:3(2001), 
pp.364-375 at 368 and Pavassant and Dean, Taw and Societies’, p.380 for alternative formulations of 
this point.
64 Butler’s characterization of resignification as a ‘non-juridical’ activity is also curious if one considers 
the relation between speech and the law in operation today in the context with which she is 
concerned. For what precisely would be ‘non-juridical’ in the scene in which the freedom of speech is 
guaranteed by the law? What would ‘free speech’ be, given that the domain of freedom is here more 
or less precisely circumscribed and delineated by the law? This suggests that it is extremely difficult if 
not impossible to designate a sphere of linguistic activity as non-juridical, as if this activity were 
unaffected by, if not opposed to, the law and legal intervention.
65 See for instance, her discussion in the chapter entitled ‘Sovereign Performatives’, in Excitable Speech, 
pp.71-102; also see Judith Butler, ‘Ruled Out: Vocabularies of the Censor’ in R.C. Post, ed. Censorship 
and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art 
and the Humanities, 1998) pp.247-259.
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correlate of the critique of the sovereign state-form, which I discussed in the first 
chapter. If this is the case, then Buder’s treatment of sovereignty can be subjected to 
the same critical points that I made against Foucault, for as with Foucault, in Buder 
the discourse of sovereignty emerges as primarily ideological, masking the 
constitutive effects of power on the one hand, and the radically conditioned position 
of the speaking subject on the other. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, this neglects 
the operations of sovereignty within contemporary politics, even if these cannot be 
seen as co-extensive with the operations of the state, which I claim is the case in the 
following chapter.
Against recourse to legal regulation dien, Buder argues that the necessary counter­
strategy to hate speech is to insist on the gap between speech and conduct, to ‘lend 
support for the role of non-juridical forms of opposition, ways of restaging and 
resignifying speech m contexts that exceed those determined by the courts’.66 Hate 
speech is more appropriately construed as perlocudonary, thus maintaining a 
distinction between speech and conduct and re-opening the temporal disjuncture 
between the speech act and its effects. This opens the possibilities for non-juridical 
forms of opposition to hate speech in several ways. First, because it challenges the 
presumption of sovereign efficacy of speech acts, allowing for the failure of terms to 
do what they say. This also has the consequence that terms are thus available for 
resignification, and the transformation of their interpellative force that this allows. 
Second, the failure of the performative is for Buder precisely the site of the political 
agency of subjects; in other words, the constraints on the efficacy of the 
performative to do what is says not only signal a failure of action but also generate 
the opportunity for political action.67
But the insistence on construing hate speech as perlocudonary sits somewhat 
uneasily within the terms of Buder’s work, for there is substantial tension between 
the two arms of Buder’s argument that I have traced above. For on the one hand, 
Buder strives to separate speech and conduct through a strong critique of the 
portrayal of speech as illocutionary, but on the other hand, her thesis on
66 Butler, E xcitab le  Speech, p.23.
67 Butler, E xcitab le  Speech, p.93.
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interpellation appears to presuppose that speech, and particularly the name, operates 
constitutively through illocutionary force. Interestingly, in the introductory discussion 
of interpellation, Butler is careful to avoid the specification of interpellation as 
illocutionary or perlocutionary, though she does suggest that there is a parallel 
between illocution and interpellation. Further, on the face of it, naming cannot be 
understood as perlocutionary, for it seems inaccurate to suggest that names are a 
consequence temporally distinct from the act of naming. While naming does have 
perlocutionary effects, being named is itself an illocutionary act.
What underlies the points of tension I have identified is a crucial conceptual slippage 
between the terms of ‘conduct’ and ‘efficacy’, which brings into focus a deeper rift 
that runs through Excitable Speech. On the one hand, Butler’s argument is an 
argument against the characterization of hate speech as illocutionary, and in that she 
insists that a gap between speech and conduct must be maintained. On the other 
hand, her arguments against the attribution of sovereignty to the speaker of hate rely 
on a presumption of efficacy, not precisely on whether or not the speech act is 
illocutionary.68 For it is possible to have an illocutionary speech act which fails to do 
what it says it will do. In other words, illocutionary speech acts are not always or 
necessarily efficacious or felicitious to be more precise — and thus do not necessarily 
presuppose a sovereign speaker — but they nevertheless remain illocutionary 
utterances. If we uncouple the critiques of sovereignty and illocution in this way, 
these two dimensions of Butler’s argument appear at cross-purposes, giving rise to 
further tensions between the critique of sovereignty that she offers and the suggested 
consequences or effects of this critique for responding to hate speech.
68 Consider here Butler’s comment that ‘If we accept that hate speech is illocutionary, we accept as 
well that words perform injury immediately and automatically’ (Butler, Excitable Speech, pp.101-2). This 
comment makes clear the slippage between the questions of the illocutionary force of utterances and 
the (‘sovereign’) efficacy of such utterances. However, Austin’s catalogue of potential ways that an 
illocutionary performative can fail in How to do Things with Words shows that it is possible to have an 
illocutionary speech act which fails to do what it says it will do. Butler does in fact recognize this when 
she states that ‘a speech act can be an act without necessarily being an efficacious act’ (Buder, Excitable 
Speech, p.16.), however this recognition is lost in her arguments against casting hate speech as 
illocutionary.
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4.3 Linguistic Agency, Responsibility and Social Death
To close my discussion of Butler’s work, I want to turn to the question of 
responsibility, which is provocatively raised but ultimately left unresolved in Excitable 
Speech. In the introduction to this text, Butler asks how responsibility for hate speech 
can be established if speech cannot be said to originate with the sovereign subject. 
Unfortunately, she passes over the question of responsibility to address not how one 
ought to speak, but what is for her the more fundamental question of what occurs in 
speaking, though she does suggest that the paradox of responsibility ‘intimates an 
ethical dilemma brewing at the inception of speech’.69 It is somewhat preemptory to 
turn the questions posed by such a paradox back onto Butler at this stage, but the 
grounds for doing so are indicated by her characterization of the stakes of 
signification, which are ultimately nothing short of the subject’s survival within 
language. As Butler states ‘the excessive historicity and structure [of language] makes 
possible that subject’s linguistic survival as well as, potentially, that subject’s linguistic 
death’.70 The importance of this question then is redoubled in the context of 
linguistic vulnerability, and here, I take up Butler’s provocation to ask what response 
is elicited in social death. What call is made to the subject from those beings cast out 
of social intelligibility, which are not yet or no longer fully subjects? What, ultimately, 
is the nature of interpellative address? In asking these questions, I also return to 
several of the points made in the previous chapter, which can now be extended 
following the consideration of contingency, agency, and linguistic vulnerability in the 
previous section. Interestingly, the questions of responsibility and social death come 
together in Butler’s most recent text, Antigone’s Claim, and I use this reading of 
Sophocles' Antigone as a point of reference here.
Given her critique of the sovereign subject and of legal regulation of speech, Butler 
casts Excitable Speech as an attempt to rethink questions of linguistic agency and 
ultimately, of responsibility. As she states ‘[ujntethering the speech act from the 
sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of agency and, ultimately, of 
responsibility’.71 The alternative account that Butler gestures toward would be one
69 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.28.
70 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.28.
71 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.15.
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that addresses the subject’s constitution in language, a position which she concedes 
may well ‘intensify our sense of responsibility’ for linguistic utterance, since ‘the one 
who utters hate speech is responsible for the manner in which such speech is 
repeated, for reinvigorating such speech, for reestablishing contexts of hate and 
injury’.72 There is undoubtedly a certain amount of tension between the suggestion 
that responsibility might be heightened by the citationality of language, and the 
opposition to legal regulation that Butler maintains. However, the question to be 
asked here is how the responsibility that is heightened by citationality differs from 
and undermines legal responsibility. Initially, it seems that the cmcial point of 
difference is a matter of sovereignty, since for Butler the law is mistaken in its casting 
of the subject as the origin and sovereign agent of hate speech, in which case it may 
be that her characterization of the attribution of responsibility in law unnecessarily 
assumes that legal culpability requires a sovereign subject. For it could surely be the 
case that the speaker of hate can still be held legally culpable even if the philosophical 
recognition that the individual is not the origin of such speech is maintained. After 
all, is it not possible that the individual may still be held legally responsible for their 
citing of a term that carries with it considerable historical and cultural weight as racist 
or homophobic? Certainly the determination and attribution of culpability is 
complicated by this recognition, but it may not yet be undermined completely.
But it is also important to recognize that the responsibility that is enhanced by 
recognition of the subject’s dependence on and vulnerability toward language that 
Butler gestures toward is a particularly ethical responsibility, a responsibility that 
cannot be contained or delimited through legal culpability.73 While it has some
72 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.27.
73 Renata Salecl also addresses this point through setting Lacanian psychoanalysis against Buder’s 
‘deconstructive’ argument to conclude that while language both can and cannot be controlled, the 
subject remains ethically responsible for the jouissance they experience in speaking hate (p.136). As she 
states, ‘although the words might escape the subject’s intentions, and he or she says more in slips of 
the tongue or between the lines, the subject cannot escape responsibility, even if that responsibility 
accounts for no more than the mere fact that he or she is a subject’ (Renata Salecl, (Per)Versions of Love 
and Hate (London: Verso, 1998), pp.118-140 at 124). However, Salecl does not address the distinction 
between ethical and legal responsibility that operates in Buder’s work and while gesturing toward the 
responsibility of the subject, gives no description of what that responsibility entails. The distinction 
between legal culpability and moral or ethical responsibility at least partly maps on to the distinction 
between blame and responsibility' proposed by Iris Young in her discussion of whether persons can be 
held responsible for denigratorv and offensive statements or actions that they are not consciously 
aware of. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), pp.148-151. Also see Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’, The
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bearing on this discussion, whether Buder can sustain a strong distinction between 
ethical and legal responsibility is not a question I take up here, particularly since it is 
as yet unclear how Buder would elaborate this distinction. Instead, I suggest that 
even if we accept that the responsibility that is enhanced by recognition of the 
linguistic embeddedness of the subject is ethical, it is still not clear that the dynamic 
of (mis)-recognition that structures the relations of intersubjectivity for Buder yields 
an adequate conception of ethical responsibility. I mentioned earlier that Buder 
critically reformulates Hegel’s master-slave dialectic through Althusser’s discussion of 
interpellation to bring out the fundamental dependence of the subject on the address 
of the other for its existence. As she states,
to be addressed is not merely to be recognized for what one already is, but to 
have the very terms conferred by which the recognition o f existence becomes 
possible. One comes to “exist” by virtue o f this fundamental dependency on 
the address o f the Other. One “exists” not only by virtue o f being recognized, 
but, in a prior sense, by being recognisable.74
In her rendering of the subject’s emergence, the address of the other is the 
constitutive condition of the subject and survival hinges on the possibility of address, 
on intelligibility within language, and therefore on the determinations of ‘speakability’ 
and ‘unspeakability’ within configurations of hegemonic regulation. In this 
scenography, it is not the gaze that conditions social existence but the voice, the 
possibility of speaking and address.75
From this account of linguistic vulnerability and intersubjective dependence, it is 
possible to see how one’s responsibility for one’s own speaking may be enhanced by 
recognition of the vulnerability of the other to one’s own speaking. This is so even in 
the scenario where that responsibility is tempered by the instability of one’s own 
utterances and their vulnerability to re-appropriation, return and redress. If one’s
Journal of Political Philosoph, 9:3(2001), pp.249-276 for a pertinent Foucauldian inflected clarification of 
historical changes in conceptions of responsibility in Western criminal law.
74 Buder, TLxcitable Speech, p.5.
75 In this, Buder is aligned with Aristode’s formulation of the political being as the speaking being, a 
position re-articulated most forcefully in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958) esp. pp.25-27. Also see Buder, ‘Ruled Out’. As will be discussed in later chapters, 
this definition of the subject is also crucial for Giorgio Agamben, whose work is wholly engaged in 
addressing the question of the role of voice in ethico-political survival.
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own speech reinstalls normative foreclosures of non-hegemonic identifications then 
there is certainly a sense in which one might be said to be responsible for that 
speech, even if it does not amount to legal responsibility. It appears intuitively 
plausible to suggest that ethical responsibility7 for one’s speech is enhanced given that 
social survival is conditioned by linguistic vulnerability, even if giving elaboration to 
this intuition may prove difficult. In any case, this is not the question that concerns 
me here. Rather, I want to ask whether, or how, the subject can been seen as 
responsible for the ‘not yet subject’ or those beings rendered unintelligible by 
hegemonic normative exclusions, the speech of whom is doubly unspeakable or 
unintelligible given the condensed historicity or ritual dimension that underpins the 
performative force and intelligibility of speech acts. That is, if the speech acts of the 
socially dead are unintelligible or inefficacious, what weight of responsibility falls on 
the subject to heed a call they cannot or at least do not understand? Can the call of 
the socially dead interpellate the subject into the space or mode of the ethical? To 
what extent can the call from the socially dead to take responsibility, to identify, be 
rendered operative within the demands of intelligibility or hegemony?
The question to consider here is whether the address of the socially dead constitutes 
a demand for ethico-political response. To approach this, it is worth considering that 
in addition to positing the demand for intelligibility by the other as a condition of the 
subject’s survival, Butler also suggests that ‘to become a subject means to be 
subjected to a set of implicit and explicit norms that govern the kind of speech that 
will be legible as the speech of a subject... to move outside of the domain of 
speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject’.76 Thus the constitutive effect of 
speech for the survival of the subject is double-edged. Not only does the emergence 
and survival of the subject depend on its recognizability within the speech of the 
other, that is on the possibility of address by the other, but also on the intelligibility 
of its own speech: to be a subject is to speak within the borders of discursive 
intelligibility. In other words, the risk of social death, of falling outside the domain of 
intelligible life as a subject, lies not only in the failure to fully enter into the terms of 
recognition conferred by the other but also in the perilous perturbation of one’s own 
speaking.
76 Butler, ‘Ruled Out’, pp.252-253.
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The double-edged, self-destructive force of speech acts can in fact be seen as the 
problematic heart of Butler’s reading of the figure of Antigone, developed in 
Antigone’s Claim. Buder argues against the perceived tendency, following Hegel, to 
posit the figure of Antigone as representative of a pre-political domain of kinship, 
which while essential to the constitution of the political is not political itself. She 
claims instead to read the figure of Antigone as exposing a crisis of representation 
and of the political defined against kinship. The effect of this crisis is that the 
problematics of kinship appear in the sphere of the political, resulting in a 
‘deformation of both idealized kinship and political sovereignty... as a consequence 
of her act’.77 The act in question is Antigone’s attempt to bury her brother 
Polyneices, whose dead body is left unburied following an injunction against his 
burial by Creon, King of Thebes. However, for Butler, it is not so much this act but 
the speech act by which Antigone claims the deed of burying the body as hers and 
the ensuing locutionary struggle between her and Creon, read in part as a struggle for 
sovereignty in speech, that takes precedence. The kernel of Butler’s reading is 
Antigone’s performative, ‘I say that I did it and I do not deny it’,78 in which Antigone 
claims the deed and thus inaugurates her exclusion from the domain of moral and 
political intelligibility and her conscription to a mode of existence ‘between life and 
death’. Antigone’s life subsequently ends with her suicide in the ‘bridal chamber of 
death’79 to which she is condemned by Creon, a scene that Buder understands as the 
completion of the social death that Antigone had been living.
There is no need to take up a full reading of Antigone, nor of Butler’s interpretation of 
the play. Instead, I restrict my discussion to several points that bear on the question 
of the speech of the socially dead and whether an account of ethico-political 
responsibility can be sustained through the formulation of recognition and the 
linguistic survival of the subject. In doing so, my aim is not to develop a strong 
critique of Butler’s reading, but simply to pose some questions to it in order to open
77 Butler, Antigone’s Claim, p.6.
78 Cited in Buder, Antigone's Claim, p.8; the translation Buder is referring to is from Hugh Lloyd Jones, 
ed. and tr. Sophocles, vol. 2, Loeb Library Series, (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press: 1994), 
p.43; also see David Grene, ed. and tr. Sophocles 1, 2nd Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), p.178; for another Austinian reading of Antigone that also takes this performative as its starting 
point, see Timothy Gould, ‘The Unhappy Performative’ in Andrew Parker and Eve Kosovsky 
Sedgwick, eds. Performativity and Performance (New York: Roudedge, 1995), pp. 19-44.
79 Lloyd-Jones, Sophocles, p.l 15.
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this account to concerns that I take up in detail in the following chapters. First then, 
Buder’s reading of Antigone seeks to establish the critical agency of Antigone’s speech 
within the normative order imposed through Creon’ injunction to leave the body of 
her brother unburied. Buder argues that in defying the king’s injunction, and in 
claiming that defiance in speech, Antigone disrupts the normative order of kinship 
and attempts to claim a legitimate position in a language that is not hers. In doing so, 
Antigone upsets the preconditions for the delimitation of the human, bringing the 
human into catachresis, thereby opening possibilities for an ‘unprecedented future’ .80 
The background to this claim is the recuperation of incestuous desire effected in 
Antigone’s defiance, a repetition that gives new life to the curse imposed upon 
Antigone’s life by her father Oedipus.
However, the emphasis on the agency of the socially dead recalls the discussions of 
the previous chapter. There, I argued that Buder’s account of the agency of the 
abject is stricken by a crucial vacillation between the insistence on resignification as 
the site of the subject’s agency an the inevitable failure of resignification, whereby 
defiant speech acts ‘cannot possibly’ produce the effects that they seek. Further, I 
suggested that Buder’s account of agency was undercut by the conflation of social 
death with literal death, such that suicide appears as a form of freedom. These claims 
take hold again against Buder’s reading of Antigone, in which Antigone’s defiant 
speech act renders her unintelligible within a political and moral order by obviating 
and undermining her claim to legitimacy and intelligibility within that order. 
Antigone’s speech act indicates the return of the unintelligible within the regulatory 
norms of intelligible political existence, thus simultaneously disrupting that existence 
and condemning its author to social death. The unspeakability of Antigone’s love for 
her brother traces the horizon of the possible within social existence and marks her 
existence as the impossible outside, bound as she is to the world of the dead more 
than to that of the living. Thus her suicide merely actualizes the termination of a life 
already dead, and in doing so, renders her free from the curse of the moral order that 
condemns the kinship relations to and by which she is bound.
80 Butler, A n tig o n e ’s C la im , p.82.
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Two closely related points can now be made. The first concerns the status of 
intelligibility within Buder’s account of social death, and the second concerns the way 
in which social death, while predicated on the prior existence of the social 
nevertheless appears not to yield a demand for response within it. As I have argued, 
for Buder, political engagement and belonging is at base a matter of linguistic 
practice conditioned by the productive constraints of intelligibility. Intelligibility7, in 
the sense of being speakable and therefore recognizable, traces the line of political 
inclusion and exclusion and in doing so, demarcates the limits of the livable. Thus 
social death is the status of unintelligibility within the normative constraints of 
hegemony — a threshold status ‘between life and death’ to which one is condemned 
through either a failure of discursive interpellation or the failure of one’s own speech 
acts to be ‘hearable’, that is, politically and socially intelligible. By speaking the 
unspeakable, one risks one’s own intelligibility and thus one’s status as subject. 
Clearly, a lot of weight falls on the notion of intelligibility within this framework. 
However, this seems to raise problems for developing an account of ethical 
responsibility. Assuming that social death is synonymous with a certain social 
unintelligibility, it would seem to follow that the speech acts of the socially dead 
would also be unintelligible and certainly inefficacious as Butler herself suggests. This 
is of course the point behind the claim that political exclusion amounts to a question 
of silencing, of one’s claims going unheard or unaddressed within the contestatory 
domain of the political. Yet while it might be accurate to say that politically the 
socially dead are silenced, what are the implications of this at the level of ethical 
responsibility?
Kelly Oliver has argued that Butler’s characterization of the dependency of the 
subject on language for its emergence and survival as subordination and subjection 
reveals that Butler is still nostalgically beholden to the figure of the sovereign subject 
that she seeks to undermine. Oliver cites Butler’s comment that ‘vulnerable to terms 
that one never made, one persists always, to some degree, through categories, names 
terms and classifications that mark a primary and inaugurative alienation in 
sociality’.81 From this, Oliver argues that Butler’s insistence that dependence on 
external conditions of sociality constitutes an inaugurative alienation and 
subordinating violence presupposes an ideal of a self-contained, self-constituting
81 Butler, Psychic Life, p.28.
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subjectivity violated by dependence. The problem with this framework for Oliver is 
that it becomes difficult to see the ways in wThich subjects engage in mutually 
constitutive and sustaining relations beyond the troubled conferral of recognition. 
Overcoming such a conception of the subject requires instead that dependence be 
affirmed as a necessary and enabling condition of subjectivity rather than a 
debilitating violence.82 Thus, while Butler presupposes the constitutive force of the 
social upon the subject, in casting that constitution as subjugating alienation, the 
sustaining effects of interdependence and community are elided within her account 
of subject formation.
Oliver’s point does not entirely hold since it does not give enough weight to the fact 
that for Butler dependence is not bad in itself. Instead, dependency on address opens 
the subject to a certain vulnerability to the language of others with potentially though 
not necessarily harmful consequences. Nevertheless, Oliver’s point does help bring 
out an important lacuna in Butler’s framework. The problem is that Butler does not 
give adequate consideration to the implications of this dependency; while she 
understands this as vulnerability, she does not give an account of the responsibility 
yielded, or perhaps demanded, in that vulnerability. That is, while Butler does 
provide an account of the potentially injurious effects of that vulnerability, her 
silence on the particular responsibility yielded in that dependence and vulnerability is 
a curious lacuna in her work. It is curious because on the one hand, Butler is 
pointedly aware of the need to risk the current conditions of existence in order to 
expand the possibilities of livable lives, lives that count as fully human and hence as 
the life of a subject in the full political sense. On the other hand though, she does not 
give an indication of why it is that subjects should risk that status for others, why one 
might be obliged and compelled to risk one’s life as a subject for another.83
While Butler is aware of the political pertinence of ‘risking the incoherence of 
identity’ in order to allow connection with others, there is nevertheless a sense in
82 Kelly Oliver, Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2001), p.68.
83 There is a sense in which Butler’s figuration (in A.ntigone’s Claim for instance) reveals why that risk is 
taken, but does not clarify why it should be taken. That is, while the figures that Buder invokes risk the 
status as subject because of relations of desire, it is not clear whether an ethics can be yielded from 
that condition, that is, whether relations of desire should be the enabling condition of ethical 
responsibility.
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which her argument can be extended further. Fiona Jenkins has argued for instance 
that while Buder is correct to emphasize the productive communicative possibilities 
of risking the coherence of identity, she does not go far enough toward explicating 
the implications of this in her account of mis-recognition. Turning to Alfonso Lingis’ 
work on the ethical demand of the face and gesturality, Jenkins argues that 
addressing the singularity of the other exposes identity to a deeper crisis than that 
discussed by Buder. She comments that ‘if there is to be a singular self at all, it must 
be “exposed” to that otherness which “presents” the finitude in which it begins and 
ends; the hazards of quasi-mimetic responsiveness... must be undergone if there is 
to be a singularity to risk at all’.84 In this formulation, the exposure to the other calls 
for a double identification, both in the sense of identifying with the other and 
identifying oneself in the exposure of constitutive vulnerability. Interestingly, the 
blindspot in Buder’s formulation of mis-recognition and linguistic vulnerability is 
evident in her formulation of the dynamic of address that I quoted at length at the 
beginning of this chapter. To reiterate, Buder asks ‘is the one speaking merely 
speaking, or is the one speaking comporting his or her body toward the other, 
exposing the body of the other as vulnerable to address. As an “instrument” of a violent 
rhetoricity, the body of the speaker exceeds the words spoken, exposing the addressed 
body as no longer (and not ever fully) in its own controls This indicates that while Buder 
recognizes the exposure of the vulnerability of the body addressed in the threat, she 
is not sufficiendy cognizant of the correlative vulnerability and exposure of the body 
comported to the addressee. That is, the vulnerability of the speaker in the 
scenography of address is elided in her account of linguistic constitution. However, 
the speech situation exposes both the addressee and the speaker in their constitutive 
corporeal vulnerability to the other.86
84 Fiona Jenkins, ‘Plurality, Dialogue and Response: Addressing Vulnerability’, Contretemps 3(July 2002), 
pp.85-97 at 94.
85 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.12-13; emphasis added.
86 On the mutual corporeal exposure o f ‘plural singulandes’ in address, see Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Of Being 
Singular Plural’, in Being Singular Plural, tr. Robert O. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.83-88; Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Corpus’, in The Birth to Presence, tr. Brian 
Holmes and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp.189-207, particularly his claim that 
‘neither signification, nor manifestation, nor incarnation and not revelation, either. The body exposes 
— the body; bodies expose each other’ (p.204).
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It is not necessary to follow Lingis’ conception of the body and intersubjectivity 
completely to see that a different conception of address begins to emerge in this 
scenario. This form of address moves away from the strong emphasis on 
intelligibility to an unintelligible yet potentially efficacious affective demand upon the 
subject to identify itself, in both the sense of making itself known to the other and 
identifying with the other. The language of this encounter is not the linguistic 
demand for recognition that structures the speech act in Butler’s account, but a 
gestural language that operates at the level of the body that demands that one 
‘identify oneself to and with the other rather than confer recognition upon the other. 
This account suggests that more might be taken from Butler’s phrase that the body 
constitutes ‘a demand in and for language’, for in this ‘demand’ the body speaks its 
own language, but one that cannot be wholly understood through the performativity 
of the speech act. Further, the response elicited by that language cannot be rendered 
through the cognitive problematics of intelligibility and unintelligibility, for the 
language of the body derives it force not from entering into signification and 
reiteration, but from the affectivity of the call to the other to identify.
This also suggests that Butler’s claim that ‘speaking is itself a bodily act’87 might be 
usefully reversed, such that the bodily act can be construed as a form of speaking. 
For Butler, the body confounds the efficacy of the speech act, but might it also be 
the case that the speech act obviates and confounds the demands of the body, its 
own obscure language of gesture, sensibility and affect that is not silenced in death? 
The scene of response to the call of the body and the identification evoked in that 
can be read throughout Antigone; Antigone’s crime might be said to be to respond to 
the call of the dead body of her brother, the call to honor the finitude and singularity 
of the unburied body laid bare and exposed above ground when its proper place is 
below. In responding to that call, Antigone identifies with the dead brother and it is 
this identification that compels Antigone to her own finality. As she states, ‘my life 
has long been dead, so as to help the dead’, or perhaps more tellingly, ‘where the act 
was death, the dead are witnesses’.88 Antigone’s hesitant, defiant speech act in which 
she claims the deed as hers, in which she cannot deny the deed, yet cannot fully 
affirm it since she alienates herself from the deed in and through language, indicates
87 Butler, Excitable Speech, p.10.
88 Lloyd-Jones, Sophocles, p.55; Grene, Sophocles 1, p.182.
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not only the instability and incompledon of language but also the excess of the deed 
and the difficulty of putting oneself in relation to the dead, of taking the place of the 
one who bears witness to their death. My point here is clearly more suggestive than it 
ought to be, and it must remain so at this stage. However, the identification and 
taking place of the witness will be given further elaboration in the final chapter, 
where I discuss Giorgio Agamben’s provocative suggestion that the central gesture 
of ethics is the affective, apostrophic address of the remnant.89
In this chapter, I extended discussion of Butler’s conception of agency and 
signification through an examination of her theoretico-political commitments and the 
strategy of resignification that she urges. I have argued that Butler’s positing of 
resignification as a necessary political response indicates important ambiguities in her 
political commitments. In particular, this indicates a tension between the contingent 
pragmatics of Foucauldian genealogical politics and the Derridean inflected politics 
of radical democracy, both of which Butler explicitly claims to hold. The double role 
that Butler gives to contingency also reflects tensions in her critique of illocution and 
sovereignty7, which I suggest ultimately reveal a deep rift running through the 
arguments of Yixcitable Speech. In addition, I close the chapter with a discussion of 
responsibility, given the constitutive vulnerability of the subject in language. I suggest 
that Butler’s account of interpellative mis-recognition is marked by an important 
lacuna in that it does not yield an account of the responsibility of the subject for 
those beings that do not yet count as subjects. While the account of interpellative 
mis-recognition and the attendant account of linguistic vulnerability might allow an
89 In this, it might not be without significance that the figures Butler invokes throughout her work to 
illustrate the agency of the abject or the socially dead predominantly die alone. That is, their death does 
not yield a relation to others, in which the status of those others is itself risked and exposed in its 
finitude and vulnerability. Agamst this, the vulnerability and dependence established in the exposure 
of oneself to the other in identification — in both senses noted above -  secures a sense of 
responsibility that exceeds the dynamic of mis-recognition. Jenkins’ suggestion links the question of 
singularity both risked and established in the exposure of one’s own vulnerability to the inherent 
finitude of that singularity, thus posing the question of responsibility in relation to death. Tentatively 
taking up this gesture, one might also call upon Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion that ‘community is 
revealed in the death of others’ or Alfonso Lingis’s suggestion that ‘we die with others’ to suggest that 
the finitude revealed in the vulnerable, gestural identification bestows upon each singularity a 
responsibility for others in dying. This is not the place to take up a discussion of this thematic, though 
it clearly has significance for the arguments developed throughout this thesis. It would however, take 
the thesis into territories that cannot be explored at this time. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p.15; Alfonso Lingis, ‘To Die With 
Others’, Diacritics 30:3(2000), pp.106-113 at 106. Also see Tina Chanter, Time, Death and the Feminine: 
Tevinas with Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) for an excellent comparative 
discussion of ethics and death in Levinas and Heidegger, two philosophers who have immediate 
relevance to this thematic and to Lingis and Nancy’s contributions.
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account of the ethical responsibility of the subject for its own speech, Butler does 
not address the sense in which the subject might be ethically beholden to those 
abjected, excluded beings whose speech is radically unintelligible, inefficacious but 
still affectively compelling.
192
193
Chapter 5
Agamben's Messianic Politics: Biopolitics, Bare 
Life, and Abandonment
Human life is politicized only through an abandonment to an unconditional 
power of death. 1
5.1 Introduction
In the first chapter of this thesis, I examined Foucault’s account of biopolitical 
subjection and argued that the determination of life worth living operates as a 
constitutive decision within the biopolitical. I claimed that while Foucault opens 
discussion of the role of violence within the operation of biopolitics through his 
characterization of normalization as constitutive violence, his account was 
nevertheless limited by two sets of problems. The second of these related to 
Foucault’s characterization of subjectivation. I argued that his account of 
subjectivation is overly reductive and fails to account for psychic attachments to the 
operations of power and the positive political implications of subjectivation. To 
address these problems, I turned to the work of Judith Buder, who explicidy 
addresses the risks posed to the subject as a consequence of its fundamental 
dependence on the productive operations of relations of power for survival. Buder 
extends Foucault’s work by giving an account of the normative materialization of the 
‘morphological imaginary’, by which the body appears as political from its inception. 
Furthermore, her work broaches the question of the psychic dimensions of 
subjectivation in a way that Foucault refused to do, thus strengthening her account 
of subjection and the difficulties and dangers of resistance.
In this chapter, I return to the other set of problems identified in Foucault’s account 
of biopolitics, which pertain to the relation between biopolitics and sovereignty. I 
take up Giorgio Agamben’s recent critique of Foucault in which he develops an
1 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Ufe, tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p.90.
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alternative account of biopolitics that sees the biopolitical capture of life as 
fundamentally co-existent widi the operations of sovereignty. Agamben develops a 
critique of Foucault that challenges both the historical narrative of the emergence of 
biopolitics as the ‘threshold of modernity’ and Foucault’s provocation that ‘bodies 
and their pleasures’ should provide the rallying point for opposition to biopolitical 
operations. This entails a reconsideration of the concept of sovereignty and its 
relation to biopolitics, as well as a reformulation of the concept of life. Taking the 
term ‘abandonment’ from Jean-Luc Nancy, Agamben links a theorization of 
sovereign power with the biopolitical capture of life through the concepts of 
abandonment and bare life. Drawing simultaneously on Aristotle, Carl Schmitt and 
Walter Benjamin as well as the obscure figure of sacred man or ‘homo sacer} from 
Roman law, Agamben argues that life captured within the sovereign ban is bare life, 
and as such, is irreparably exposed to the force of death that characterizes 
sovereignty. In this, Agamben provides a means of thinking through the nexus 
between sovereign violence and the exposure of life to the law to specify the hold 
that biopolitical power has on life in abandonment.
In formulating a response to the dangers of biopolitics discussed in Homo Sacer, 
Agamben concludes this text with an elusive gesture toward a new ‘form-of-life’ as 
the ground of a coming politics over and against the bloody nexus of sovereign 
violence and biopolitics. In the second section of this chapter, I take up this gesture 
to highlight the messianic aspect of Agamben’s work and develop three points to 
clarify his gesture of political futurity. First, I argue that the commitment to 
messianic redemption rests on a failure to consider the political potentiality of bare 
life itself within Agamben’s work, which has the concomitant effect of limiting his 
account of abandonment. Second, through a comparison of Agamben’s messianics 
with the insistence on immanent possibilities of resistance in Foucault and Butler, I 
show that Agamben’s position is based on the predication of the pure immanence of 
a new ‘form-of-life’ on transcendent conditions of political futurity. Third, to specify 
this further I compare the ‘weak messianics’ of Jacques Derrida with Agamben’s 
position, which I call ‘strong messianics’. In this comparison, I focus particularly on 
the essays in which Derrida provides an interpretation of Benjamin’s messianics and 
the status of the law, these being ‘Force of Law’ and ‘Before the Law’, as these texts 
are closely paralleled in Agamben’s work.
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In this chapter then, I investigate the theoretical shifts between Foucault and 
Agamben, particularly in the concepts of life and politics and their various accounts 
of biopolidcs to make two claims of Agamben’s work. First, I suggest that 
Agamben’s theorizadon of sovereignty and biopower is an important corrective to 
Foucault’s account in that it allows for consideration of the operations of sovereign 
power beyond questions of legitimacy and centralized state power without casting 
sovereignty as ideological. Second, I develop a discussion of the messianic aspect of 
Agamben’s work to bring out the specific characteristics of his political eschatology 
and account of political futurity. I show in this section that the strong messianics that 
Agamben holds derive from the decisive influence of Walter Benjamin’s eschatology 
in Agamben’s work, and I draw out several implications of this for the political 
theory that Agamben develops. Thus the chapter is largely explicatory, providing a 
detailed interpretation of Agamben’s work to highlight his conceptual divergence 
from Foucault’s formulation of biopolitics and his particular version of political 
messianics, two aspects of his work that have received insufficient treatment within 
secondary literature to date.
It is worth noting at this point I have reconstructed Agamben’s argument in Homo 
Sacer in a form that may initially seem at odds with the ethos of his work. One of the 
difficulties that Agamben’s work presents for interpretation lies in his fragmentary 
and iterative style, which means that the reduction of summary is a particularly 
difficult task that can too easily give the impression of a greater systematicity than 
there is in the original work. Yet while Agamben’s work is densely interwoven in 
fragments, ‘thresholds’, and short essays, there is nevertheless an internal consistency 
of argumentation and it is this that I am concerned with here. Hence, my 
reconstruction of Agamben’s argument does not attempt to either replicate or to 
simply obscure his stylistics but instead attends to the rigorous conceptuality that 
gives such a style its critical theoretical force. In doing so, I have also drawn from 
essays and fragments in several other books that complement the often dense and 
enigmatic claims made in Homo Sacer.
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5.2 Bare Life and the Sovereign Exception
In the final chapter of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the regime of 
power that emerged from the seventeenth century onward involved a fundamental 
reversal of the principle of power’s operation.2 He claims that whereas sovereign 
power operated on the principle of the right to commit its subjects to death in order 
to enhance the strengdi of the sovereign, modem power reverses this axis and works 
through the administration of life. The entrance of life into the mechanisms of power 
and correlative organization of political strategies around the survival of the species 
constitutes the ‘threshold of modernity’ for Foucault. He argues that the eighteenth 
century witnessed an event nothing short of the engagement of life in history, that is, 
‘the entry of phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of 
knowledge and power, into the spheres of political techniques’.3 As he states, ‘for the 
first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political 
existence’.4 Thus, the administration of life has become the central characteristic and 
defining rationale of the regime of power operative in the modern world. From this, 
Foucault suggests that the Aristotelian conception of man as a ‘living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence’ should be revised to acknowledge that 
‘modem man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in 
question’.5
In his recent book on biopolitics, Giorgio Agamben takes up this redefinition of the 
Aristotelian conception of man in order to reconsider the relation between politics 
and life posited by Foucault. Tracing the etymological roots of the word ‘life’, he 
finds that the Greeks had two semantically and morphologically distinct terms for it: 
\oe, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, 
men or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an 
individual or a group’.6 This qualitative distinction between modes of existence had 
the effect of excluding natural life from the polis in the strict sense and relegating it
2 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexually, vol.1: A n  Introduction, tr. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 
1981), p.136.
3 Foucault, History o f Sexuality, pp.141-142.
4 Foucault, History of Sexuality, p.142.
5 Foucault, History of Sexuality, p.143.
6 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.l.
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entirely to the private sphere, as the basic life of reproduction.7 Thus, according to 
Agamben, Foucault’s supplanting of this distinction in his redefinition of Aristode 
signals the entry not of ‘life’ in its generality, but rather the integration of what is 
captured by the more specific designation of %oe or natural life into the realm of 
politics. What is at stake in political operations in the modern era according to 
Foucault is the simple living body of the individual and the species. As Agamben 
states, for Foucault ‘the entry of %oe into the sphere of the polis... constitutes the 
decisive event of modernity and signals a radical transformation of the political- 
philosophical categories of political thought’.8 From this clarification, Agamben 
develops a critical analysis of Foucault’s historico-theoretical thesis on biopolitics and 
sovereignty.
Foucault’s historical claim that biopolitics emerged during the seventeenth century 
provides the point of purchase of Agamben’s critical thesis, which he describes as an 
attempt to ‘correct or at least complete’ Foucault’s analysis of the relation between 
biopolitics and sovereign power. Agamben claims that Foucault’s rejection of an 
analytics of juridical power has led to a certain absence in his work, such that the 
relation of biopower to sovereignty remains hidden. Agamben states this problem in 
the following manner: Foucault’s later work follows two lines of research, these 
being the study of political techniques by which the natural life of individuals is 
integrated into circuits of governance by the State and technologies of the self, or 
those processes of subjectification by which the individual actively intervenes in their 
own self-formation. It is clear that there are points of interaction between these two 
dimensions of his research, articulated in his concern over the ‘political double bind’ 
engendered by the ‘simultaneous individualization and totalization of modem power 
structures’.9 However, the point at which these two ‘faces of power’ converge
7 Neither Foucault nor Agamben are sensitive to the gendered dimension of the exclusion of natural 
life from the realm of the political, although feminists have long argued that the association of 
femininity with natural, biological life is a consistent element of the Western political and cultural 
imaginary. It would be worth considering the formulations of biopolitics developed by Agamben and 
Foucault with reference to gender, though to my knowledge, this has not yet been done and it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
8 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.4.
9 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp.208-226 at 216.
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remains almost entirely unarticulated in Foucault’s own work. 10 For Agamben, 
Foucault’s critique of the traditional juridical model of power and development of an 
analytic of power that supplants the model of law means that the ‘zone of 
indistinction’ between ‘techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures’11 
remains largely obscured. Flence, the ostensible aim of Agamben’s argument in Homo 
Sacer is to address this lacuna: he claims that it is precisely this ‘hidden point of 
intersection between the jutidico-institutional and the bio-political models of power’ 
that he focuses on in his own study of power.
While there are evidendy problems in Agamben’s characterization of Foucault’s 
account of biopolitics and sovereignty, particularly insofar as he over-emphasizes the 
temporal succession of sovereignty and biopolitics, these do not wholly disable 
Agamben’s thesis. As I discussed in Chapter One, there is substantial ambiguity in 
Foucault’s work on this point, since the characterization of the emergence of 
biopolitics in The History of Sexuality does seem to posit a transformative break in 
operations of power such that biopower effectively replaces sovereignty. Agamben 
exploits this ambiguity to develop an alternative historical and theoretical account of 
the relation between biopolitics and sovereignty. 12 In doing so, he effects a number
10 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.5.
11 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.6.
12 However, the distinction between biopolitics and sovereignty is not as clear in Foucault’s work as 
Agamben initially suggests. There are after all, points at which Foucault explicidy denies such a 
temporal succession of regimes of power and states that sovereignty and discipline operate together in 
modernity. In ‘On Governmentality’, Foucault states that it is not a matter of ‘the substitution for a 
society of sovereignty of a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society 
by a governmental one; in reality, we have a triangle: sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as 
its primary7 target the population and as its essential mechanism apparatuses of security.’ (Michel 
Foucault, ‘On Governmentality’, ZerC 6(1976), pp.5-21 at 19. See my further discussion of this in the 
first chapter where I draw out the ambiguity in Foucault’s formulation). Reflecting on this, Peter 
Fitzpatrick has claimed that Agamben does not so much ‘correct and complete’ Foucault’s arguments 
as reinstate them in a reduced form. However, Fitzpatrick’s criticism does not take enough account of 
the conceptual shifts involved in Agamben’s reconsideration of biopolitics and sovereignty. In 
particular, Fitzpatrick does not engage with the indisputable and central influence of Walter Benjamin 
— particularly his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ — in Homo Sacer. See Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘These 
mad abandon’d times’ Economy and Society 30:2(2001), pp.255-270 at 265 and Peter Fitzpatrick, Tare 
Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the Insistence of the Law1, Theory and Event 5:2(2001). Additionally 
though, Agamben’s characterization of the relation between political techniques and technologies of 
the self reduces the complexity of Foucault’s analysis by establishing an association between, on the 
one hand, political techniques and sovereignty and on the other, technologies of the self and 
biopolitics. To Foucault’s work he poses the questions ‘what is the point at which the voluntary 
servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power... is it legitimate or even possible to 
hold subjective technologies and political techniques apart?’ (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.6.) While this 
implies that these form the guiding questions of Agamben’s thesis, he then goes on to claim that the 
point of intersection that he is interested in is that between sovereign power and biopolitics. Within
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of important conceptual transformations from Foucault’s initial account of 
biopower. Most broadly, Agamben’s work displays much less reticence to consider 
questions of metaphysics in discussing political constitution. In this, his heritage is 
not so much the Nietzschean rejection of metaphysics that informs Foucault’s 
genealogical approach but the ontological concerns of Aristode and Heidegger, even 
though each of these are critically reformulated in Agamben’s later work. 
Consequendy, the historiographical commitments of Foucault and Agamben are also 
strikingly at odds: while Foucault’s genealogy rejects the search for origins and 
instead traces the emergence of particular configurations of relations of force, 
Agamben seeks to illuminate the ‘originary’ relation of law to life. 13
These broad historiographical and metaphysical divergences between Foucault and 
Agamben underpin important differences in their conceptions of power and life and 
their work cannot be successfully compared without recognition of these. In this 
chapter then, I set aside the empirical aspects of the historical divergence between 
Foucault and Agamben in order to trace the central conceptual shifts that distinguish 
their work. In particular, the theoretical divergence I trace is driven by the decisive 
influence of Walter Benjamin on Agamben’s theorization of law and his engagement 
with the theory of sovereignty posed by Carl Schmitt. 14 Agamben’s work on
Foucault’s work, these two problems, while inseparable, are nevertheless not equivalent. Additionally, 
Foucault’s analyzes of the sexual ethics of the Ancient Greeks suggests that he was himself revising 
the historical thesis presented in the first volume of History of Sexuality, most explicitly brought to light 
in his comment that Ancient dietetics manifested ‘a twofold anxiety about the survival of the 
individual and the maintenance of the species’ (Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of 
Sexuality, vol. 2, tr. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1985), esp. p.251). Nevertheless, Foucault 
does not explicitly recant on the claim that biopolitics emerged during the seventeenth century, and 
his later analyzes of bodily techniques of the self do not address the question of the relation between 
sovereignty and biopolidcs.
13 While it is not possible to examine the historical methodologies of Foucault and Agamben here, it 
should be noted that these differing commitments undermine criticisms of their respective works 
simply on the basis of empirical accuracy, since such criticism fails to consider the specific conceptual 
underpinnings of historical interpretation.
14 Schmitt’s work has enjoyed a renaissance in political theory in the last two decades, with particular 
attention being paid to his definition of the political as constituted by the friend-enemy opposition. 
While some radical democratic theorists such as Chantal Mouffe have taken up this opposition in 
order to articulate the essential conflictual or antagonistic characteristics of the political, odiers such as 
Derrida and Zizek have sought to overcome the formulation offered by Schmitt. See in particular 
Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); Chantal Mouffe ed. The Challenge of 
Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999); Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997); For a 
discussion of political theology see Heinrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the 
Distinction between Political Philosophy and Political Theology, tr. Marcus Brainard (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998); for extensive discussions of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism see David 
Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997); David Dyzenhaus ed. Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism
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biopolitics can in fact be read as an attempt to extend or perhaps fulfill Benjamin’s 
critique of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, presented in Benjamin’s essays ‘The 
Critique of Violence’ and ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. Agamben’s 
understanding of sovereignty, law and violence works between on the one hand, 
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty as the decision on the exception and 
Benjamin’s implicit critique of Schmitt in his eighth thesis on the philosophy of 
history, where he claims that the exception has increasingly become the rule. For the 
remainder of this section of the chapter, I closely trace Agamben’s argument to bring 
out the theoretical effects of this engagement and the commitments it entails. Three 
particular aspects of Agamben’s work on biopolitics will be considered. These are his 
conception of sovereignty and politics, his understanding of life and his 
characterization of the concept of abandonment that he develops in reference to 
Jean-Luc Nancy to link these together. 15
The starting point for Agamben’s discussion of sovereignty is the apparent paradox 
of sovereignty, wherein the sovereign is simultaneously inside and outside the 
juridical order, a situation encapsulated in the notion of the sovereign exception. 
Taking up Schmitt’s thesis that ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’, 16 
Agamben argues that what is at stake in the state of exception is the very possibility 
of juridical rule and the meaning of State authority. According to Schmitt, in deciding 
on the state of exception — a process in which the sovereign both includes and 
excludes itself from the purview of law — ‘the sovereign “creates and guarantees the 
situation” that the law needs for its own validity’.17 He argues that since the exception 
cannot be codified in the established order, a true decision is required in order to 
determine whether it is an exception, and thus, whether the rule applies to it.
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); William E. Scheuerman Between the Norm and the Exception: The 
Frankfurt School and the Rule of Taw (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1994); William Rasch, ‘Conflict as 
Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics’, Theory, Culture and Sodety 17:6(2000), pp.1-32.
15 In particular, I am interested in the uses to which Agamben puts two particular fragments from 
Schmitt and Benjamin to work in Homo Sacer. These are the opening paragraphs of Schmitt’s Political 
Theology and especially the dictum on sovereignty, and the eighth fragment of Benjamin’s ‘Theses on 
the Philosophy of History’. Throughout his oeuvre, Agamben methodologically relies on the fragment 
as the spur of interpretation, and this is the case with the theoretical method of Homo Sacer. While 
these fragments clearly do not exhaust the theoretical complexity or heritage of Agamben’s thought, 
grasping their significance is nevertheless crucial for understanding the claims he makes.
16 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, tr. George Schwab 
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1985), p.5.
17 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.17.
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Sovereignty resides in this decision on what constitutes public order and security, and 
hence, whether the social order has been disturbed. He claims that ‘the exception is 
that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it simultaneously 
reveals a specific juristic element — the decision in absolute purity... Therein resides 
the essence of the state’s sovereignty... which must be juristically defined... as the 
monopoly to decide. ’18 Further, because the sense of the legal order rests upon the 
existence of the normal situation, the form of the sovereign decision is a decision on 
the norm and the exception. Thus, sovereignty is the ‘border-line concept’ of order 
and the exception, where the sovereign decides whether the situation that confronts 
it is truly an exception or the normal order, such that sovereignty itself becomes 
apparent in that decision.
In his interpretation of Schmitt, Agamben takes up the notion of the sovereign as 
borderline or limit concept to argue that the peculiar characteristic of sovereignty is 
that the sovereign determines when law is applicable and what it applies to, and in 
doing so, must also create the conditions that are necessary for law to operate since 
the law presupposes normal order for its operation. As Agamben states, ‘what is at 
issue in the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an 
excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political 
order can have validity. ’19 The sovereign thus operates as the threshold of order and 
exception, determining the purview of the law. This means that the state of exception 
is not simply the chaos that precedes order. For Agamben, it operates both as a 
condition of law’s operation and an effect of the sovereign decision such that the 
exception is not simply outside the realm of the law, but is in fact created through 
the law’s suspension. The sovereign determines the suspension of the law vis-a-vis an 
individual or extraordinary case and simultaneously constitutes the efficacy of the law 
in that determination.
But Agamben adds the crucial caveat that while the law might be suspended in 
relation to the exception, this does not mean that the exception is without relation to 
the rule; rather, the state of exception is such that what is excluded from the purview
18 Schmitt, Political Theology, p.13.
19 Agamben, H om o Sacer, p.19.
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of the law continues to maintain a relation to the rule precisely through the 
suspension of that rule. In making this claim, Agamben employs a specific distinction 
between inclusion and membership made in set theory to make a distinction between 
exceptionality and exemplarity, showing that the exception functions as an inclusive 
exclusion while the example functions as an exclusive inclusion. By this Agamben 
means that the exception is only included within a set by its differentiation from that 
set and hence, ‘cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot 
be a member of the whole in which it is always already included’.20 The effective 
consequence of this is that the exception confirms the rule by its being other than 
the normal reference of the rule. Agamben concludes from this structure of the 
exception that ‘the rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in 
withdrawing from it’.21 With regard to juridical rule, the state of exception that 
characterizes the structure of sovereignty is not simply inaugurated through an 
interdiction or confinement, but through the suspension of the validity of the
juridical order, wherein the rule withdraws from the exception and applies to the
€
exception in that withdrawal. As Agamben states, ‘the exception does not subtract 
itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, 
maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. The 
particular force of law consists in this capacity of law to maintain itself in relation to 
an exteriority’.22
In the state of exception, the form of the law, that is law considered apart from any 
positive or actual content, can be understood as ‘being in force without 
significance’.23 Addressing a disagreement between Benjamin and Judaic scholar, 
Gerschom Scholem on the status of law in Franz Kafka’s writings,24 Agamben argues
20 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.25. Conversely, the example is differentiated from a set by its belonging to 
it. For a discussion of exemplarity within Agamben’s work, see Steven D. DeCaroli, Visibility and 
History: Giorgio Agamben and the Exemplary’, Philosophy Today 45:5(2001), pp.9-17.
21 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.18.
22 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.18.
23 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.51; also see Andreas Gailus, ‘Lessons of the Cryptograph: Revelation and 
the Mechanical in Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony’”, Modernism/Modernity 8:2(2001), pp.295-302.
24 The exemplary parable of Kafka for Agamben is ‘Before the Law’, in which a man from the country 
presents himself before the doorkeeper who refuses to let him enter through the door (of the law). 
The man from the country waits indefinitely, only to be told toward the end of his life that the door 
was meant for him alone. See Franz Kafka, ‘Before the Law’, in The Collected Short Stories of Fran~ Kafka, 
ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, tr. W. Muir and E. Muir (London: Penguin, 1988), pp.3-4. The discussion of
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that the formulation ‘being in force without significance’ proposed by Scholem 
perfecdy describes the status of law in the state of exception. Agamben takes this 
phrase to describe the situation in which ‘the law is valid precisely insofar as it 
commands nothing and has become unrealizable’ .25 In being in force without 
significance, the law is not absent, but is emptied of positive content or meaning and 
suspended in its application. It is not that the law no longer applies as if in a state of 
lawlessness, but rather that while applying the law cannot apply in any concrete or 
immediate sense since it has lost any apparent meaning or intelligibility. The 
examples that Agamben uses to explicate this paradoxical condition of the law in 
suspension are the original meaninglessness of the Torah — where the letters of the 
Torah are said to have no order at all, and hence no meaning, until the coming of the 
Messiah — and the open door of the law through which no-one can pass, not even 
the one for and to whom the door presents itself.
But in taking up Scholem’s phrase, Agamben also proposes that Scholem misses the 
fundamental importance of Benjamin’s objection that the law that has lost all content 
is indistinguishable from life.26 By the indistinguishability of life and law, Benjamin 
appears to mean that the law is reduced to the ontic conditions of existence and 
cannot rule over life through claims to transcendence. Correlatively, there is no 
possibility of interpretation of the law from the position of life, since life is itself 
indistinguishable from law.27 Agamben concludes from these opposed positions that 
there is an essential correlation between life under a law in force without significance 
and life in the sovereign exception in that neither situation allows that life and law be 
distinguished: in the state of exception in which we live, law without significance 
passes into life while life always subsists in relation to the law. For Agamben, this is
this problem in Homo Sacer is offered in a more developed form in Giorgio Agamben, 'The Messiah 
and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter Benjamin’ in Potentialities: Collected Essays in 
Philosophy, ed and tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp.160-174. I 
discuss this further in the final section of this chapter, where I compare Agamben’s interpretation with 
that of Derrida.
25 Agamben, 'The Messiah and the Sovereign’, p.172.
26 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.53. For a discussion of the coincidence of life and law in Nazi Germany see 
David Fraser, ‘Law Before Auschwitz: Aryan and Jew in the Nazi Rechtsstaat’, in Pheng Cheah, David 
Fraser and Judith Grbich, eds. Thinking through the Body of the Haw (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 
pp.63-79.
27 See the discussion of Benjamin in Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.53-55. Also compare Agamben’s 
discussion of Kafka in the same section of Homo Sacer.
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the true danger of modern politics, for the indistinction between life and law means 
there is nothing in life itself from which to oppose the rule of law. Importantly then, 
this passage pre-empts the distinction between the real and virtual state of exception 
that Benjamin makes in his ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, to which 
Agamben responds with a distinction between imperfect and perfect nihilism. The 
latter of these will provide the redemptive overcoming of the state of exception in 
which we find ourselves today. However, this is moving too far ahead; I will return 
to a discussion of this distinction and its implication for Agamben in the following 
section.
What is important here is to get a clearer view of the proposed indistinction between 
life and law established in the sovereign exception wherein law applies while no 
longer applying. Following Jean-Luc Nancy, Agamben suggests that the term most 
appropriate to the capacity of the law to apply in no longer applying is that of the 
ban .28 That which is excluded is not simply set outside the law and made indifferent 
or irrelevant to it, but rather abandoned by it, where to be abandoned means to be 
subjected to the unremitting force of the law while the law simultaneously withdraws 
from its subject. As Nancy states ‘the origin of “abandonment” is a putting at bandori, 
where
bandon is an order, a prescription, a decree, a permission and the power that 
holds these freely at his disposal. To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over 
to such a sovereign power, and to remit, entrust, or mm over to its ban, that is, 
to its proclaiming, to its convening, and to its sentencing... the law of 
abandonment requires that the law; be applied through its withdrawal... 
abandoned being finds itself deserted to the degree that it finds itself remitted, 
entrusted, or thrown to this law.29
Agamben claims from this that the position of being in abandonment correlates to 
the structural relation of the exception; ‘the relation of exception is a relation of 
ban’ .30 Just as with the exception that is included only through its exclusion, the 
subject of the ban is not simply excluded from the realm of the law, set outside and
28 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.28.
29 Jean Luc Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’ in The Birth to Presence, tr. Brian Holmes and others (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), pp.43-44.
30 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.28.
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untouched by it, but is given to the law in its withdrawal. The correlation between 
the exception and abandonment means that it is impossible to say clearly whether 
that which has been banned is inside or outside the juridical order.31 Moreover, if the 
exception is the ‘originary structure of the law’ as Agamben claims, then the principle 
relation of the law to life is abandonment. Thus, the concept of abandonment 
provides the key to understanding the relation between life and law in the exception. 
I will come back to a fuller discussion of the characterization of abandonment that 
Agamben develops in the following section. First though, the questions to address 
here are what Agamben means by ‘life’ and how he accounts for the capture of life 
within the sovereign ban.
Taking cue from both Benjamin and Schmitt, Agamben argues in Homo Sacer that 
what is captured within the sovereign ban is life itself. Fie states that ‘life... [is] the 
element that, in the exception, finds itself in the most intimate relation with 
sovereignty’.32 Furthermore, since the ‘law is made of nothing but what it manages to 
capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion’ it finds its own existence in the 
‘very life of men’. 33 Importantly, Agamben is not simply suggesting that natural life or 
nutritive, biological life provides the foundation for the existence of law. Rather, the 
principle protagonist in the inclusive exclusion that founds the law is bare life, or ‘life 
that is irremediably exposed to death’. As he states ‘not simple natural life, but life 
exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element’.34
31 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp.28-29.
32 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.67.
33 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.27.
34 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.88. The notion of ‘bare life’ has given rise to a great deal of 
misunderstanding in literature on Homo Sacer, as bare life is frequendy conflated with natural, nutritive 
life. But if bare life is understood as synonymous with nutritive life, Agamben’s rejection of the thesis 
on sacrifice and the sacralization of life makes little sense and his final gesture to a new ‘form-of-life’, 
which I discuss in the following section, cannot, it seems, be read at all. What has to be kept in mind is 
that it is precisely the exposure to (non-sacrificial) violence that marks bare life as both inside and 
outside the political order, as the ‘zone of indistinction’ or excrescence produced in the division of 
biological, nutritive life and political life. The new ‘form-of-life’ that Agamben posits aims to 
overcome the exposure of bare life to bio-sovereign violence through rendering the division of 
nutritive and political life impossible. There are thus four categories of life that operate in Homo Sacer. 
%oe or biological life, bios or political life, bare life (sometimes rendered as sacred life or naked life, 
from the original Italian term ‘nuda vita’) and a new ‘form-of-life’, rendered elsewhere as ‘happy life’. 
This contradicts Andrew Norris’s claim, then, that ‘it is because biopolitics in the form of sacred life 
defines both bare life and political life that these definitions change, and even, as in modernity, 
collapse into one another’ (Andrew Norris, ‘Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead’, 
Diacritics 30:4(2002), pp.38-58 at n.17); Norris’s confusion emerges from failing to make adequate 
distinction between natural life and bare life to begin with.
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Agamben’s category of bare life recalls, and in a limited sense deconstructs, the 
Aristotelian distinction between bios and type, in that bare life appears as that which is 
neither bios nor %oe, but rather the politicized form of natural life. Immediately 
politicized but nevertheless excluded from the polis, bare life is the limit-concept 
between the polis and the domis. In being that which is caught in the sovereign ban, 
bare life indicates the exposure of natural life to the force of the law in abandonment, 
the ultimate expression of which is the sovereign’s right of death. Thus, neither bios 
nor %oe, bare life emerges through the irreparable exposure of life to death in the 
sovereign ban. This means then that the object of biopolitics is not precisely 
biological life, but rather bare life: natural life politicized in its capture in the 
sovereign ban .35
To outline the category of bare life further, Agamben resuscitates the figure of 
‘sacred man’ or homo sacer from Roman law. In particular, he takes up the definition 
of sacred man given by Pompius Festus who writes that ‘the sacred man is the one 
whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice 
this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide’.36 Agamben
Nevertheless, it is true that even Agamben does not always maintain sufficiendy clear conceptual 
distinctions, for his final examples of Karen Quinlan and the ‘over-comatose’ reveal a seduction by 
the current concentration on health and biotechnologies as the privileged examples of biopolitical 
intervention. This concentration is carried forward in Paul Rabinow’s French D NA: Trouble in Purgatory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) as well as in the work of Nikolas Rose and others (eg. 
Nikolas Rose ‘The Politics of Life Itself, Theory, Culture and Society 18:2(2001), pp.1-30; Melinda 
Cooper, ‘Transgenic Life: Controlling Mutation’, Theory and Event 5:3(2001)). I am not disputing the 
importance of this work, nor claiming that biotechnology does not constitute a form of biopolitical 
intervention in the life of individuals and populations. However, the category of bare life that 
Agamben develops offers other directions for research as well. For just as bare life shades into 
biological life, so it does into political life, which reveals its usefulness for understanding political 
exclusion. If this is taken seriously, then it may be that the privileged examples of biopolitics should 
not so much be biotechnologies, genetic counselling, state-sponsored health programs and so on, but 
rather, political terror waged against ways of life in, for instance, the Rwandan genocide, the current 
global abandonment of refugees, or hate violence. As I argued in the Chapter 1, it is shortsighted to 
limit the decision on life worth living to the domain of bio-medical technology. In fact, the normative 
adjudication and determination of lives worth living permeates legal, social and political structures well 
beyond the bio-medical. Additionally then, the category of bare life suggested by Agamben is formally 
similar to the concept of the morphological imaginary developed by Butler, though there are 
differences between these concepts. In particular, Agamben argues that bare life emerges through the 
constitutive relation it maintains to sovereign power, whereas Butler — following Foucault — 
understands the violence in subjectivation as that of normalization and exclusion. Again following 
Foucault, Buder’s strong critique of sovereignty, understood primarily as a critique of the notion of 
the sovereign subject rather than the state, fails to consider the ways in which sovereignty operates 
within the contemporary political field apart from its posited discursive or indeed, ideological function 
of concealing the radically conditioned status of the subject.
36 Cited in Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.71.
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claims that the apparently contradictory traits of the sacred man, which allow that he 
can be killed with impunity but not according to ritual practices, have eluded full 
explanation. Agamben rejects explanation of these characteristics through positing an 
essential ambiguity of the sacred on the basis of circularity, and argues instead that 
the sacred man is most properly understood to be characterized by a ‘double 
exclusion and a double capture’.37 That sacred man can be killed but is unable to be 
sacrificed means that this figure is set outside the purview of human law and is 
simultaneously excluded from divine law, since to be sacrificed is to be given over to 
the gods, dedicated to or revered as if of the gods, a fate which sacred man is 
excluded from. Consequently, the violence committed against homo sacer does not 
constitute sacrilege but is instead considered licit.38 Agamben goes on to argue that 
the double exclusion of sacred man points to a correlative double inclusion in the 
realms of the divine and the human, since the formal characteristics of being able to 
be killed and not sacrificed also indicate inclusion of homo sacer within the human 
community and to God. He states that ‘homo sacer belongs to God in the form of 
unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form of being able to be 
killed. ’39
He concludes from this contradictory status that sacred or bare life is life lived 
beyond both divine and profane law, and is thus life singularly exposed to death. 
However, the ‘double exclusion and double capture’ of bare life means that the zone 
in which bare life persists is not simply lawless, but instead reveals the inclusive 
exclusion or abandonment of bare life vis-a-vis law. Furthermore, it reveals a 
fundamental homology between homo sacer and the exception, in that each is 
simultaneously included and excluded from the law and thus subject to the sovereign
37 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.82.
38 Agamben cites the observation of Macrobius that “While it is forbidden to violate the other sacred 
things, it is licit to kill the sacred man” (Cum cetera sacra violari nefas sit, hominem sacrum ius fuerit occidi)', 
cited in Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.82.
39 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.82. There is a clear opening in the idea of life able to be killed with 
impunity expressed through the figure of homo sacer to develop a consideration of homophobic 
violence and the correlative abandonment of the homosexual victim by the law. For an attempt to use 
Agamben’s work to consider the homosexual advance defence discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis, see my ‘The ‘homosexual advance defence’: the law of abandonment’, Conference Proceedings, 
http://www.kcwh.unimelb.edu.au/full length papers/Catherine%20Mills.doc: presented at Sexconf 
2001, 3rd Conference of the International Association for the Study of Sex, Culture and Society, 
University of Melbourne, October 2001.
208
decision.40 For Agamben, the figure of homo sacer expresses the originary political 
relation, as this figure recalls the memory of the exclusions which found the juridico- 
polidcal sphere as the excrescence of the religious and profane, and illuminates the 
indistinction between sacrificial and homicidal violence that lies at the heart of 
sovereign power. Hence, he states that ‘the sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it 
is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, 
and sacred life — that is life that may be killed but not sacrificed — is the life that has 
been captured in this sphere’.41 A crucial symmetry then becomes apparent between 
homo sacer and sovereignty, for while ‘the sovereign is the one with respect to whom 
all men are potentially homines sacri. .. homo sacer is the one to whom all men [may] act 
as sovereign’.42 Clearly then, homo sacer is exposed to violence and the power over life 
and death as a condition of existence; homo sacer persists in relation to sovereignty, 
wholly turned over to sovereign power, but, in its correlation with the sovereign 
exception, simultaneously left bereft by it. This, then, is the double structure of 
abandonment.
To add an important caveat, Agamben does not see the proximity of sacredness and 
sovereignty as the ‘secularized residue of the originary religious character of every 
political power’,43 or as an attempt to provide a theological foundation for politics. 
Nor is it that the sacredness that is often assumed to belong inexorably to life as such 
necessarily places the political in relation to the sacred. Rather, sacredness constitutes 
the ‘originary’ form of the inclusion of bare life in the juridical order, and the 
syntagm homo sacer brings to light the inclusive exclusion of bare life in the political 
order as the object of the sovereign decision, and thus names the ‘originary political 
relation’. In response to Benjamin’s question posed in ‘Critique of Violence’ 
concerning the origins of the dogma of the sacredness of life,44 Agamben argues that 
the sacredness of life emerges only to the extent that life is incorporated into the 
sovereign exception: ‘life is sacred only insofar as it is taken into the sovereign
40 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.84.
41 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.83.
42 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.84.
43 Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp.84-85.
44 See Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, 
ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp.277-300 at 299.
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exception’.45 Consequently, he rejects recourse to the notion of the sacredness of life 
against the power of the sovereign in the form of power over life and death, and 
claims instead that it is precisely the sacralization of life that permits the capture of 
life within the sovereign exception and the concomitant production of bare life and 
the exposure to death that this life entails. As he states, the ‘sacredness of life that is 
invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, 
in fact originally expresses precisely both life’s subjection to a power over death and 
life’s irreparable exposure in the relation of abandonment. ’46
One of the important theoretical consequences of the inclusive exclusion of bare life 
vis-a-vis the realm of the political is that biopower and sovereign power are tightly 
integrated in their operation. Moreover, modern politics does not represent a 
definitive break from classical sovereignty but rather the extension and generalization 
of the state of exception that founds sovereign power. In a provocative formulation, 
Agamben suggests that ‘in Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of 
being that whose exclusion founds the city of men [sic] . ’47 This means that the 
transformation of life into the good life characteristic of politics necessitates that 
bare life is always already politicized, but nevertheless remains excluded from the 
polis. Recalling Aristotle’s exclusion of goe from politics, it becomes clear that 
traditionally, the polis, the place of politics, is grounded upon that which it 
necessarily excludes. This is the starting point for Agamben’s argument that ‘the state 
of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on 
which the entire political system rested’,48 where by the state of exception he means 
‘the extreme form of relation by wtitich something is included only through its 
exclusion’.49 Agamben claims that ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political realm 
constitutes the original — if concealed — nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said 
that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense,
45 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.85.
46 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.83. Peter Singer and others have also argued for the irrelevance of the 
doctrine of the sacredness of human life in normative discussion of the ethical dilemmas generated by 
new technologies of life and death. See for instance, Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death 
(Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1994).
47 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.7.
48 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.9.
49 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 18.
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biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception’.50 Consequendy, he concludes 
that the modern State ‘does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting 
power and bare life, thereby reaffkrning the bond between... modern power and the 
most immemorial of the arcana imperii’.51
Therefore, Agamben argues that the biopolitical regime of power operative in 
modernity is not so much distinguished by incorporating life into politics, but by the 
fact that the ‘state of exception comes more and more to the foreground as the 
fundamental political structure and ultimately begins to become the rule’.52 Or again, 
‘together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the mle, the 
realm of bare life — which is originally situated at the margins of the political order — 
gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, 
outside and inside, bios and %oe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible 
indistinction’.53 In other words, while sovereignty and biopolitics are intimately 
conjoined in their treatment of life, biopolitics constitutes an extension and 
generalization of the state of exception that founds sovereign power. The theoretical 
point of inspiration for this claim comes from Benjamin’s suggestion in his ‘Theses 
on the Philosophy of History’ that ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule’.54 Taking up the 
provocation in this thesis, Agamben generalizes the sovereign exception such that it 
no longer appears as the exceptional case, but as the norm. Given wdiat we now 
know about the sovereign exception and bare life, this means that the capture of bare 
life within the exception is a general condition of existence, such that the rule and the 
exception, inclusion and exclusion, and right and violence are no longer clearly 
distinguishable. Agamben claims from this that under a regime of biopolitics, all 
subjects are potentially homo sacers. That is, all subjects are at least potentially if not
50 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.6.
51 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.6.
52 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.20.
53 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.9.
54 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, tr. Harry 
Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), pp.255-266 at 259.
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actually abandoned by the law and exposed to violence as a constitutive condition of 
political existence.55
Agamben’s historical reference points for elaborating this theoretical claim include 
the legal doctrine of habeas corpus, the French Revolution and the German 
concentration camps of the Second World War. He claims that the founding 
moment for the extension of the state of exception was the transference of 
sovereignty to the people in the French Revolution and discourses that struggled 
with the articulation of a new form of governance that arose at that time. Agamben 
argues that the French ‘Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizens’ of 1789 marks the 
‘originary figure of the inscription of bare life within the juridico-political order of 
the nation-state’.56 Bare life as such now appears as the source and bearer of rights, 
and citizenship ‘names the new status of life as the origin and ground of 
sovereignty’.57 The biopolitical state in which the exception has become the rule is 
further exemplified by concentration camps and the determination of ‘life unworthy 
of being lived’58 that accompanied the Nazi eugenics programs in Second World War 
Germany. Since the camps do not constitute an aberration in modern political 
rationality for Agamben but rather the apogee of it, these extreme situations actually 
bring to light the nomos of the political conditions of existence today.59 By this,
55 This clearly has implications for a consideration of rights within contemporary politics and I will 
return to a discussion of this in the final chapter after the philosophical commitments that Agamben 
holds are made clearer. Suffice to say at this point that Agamben wholly rejects recourse to rights as a 
limitation on the violence of sovereign power, claiming that ‘every attempt to found political liberties 
in the rights of the citizen is... in vain’ (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.l 81). In the final section of the thesis 
though, I argue that this claim is ultimately untenable, though it is one that Agamben cannot avoid 
easily given his other theoretical commitments. Yet, it is possible to moderate Agamben’s position 
through a close reading of the messianic gestures within his work, which I then juxtapose with 
Foucault’s critique of rights. But first, clarification of Agamben’s philosophical claims is required to 
see how closely he is tied to the full rejection of rights.
56 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p .l27.
57 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p .l29.
58 Agamben points out that this is not an ethical valuation but a political one, since in the context of 
biopolitics the decision on life and death is taken without regard for the expectations and legitimate 
desires of the individuals involved. Rather, ‘euthanasia is situated at the intersection of the sovereign 
decision on life that may be killed and the assumption of care for the biological body of the nation’. 
Here, sovereignty is ‘transformed into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be 
politically relevant’ (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p .l42), and biopolitics fades into ‘thanato-politics’ — a 
politics of death that recalls and partly challenges Foucault’s understanding of biopower as that which 
fosters life or disallows it.
59 This claim is discussed in Homo Sacer, but also see Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Camp as the Nomos of 
the Modern’ in Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, eds. Violence, Identity and Self-Determination (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.106-118.
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Agamben means that the camps are a biopolitical space par excellence, since their 
operative rationality is the reduction of human life to bare existence and exposure to 
violence, yet as such they are not isolated exceptions, but reveal the general 
conditions of political rationality in operation today. Hence, the condition of 
abandonment that bare life finds itself in is not limited to the camps, but instead 
enters into a process of banalization with scientific experimentation on human 
subjects on death row60 or the determination of the limits of life and death required 
by the invention of the category of brain death and coma depasse (‘overcoma’). Of 
these, Agamben claims that the suspension between life and death reveals that bare 
life is exposed absolutely, such that killing does not constitute murder, but can in no 
way be understood as sacrificial; here, life is itself exceptional, such that life and law 
are truly indistinguishable.61
Two points can be made of this characterization of biopolitics and sovereignty. The 
first point relates to Foucault’s distinction of biopolitics and sovereignty, and the 
subsequent casting of sovereignty as ideological that I discussed in the first chapter. I 
argued that the ambiguity in Foucault’s distinction between sovereignty as an 
extractive power over life and death and biopolitics as a productive form of power 
that fosters life leads to the view that the deployment of discourses of sovereignty 
ideologically masks the operations of the material technologies of biopolitics. Insofar 
as this is the case, Foucault risks a reductive analysis of operations of power that, a
60 For an important discussion of experimentation on prisoners in the United States of America, see 
Allen N. Homblum, Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison (New York: Routledge, 
1998) .
61 Agamben’s list of examples of biopolitics raises the question of the comparability and 
generalizability of such situations as examples, a problem that Agamben is not unaware of himself. In 
addressing the imagined criticism that his examples are ‘extreme or arbitrary’, he reaches for further 
‘more familiar’ examples such as Bosnian women in rape camps, but the list could be expanded 
indefinitely. What is important to recognize though is not whether the examples are comparable or 
generalizable with a ‘normal’ political situation -  for a number of reasons, if Agamben’s foregoing 
argument is accepted — but that the task is to reveal something previously uncovered in such examples 
and to ask whether such examples reveal something previously uncovered in contemporary life. What 
is important in these examples is the way in which they actually confound or trouble more established 
means of understanding. Thus, the example of ‘overcoma’ and the definition of brain death brings 
into question traditional definitions of life and death, and does so through a politicized technology 
that leaves the decision of what counts as life and death both radically undetermined and 
simultaneously over-determined. In this regard, Peter Singer’s discussions of the Karen Quinlan case 
(among others) to show the ways in which the doctrine of the sanctity of life is being radically 
undermined by bio-medical technology and the legal decisions that the capabilities of such technology 
occasion operates in a similar way: what is at issue is the continued relevance of more traditional 
frameworks for interpretation and decision-making. Consequently, it is an exercise in question­
begging to return to those as the privileged tools of interpretation. See Singer, Rethinking Life and 
Death.
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priori, excludes consideration of sovereignty as a material technology in the operation 
of power. Against this, it is clear that Agamben’s theorization of the intersection of 
biopolitics and sovereignty allows for consideration of the operational technologies 
of sovereignty in ways foreclosed by Foucault’s account. Agamben’s analysis of the 
ways in which biopolitics constantly overlaps with a politics of death or ‘thanato- 
politics’ brings into focus the constitutive role of sovereign violence within 
biopolitics. Furthermore, it does so in a way that does not require the allocation of 
sovereign power solely to the nation-state, and thus avoids returning analysis of 
sovereignty to the questions of legitimacy and centralized state power that Foucault 
had sought to overcome. In this light, in his rejection of an analysis of State 
sovereignty, it appears that Foucault failed to consider that sovereignty might operate 
in ways distinct from the state figured on the monarch. However, as Antonio Negri 
and Michael Hardt point out, ‘the decline of sovereignty of nation-states... does not 
mean that sovereignty as such has declined. ’62
Indeed, the implication of Agamben’s reformulation of Schmitt’s definition of the 
constitution of sovereignty through Benjamin’s claim that contemporary conditions 
are characterized by the state of exception becoming the rule is that the sovereign 
decision has been radically dispersed. However, it does not follow that the sovereign 
decision has disappeared. Rather, if we accept Agamben’s claim that all subjects are 
potentially homo sacers, that is, subject to irremediable sovereign violence, then it is 
also the case that all subjects can potentially take the sovereign position of deciding 
on the exception, of deciding on the life and death of another. As I noted previously, 
Agamben suggests that ‘the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are 
potentially homines sacri. .. homo sacer is the one to whom all men [may] act as 
sovereign’.63 The symmetry posited between sovereignty and homo sacer is also marked 
by an inherent reversibility enabled by the indistinction between law and life itself in 
which life is caught in the sovereign ban. In this then, the violence that conditions 
bare life might usefully be understood as bio-sovereign violence, violence that enacts the 
sovereign determination on life worth living in the moment of its execution.
62 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.x; 
also see Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalisation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996).
63 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.84.
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The second point follows from this in that insofar as Agamben’s reconsideration of 
biopolitics and sovereignty allows for further explication of the role of violence 
within the political, so it allows for reconsideration of the status of the subject, 
understood as the particularly political status of human beings. In particular, what 
becomes clear at this point is that within biopolitics, the status of being a subject is 
intimately linked to the exposure of life to bio-sovereign violence. While I discuss 
this further in the following chapter, it is worth noting here that the role of violence 
is not only subjectifying as it is in Foucault’s discussion of normalization, in which 
subjection ultimately emerges as an enforced constraint on the internal forces of the 
body. Rather, violence is at the same time the constitutive condition of the subject 
and the permanent threat of destruction and desolation of the subject through its 
desubjectifying effects. As the excrescence of the distinction between bios and t(oe, 
bare life — that is, life exposed to bio-sovereign violence — simultaneously indicates an 
extreme limit of subjection and a radical desubjectivation in which human life is 
reduced to a matter of survival. If it is the case that human life is politicized through 
its abandonment to the law, which exposes life to the irremediable force of the 
sovereign decision and that abandonment constitutes the fundamental condition of 
existence today, then it seems that there is a particular urgency in developing a 
political response to the biopolitical capture of life.
In formulating a response to the capture of bare life in the sovereign ban, in the final 
pages of Homo Sacer, Agamben gestures toward a new ‘form-of-life’,64 formulated 
elsewhere as ‘happy life’,65 in which bios and %oe cannot be separated. We have seen 
that for Agamben, the ‘originary’ relation between the sovereign exception and the 
bare life captured within it indicate that life has always been included in politics, even 
if only through its exclusion. However, while Agamben sees an essential continuity 
between classical and modern politics, this does not lead to the conclusion that there 
has been no substantive alteration of the relation between political power and bare 
life since the Greeks. Rather, Agamben suggests that what distinguishes modem 
democracy from classical democracy is that the former ‘presents itself from the
64 See Giorgio Agamben, ‘Form-of-Life’ in Means without End: Notes on Politics, tr. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp.3-12.
65 For instance, in Giorgio Agamben, ‘Notes on Politics’ in Means without End: Notes on Politics, 
tr.Vincenzo Bmetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp.109- 
118 at 114.
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beginning as a vindication and liberation of %oe, and that it is constandy trying to 
transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of ^oe\ 66 
Thus the raison d’etre of contemporary political power is the annulment of the 
distinction between bios and %oe\ that is, a total politicization of biological life that 
undercuts the distinction between bios of %oe and therefore eradicates bare life. At the 
same time though, Agamben also claims that modern democracy has consistendy 
failed in the endeavor to reconcile bios and %oe, such that ‘bare life remains included in 
politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something which is included only 
through an exclusion’ .67 While modern politics is increasingly played out on the level 
of biological life, in its attempt to discover the bios of %oe it nevertheless produces 
bare life as the excrescence of its failure, thereby preventing the overcoming of the 
sovereign exception and the violence that conditions bare life.
He goes on to claim that this situation leads to an aporia specific to modern 
democracy: ‘it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into play in the very 
place — “bare life”— that marked their subjection’ .68 According to Agamben, this 
aporia stymies any attempt to oppose biopolitical regimes from within the framework 
of bios and %oe. Such projects will tirelessly repeat the aporia of the exception, the 
danger of which lies in the gradual convergence of democracy with totalitarianism. In 
other words, the condition of abandonment indicates a fundamental aporia for 
contemporary politics, where attempts to overcome the capture of life within the 
sovereign exception through recourse to natural life necessarily repeat and reinstall 
that capture in their politicization of natural life. Thus, Agamben rejects Foucault’s 
gesture toward a ‘new economy of bodies and their pleasures’, claiming that ‘the 
body is always already a biopolitical body and bare life, and nothing in it or the 
economy of its pleasure seems to allow us to find solid ground on which to oppose 
the demands of sovereign power’.69 He argues instead that:
66 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.10.
67 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p .ll.
68 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.10.
69 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.187.
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Until a completely new politics — that is, a politics no longer founded on the 
exceptio o f bare life — is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain 
imprisoned and immobile, and the “beautiful day” o f life will be given 
citizenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness 
to which the society of the spectacle condemns it.70
The reference in this passage to the ‘beautiful day’ of life not only gestures toward 
the distinction Aristotle makes between the great difficulty of bios and the natural 
sweetness of %oe, but offers the key to the foundation of the coming politics that 
Agamben proposes.71
For Agamben, the transformation of politics must take the form of an inauguration 
of a ‘form-of-life’ or ‘happy life’. As he states in Means Without End:
The “happy life” on which political philosophy should be founded thus cannot 
be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn 
it into its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity o f science and o f modern 
biopolitics that everybody tries in vain to sacralize. This “happy life” should be 
rather, an absolutely profane “sufficient life” that has reached the perfection of 
its own power and its own communicability — a life over which sovereignty and 
right no longer have any hold.72
Agamben seeks a philosophical redefinition of life that no longer separates between 
the natural life of the species and contemplative or political life,73 since, in his view, it 
is precisely this distinction that underlies the political situation in which we find 
ourselves today. Bare life is produced as the excrescence of the distinction between 
bios and %oe and as such, is the carrier of the sovereign nexus of right and violence 
and the locus of biopolitical capture. Against this situation, he points toward a new
70 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p .ll.
71 The relevant fragment from Aristotle’s Politics for Agamben’s argument is quoted as: “This [life 
according to the good] is the greatest end both in common for all men and for each man separately. 
But men also come together and maintain the political community in view of simple living, because 
there is probably some kind of good in the mere fact of living itself [kata to pin auto monon\. If there is 
no great difficulty as to the way of life [kata ton bion], clearly most men will tolerate much suffering and 
hold on to life [p>e\ as if it were a kind of serenity [euemeria, beautiful day] and a natural sweetness.” 
Aristode, Politics, 1278b, 23-31. The parenthetical inserts are Agamben’s. Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.2.
72 Agamben, ‘Notes on Politics’, pp. 114-115.
73 For a different approach to this problem see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd Edition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
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conception of life, described as ‘happy life’ or a ‘form-of-life’, in which it is never 
possible to isolate bare life as the biopolitical subject.74 The happy life will be such 
that no separation of bios and %oe is possible, and life will find its unity in a pure 
immanence to itself, in ‘the perfection of its own power’. In this way, Agamben 
offers a redemptive hope that is external to the problems of biopolitics; the problems 
posed by the state of exception and sovereignty’s hold over the bare life caught 
within it can be resolved by the coming unified life. The inauguration of the happy 
life and the coming politics it grounds redeems bare life in the face of biopolitical 
capture.
5.3 The Messianics of Happy Life: Agamben and Benjamin
As provocative as it is, Agamben’s gesture toward a happy life that provides 
foundation for the coming politics clearly warrants further consideration and to do 
this, I turn to discussing the theoretical commitments that underpin Agamben’s 
theorization of biopolitics and the sovereign exception. In particular, I consider the 
messianic dimension of Agamben’s theorization. This derives from the influence of 
Walter Benjamin, whose work is perceived to provide the means of overcoming the 
Schmittian conception of sovereignty. While the messianic dimension of Agamben’s 
thought has received litde consideration in secondary literature, I show that 
understanding this aspect of Agamben’s later work is crucial to recognizing the
specificity of the theoretico-political position he outlines and for recognizing the
<
implications of this position. I argue that the conception of ‘happy life’ that 
Agamben posits as foundational for the coming politics that overthrow biopolitical 
capture of bare life can be understood as a gesture of messianism not dissimilar to 
that made on occasion by Benjamin. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the most 
important of Benjamin’s texts for Agamben are those in which the gesture toward 
the messianic is most explicitly formulated.75 However, I am less concerned with the
74 Agamben, ‘Form-of-Life’, pp.4, 11-12.
75 These are ‘Critique of Violence’, ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, ‘On Language as Such and on the 
Language of Man’, and Theses on the Philosophy of History’. See Walter Benjamin, ‘On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Man’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter 
Demetz, tr. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books 1978), pp. 314-332; Walter Benjamin, 
‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter 
Demetz, tr. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books 1978), pp.312-313. For discussions of 
Benjamin’s conception of the messianic see Gordon Hull, “‘Reduced to a Zero-Point”: Benjamin’s 
Critique of Kantian Historical Experience’, Philosophical Forum 31:2(2000), pp.163-186; Irving
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particular characteristics of Benjamin’s conception of the messianic than with the 
way in which this gesture operates within Agamben’s argument on sovereignty and 
biopolitics. In particular, I am interested in the theoretico-political implications of 
Agamben’s messianism, which can be brought out through a comparison of his 
position with that of Foucault and Derrida. I show that Agamben’s commitment to a 
notion of messianic redemption forecloses consideration of an immanent potentiality 
within bare life, which both limits his conception of abandonment and reveals a 
fundamental opposition between Agamben and Foucault on questions of political 
praxis. This opposition can be further illustrated by comparison of Agamben’s 
interpretation of Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’ and Kafka’s parable ‘Before 
the Law’ with Derrida’s.
The conflict between Scholem and Benjamin on the status of law in Kafka’s work 
that I mentioned previously provides the point of departure for this discussion. 
Agamben argues that Scholem’s description of Kafka’s conception of the law as 
being in force without significance exacdy describes the status of the law in the 
situation of the sovereign exception. Extending on diis insight dirough Benjamin’s 
contention that a law in force without significance is essentially indistinguishable 
from life itself, Agamben argues that the fundamental condition of biopolitical 
existence is the indistinction of life and law. This indistinction, understood through 
the notion of abandonment, exposes life itself to an irreparable sovereign violence, a 
violence that can only be overcome through the inauguration of a new form-of-life. 
Further, it can now be said that for Agamben recognition of the status of law as 
being in force without significance in the ban is insufficient as the aim and 
achievement of contemporary thought, since residing in this recognition does little 
other than repeat the ontological structure of the sovereign ban.
Instead, Agamben claims that contemporary thought must think abandonment 
beyond any conception of the law in order to move toward a politics freed of every 
ban. He states that:
Wohlfarth, ‘On Some Jewish Motifs in Benjamin’, in A. Benjamin ed. The Problems o f Modernity: Adorno 
and Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1989); Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour o f Experience, 
(London: Roudedge, 1988); Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: A n  Aesthetics o f Redemption (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982).
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The relation o f abandonment is now to be thought in a new way. To read this 
relation as a being in force without significance — that is, as Being’s 
abandonment to and by a law that prescribes nothing, and not even itself — is to 
remain inside nihilism and not to push the experience o f abandonment to the 
extreme. Only where the experience o f abandonment is freed from every idea 
of the law and destiny... is abandonment truly experienced as such.76
This complicated suggestion brings to light several crucial aspects of Agamben’s 
theorization of abandonment. First and most obviously, this statement summarizes 
Agamben’s critique of the conception of abandonment given by Nancy in his essay 
‘Abandoned Being’. Nancy argues that abandonment is the condition — perhaps the 
sole condition — of the thinking of being in the contemporary world and, further, 
abandonment is always to be abandoned in relation to law, since ‘abandonment 
respects the law; it cannot do otherwise’.77 He concludes that ‘abandonment’s only 
law... is to be without return and without recourse’.78 Without exploring the 
complexities of Nancy’s text or his critical relation with Heidegger from whom the 
notion of abandonment is taken, it can be said that Agamben diverges from Nancy 
on this final point of the resolution and recourse of abandonment. Agamben’s 
divergence from Nancy’s formulation lies in his claim that the state of abandonment 
must be overcome through pushing the experience of abandonment to its extreme 
limit, beyond the law’s being in force without significance and beyond the 
contemporary condition of nihilism.
This reference to nihilism is key for disentangling Agamben’s commitment to a 
Benjaminian messianics as the path of overcoming the condition of abandonment, 
for it prefigures his distinction between perfect and imperfect nihilism that he poses 
as synonymous with the virtual and real state of exception posed by Benjamin.79
76 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.60.
77 Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, p.44.
78 Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, p.47.
79 This comment also reveals the critical relation that Agamben maintains toward Heidegger, for the 
notion of abandonment that both he and Nancy are working with comes from the Heideggerian 
conception of the abandonment of being by Being. Agamben’s response to the Heideggerian ontology 
of Being and the abandonment of being is to argue for the overcoming of abandonment through the 
messianic redemption of happy life. On Agamben’s relation to Heidegger see Leland Deladurantaye, 
‘Agamben’s Potential’, Diacritics 30:2(2000), p.3-24 at 8. Deladurantaye’s note concerning Agamben’s 
comments in the French daily newspaper Liberation on his theoretical engagement with Martin 
Heidegger and Benjamin is of particular importance. Agamben is quoted as claiming that his
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Benjamin’s distinction in made in the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, where 
he writes that:
The tradition o f the oppressed teaches us that the “state o f emergency” in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception 
o f history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it 
is our task to bring about a real state o f emergency, and will improve our 
position in the struggle against Fascism.80
Benjamin’s fragment posits the generalization of the state of exception and the 
correlative necessity of developing an account of historical time that can clearly 
illuminate and assist in realizing a means of overcoming that state through the 
creation of a real state of exception. The distinction that Benjamin posits between 
the virtual and the real state of exception or state of emergency can be understood as 
strictly analogous to a differentiation between the state of exception that constitutes 
sovereignty according to Schmitt’s diesis and the exceptionality of the messianic, 
which redeems and rescues humanity from the grip of the former. That is, historical 
fulfillment or redemption comes in the form of a messianic, real exceptionality that 
overcomes the form of law in the virtual state of exception, the latter of which is at 
least partly equated for Benjamin with Fascism.
Given that the fragment from the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ presents a 
barely disguised critique of Schmitt,81 it provides Agamben with the solution to the
encounter with Heidegger meant that ‘philosophy became possible’. He goes on to say though that 
‘this is precisely the interest of encounters — both in life and in thinking. They render life, for us, 
possible (or, sometimes, impossible). In any event, this is what happened to me with Heidegger, and, 
during these same years, with Benjamin’s thought. Every great oeuvre contains a degree of shadow 
and poison for which it does not always furnish the antidote. For me, Benjamin was that antidote 
which helped me to survive Heidegger’, (Agamben cited in Deladurantaye, ‘Agamben’s Potential’, p.8, 
n.8).
80 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ p.259; the phrase ‘state of emergency’ is more 
accurately rendered as ‘state of exception’ from the original ‘Ausnahmezustand’. Agamben uses this 
latter translation, as do other Benjamin and Schmitt scholars.
81 For discussions of Benjamin’s relation to Schmitt, particularly on the question of the state of 
exception, see Samuel Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’, 
Diacritics 22:3-4(1992), pp.5-18; Horst Bredekamp, ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, via 
Thomas Hobbes’, Critical Inquiry 25(Winter 1999), pp.247-266. Bredekamp also points out the 
importance of the Benjamin-Schmitt interaction for reading Derrida’s ‘Force of Law’ and concludes 
his essay with a quote from Benjamin’s diary that emotively summarizes his relation to Schmitt: 
“Schmitt/Agreement, Hate, Suspicion” (Benjamin cited in Bredekamp, ‘From Walter 
Benjamin’p.266). For a discussion of Schmitt’s relation to Sorel, which also reflects on Benjamin’s 
‘Critique of Violence’, see Stathis Gourgouris, ‘The Concept of the Mythical (Schmitt with Sorel)’, 
Cardoso Law Review 21(2000), pp. 1487-1514.
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perceived urgency of overcoming or escaping the operations of the sovereign ban 
and biopolitics and the capture of bare life that this entails. Accepting the essential 
correlation between nihilism and messianism posited by Scholem and Benjamin, 
Agamben claims that it is necessary to distinguish between two forms of messianism 
or nihilism.82 The first form, which he calls ‘imperfect nihilism’ nullifies the law but 
maintains ‘the Nothing [that is, the emptiness of the law] in a perpetual and infinitely 
deferred state of validity’. This is the nihilism that Agamben refers to above in his 
critique of Nancy’s conception of abandonment. The second form, called ‘perfect 
nihilism’ overturns the Nothing, and does not even permit the survival of validity 
beyond meaning; perfect nihilism, as Benjamin states, ‘succeeds in finding 
redemption in the overturning of the Nothing’ .83 The task that contemporary 
thought is faced with is the thought of perfect nihilism, which overturns the law in 
force without significance that characterizes the ‘virtual’ state of exception of 
Western politics.84 Importantly though, the overturning of the law does simply mean 
instituting a new law, and nor does it mean reinstating the lost law of a previous time 
‘to recuperate alternative heredities’.85 Both of these modes of progression would 
merely repeat the political aporia of abandonment. Rather, the task of redeeming life 
from the aporia of law in force without significance requires both the destruction of
82 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’, p.171. The distinction Agamben poses 
between imperfect and perfect nihilism is similar to that between passive and active nihilism made by 
Nietzsche in for instance Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufman, tr. Walter 
Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967), esp. pp.5-82 at 17. Additionally, one should 
see Heidegger’s discussion of nihilism in Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Question of Being’ [1955], in 
Pathmarks, ed. William. McNeill, tr. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp.291-322 and Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1988).
83 Cited in Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’, p.171.
84 Agamben’s conception of the law is particularly ambiguous throughout his work and has given rise 
to a number of criticisms. This ambiguity derives from his metonymic characterization of the 
institutions of positive law on the model of the Torah, a characterization that is unlikely to be 
convincing for many legal and political theorists. Indeed the theological dimension o f Agamben’s 
political analysis is no doubt problematic from a number of points of view. Later in this chapter, I 
argue that the strong messianic position that Agamben takes in developing his political theology is 
problematic in its insistence on the overturning of the law in its totality, a position which is further 
reinforced by the association of positive legality with divine law. Setting this aside though, it remains 
the case that the analysis of sovereignty and biopolitics in Homo Sacer offers important 
reconsiderations of violence and the determination of life worth living. See Fitzpatrick ‘These mad 
abandon’d times’; Fitzpatrick, Bare Sovereignty’; Anton Schütz, ‘Thinking the Law with and against 
Luhmann, Legendre and Agamben’, Taw and Critique 11:2(2000), pp.107-136; Thanos Zartaloudis, 
‘Without Negative Origins and Absolute Ends: A Jurisprudence of the Singular’, Taw and Critique 
13:2(2002), pp. 197-230.
85 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption’ in 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed and tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), pp.138-159 at 153.
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the past and the realization of ‘that which has never been\ 86 It is only the inauguration of 
that which has never been, the not having been of the past, that will suffice to 
overturn the Nothing maintained by the law in force without significance and 
thereby restore human life to the unity of bios and %oe, a unity that itself has never yet 
been. As Agamben states ‘this — what has never happened — is the historical and 
wholly actual homeland of humanity’ .87
In this light, it becomes clear that the ‘form-of-life’ or ‘happy life’ that Agamben 
proposes as the foundation of the coming politics constitutes the ‘real state of 
exception’ from which the biopolitics of modern democracy and its correlation with 
totalitarianism can be combated and life redeemed. For Agamben, the real state of 
exception or the messianic redemption that overturns law in force without 
significance can be actualized in the inauguration of a happy life that does not 
partake in the distinction between natural life and political life, but has instead 
‘reached the perfection of its own power and its own communicability’.88 What then 
does Agamben mean by the term ‘happy life’ and what is he suggesting in the 
enigmatic phrase cited here? If Agamben’s starting point for the theorization of bare 
life is the term ‘mere life’ that Benjamin uses in ‘Critique of Violence’, the inspiration 
for the notion of a ‘happy life’ derives from the short text, ‘Theologico-Political 
Fragment’. In this, Benjamin explicitly addresses the relation of Messianic and 
historic time and writes that ‘only the Messiah himself consummates all history, in 
the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its relation to the Messianic. ’89 
Constructing an image of two arrows pointing in different directions but wFtich are 
nevertheless reinforcing, Benjamin goes on to say that ‘the order of the profane 
should be erected on the idea of happiness’. This is because while the profane cannot 
in itself establish a relation with the Messianic, it assists the coming of the Messianic 
Kingdom precisely by being profane. In other words, while the profane is not a 
category of the Messianic, it is ‘the decisive category of its quietest approach’,
86 See further, Agamben ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’; Agamben, ‘Benjamin and the Demonic’; 
Deladurantaye, ‘Agamben’s Potential’, p. 17-19; Daniel Heller-Roazen, ‘Editor’s Introduction: To Read 
What Was Never Written’, in Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed and tr. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp.1-23.
87 Agamben, ‘Benjamin and the Demonic’, p.159.
88 Agamben, ‘Notes on Politics’, pp.114-115.
89 Benjamin, ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, p.312.
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because ‘the rhythm of Messianic nature is happiness’. Happiness allows for the 
fulfillment of historical time, since the Messianic kingdom is ‘not the goal of history 
but the end’.90
Agamben’s absolutely profane happy life draws on this characterization of the 
profane and messianic, wherein the profane happy life provides passage for 
messianic redemption. The inauguration of happy life in which neither yoe nor bios 
can be isolated allows for the law in force without significance to be overturned such 
that the Nothing maintained by that law is eliminated and humanity reaches its own 
fulfillment in its transparency to itself. For Agamben, happy life might be 
characterized as life lived in the experience of its own unity, its own potentiality of 
‘being-thus’.91 In this, the notion of happy life is structurally similar to the theoretical 
gesture that Agamben makes in his earlier text, The Coming Community. Though not 
formulated in the terms of bare and happy life, the messianic overturning of 
expropriated being provides the logical impetus of this text, in which Agamben 
develops his conception of community without essence realized in the ‘whatever’ 
singularity. In this text, the community of whatever, the being-thus of humanity, 
which is neither general nor particular, without attribute or identity, is essentially a 
messianic community of humanity restored to its own potentiality, its own ‘being-in 
language’ that thereby overturns being’s expropriation by the Nothing of the 
spectacle to which it is currently condemned .92 However, it is important to be clear 
this does not amount to a nostalgic re-invocation of GemienschafP, rather, as should be 
expected from the structure of messianics, the coming community has never yet 
been. As Thomas Carl Wall comments, ‘without destiny and without essence, the 
community that returns is one never present in the first place. ’93 This suggests then
^Benjamin, ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, pp.312-313; Agamben, ‘Benjamin and the Demonic’, 
p.154.
91 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, tr. Michael Hardt, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press: 1993), p.93; Also see Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot and Agamben (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999), pp.115-162. However, the problem with Wall’s otherwise 
instructive sympathetic reading of Agamben is that he does not give enough weight to the messianic 
gesture within The Coming Community.
92 Guy Debord’s classic analysis of the spectacle of commodification in The Society of the Spectacle, tr. D. 
Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994) is crucial for Agamben’s political theory.
93 Wall, Radical Passivity, p.156; also see Agamben’s essay {*Se: Hegel’s Absolute and Heidegger’s 
Ereignis1’ in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed and tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), pp.116-137 for a further discussion of the proper being of humanity, 
understood as neither ‘something unsayable, the sacer that must remain unsaid in all speech and
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the gesture toward a new form of life or happy life to ground the coming politics that 
appears in the final pages of Homo Sacer derives from a fundamental messianism that 
underpins Agamben’s conceptions of life, politics and historical transformation 
developed in recent work.
5.4 Bare Life, Potentiality and Strong Messianism
At this point, three closely related points can be made to specify the nature of 
Agamben’s messianic gesture further. First, the messianic commitment that 
Agamben maintains rests on a foreclosure of consideration of the potentiality of bare 
life itself. This not only limits Agamben’s conception of abandonment but also 
guarantees the necessity of the messianic gesture. Second, Agamben’s positing of the 
political necessity of happy life reveals an important difference between his 
conception of political praxis and that of Foucault and Butler, which I have discussed 
in earlier chapters. While these latter theorists emphasize the importance of 
immanent resistance, according to Agamben this does litde other than repeat the 
aporia of abandonment. Instead, Agamben predicates the redemptive immanence of 
happy life on transcendent conditions of futurity. Third, in order to specify 
Agamben’s gesture to transcendent futurity, I compare his interpretation of 
Benjamian messianics with that of Derrida. This shows that while Derrida adopts a 
‘weak messianics’,94 Agamben takes a position of strong messianics. I conclude by 
suggesting that the strength of this position must be tempered in order to overcome 
some of its more problematic aspects.
If this characterization of happy life as the condition of the messianic fulfillment of 
humanity and history is correct, it is worth considering the implications of 
Agamben’s messianism for his conception of abandonment and bare life. What this
praxis... nor... according to the pathos o f contemporary nihilism, a Nothing whose nullity grounds 
the arbitrariness and violence of social activity. Rather *se -  ethos [dwelling place] -  is the social praxis 
itself that, in the end, becomes transparent to itself. This also indicates and helps explain Agamben’s 
unequivocal insistence on the elimination of the dogma of the sacredness of life, for here he states 
that ‘a fulfilled foundation of humanity in itself necessarily implies the definitive elimination of the 
sacrificial mythologeme’ (Agamben, c*Se, p.137). Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); Maurice Blanchot, The Unavoidable Community, tr. 
Pierre Joris (New York: Station Hill Press, 1988).
94 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), p.352, n.l.
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reveals is that the perceived necessity of messianic redemption occludes formulation 
of an inherent potentiality within bare life, which also limits the conception of 
abandonment developed in Homo Sacer. To recapitulate the main points of 
Agamben’s conception of abandonment: he argues that the term abandonment 
describes the relation by which the law applies to bare life in not applying, in 
withdrawing from the life caught in the sovereign ban. The force of law lies in the 
capacity to be in operation through its suspension or withdrawal, such that the life 
caught in the ban is simultaneously thrown to the law and bereft of it. This is why 
bare life can be killed but not sacrificed, since the double exclusion from the realm of 
the profane and the sacred that characterizes bare life means that it is exposed to the 
force of sovereignty but no longer protected by the either profane or divine law. 
Finally, even the doctrine of the fundamental sanctity of human life can no longer 
operate as a bulwark against the force of the law, since that doctrine is the means by 
which life is brought to the law.95 Agamben concludes from this that abandonment 
rather than application constitutes the originary form of the relation of law to life.96 
Moreover, abandonment indicates the fundamental condition of existence today, 
where biopolitics constitutes the extension and generalization of the sovereign 
exception and bare life is entirely politicized.
While Agamben’s analysis places the concept of abandonment at the center of 
understanding the relation between life and politics, his characterization of this 
condition requires that the redemption of life comes through the production of a 
happy form of life that does not partake in the distinction between natural and 
political life at all. However, the necessity of this for Agamben begins to indicate a 
fundamental weakness in his characterization of abandonment. In his borrowing of 
the terminology of the ban from Nancy to describe the relation of the law to the 
‘exceptio ’ of bare life, Agamben adds in parentheses that ‘in Romance languages, to be 
“banned” originally means both to be “at the mercy o f ’ and “at one’s own will,
95 One might say that, in effect, there is no home for bare life. The suggestion that bare life is 
‘homeless’ is not misplaced in its evocation of Martin Heidegger’s notion of homelessness, since 
Agamben does in fact see the isolation of bare life in Western politics as analogous to the isolation of 
pure Being in Western metaphysics, such that the resolution of each of these problems is dependent 
on the resolution of the other. However, this is not the place to investigate the purported relation 
between bare life and pure Being. See Agamben’s brief discussion of this on p.182 of Homo Sacer. See 
Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ [1949], in Pathmarks, ed. William. McNeill, tr. Frank A. 
Capuzzi and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.239-276.
96 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.29.
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freely,” to be “excluded” and also “open to all, free” ’.97 Following this parenthetical 
statement, he goes on to say that ‘the matchless potentiality of the nomos, its originary 
“force of law” is that it holds life in its ban by abandoning it’ .98 However, the 
parenthetical status of the freedom given in abandonment and the subsequent 
formulation of the ‘matchless potentiality’ of the law bring into focus a crucial lacuna 
in Agamben’s theorization of abandonment. While he notes the freedom given in 
abandonment, in his following account this is entirely occluded by the force of the 
law. The life captured within the sovereign ban is entirely given over to the law, even 
if that law only applies in its withdrawal, such that its freedom consists in being 
entirely subsistent in relation to the law and thus, in being exposed to death. What 
this fails to allow then is that abandonment is not simply the exposure of life to death 
without recourse, but also indicates a profusion of possibilities such that the 
potentiality of bare life itself is not entirely exhausted in abandonment.99
The one-sidedness of this conception of abandonment hangs on the equation of 
potentiality with sovereignty that Agamben develops, indicated in his characterization 
of a matchless potentiality of the nomos and explicitly posited in his discussion of 
Aristode’s conception of potentiality. Agamben claims that the paradox of 
sovereignty is most clearly evident in the distinction between constituting and 
constituted power, where constituting power is essentially identical with sovereign 
power insofar as each is concerned with the ‘constitution of potentiality’ . 100 That is, 
sovereign power is essentially coequal to constitutive power in that neither can be 
determined by the existing order and nor can either be limited to constituting that 
order but are instead ‘free praxis’ and potentiality. 101 This means that the problem of
97 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.29.
98 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.29.
99 See Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, p.37.
100 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.44; the phrase cited by Agamben is taken from Antonio Negri, II 
Potere Constituente: Saggio sulle alternative del modemo (Milan: SugarCo, 1992), p.383. Agamben’s discussion 
of Negri is directed against the latter’s attempt to distinguish between sovereign power and 
constituent power, but allows that the real import of Negri’s analysis lies in his identification of the 
way in which constituent power transforms from a political concept to an ontological problem 
through the notion of potentiality employed here. Also see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Habor of 
Dionysus: A  Critique of the State-Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
101 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.43. This claim is made in the context of a critique of Antonio Negri’s dis- 
identification of sovereign and constitutive power on the basis that while constitutive power is ‘the 
punctual determination that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of something that did not exist 
before and whose conditions of existence stipulate that the creative act cannot lose its characteristics
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sovereignty returns political philosophy to ontology, and at that level, necessitates a 
rethinking of the relation between potentiality and actuality. Returning to Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics then, Agamben finds that Aristode rigorously separates potentiality from 
actuality, giving it an autonomous existence prior to actuality. From this, Agamben 
claims that to maintain the distinction between potentiality and actuality and explicate 
the effective mode of potentiality’s existence, it is necessary that potentiality be able 
to not always pass over into actuality. Therefore, potentiality is defined precisely by 
its capacity to not (do or be) and is thus also ‘impotentiality’ . 102 He states that 
‘potentiality maintains itself in relation to actuality in the form of its suspension; it is 
capable of the act in not realizing it, it is sovereignly capable of its own imp- 
potentiality’ . 103
This characterization necessarily raises the question of the passage into actuality, and 
Agamben argues that this does not entail the destruction of potentiality, but rather 
entails the maintenance or conservation of potentiality as such. 104 His point of 
departure for this claim is Aristotle’s enigmatic phrase ‘a thing is said to be potential 
if, when the act of which it is said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing im- 
potential. ’105 Agamben interprets this phrase to mean that ‘if a potential to not-be 
originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where the 
potential to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it as such’ . 106
in creating’ while sovereignty ‘arises as the establishment — and therefore the end — of constituting 
power, as the consumption of the freedom brought by constituting power’ (Negri cited in Agamben, 
Homo Sacer, p.43).
102 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.45. The claims concerning potentiality made in Homo Sacer are explicated 
further in Giorgio Agamben, ‘On Potentiality’ in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed and tr. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p.177-185; also see Giorgio 
Agamben, ‘Bartleby, or On Contingency’ in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed and tr. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp.243-271.
103 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.45.
104 Yet, the question that Agamben does not broach is whether there is a qualitative transformation 
apart from the destruction of potentiality in the passage to actuality. This question is more thoroughly 
addressed by Gilles Deleuze in his treatment of the concept of virtuality, however a comparison of 
Agamben and Deleuze is beyond the scope of this thesis. For insightful discussions of the concept of 
virtuality as it relates to the concept of life in Deleuze, see John Rachjman, The Deleuze Connections 
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2000); Keith Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: 
Bergson and the Time of Life (London: Roudedge, 2002); Keith Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life: The 
Difference and Prepetition of Deleuze (London: Roudedge, 1999); Keith Ansell-Pearson, Deleuze and 
Philosophy: The Difference Engineer (London: Roudedge, 1997).
105 Aristode cited in Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.45.
106 Agamben, ‘On Potentiality’, p.183.
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Hence Aristotle’s phrase concerns the conditions in which potentiality is realized; 
potentiality is not destroyed in the passage to actuality, with im-potentiality set aside 
or overcome. Rather, the potentiality to not be or do is conserved in the passage to 
actuality. In this way, the passage from potentiality to actuality appears as a gift, a 
giving of oneself to self. As Daniel Heller-Roazen points out ‘actuality is nothing 
other than a potentiality to the second degree, a potentiality that, in Aristotle’s 
phrase, “is the gift of the self to itself’... actuality reveals itself to be simply a 
potential not to be (or do) turned back on itself, capable of not not being and, in this 
way, granting the existence of what is actual.’107
From this discussion of potentiality in Homo Sacer.; Agamben claims that Aristotle 
‘actually bequeathed the paradigm of sovereignty to Western philosophy. For the 
sovereign ban, which applies to the exception in no longer applying, corresponds to 
the structure of potentiality, which maintains itself in relation to actuality precisely 
through its ability not to be’.108 Agamben argues that the structure of potentiality 
corresponds to that of the operation of the sovereign, wherein the sovereign decides 
on what the law* applies to. He claims that potentiality is ‘that through which Being 
founds itself sovereignly... without anything preceding or determining it... other 
than its own ability not to be. And an act is sovereign when it realizes itself by simply 
taking away its own potentiality not to be, letting itself be, giving itself to itself. ’109 
Moreover, the particular force of the sovereign in relation to the exception is that it 
maintains itself indefinitely in its own potentiality, that is, its own not passing into 
actuality through the structure of not applying, of withdrawing from the exception. 
Interestingly though, it is precisely as Agamben concludes that sovereignty is 
identical with potentiality that he adds — again in parentheses — that ‘the 
troublemaker is precisely the one who tries to force sovereign power to translate 
itself into actuality’.110 But if it is possible to understand the troublemaker as 
equivalent to the exception momentarily, this interpolated statement reveals that the 
force of the exception is that it forces the sovereign into actuality, such that the
107 Heller-Roazen, ‘Editor’s Introduction, p.18.
108 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.46.
109 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.46.
110 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.47.
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exception founds sovereignty. 111 If this is the case, then the figure of the 
troublemaker opens the question of potentiality and sovereignty to a different 
alignment.
This becomes clearer if we return briefly to Schmitt’s discussion of sovereignty and 
the exception, wherein the decision on the exception is the essential characteristic of 
sovereignty. One of the axiomatic claims that Schmitt makes is that the exception not 
only proves the rule, but also proves the very existence of the rule: hence, ‘the rule as 
such lives off the exception alone’ . 112 He goes on to say that ‘in the power of the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has 
grown torpid by repetition’.113 Thus, not only is the exception rendered as 
constitutive of the rule, but in addition, since it is also in the decision on the 
exception that the sovereign is realized, then sovereignty itself depends on the 
exception for its own force. Now if this is the case, it becomes unclear which can be 
identified with constituent power, for in a sense, the exception displays the 
characteristics of constituent power as much as the sovereign does. The exception is 
by definition undetermined by the previous order and exists in a symbiotic relation 
with sovereignty, insofar as each emerges mutually in a pure decision that violently 
establishes the normal order. Nor can the exception be limited to constituting that 
order, since it threatens order by breaking through the crust of torpid mechanisms. 
Similarly, Slavoj Zizek points out that the ambiguity of Schmitt’s notion of the
111 In fact, Agamben closes his brief discussion of sovereignty and potentiality with the suggestion that 
potentiality must be thought without any relation to actuality or Being at all, ‘not even in the extreme 
form of the ban and the potentiality to not be’ (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.47). This, he suggests, implies 
a total revaluation of politics and ontology, and requires ‘thinking ontology and politics beyond every 
figure of relation’ (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p-47). This claim mirrors the messianism that I discuss 
below.
112 This translation of Schmitt’s comment appears in Homo Sacer, p.16 and is presumably Agamben’s 
translation from German to Italian and Heller-Roazen’s translation from Italian to English. In his 
English translation of Political Theology, George Schwab renders this passage as ‘the exception proves 
everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception 
(Schmitt, Political Theology, p.15; emphasis added).
113 Schmitt, Political Theology, p.15; for a discussion of the connection between a theory of the political 
and a philosophy of life that Schmitt establishes in his conception of the norm and the exception, see 
Giacomo Marramao, ‘The Exile of the Nomos: For a Critical Profile of Carl Schmitt’, Cardogo Taw 
Preview 21(2000), pp.1567-1587. Interestingly, the characterization of the exception in the political 
given by Schmitt is not altogether dissimilar to the conception of the error in biological life developed 
by Georges Canguilhem in The Normal and the Pathological, tr. Carolyn Fawcett (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991). Also see Oren Gross, ‘The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s 
Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm-Exception” Dichotomy’, Cardogo Taw Review 21(2000), 
pp.1825-1868.
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exception lies in the fact that it ‘stands simultaneously for the intrusion of the Real 
(of the pure contingency that perturbs the universe of symbolic automaton) and for 
the gesture of the sovereign who (violendy, without foundadon in the symbolic 
norm) imposes a symbolic normative order. In ‘Lacanese’, Zizek claims that the 
Schmittian exception is both the objetpetit a and St the master signifier. 114
The important correlative of the foreclosure of recognizing the potentiality of the 
exception that Agamben effects in associating potentiality with sovereignty is that if 
bare life is caught within the exception then recognition of the potentiality within 
bare life is also foreclosed. For Agamben, the only means of escape from a 
biopolitical regime is the reconsideration of the notion of life apart from the 
separation of bare life from political life, such that a ‘coming politics’ that no longer 
takes bare life as its ground is made possible. In doing so though, Agamben 
construes bare life as fundamentally passive in relation to sovereign violence, 
singularly exposed without recourse or response. As Antonio Negri and Michael 
Hardt claim in Empire, Agamben’s understanding of naked or bare life exposes 
‘behind the political abysses that modern totalitarianism has constructed the (more or 
less) heroic conditions of passivity. 115 By contrast, Negri and Hardt claim that 
Nazism and fascism do not reveal the essential passivity of bare life so much as 
amount to an attempt to destroy ‘the enormous power that naked life could 
become’. 116 Without following Negri and Hardt into their Deleuzian formulation of 
the potentiality of naked or bare life, this helps bring into view the second point that 
I want to make about Agamben’s characterization of political futurity, particularly as 
it relates to the opposition of immanence and transcendence in conceptions of 
political praxis.
114 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 1999), p.114.
115 Negri and Hardt, Empire, p.366; Michael Hardt and Thomas Dumm, ‘Sovereignty, Multitudes, 
Absolute Democracy: A Discussion between Michael Hardt and Thomas Dumm about Hardt and 
Negri’s Empire', Theoty and Event 4:3(2000), §16.
116 Negri and Hardt, Empire, p.366; their response to the biopolitical dilemma is to invoke the 
Deleuzian concept of multiplicity and sketch out a liberatory future in ‘machinic metamorphosis’ 
(Negri and Hardt, Empire, p.367). However, this simply endorses the powers of multiplicity against 
sovereignty in Empire and sidesteps Agamben’s point that no new body provides sufficient foundation 
for opposition to biopolitical capture (Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.188). In fact, while Negri and Hardt’s 
position is diametrically opposed to Agamben’s, the gesture toward multiplicity and machinic 
metamorphosis might ultimately be structurally similar to Agamben’s gesture to a happy life. 
However, this is not something I can explore here.
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The foreclosure of consideration of a potentiality of bare life itself is closely related 
to the rejection of Foucault’s formulation of a political response to biopolitics at the 
end of The History of Sexuality, where he calls for the inauguration of a new ‘economy 
of bodies and pleasures’ to combat biopolitical subjection and the deployment of 
sexuality. As I discussed in the first chapter, Foucault’s account of biopohtics 
involves collapsing the Aristotelian distinction between political and natural life. 
Whereas Aristode proposed that man was an animal with the additional capacity for 
political existence, Foucault claims that natural, biological life immediately coincides 
with political existence under a regime of biopolitics. From this, he appears to claim 
that natural, biological life is the site of resistance to biopolitical subjection, first in 
his suggestion that life has not been totally integrated into the techniques that govern 
it, but constandy escapes them, but more importandy, in his claim that struggles 
against biopolitics ‘relied for support on the very thing [powder] invested, that is, on 
life and man as a living being’ ,117 The theoretical stance underpinning this historical 
observation is elaborated earlier in the text, where Foucault claims that resistance is 
never external to power, but is inscribed in relations of power as the ‘irreducible 
opposite’, the ‘odd term’ that provide the ‘adversary, target or support’ for their 
strategic operation. 118 Resistance is an immanent possibility within any confrontation 
of power relations, and as such it emerges from the inherent forces of the body 
targeted by techniques of biopower. It is precisely that which power targets that 
provides the points of opposition, resistance and possible transformation. Thus, 
Foucault locates the possibility of escaping the capture of biopolitical techniques 
within the body itself through the immanent potential for reversal within relations of 
force.
Similarly, while Judith Buder criticizes Foucault for an apparent valorization of the 
body as the ‘principle of necessary and permanent disruption’, 119 she extends the 
claim that resistance is internal to the operation of power through her conception of 
resignification as political strategy. Against Foucault’s conception of the body, Butler 
develops the concept of the morphological imaginary to effectively deconstruct the
117 Foucault, History o f Sexuality 1, p.144.
118 Foucault, History o f  Sexuality 1, pp.95-96.
119 Judith Buder, ‘Revisiting Bodies and their Pleasures’, Theory, Culture and Society 16:2(1999), pp.11-20 
at 14.
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distinction between nature and culture and to argue that the body is political from its 
inception. She claims that the ‘dominant and indifferent’ discourses that structure the 
emergence of the morphological imaginary through compelled identification only 
establish their efficacy in being repeated. At the same time, it is precisely the 
necessity of repetition that opens the terms and conditions through which 
subjectivation takes place to reconfiguration. Butler’s theory of agency posits an 
irremediable temporal vulnerability in discursive relations such that the performative 
force of the terms of subjectivation can be altered, thereby allowing for the 
development of new possibilities of bodily life. The aim of Butler’s conception is to 
establish the tremulous agency of those bodies excluded from the status of subject, 
their capacity to disrupt or destabilize hegemonic identifications effected through 
discursive subjectivation and to force a more or less radical reconsideration of 
conditions of existence. In this, her argument repeats the insistence upon the 
immanent possibilities for resistance within the operations of power evident in 
Foucault’s characterization of resistance to biopolitical subjection.
Against this position, Agamben argues that the attempt to isolate die body as the site 
of resistance remains trapped within the logic of biopolitics; analogous to attempts to 
sacralize life in opposition to sovereign power, this position ultimately does nothing 
but reinscribe the very means of subjection. While Agamben’s formulation of the 
concept of bare life is formally similar to Butier’s concept of the morphological 
imaginary insofar as it deconstructs the distinction between bios and %oe, or political 
and natural life, he concludes that resistance to biopolitical capture cannot be 
generated from within the terms of biopolitics. Rather, in positing the necessity of 
the inauguration of happy life as the condition of messianic redemption, Agamben 
gestures toward the necessity of a radically disruptive event that does not simply 
reconfigure current conditions of existence but overturns the totality of the current 
order of political existence.120 To summarize the distinction between Foucault, Buder
120 In this, Agamben’s position is not entirely dissimilar to Slavoj Zizek’s claim that Foucault fails to 
consider the possibility that the ‘system itself, on account of its inherent inconsistency, may give birth 
to a force whose excess it is no longer able to master and which thus detonates its unity, its capacity to 
reproduce itself (p.256). Or, as Zizek claims of Butler, the account of immanent resistance cannot 
consider the possibility of a ‘radical gesture of the thorough restructuring of the hegemonic symbolic 
order in its totality’ (Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, p.264); also see Alain Badiou’s discussion of the 
importance of the event that has never taken place, in Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, ed. and tr. 
Norman Madarasz (Albany: State Unversity of New York Press, 1999) and his interview on politics 
and philosophy with Peter Hallward, in Alain Badiou, Ethics: A n  Essay on the Understanding of Evil, tr. 
Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2001), pp.95-144.
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and Agamben, the Foucault/Butler position is guided by the presupposition of an 
immanent capacity for resistance, which is not however essential or localizable within 
the subject. Agamben’s position gestures toward a happy life predicated on its own 
transcendence, insofar as the parameters of the happy life cannot derive from the 
conditions of existence given today. Yet, Agamben’s conception of happy life also 
requires a notion of pure immanence insofar as happy life is entirely transparent to 
itself and bare life and political life cannot be distinguished. This means that 
Agamben effectively predicates the possibility for redemptive immanence on 
transcendent conditions of futurity.
The particular characteristics of Agamben’s gesture of political futurity can be 
outlined through a brief comparison of Agamben and Derrida’s interpretations of 
Benjaminian messianics. So far, I have argued that Agamben’s conception of 
opposition to biopolitical capture draws upon the logic suggested by Benjamin in his 
eighth thesis on the philosophy of history, such that instead of residing in the 
immanent potentiality of bare life he posits a messianic redemption from biopolitical 
capture in the form of a unified, happy life. Several commentators on Agamben have 
suggested that this logic can be understood as the transformation of the aporia of the 
exception in a redemptive euporia that subsequently provides the hope and 
foundation of a coming politics. 121 In other words, Agamben’s political logic relies on 
a transition from a situation of hopelessness or literally, ‘lack of way’ into a ‘felicitous 
way’ or hopefulness. 122 This transition is suggested in his discussion of the role of 
terminology and ‘the trace’ in the work of Jacques Derrida, 123 where he argues that 
the concept of the trace is an attempt to rethink the Aristotelian paradox of 
potentiality. The deconstructive writing of the trace does not indicate the passage of 
potentiality into actuality, but is rather ‘a potentiality that is capable and that 
experiences itself in its passivity. 124 As the ‘excess of signification in all sense’, the 
concept of the trace (which is nevertheless not a concept) central to deconstruction
121 See Heller Roazen, ‘Editors Introduction’, p.5; Deladurantaye, ‘Agamben’s Potential’, p.8. 
Deladurantaye in particular points out that the logic of the transformation of aporia into euporia 
derives from Benjamin’s influence on Agamben’s thought.
122 Heller-Roazen, ‘Editors Introduction’, p.5.
123 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Parder. The Writing of Potentiality’, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 
ed. and tr., Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp.205-219 at 217.
124 Agamben, ‘Parded, p.216.
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radicalizes the paradox of self-reference wherein a term refers only to a term and 
through that only to itself. But Agamben argues, Derrida’s response to the paradox 
of self-reference is not logical resolution, but dislocation and transformation: he 
states, ‘the aporias of self-reference do not find their solution here; rather, they are 
dislocated and... transformed into euporias’.125 While Agamben does not seek to 
distinguish his own position from that which he finds in Derridean deconstruction, 
his position on aporetic hopefulness differs substantially from that taken by Derrida. 
This difference can be illustrated through a brief consideration of their respective 
interpretations of Kafka’s parable, ‘Before the Law’.126
In his essay ‘Before the Law’, presented in 1982, Derrida seeks to elaborate the 
relation between law and literature through an interpretation of Kafka’s parable of 
the same title. The key moment in this parable of the man from the country arriving 
before the open door of the Law for Derrida’s reading is the doorkeeper’s response 
to the man’s request to enter, the ‘not yet’, or ‘not at the moment’. Derrida suggests 
that this response indefinitely defers the decision on whether the man from the 
country7 can pass through the door. The deferral of passage is not a direct prohibition 
but an interruption that delays access to the law itself, a paradoxical situation given 
that it is precisely the law that delays that access. As Derrida writes ‘what is deferred 
forever till death is entry into the law itself, which is nothing other than that which 
dictates the delay’.127 Importantly, for Derrida, this suggests that the law might be 
understood as ‘a nothing that incessantly defers access to itself, thus forbidding itself 
in order thereby to become something or someone’.128 This is the law that the man
125 Agamben, Pardes’, p.217.
126 It is clearly not possible to take up a full discussion of Derrida’s messianics here. Instead, I will 
limit my engagement to the short texts mentioned, which are parallelled in Agamben’s work. For 
Derrida’s discussions of the messianic see in particular Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of 
Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International (New York: Routledge, 1994); Jacques Derrida, 
Politics of Friendship, tr. George Collins (London: Verso, 1997). For further discussions of the messianic 
dimension of deconstruction though see Caputo, Prayers and Tears, John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), esp. pp.156-180; John Caputo, ‘Dreaming of 
the Innumerable: Derrida, Drucilla Cornell and the Dance of Gender’ in Ellen K. Feder, Mary C. 
Rawlinson and Emily Zakin, eds. Derrida and Feminism: Precasting the Question of Woman (New York: 
Roudedge, 1997), pp.141-160; Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York: Roudedge, 1992) 
esp. Ch.3; Richard Rand, ed. Futures of Jacques Derrida (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); 
Claire Colebrook, ‘The Future-to-Come: Derrida and the Ethics of Historicity’, Philosophy Today 
(Winter 1998) pp.347-360.
127 Jacques Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, in Derek Attridge, ed. Acts of Literature (New York: Roudedge, 
1992), pp.181-220 at 205.
128 Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, p.208.
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from the country is always subject to, for he is a figure of the subject of the law for 
Derrida, always before the law, before an incessandy deferred judgment. Further, as a 
subject of the law, the man from the country is before the law, but because he is 
before it, he is also outside of it, as an ‘outlaw’. ‘He is neither under the law nor in 
the law. He is both a subject of the law and an oudaw . ’129 Thus, the subject/oudaw 
presents himself before a law that is destined for him alone, but the incessant deferral 
of the decision on whether he can pass through the door means for Derrida that the 
parable is ‘an account of an event which arrives at not arriving, which manages not to 
happen... [the subject/oudaw] is always and remains before the lan?.X7>0
Derrida addresses the thematic of the decision of the law again in his later text, 
‘Force of Law’, where he strives to establish a distinction between law and 
incalculable justice. In this essay, Derrida explicidy links the calculability of the law 
with the impossible but necessary experience of the aporia that conditions the 
political decision. In the first section of the essay, Derrida identifies three aporia that 
condition the relation of the law and justice, two of which are particularly important 
here. The first of these, identified as ‘the ghost of the undecidable’, marks die 
spectral residue of undecidability or incalculable justice in any political or juridical 
decision. 131 The undecidable is not simply a matter of vacillation between two 
determinate decisions in the application of a rule, but marks the infinite, irreducible 
‘idea of justice’ that haunts every decision and necessarily haunts it in order for it to 
be a decision and not merely the application of a rule. The second aporia, identified 
as ‘the urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge’, adds to this in that it marks 
the necessity of the political decision in the face of the undecidable of infinite, 
irreducible justice.132 Justice, Derrida claims, cannot wait; rather than providing an
129 Derrida, ‘Before the Law*, p.204.
130 Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, p.210, 215.
131 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: the “Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Drucilla Cornell, 
Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson, eds. Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: 
Roudedge, 1992), pp.3-67 at 24; for further discussion of Derrida interpretation of ‘Cridque of 
Violence’ see Alexander Garcia Diittman, ‘The Violence of Destruction’ in David. S. Ferris ed. Water 
Benjamin: Theoretical Questions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Tom McCall, ‘Momentary 
Violence’, in David. S. Ferris ed. Water Benjamin: Theoretical Questions Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996); also see the discussions in Cardoso Taw Review 13:4 from the ‘On the Necessity of 
Violence for the Possibility of Justice’ symposium at which Derrida’s ‘Force of Law’ was presented; of 
these, for a strong, but ultimately confused, feminist critique of Derrida see Nancy Fraser, “‘The Force 
of Law”: Metaphysical or Political?’, Cardoso Taw Review 13:4(1991).
132 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.24.
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excuse to remain outside the antagonism of politics, incalculable justice requires us to 
calculate, to take the decision on what is just and right at any moment. As Derrida 
states, ‘not only must we calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and 
the incalculable... but we must take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find 
ourselves and beyond the already definable zones of morality or politics or law’. 133 
This then is the ‘mad’ decision of the political, always gesturing beyond itself to an 
incalculable justice that necessitates and haunts the decision. 134 These two 
complementary, conflicting, aporia bring into focus the very specific position that 
Derrida takes toward the messianic in this essay. In identifying the irreducible ‘idea of 
justice’ that haunts the mad decision of the political, Derrida goes on to say that he 
would hesitate to ‘assimilate too quickly this “ideal of justice” to a regulative ideal (in
133 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.28.
134 However, the unfounded decision of deconstruction does not indicate a straightforward return to 
Schmitt’s strong decisionism. The mad decision of the political that Derrida indicates here is similar to 
Schmitt’s sovereign decision in that neither can be determined by pre-existent rules and cannot be a 
true decision if merely applying or reinstating a codified rule. Additionally, both insist on the 
constitutive force of the decision, in that the true decision must suspend the currendy existing law in 
order to ‘reinvent it in each case’ as Derrida says (‘Force of Law’, p.23). Nevertheless, there are 
important differences. First, while the decision of the sovereign is essentially an expression of the will 
of the sovereign in Schmitt, in Derrida, the undecidability of the decision deconstructs the sovereign 
decision through the insistence on the ‘absolute other’ of justice. In other words, for Derrida, the 
political decision must ‘negotiate with the undecidable’ (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Schmitt and 
Poststructuralism: A Response’, Cardoso 1daw Review 21(2000), pp.1723-1737 at 1729). Furthermore, as 
Slavoj Zizek points out, for Schmitt it is not possible to pass direcdy from the pure normative order to 
the concrete order of social life- this passage is necessarily mediated by the will of the sovereign 
expressed in the sovereign decision on the exception. However, the decision of the sovereign is not a 
decision for any concrete order but for the principle of order as such — ‘the principle of order, the Dass- 
sein of Order, has priority over its concrete content, over its Was-Seirl (Slavoj Zizek, ‘Carl Schmitt in 
the Age of Post-Politics’ in Chantal Mouffe, ed. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999), 
pp. 18-37 at 18; Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, p.114). For Derrida, the situation is almost exactly the 
opposite. That is, the decision that must be taken is a decision within and on the actuality of social life, 
which is disrupted by the ‘to-come’ of justice that cannot be assimilated to a regulative ideal (or the 
principle of order). One might say then that the ‘madness’ of the decision derives from the gap 
between the concrete actuality of social and political existence and the undecidability of the absolute 
other of justice, a madness that cannot be absolved through a sovereign will but which instead 
interminably haunts every decision. If it is not apparent yet, it should become clear by the end of this 
chapter that Agamben’s messianic event is actually more akin to Schmitt’s sovereign decision than is 
the account of the political decision given by Derrida. On the Derrida-Schmitt contrast, also see John 
P. McCormick, ‘Schmittian Positions on Law and Politics?: CLS and Derrida’, Cardoso Taw Review 
21(2000), pp.1693-1722; John P. McCormack, ‘Derrida on Law; Or Poststructuralism Gets Serious’, 
Political Theory 29:3(2001), pp.395-423. Nevertheless, one might argue that Schmitt’s strong 
decisionism and the spectre of the sovereign that it invokes still haunts not only deconstruction but 
also much other contemporary political theory. This is evident not only in the theorist’s whose work I 
examine throughout this thesis, but poststructuralist and radical democratic political theory generally, 
which is explicitly engaged in putting the Schmittian ghost to rest. But further, it is also evident in 
liberal, proceeduralist political theory. The important differences lie in how such approaches attempt 
to exorcise the spirit of the strong sovereign and the unfounded, founding decision, whether through 
denying that the decision takes place or by attempting to deconstruct and displace it. For a further 
discussion of the place of the decsion in political theory generally and deconstruction in particular see 
Ernesto Laclau, ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony’, in Chantal Mouffe, ed. Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.47-68.
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the Kantian sense), to a messianic promise or to other horizons of the same type, ’135 
Derrida explains this hesitancy further, when he suggests several pages later that his 
reason for keeping distance from the Kandan regulative idea or messianic advent is 
precisely because they are horizons, a term which indicates both ‘the opening and the 
limit that defines an infinite progress or period of waiting.™ Thus, Derrida rejects the 
formulation of the messianic advent as waiting, as requiring infinite patience, because 
justice ‘does not waif. Incalculable justice does not require patience but a just 
decision ‘right away’ as he says. It necessitates the negotiation between calculable law 
and incalculable justice as an urgent decision; but at the same time, justice is the 
irreducible ‘to-come’ of the decision. As Derrida writes, justice ‘has no horizon of 
expectation... But for this very reason, it may have an avenir, a “to-come” ... Justice 
remains, is yet, to come, ä venir,; it has an, it is a-venir; the very dimension of events 
irreducibly to come... Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is unpresentable, 
but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history’ . 137
Hence, the absolute alterity of justice does not entail a horizon of waiting, but is 
nevertheless resolutely messianic; the ‘to-come’ of justice ‘is not a horizon but the 
disruption or opening up of the horizon’ 138 that necessitates constant and urgent 
engagement with the aporia of the undecidable decision of the political. In this 
context, Derrida’s taking distance from Benjamin in the post-script to ‘Force of Law’ 
can be read not as a rejection of the messianic tout court, but as a rejection of a 
particular form or structure of messianism. In particular, it can be read as a matter of 
taking distance from a messianism that associates the promise of the messianic with 
divine violence, which, for Benjamin, obviates and overturns the violence of the law 
in its totality, that is of both law-making and law-preserving violence, or mythic 
violence. In criticizing Benjamin’s suggestion that divine violence — which he 
understands as absolutely annihilating, bloodless and expiatory — must overturn the 
pernicious, bloody violence of the legal order, Derrida suggests that such a 
conception of messianism is haunted by ‘the theme of radical destruction,
135 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.25, italics in original; for further discussion of this comment and its later 
reformulation, see Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 117.
136 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.26; emphasis added.
137 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.27.
138 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 118.
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extermination, total annihilation, beginning with the annihilation of the law and right, 
if not of justice’. 139 But as such, it gives itself too readily to an interpretation of the 
Nazi ‘final solution’ as messianic, divine violence. Thus, against this, Derrida insists 
upon the interminable urgency of the undecidable, on justice as the irreducible 
condition of history. In this, Derrida’s position can be summarized as one of ‘weak 
messianics’ where the ‘to-come’ is not outside of our time, but the spectral 
potentiality of every political, moral, juridical decision. 140 As its constitutive 
condition, the ‘to-come’ of justice opens every decision of the political to 
undecidability, and as such, constitutes every second of our time as ‘the strait gate 
through which the Messiah might enter’. 141
The question of the overturning of the law is in fact the key to the different 
approaches that Derrida and Agamben take to Benjamin’s conception of the 
messianic: while Derrida rejects the association of the messianic with the waiting of 
the horizon and the total overturning of the law that divine violence entails, these are 
the central characteristics of the messianic for Agamben. In the essay ‘The Messiah 
and the Sovereign’, Agamben explicitly rejects an understanding of messianism as 
‘“life lived in deferral and delay” in which nothing can be brought to fulfillment and 
nothing accomplished once and for all’. 142 He argues instead that the messianic task is 
the restoration of meaning to the original form of the law, metonymically illustrated 
in the idea that in its original state the Torah was composed only of meaningless 
letters. Thus, he claims that the crucial problem for messianism is how the Messiah 
can restore a law that has no meaning. And as I have discussed previously, the 
resolution of the meaninglessness of the law does not come about simply through 
the inauguration of a new law; rather the messianic task is to confront and ultimately 
overturn the law in force without significance. Further, given that the law’s being in 
force without significance is characteristic of the state of exception of contemporary
139 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.63, n.6
140 Elsewhere, Derrida formulates this position as ‘messianicity without messianics’. See Derrida, 
Specters of Marx and his comments in Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, pp.22-23 as well as Caputo’s 
discussion in Chapter 6, ‘The Messianic: Waiting for the Future, pp. 156-180; Caputo, Prayers and Tears, 
p.136.
141 Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, p.266.
142 Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign, p.166; Agamben’s primary target here is Gershom 
Scholem, who is cited in the quote I have provided. However, the characterization of messianism that 
Agamben is criticizing bears a strong resemblance to the position taken by Derrida.
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politics, the overturning of the law is the task that contemporary thought must 
confront. Only then will the bloody violence of the sovereign ban be halted. For 
Agamben, the messianic kingdom is differentiated from the historical time of the 
exception by a ‘small adjustment’ 143 brought about by a messianic event that 
confronts and overturns the meaninglessness of the law. These characteristics are 
clearly evinced in Agamben’s reading of ‘Before the Law’, in which he explicitly 
criticizes Derrida’s reading of the parable.
Given that Derrida’s understanding of the law in Kafka’s parable is remarkably 
reminiscent of Nancy’s account of abandonment in relation to the law, where the 
subject is both turned over to the law and left bereft by it, held in the grip of the 
deferred decision as both subject and outlaw, it should be no surprise that 
Agamben’s interpretation of ‘Before the Law’ strikes at the heart of Derrida’s 
reading. According to Agamben, the parable is not an account of an event that never 
happens, or that happens in not happening, but exactly the reverse: Kafka’s parable 
describes ‘how something really has happened in seeming not to happen’. 144 This 
parable allegorizes the state of the law in the age of imperfect nihilism, insofar as the 
law appears as being in force without significance, and the apparent aporias of it 
express the complexity of the messianic task of overturning the Nothing of the law. 
Whereas for Derrida the law opens on to nothing and holds the subject before the 
law through the incessant deferral of the judgment on his passage through the 
already open door of the law, for Agamben the open door of the law is analogous to 
the operation of the law in the ban. The law holds the man from the country in its 
potentiality by asking nothing from him and imposing nothing on him except the 
ban. Hence, the man from the country does not so much figure as the subject of the 
law than as the messiah, who fulfils the messianic task in overturning the law. 
Agamben suggests that the behavior of the man from the country might be 
considered to be a ‘complicated and patient strategy’ to have the door closed in order 
to interrupt the law’s being in force without significance. Hence, the final line of the 
parable, in which the doorkeeper states ‘No-one else could enter here, since this door 
was destined for you alone. Now I will go and close if  indicates the success of the
143 Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’, p.164.
144 Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’, p.174; also see Agamben, Homo Sacer, pp.49-58.
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messianic event in overturning the totality of the law and the Nothing that 
characterizes the condition of nihilism.
Several brief points can be made from this to summarize the differentiation between 
the messianics of Derrida and Agamben. First, Derrida poses the indeterminacy of 
the ‘weak force’ of the messianic as the condition of contemporary politics, such that 
the political decision is simultaneously necessary and impossible, ungrounded yet 
unavoidable. This is the core experience of the aporia as the experience of the 
impossible that marks Derrida’s political theory. Against this, Agamben posits the 
messianic overturning of the law in force without significance — that is, of the 
contemporary condition of imperfect nihilism — as a necessary ground of the coming 
politics of radical immanence and unity. This means that the indeterminacy of 
contemporary politics evident in the zones of indistinction between life and law for 
instance, is not the condition of the political decision but precisely the aporetic 
condition to be overcome. Hence Agamben’s concern over the failure of the body to 
provide ‘solid ground’ for opposition to sovereign violence. Relatedly, Derrida’s weak 
messianics insists on ongoing engagement through the undecidable decision of the 
political. Against this, the strong messianic position that Agamben takes requires that 
the law be overturned in its totality-, anything less merely repeats the aporia of 
abandonment and reinscribes the dangers of the biopolitical distinction between bios 
and %oe. Third, Derrida’s position entails recognition of the undecidable danger and 
hope within the aporetic experience of contemporary politics. Agamben sees the 
contemporary condition of political existence as one of irreparable danger, such that 
a wholly new form of life is necessary to redeem humanity from the exposure of bare 
life to sovereign violence.
While the aim of this discussion has not been to develop a critical assessment of 
Agamben’s conception of the messianic so much as explication, I want to conclude 
this chapter by suggesting that one of the problems that emerges in Agamben’s 
eschatological gesture is that it fails to acknowledge the new risks entailed in the 
coming politics. As Agamben construes it, contemporary conditions of existence are 
characterized by unprecedented dangers of abandonment and bio-sovereign violence 
that can only be resolved and overcome through messianic redemption. Such 
redemption is inaugurated through the development of absolutely profane happy life
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that has reached the ‘perfection of its own power and its own communicability’, and 
restores humanity to the homeland of ‘what has never been’, that is the community 
without essence or identity. As compelling as this political theology of the fall and 
subsequent redemption of humanity may be, this position ignores the fact that new 
hopes necessarily bring new dangers. To briefly invoke Derrida’s early analysis of 
Plato’s pharmakon,us it is worth considering that the cure of contemporary politics 
that Agamben posits may also bring with it its own poison. Or more critically, one 
might agree with Georges Canguilhem’s suggestion that ‘to dream of absolute 
remedies is often to dream of remedies which are worse than the ill’. 146 What these 
positions point to against Agamben’s strong messianics is the interminable necessity 
of political engagement and the unavoidable urgency of the undecidable decision of 
the political, for as Derrida states ‘politicization... is interminable even if it cannot 
and should not ever be total. ’147 In the following chapter, I argue that this weaker and 
more sustainable version of messianics emerges in Agamben’s most recent book, 
Remnants of Auschwit^  in which he develops an ethico-political account of witnessing 
based on the aporias of testimony.
To summarize, in this chapter I have discussed Agamben’s critical arguments against 
Foucault’s conception of the relation between sovereignty and biopolitics to show 
the way in which they allow for a reconsideration of this relation. I argued in the first 
section of the chapter that Agamben’s construal of the fundamental complementarity 
of sovereign violence and biopolitics allows for an analysis of contemporary 
operations of sovereign violence that nevertheless does not return the question of 
sovereignty to the problematics of legitimacy and centralized government. Instead, 
radicalizing Schmitt’s theorization of the sovereign decision on the exception 
through reference to Benjamin’s dictum that the exception has become the rule, 
Agamben shows that the event of the sovereign decision exceeds the parameters of 
state power. The decision that constitutes sovereignty as a power over life and death 
is a decision on life worth living that can potentially be taken by all subjects in 
relation to bare life. In the second and third section, I discussed the strong 
messianism that underpins Agamben’s gesture toward ‘happy life’ as the means of
145 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981), pp.95-117.
146 Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological’ p.281.
147 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p.28.
242
redemption and suggested that such a conception of the messianic event as that 
which overturns the law in its totality is problematic because it forecloses recognition 
of potentiality within bare life. Further, such a conception of messianism 
overemphasizes the total transformation of the political, which risks ignoring the 
new dangers that come with any new mode of political existence.
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Chapter 6
Addressing Violence: An Ethics of Witnessing
To bear witness is to place oneself in one’s own language in the position of 
those who have lost it, to establish oneself in a living language as if it were 
dead, or in a dead language as if it were living — in any case, outside both the 
archive and the corpus of what has already been said.1
One must in the end speak dangerously and dangerously remain silent in the 
very act of breaking this silence.2
6.1 Introduction
While Agamben develops a political analysis of the contemporary biopolitical 
conditions of existence in Homo Sacer, in its companion volume, Remnants of 
Auschwit^ he develops an account o f ethical response to biopolitical subjection. 
Having argued in Homo Sacer that the concentration camp operates as the nomos of the 
earth, the biopolitical space par excellence, in Remnants, Agamben takes the condition of 
the camps as the starting point for a reconsideration of ethics in light o f the political 
determination of life worth living. Structured as a comment on Primo Levi’s essays 
on the status of survivor and the ethics o f bearing witness that he suggests, Remnants 
gives philosophical elaboration to the intuitions that illuminate Levi’s ethics. 
Agamben argues that ethics can no longer be thought through the fundamentally 
juridical categories of responsibility or dignity, but must instead be sought in a terrain 
before judgment, a terrain in which the conditions of judgment are suspended through 
the indistinction of the human and the inhuman. Locating the figure of the 
Muselmann at the zone of indistinction between the human and the inhuman,
1 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999),
p.161.
2 Maurice Blanchot, letter to Emmanuel Levinas, February 11, 1980, cited as an epigraph in Steven 
Ungar, Scandal and Aftereffect: Blanchot and France since 1930 (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 
1995).
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Agamben elaborates on Levi’s paradox that the Muselmann, the one who cannot 
speak, is the true witness of the camps. The ethical aporia of testimony that 
Agamben circumscribes in reflection on this paradox yields an account of an ethics 
of bare life — an ethics of witnessing the collapse of the human and inhuman.
Interestingly, in developing an account of an ethics of witnessing as a response to 
bare life, Agamben appears to move away from the strong messianic position 
gestured toward in Homo Sacer, where redemption from biopolitical capture was said 
to be only possible through a complete overturning of the law. While Remnants is 
inflected by a rejection of the juridical as the founding source of ethical 
responsibility, the ethical space that Agamben elaborates is no longer beyond the law, 
as in the messianic redemption of happy life, but rather, before it. Testimony is an 
ongoing, aporetic yet necessary ethical activity that suspends judgment under what 
could be called a radical undecidability brought about through the collapse of 
traditional western ethical categories and the corresponding determination of 
culpability. True, Agamben does not altogether explicitly reject the strong version of 
messianism discussed in the previous chapter in his elaboration of an ethics of 
testimony. Nevertheless, there is at least some instability in the conception of 
messianism operating in Remnants, if not an explicit conceptual shift from that found 
in his interpretations of Benjamin and Kafka. Indeed, Agamben’s elaboration of an 
ethics of testimony is much closer in its messianic dimension to the weak messianics 
of Derrida discussed in the previous chapter than the radical messianic violence 
suggested in Benjamin’s ‘Critique’.
In tracing this instability or shift, I argue in this chapter that the weakened version of 
messianics that emerges in Remnants allows for an understanding of an ethics of 
witnessing as means of addressing or responding to bio-sovereign violence. To make 
this argument, several aspects of Agamben’s formulation of ethical responsibility left 
implicit within the text need to be made explicit. Agamben’s ethics takes as its 
starting point a rejection of the notion of responsibility on the basis that it is a 
juridcal notion that always already returns ethics to judgment. Against this, I suggest 
that Agamben’s selective etymology of responsibility neglects an interpretation of 
responsibility not as culpability but as response, returning the call or address of 
another. Although occasionally suggested in Remnants, Agamben does not develop
246
this dimension of responsibility in his account of an ethics of witnessing. In 
emphasizing this connotation of responsibility, I argue that bearing witness to the 
plight of others constitutes the ethical dilemma of biopolitical subjection, such that 
testimony can be understood as the proper response to the apostrophic call of bare 
life. Testimony entails bearing witness to that which is neither simply biological life 
nor political life, but bare life, that is, life exposed to violence and death without 
reprieve. Such an understanding of testimony enables the development of an ethico- 
political response to the dangers of biopolitical subjection, understood as a matter of 
bearing witness to bio-sovereign violence.
In this chapter, I discuss the ethics of witnessing developed by Agamben in Remnants 
of A.uschmt£ I argue that this account of ethics reveals a shift in Agamben’s 
conception of the messianic from the strong version of messianic redemption in 
happy life to a weaker version that allows an account of ethics in the suspense of 
judgment. I go on to show that Agamben’s ethics of witnessing are an ethics of bare 
life and as such yield an account of ethical response to biopolitical subjection and the 
violence entailed in it. From this, I suggest that bearing witness to the political 
determination of life worth living constitutes the ethical dilemma at the heart of 
subjectivity. Additionally, I discuss the ways in which Agamben’s ethics extend upon 
the accounts of ethico-political response to biopolitical subjection given by Foucault 
and Butler. I claim that Agamben’s ethics of witnessing has two advantages over the 
formulations of ethico-political response suggested by Butler and Foucault. The first 
of these is that it allows a conception of ethical responsibility that recognizes the 
linguistic constitution of the subject while avoiding the reduction of responsibility to 
legal culpability. Second, it allows for recognition of a fundamental and irreducible 
responsibility without deriving a political program from that recognition. To illustrate 
this, in the final section of this chapter I turn to a concluding discussion of the 
respective positions that Foucault and Agamben take to rights, and particularly 
human rights, to explicate the status of an ethics of witnessing in relation to the 
political decision of life worth living.3
3 I noted in the previous chapter that Agamben’s texts defy easy summary because of their 
fragmentary development and style. Remnants of Auschwit\ is no exception to this, and indeed, my 
caveat can be strengthened in regard to this text, as Agamben develops his argument recursively 
through interlocking comments and philosophical observations, the connections between which are 
not always made explicit. Indeed, much of the argumentation remains suggestive, often without
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6.2 Messianism and the Aporias of Witnessing
Toward the end of his book on the ethical ramifications of Auschwitz, Agamben 
notes that the notion of remnant does not simply indicate the part of a whole 
remaindered through a process of selection and segregation but instead indicates the 
troubled caesuras and points of contact between the part and the whole. Agamben 
claims that the remnant is a theologico-messianic concept, which designates the 
consistency of a people in relation to salvation or the messianic event. Marking the 
division or non-coincidence between the whole and the part, the remnant appears as 
the ‘redemptive machine’ that permits the salvation of the whole from which it 
emerges as the signification of division and loss. The remnants mark the division 
between the whole and part and provide the only means of redemption. In relation 
to Auschwitz, the remnants of Auschwitz are neither those who died in the gas 
chambers nor those who survived the camps, neither the drowned nor the saved, but 
rather, that which remains between them. Further, for Agamben, the remnants of 
Auschwitz are the true witnesses, a situation that reveals the inherent coincidence of 
the aporia of testimony with the aporia of messianism.* 4 The coincidence of the 
aporias of testimony and messianism through the notion of the remnant as true 
witness that Agamben posits is not self-evident, since it rests on particular 
characterizations of both testimony and messianism. To bring out the coincidence of 
these aporia and the implications of it for this discussion, then, it is first necessary to 
take up Agamben’s characterization of witnessing and the paradoxes of the remnant.
Agamben begins his reflections on the aporia of witnessing the event of Auschwitz 
by noting two terms for witness in Latin: the first of these is testis, which indicates the 
position of a third party in a trial or lawsuit between rival parties. The second is 
superstes, a term that designates a person who has lived through something, ‘who has 
experienced an event from beginning to end and can therefore bear witness to it’,5 
that is, one who survives an event and can thus speak of it from the position of 
having undergone it. It is the second of these definitions of witnessing that Agamben
clarification of the central claims and their implications. The greater part of this chapter then is
explicatory work, undertaken in order to give a coherent account of Agamben’s ethics of witnessing
and to draw out the implications of it within the framework of this thesis.
4 Agamben, Remnants, p.162.
5 Agamben, Remnants, p.17.
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is interested in, as it is in light of this definition o f witnessing that Auschwitz presents 
a particular problem for an account of testimony and witnessing. As Primo Levi 
insists,
we, the survivors are not the true witnesses... we survivors are not only an 
exiguous but also anomalous minority. We... did not touch bottom. Those 
who did so, who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have 
returned mute, but they are the ‘Muslims’, the submerged, the complete 
witnesses.6
For Levi, to have survived the camps already introduces an ambiguity into testimony, 
since to have survived the concentration camps is to have not lived through the 
experience from end to end because that necessarily ends in death .7 The survivor 
presents a particular paradox: those who might bear witness and who are compelled 
to do so cannot do so in all truth. Only the drowned and destroyed could literally 
bear witness to the experience o f the camps and chambers of annihilation.
6 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, tr. R. Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1988), pp.63-64; cited in 
Agamben, Remnants, p.33.
7 For additional discussions of the aporia presented by the camps, see Jean-Francis Lyotard, The 
Differend: Phrases in Dispute, tr. G.van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); 
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Uterature, Psychoanalysis and History 
(New York: Routledge, 1992); See Agamben’s discussion of these and his critique of the aesthetic 
element in Felman’s account of witnessing, Remnants, p.36. It is important to note that Agamben and 
the authors noted here are particularly concerned with the ethical and political significance of 
testimony, not with the epistemological questions raised by it. The emphasis on the ethical raises a 
different set of questions than those raised in relation to the epistemology of testimony. This 
difference can be summarized by suggesting that while the former is concerned with the responsibility 
that the subject bears to and with others in testimony, the latter epistemological questions concern 
knowledge of other minds, the intentions and presuppositions that inform and truth-value of 
statements. Even so, it is not clear these domains of analysis are entirely separable, which suggests that 
Agamben’s silence on the epistemological dimension of testimony may not be wholly justified. For a 
thorough analytic treatment of the epistemology of testimony, see C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A  
Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Agamben’s insistence that he is particularly 
concerned with the ethical ramifications of the Nazi concentration camps is also taken to justify a lack 
ofdiscussion of the empiral circumstances of the camps, which effectivley renders ‘Auschwitz’ more a 
figure of a topolitical space of ethico-political indeterminacy than a historico-political event. This 
largely figurative use of Auschwitz, sometimes rendered more generally as ‘the camps’, certainly raises 
questions about the movement from the specific to the general in Agamben’s ethico-political 
considerations. In other words, can ‘Auschwitz’ stand synechdocally for the biopolitical condition that 
Agamben diagnoses in its generality? Some of the potential criticism that this figural usage generates is 
held off by the argument elaborated in the previous chapter that for Agamben the point is that the 
exception has increasingly become the rule, and further, the exception reveals the general conditions of 
existence. Even so, Agamben’s treatment of Auschwitz does raise serious questions that are largely 
unresolved in the text. Here though, I simply want to register the problem — I cannot address these 
questions in detail since my aim is primarily to consider the theorization of subjectivation and ethical 
responsibility that Agamben offers.
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The paradox presented in Levi’s observation lies at the center of Agamben’s 
reflections on witnessing. He asks, if the complete and true witnesses of Auschwitz 
are not the survivors but rather the drowned and desolate, those who have not 
returned at all or who have returned mute, then how is it possible that the event of 
Auschwitz be borne witness to and what, further, are the ethical implications of this 
paradox? To respond to these questions, Agamben takes up Levi’s reference to the 
‘Muslims’ or ‘Muselmann' of the camps, the extreme figures of survival who no longer 
sustained the sensate characteristics of the living but who were not yet dead. The 
term ‘Muselmann’ refers to those in the camps who had reached such a state of 
physical decrepitude and existential disregard that ‘one hesitates to call them living: 
one hesitates to call their death death’.8 ‘Muselmann’ names the ‘living corpses’ that 
moved apparendy inexorably toward death in the camps, beings who, through 
exhaustion and circumstance, had lost the capacity for living. They are die 
‘anonymous mass’ that formed ‘the backbone of the camps’ — ‘the drowned’ in Levi’s 
formulation.9 For Agamben, the suggestion that the Muselmann is the true witness of 
the camps reveals that ‘the value of testimony lies essentially in what it lacks; at its 
center it contains something that cannot be borne witness to and that discharges the 
survivors of authority. ’10 Further, assuming the task of bearing witness in the name of 
those who cannot speak reveals that the task of bearing witness is essentially a task of 
bearing witness to the impossibility of witnessing.
The aporia of witnessing, in which what is testified to is the impossibility of 
witnessing, has been theorized previously in post-Holocaust literature, particularly 
that induenced by the work of Maurice Blanchot. * 11 However, the particular 
contribution that Agamben makes to this literature is to link the question of the 
aporia of witnessing to the definition of the human and the inhuman within the 
context of biopolitical subjection. Against understanding the status of the Muselmann 
as a threshold state between life and death, Agamben argues instead that the 
Muselmann is more correctly understood as the limit-figure of die human and
8 Levi cited in Agamben, Remnants, p.44.
9 Levi cited in Agamben, Remnants, p.44.
10 Agamben, Remnants, p.34.
11 See in particular, Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, New Edition, tr. A. Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Sarah Kofman, Smothered Words, tr. M. Dobie (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1998).
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inhuman. Rather than simply being a death camp, Auschwitz is the site of an extreme 
biopolidcal experiment, wdierein ‘the Jew is transformed into a Muselmann and the 
human into a non-human’ .12 However, as the threshold between the human and the 
inhuman, the figure of the Muselmann does not simply mark the limit beyond which 
the human is no longer human. Agamben argues that such a stance would merely 
repeat the experiment of Auschwitz that places the Muselmann outside the limits of 
human and the moral status that attends the categorization. Instead, the Muselmann 
indicates a more fundamental indistinction between the human and the inhuman, in 
which it becomes impossible to distinguish them from each other. The Muselmann is 
an indefinite being in which (or whom) the distinction between humanity and non­
humanity is brought to crisis, and as such, calls into question the moral categories 
that attend the distinction. 13
Agamben claims from this ambiguous status that ‘in Auschwitz, ethics begins 
precisely at the point where the Muselmann, “the complete witness” makes it forever 
impossible to distinguish between man and non-man . ’14 The ethical problematic 
presented by Auschwitz is that of remaining human or not, but in the biopolitical 
situation of the camps, remaining human takes on a particular cast that eludes and 
contradicts attempts to sanctify human life through moral categories such as dignity 
and respect. To make this argument, Agamben discusses the position taken by Bmno 
Bettelheim, who suggests in his interpretation of the ethical implication of the 
Muselmänner that the absolute distinction between the human and the inhuman is 
marked by the loss of an element of self-reflexivity and freedom in relation to one’s 
own actions. For Bettelheim, the Muselmänner has lost this trace of freedom and the 
dignity it gives, and as such, has irretrievably passed from the human to the inhuman. 
The Muselmann effectively becomes the cipher of a ‘moral death against which one 
must resist with all one’s strength, to save humanity, self-respect, and perhaps, even 
life’ .15 Against Bettelheim, Agamben argues that ‘Auschwitz marks the end and the 
ruin of every ethics of dignity and conformity to a norm... the Muselmann... is the 
guard on the threshold of a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins where
12 Agamben, Remnants, p.52.
13 Agamben, Remnants, p.55-63.
14 Agamben, Remnants, p.47.
15 Agamben, Remnants, p.63.
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dignity ends’. 16 The Muselmänner is the ‘shipwreck of dignity’17 and it is it is precisely 
as such that this figure presents itself with such ethical urgency, for if dignity and 
respect are taken as definitional to the distinction between the human and inhuman, 
then the limits of ethics are circumscribed through their loss. Instructively, Agamben 
points out that the legal status of Jews under Nazism was described as ‘entwürdigen’, 
which he literally transcribes as ‘deprived of dignity’ . 18
In line with this, Agamben also rejects the thesis that the unique characteristic of 
Auschwitz was not the degradation of the dignity of human life but of human death. 
The transformation of death effected within the camps is indicated in Levi’s 
observation of the Muselman that ‘one hesitates to call their death death’, such that 
the death of a human being is no longer or is only catachrestically called death. In 
addition to this, Agamben recalls Hannah Arendt’s use of the phrase ‘the fabrication 
of corpses’ to describe the mass slaughter in the camps. He claims from this that ‘in 
Auschwitz, people did not die; corpses were produced’. 19 In the camps, the idea of 
human death entailing a fundamental individual profundity that gives unity to one’s 
life as a human being is completely eroded, such that death itself becomes a matter of 
‘mass production and cost-cutting’.20 However, to conclude from this that the 
apparent debasement of human death that these phrases indicate constitutes the 
particular horror of Auschwitz is again to risk ethical ineffectuality when confronted 
with the Muselmänner.
This position is articulated in Heidegger’s distinction between proper and improper 
death for instance, in which the former indicates ‘Being-toward-death’ as the 
condition of authenticity and the appropriation of the impropriety of being, and the 
latter indicates mere decease, or in the case of the camps, elimination and the
16 Agamben, Remnants, p.69.
17 Agamben, Remnants, p.62.
18 Agamben, Remnants, p.68.
19 Agamben, Remnants, p.72. Also see Hannah Arendt, ‘The Concentration Camps’, Partisan Review, 
15:7(1948),pp.743-763. Her discussion of a distinction between the juridical and moral person is also 
pertinent to this discussion.
20 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged LJfe, [1951] (London: NLB, 1974), p.233
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‘fabrication of corpses’.21 As Agamben points out, in Heidegger’s account, proper 
death is impossible within the camps, since ‘the camp is the place in which it is 
impossible to experience death as the most proper and insuperable possibility, as the 
possibility of the impossible... in the camps... the Being of death is inaccessible and 
men do not die, but are instead produced as corpses’ .22 Against this, Agamben asks if 
it is even possible to make a distinction between proper and improper death in the 
camps, since here ‘the appropriation of the improper is no longer possible because 
the improper has completely assumed the function of the proper: human beings live 
factually at every instant toward their death’ .23 This means that it is no longer possible 
to distinguish between proper and improper death, between dying and merely 
deceasing; the fabrication of corpses is the material, trivial and bureaucratic 
actualization of death, such that ‘the prisoners exist everyday anonymously toward 
death’.24
Agamben concludes that neither the claim that the intolerable uniqueness of 
Auschwitz lies in the degradation of life nor, conversely, in the degradation of death, 
is sufficient to yield an understanding of the indistinction of the human and the 
inhuman and yield an ethics adequate to the challenge presented by the Muselmänner. 
In light of the failure of the dignity of either life or death to definitely characterize 
the human being and ground a post-Auschwitz ethics, Agamben characterizes the 
Muselmann as ‘the non-human who obstinately appears as human: he is the human 
that cannot be told apart from the inhuman . ’25 How then does he understand the 
distinction between the human and the inhuman and what are the implications of its 
irreparable collapse in the biopolitical space of the camps? First, it should be kept in 
mind that in questioning the distinction between the human and the inhuman,
21 The text in question is Heidegger’s lecture on technology, presented in Bremen under the title ‘The 
Danger’ (Die Gefahr)', cited in Agamben, Remnants, p.73.
22 Agamben, Remnants, p.75.
23 Agamben, Remnants, p.76.
24 Agamben, Remnants, p.76. For a similar critique of the Heideggerian conception of death and 
authenticity, see Jonathon Strauss, ‘After Death’, Diacritics 30:3(2000), pp.90-104; for a critique of the 
‘authenticity’ paradigm in relation to mass death, see Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger 
and Man-Made Mass Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). For recent arguments in favour 
of a Heideggerian conception of death, see Jeff Malpas, ‘Death and the Unity of Life’ in Jeff Malpas 
and Robert C. Solomon, eds. Death and Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.120-134 and Julian 
Young, ‘Death and Authenticity’ in Jeff Malpas and Robert C. Solomon, eds. Death and Philosophy 
(London: Roudedge, 1998), pp.112-120.
25 Agamben, Remnants, p.82.
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Agamben is not seeking to elaborate an essence of the human, but the potentiality of 
being human or more precisely, human being as potentiality. Recalling Agamben’s 
earlier discussions of potentiality as the capacity to not-be and actuality as the giving 
of the self to itself in a capacity to not not-be, then by being human, he means being 
human in not not-being human.26 While this definition of the human may appear to 
be tautological, or at least truistic, it also raises questions of the passage of the human 
into the non-human or vice-versa, the conditions under which such passage occurs 
and the inherent relation between being human and non-human.
O f this relation, Agamben begins by suggesting that
human power borders on the inhuman; the human also endures the inhuman... 
humans bear within themselves the mark of the inhuman... their spirit contains 
at its very center the wound of non-spirit, non-human chaos atrociously 
consigned to its own being capable of everything.27
Being human is fundamentally conditioned by an indefinite potentiality for being 
non-human, for being capable of everything and of enduring the inhuman. Being 
human is a question of enduring, of ‘bearing all that one could bear’, and surviving 
the inhuman capacity to bear everything. In this, testimony plays a constitutive role, 
since for Agamben remaining human is ultimately a question of bearing witness to 
the inhuman: “‘human beings are human insofar as they bear witness to the 
inhuman’” .28 To endure the inhuman is to bear witness to it, and it is in this sense 
that Levi speaks of the Muselmann as the true witness, for the Muselmänner have 
endured the inhuman, borne more than they should ever have had to bear, and in 
doing so, remained fundamentally human. Correlatively, the survivor is human to the 
extent that they bear witness to an impossibility of bearing witness, that is, of being 
inhuman. Hence, the human being exists as the nodal point for ‘currents of the 
human and the inhuman’, and as such, presents testimony itself as the human being’s 
remaining human. Testimony takes place at the site of non-coincidence between the
26 See my discussions of potentiality in the previous chapter.
27 Agamben, Remnants, p.77.
28 Agamben, Remnants, p .l21.
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human and the inhuman as the task of the human being’s bearing witness to the 
inhuman .29
The fracturing of the human that Agamben is proposing is given further elaboration 
in his account of subjectivation, which rests on a distinction between the human as a 
speaking being and as a living being.30 Agamben’s account of subjectivation, which 
he defines as the ‘production of consciousness in the event of discourse’,31 emerges 
through theorization of two interrelated existential modalities, the first affective and 
the second linguistic. Taking up Levi’s identification of the particular shame felt by 
survivors of the camps, Agamben argues that shame is the constitutive affective 
tonality of subjectivity. He rejects interpretations of the shame of the survivor in 
terms of guilt or innocence to argue that the experience of shame derives not from 
culpability but from the ontological situation of being consigned to something that 
one cannot assume. The starting point for Agamben’s understanding of shame is 
Emmanuel Levinas’ claim that shame arises from ‘our being’s incapacity to move 
away and break from itself ,32 evident in for instance the impossible desire to separate 
oneself from a particular presentation of oneself. Shame is not a consequence of an 
imperfection or lack from which we separate ourselves, but arises from the sheer 
impossibility of separating ourselves from ourselves. For example, the shame felt in 
nudity is not shame at a lack that one perceives in oneself, but a consequence of not 
being able to present oneself otherwise, of being exposed in a vision from which one 
seeks to hide.
Extending on this, Agamben argues that shame arises from consignment to 
something that one cannot assume, but that this something is not external to 
ourselves but ‘originates in our own intimacy; it is what is most intimate in us’, 33 that
29 Agamben, Remnants ofAuschwit^ p.135
30 The importance of this distinction in Agamben’s work cannot be overemphasized. It not only maps 
onto the Aristotelian distinction between bios and 3oe that structures Agamben’s account of biopolitics, 
but is also fundamental to his critique of Heidegger in Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, [1982] 
tr. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Also see 
n.46, this chapter.
31 Agamben, Remnants, p.123.
32 Agamben, Remnants, p.104.
33 Agamben, Remnants, p.105.
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is, something from which we cannot separate ourselves, but which simultaneously, 
we cannot wholly take on as ours. The dilemma this creates for the subject is one of 
simultaneous subjectification and desubjecdfication, wherein the subject is called to 
witness its own ruin. As Agamben puts it:
It is if our consciousness collapsed, and seeking to flee in all directions, were 
simultaneously summoned by an irrefutable order to be present at its own 
defacement, at the expropriation of what is most its own. In shame, the subject 
thus has no other content than its own desubjectification; it becomes witness to 
its own disorder, its own oblivion as a subject.34
The experience or affectivity of shame thus indicates a double movement, whereby 
sub jecdfication is accompanied by desubjectification, understood as the destitution 
or ruin of the subject. However, this double movement is not simply an occasional 
turmoil for the subject, but instead indicates a fundamental characteristic of 
subjection itself. For if subjection or the position of being a subject is understood as 
the event of being simultaneously sovereign and subjected by another, then the 
double movement of shame is replicated in the event of subjection. But more 
fundamentally, the doubling of subjectification is the interminable condition of the 
subject insofar as subjectification is itself an event in language or discourse.
Through an analysis of pronouns as grammatical shifters, Agamben argues that the 
enunciative taking place of the subject is itself an occasion for shame and the double 
movement of subjectification and desubjectification it entails. Grammatical shifters, 
or ‘indicators of enunciation’, are linguistic signs that have no substantive reference 
outside of themselves, but which allow a speaker to appropriate and put language to 
use. Thus, terms such as T  and ‘you’ indicate an appropriation of language, without 
referring to a reality outside of discourse. Instead, their sole point of reference is to 
language itself and particularly the taking place of enunciation. ‘Enunciation... refers 
not to the text of what is stated, but to its taking place; the individual can put 
language into act only on condition of identifying himself with the very event of 
saying, and not with what is said in it’.35 For Agamben, the appropriation of language 
as an enunciative taking place of language indicates the double movement of
34 Agamben, Remnants, p.106.
35 Agamben, Remnants, p.l 16.
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subjectification and desubjecdfication that marks the relation of the subject to the 
language in which it speaks and thus appears. That is, the appropriation of language 
requires that the psychosomatic individual erase or desubjectify itself as an individual 
in its identification with the grammatical shifters that indicate the taking place of 
enunciation in order to become the subject of enunciation.
Agamben concludes from this that ‘the subject of enunciation is composed in 
discourse and exists in discourse alone. But, for this very reason, once the subject is 
in discourse, he can say nothing: he cannot speak. ’36 That is, the assumption of the 
position of subject of enunciation does not so much allow access to the possibility of 
speaking as the impossibility of it. In becoming the subject of enunciation, the 
subject finds itself anticipated and preceded by a ‘glossolalic potentiality over which 
he has neither control nor mastery’.37 Because the individual is always already distinct 
from the T  that gives it a place within language, always other to the ‘I’ of enunciation 
and further, because the event of enunciation is itself a pure event in language 
without reference outside language and thus without meaning, the tl-othei} of 
enunciation is held in the impossibility of speech, of saying anything. In other words, 
it is only in the assumption of the grammatical position of T  as the subject of 
enunciation that the individual enters into the possibility of speaking. But because 
that ‘I” is always already distinct from the individual, it is not the individual who 
speaks — the individual remains silent. But at the same time, the T  cannot be the 
subject of enunciation on its own, since as a grammatical shifter, it has no substantive 
content outside its indication of the event or taking place of enunciation.
The double structure in operation here parallels the double movement of 
subjectification and desubjectification in shame, in that it brings the necessary 
consignment of the individual to language as a speaking being and the simultaneous 
impossibility of assuming or taking up the event o f speech to light. In this light, 
shame appears as the principle emotive tonality, or ‘hidden structure’, of subjectivity, 
understood as the constitution of consciousness in the event of discourse. For 
‘insofar as it consists solely in the event of enunciation, consciousness constitutively
36 Agamben, Remnants, pp. 116-117.
37 Agamben, Remnants, p.l 16.
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has the form of being consigned to something that cannot be assumed. ’38 If this is 
the case, then the correlate of this is that the structure of subjecdfication is at base 
always already double: every subjecdfication entails a constitutive desubjectification 
in order to take place as the constitution of consciousness. Subjectivity and 
consciousness are founded on ‘what is most precarious and fragile in the world: the 
event of speech’.39 But as a consequence of the impossibility of the psychosomatic 
individual ever fully appropriating the taking place of speech as the site of 
subjecdfication, ‘the fragile text of consciousness incessantly crumbles and erases 
itself, bringing to light the disjunction on which it is erected: the constitutive 
desub jectification in every sub jectification’.40 Conversely, every desub jectification is 
attended by the process or event of subjecdfication, the assumption of the 
enunciative event of the T  and the correlative constitution of consciousness in 
discourse.
The enunciative event of T  marks the assumption of the position of speaking subject 
by the phenomenal or living individual; but rather than allowing the subject thereby 
constituted and the individual to coincide, the T  indicates their fundamental 
irreducibility. As Agamben puts it, ‘“I” signifies precisely the irreducible disjunction 
between vital functions and inner history, between the living being’s becoming a 
speaking being and the speaking being’s sensation of itself as living’.41 What is at 
stake in subjectivation and desubjectivation for Agamben is nothing less than the 
traditional philosophical definition of the human as a speaking being, or the living 
being that has language: as ‘goon logon echön. In particular, the nature of the having of 
language by a living being or the living being’s appropriation of language is brought 
into question and shown to be conditioned by a full expropriation. ‘The living 
individual appropriates language in a full expropriation alone, becoming a speaking 
being only on condition of falling silent’.42 Thus, the T  marks the simultaneous 
appropriation and expropriation of the living being in language and their irreducible 
disjuncture.
38 Agamben, Remnants, p.128.
39 Agamben, Remnants, p.122.
40 Agamben, Remnants, p.123.
41 Agamben, Remnants, p.125.
42 Agamben, Remnants, p.129.
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This provides the background to Agamben’s claim that the disjuncture between the 
human as living being and speaking being is the condition of possibility of testimony. 
Testimony arises in the intimate non-coincidence of the human and inhuman or the 
speaking being and the living being, the subject and non-subject. As Agamben states, 
‘if there is no articulation between the living being and language, if the T  stands 
suspended in this disjunction, then there can be testimony’ .43 Testimony marks the 
fracture of the human being in its own potentiality for being human or not-being 
human, since the ‘place of the human being is divided... the human being exists in 
the fracture between the living being and the speaking being, the inhuman and the 
human’.44 It is in this sense that testimony appears as the task of remaining human, 
since testimony marks the trial by which the human being undergoes the double 
process of appropriation and expropriation in speaking, in which the human endures 
the inhuman and survives beyond its own expropriation or desubjectivation. Given 
this account of the human being’s remaining human and the problem of testimony, 
three further points should be mentioned about Agamben’s ethics of witnessing.
First, testimony appears as a matter of bearing witness to the impossibility of 
speaking, that is, to the process of desub jectivation that attends every sub jectivation. 
In testimony, the subject turns back on itself to give account of its ruin in the 
constitutive desub jectivation endured in becoming a subject of enunciation and in 
doing so, bears witness to the impossibility of speaking. This is one of the reasons 
why testimony is so central to considerations of the implications and ramifications of 
Auschwitz for ethics, for as Agamben states ‘the Muselmann produced by Auschwitz 
is the catastrophe of the subject’.45 Several steps are required to fully understand what 
Agamben means by this claim. In a critical comment on Foucault’s archaeological 
analysis of statements understood as utterances at the level of the event of speaking 
rather than at the level of semantic content, Agamben proposes that for all the value 
of Foucault’s analysis, what it obscures is the ethical and ontological implication of 
the living being entering into the ‘vacant place’ of the subject. In order to address 
these questions, the point of analysis has to be shifted from the difference between 
the statement as an indication of enunciation and discourse as the corpus of what is
43 Agamben, Remnants, p.130.
44 Agamben, Remnants, p. 135.
45 Agamben, Remnants, p.146.
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said or unsaid, to the difference between ‘the pure possibility of speech and its 
existence as such’ .46 In other words, focus is redirected from the system of relation 
between the inside and outside of what is said to the pure potentiality of language 
itself, that is, to the system of relation ‘between the sayable and unsayable in every 
language... between a possibility and impossibility of speech’.47
From this redirection of analysis, Agamben states that while the term ‘archive’ 
designates the system of relations of the unsaid and the said, ‘testimony’ designates 
the relations between the potentiality and impotentiality of language. That is, 
testimony marks the taking place of language as such and the impossibility of 
speaking that this is predicated on, not the content of what is said or not. This 
returns us to the question of potentiality discussed in the previous chapter; there, I 
discussed potentiality in relation to sovereignty and the distinction of constituting 
and preserving power. What becomes apparent here though is that language is itself 
the potentiality of the human being. To the extent that potentiality passes into 
actuality through the suspension of its own impotentiality such that potentiality is 
ultimately a matter of not not-being, then ‘die human being is the speaking being, the 
living being who has language, because the human being is capable of not having 
language’ .48 Conversely, the human being is only human in having language, that is, in 
the expropriation of speaking that marks the event of language as such.
In conjunction with this, Agamben claims that the modal operators of contingency, 
necessity, possibility and impossibility that attend the categories of potentiality and 
impotentiality appear as sites of biopolitical experimentation. Such categories are not
46 Agamben, Remnants, p.144.
47 Agamben, Remnants, p.145. The question of the relation between speaking and the possibility of 
speech as such can be seen as the key question that structures Agamben’s work as a whole. As he 
suggests in the preface of Infamy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, tr. Liz Heron 
(London: Verson, 1993), ‘in both my written work and unwritten books, I have stubbornly pursued 
only one train of thought: what is the meaning of “there is language; what is the meaning of ‘I speak’? 
(p.5). For a related consideration of the relation of language and ethics through the possibility of 
speaking as such and what is spoken, see Levinas’s discussions of the Saying and the Said, in 
Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or, Byond Essence, tr. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1981).
48 Agamben, Remnants, p.146; for a further discussion of language and potentiality, see Daniel Heller- 
Roazen ‘Editors Introduction: To Read What was Never Written’, in Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: 
Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
pp.1-23.
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innocuous logical categories but ‘weapons used in the biopolitical struggle... in 
which a decision is made each time on the human and the inhuman, on “making 
live” and “letting die’” .49 For Agamben, the ground of this batde is subjectivity itself. 
He claims that while contingency and possibility are the ontological operators of 
subjectification, impossibility and necessity are the operators of desubjectification. 
Thus the ‘catastrophe of the subject’ to which Agamben refers indicates the historical 
collapse of potentiality and impotentiality, through the erasure of contingency and 
the installation of the impossible as the possible. Agamben states, as a biopolitical 
experiment, Auschwitz ‘represents the historical point in which [potentiality and 
impotentiality] collapse. Auschwitz is the existence of the impossible, the most 
radical negation of contingency’.50 The claim that Auschwitz is the catastrophe of the 
subject indicates the erasure of the contingency of subjectivation in the camps, and 
the radical installation of the subject as ‘the existence of the impossible’. In bearing 
witness to the impossibility of speaking then, testimony bears witness to the 
desubjectification and destitution of the subject in the biopolitical experiment carried 
out through the determination and allocation of life and death.
Second, insofar as testimony marks the non-coincidental intimacy of the human and 
inhuman, that is, the human being’s remaining human in enduring the inhuman, 
testimony appears as the task of the remnant. Returning to the notion of the remnant 
that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is now possible to see that this 
characterization of the remnant indicates the consistency of the human in relation to 
the event of the biopolitical determination of ‘making live’ and ‘letting die’, that is, 
the determination of life worth living and the production of the inhuman in radical 
desubjectification. Within Agamben’s account, subjectivity appears as the ‘batdefield’ 
of the decision on the human and inhuman that characterized the biopolitical 
experiment of the camps. As we have seen, the camps are effectively the catastrophe 
of the subject insofar as the biopolitical experiment that takes place in the space of 
the camps eliminates the subject in its potentiality within language and instead installs 
the subject in its own impossibility through a radical desubjectification. The subject is 
installed in the impossibility of speaking, which leads to the collapse of testimony 
insofar as the true witnesses of the camps are those who do not return from the
49 Agamben, Remnants, p.147.
50 Agamben, Remnants, p.148.
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camps, or return unable to speak. As the task of the remnant, testimony supplements 
and completes the witnessing of those who cannot speak and in doing so, bears 
witness to the impossibility of speaking and the desubjecdfication that installs the 
subject at the site of impossibility. Hence, ‘the witness, the ethical subject, is the 
subject who bears witness to desubjecdfication.51
Consequendy, the ethics of witnessing that Agamben develops can be understood as 
an ethics of survival, insofar as the subject survives its radical and constitutive de­
sub jectification in testimony. As Agamben notes, the double movement of 
desubjectification and sub jectification suggests that within humans, ‘life bears with it 
a caesura that can transform all life into survival and all survival into life’.52 This 
suggestion clearly bears a strong relation to the distinction between bios and %oe that 
Agamben argues is crucial to the operation of biopolitics in his earlier book, Homo 
Sacer. In that text, Agamben argued that biopolitics operates through the disjuncture 
of bios and %oe, and the production of bare life as the excrescence of the failure of 
modern democracy to broach that disjuncture. Similarly, in Remnants, Agamben states 
that ‘biopower’s supreme ambition is to produce, in a human body, the absolute 
separation of the living being and the speaking being, %oe and bios, the inhuman and 
the human — survival’.53 Against Foucault, Agamben suggests that the definitional 
formula of biopolitics is not ‘to make live or let die’, but rather, to make survive, that is, 
to produce bare life as life reduced to survival through the separation of the human 
from the inhuman, or the speaking being from the living being.54 Biopolitics entails 
the absolute breaking apart of the double articulation of sub jectification and 
desubjectification in the space of the camps, where sub jectification is installed in the 
place of desubjectification and the impossibility of speaking, that is, the reduction of 
the human or the speaking being to the living being, the inhuman.
51 Agamben, Remnants, p.l 51.
52 Agamben, Remnants, p .l33.
53 Agamben, Remnants, p .l56.
54 For a contemporary literary rendition of this, see J.M Coetzee, The Life and Times of Michael K. 
(London: Vintage, 1988). While it is not possible to take up an interpretation of Coetzee’s work here, 
much of his later work can productively be read through the problematic of the separation of the 
living being and the speaking being in biopolitical operations upon the subject.
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This suggests that bare life is the remnant of biopolitics in that it traces the caesura of 
the whole and the part, the disjuncture of the inhuman and the human produced in 
the operations of biopolitical subjection. As such, it is ultimately the production of 
bare life that testimony bears witness to and in doing so, resists. Thus the 
Muselmänner that Agamben argues are the true witnesses of the camps are so because 
of the reduction of human existence to survival or bare life, which is produced as the 
biopohtical excrescence of the caesuras that cross and fracture the human being. 
Simply, the inhuman life of the Muselmann is bare life or natural, organic life exposed 
to violence and death without reprieve. Given that testimony emerges in the 
interstices between the human and the inhuman, the speaking being and the living 
being — that is, between subjectification and de-subjectification — the value of 
testimony is that it presents an interminable opposition to the reduction of human 
life to survival. In bearing witness to desubjectification, testimony re-subjectifies and 
resists the biopolitical operations on the caesura in human life. In this, testimony 
appears as an ethics of survival insofar as ‘with its every word, testimony refutes 
precisely this isolation... of survival from life’.55 Testimony provides a means of 
response to bare life that does not abandon bare life to its absolute exposure to 
violence or sacralize human life at the expense of the biological and inhuman.
To the extent that testimony can be understood as a means of response to the 
biopolitical exposure of bare life, the ethics of witnessing developed in Remnants 
appear to necessitate a revision of the strong messianic position that Agamben took 
in Homo Sacer. As I discussed in the previous chapter, in developing his position of 
strong messianics in the earlier text, Agamben rejected recourse to an inherent 
potentiality or immanent resistance within bare life and instead posits the 
inauguration of a ‘happy life’ that has reached the perfection of its own power and 
communicability as the necessary ground of messianic redemption. Further, the 
strong messianic position that Agamben gestured toward required the total 
overturning of the law in order to overcome the biopohtical capture of bare life. 
Neither bare life nor the suspension of the law in abandonment could be taken to 
provide the ground for the messianic redemption required to overturn the imperfect 
nihilism and corresponding bloody violence of our time. For Agamben, each of these 
gestures did litde more than reinstate the biopohtical conditions of existence, in
55 Agamben, Remnants, p. 155.
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which bare life is produced as the excrescence of the distinction between bios and %oe 
and exposed to sovereign violence without reprieve. In contrast to this, in Remnants, 
Agamben does not argue that redemption can onlv come through the complete 
overturning of the ban or the law in force without significance that produces bare 
life. Instead, redemption is only possible in bearing witness to bare life as the 
remnant of biopolitics.
To be sure, Agamben maintains his critique of the extension of the ‘juridification’ of 
ethics and politics beyond the law, which is understood in Homo Sacer as the co­
incidence of the law and life. In Remnants, this is evident in his aim to establish an 
account of ethics without reference to juridical concepts such as responsibility and 
dignity. However, the gesture that informs this critique in each text is substantially 
different. In the earlier text, this takes the form of positing the necessity of a 
complete overturning of the law and the expropriation of being in the name of a 
fulfilled humanity or coming community. In the later text however, the rejection of 
the juridical is not based on the overcoming of the law, but the specification of an 
ethical dimension or domain before the law. That is, the ethics of witnessing 
developed by Agamben are an attempt to articulate an ethics wtithout final recourse 
to judgment. This is indicated in the central importance of Levi’s text ‘The Grey 
Zone’, in which Levi refuses to allocate blame and culpability in his analysis of 
complicity within the camps. It is also made explicit in Agamben’s comment that
what is at issue here, therefore, is a zone of irresponsibility and “impotentia 
ju dican dT that is situated not beyond good and evil but rather before them... 
This infamous zone of irresponsibility is our First Circle, from which no 
confession of responsibility will remove us56
I will return to a fuller discussion of this rejection of the concept of responsibility in 
a moment, but first, the consideration of the messianic gesture operating within an 
ethics of witnessing must be pushed further.
In addition to this, Agamben also suggests in the final pages of Remnants that:
56 Agamben, Remnants, p.21; the additional citation within Agamben’s text is to Levi, ‘The Grey Zone’, 
in The Drowned and the Saved, pp.23-51 at 43. This text provides the main point of reference for 
Agamben’s rejection of a notion of responsibility based on judgment and culpability.
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We must cease to look toward processes of subjectification and 
desubjectification... and more generally, toward historical processes as if they 
had an apocalypdc or profane telos in which the living being and the speaking 
being... are joined in an established, completed humanity and reconciled in a 
realized identity... the Messianic kingdom is neither the future (the millennium) 
or the past (the golden age); it is, instead, a remaining time? 1
Agamben’s suggestion that the Messianic time is the remaining time has several 
implications pertinent to this discussion. First, the characterization of the messianic 
kingdom as the remaining time might be read as an almost explicit rejection of the 
earlier portrayal of the Messianic as the telos of an ‘absolutely profane happy life’, 
that entailed the full appropriation of human existence against the expropriation of 
biopolitics and the spectacle of contemporary sociality analyzed in The Coming 
Community. Such a reading would be reinforced by an association of the remaining 
time with the time of biopolitics, insofar as biopolitical operations give ground to the 
witness of bare life as the remainder of the distinction between bios and goe. The 
disjunctive of bios and goe appears as analogous to the messianic, and the witness 
marks the consistency of the human in relation to that and as such, traces the caesura 
of the whole and the part, the inhuman and the human. Thus, the remaining time is 
not a coming time in the sense that the time of happy life is; rather, it is the present 
time, conditioned by its own historicity and futurity.
Furthermore, this statement throws light on the co-incidence of the aporia of 
testimony with the aporia of messianics that structures Agamben’s argument. I 
mentioned at the start of this chapter that for Agamben, the remnant is a theologico- 
messianic concept that ultimately reveals the co-incidence of the aporia of testimony 
and the messianic. We can now see that what Agamben means by this is that the 
disjunctive of the speaking being and the living being that founds testimony is also 
precisely the site of the messianic event. Flere then, the messianic event no longer 
takes the form of the redemptive overcoming of the disjunctive of bios and goe, but 
is precisely the means by which the disjunctive is brought to bear as the condition of 
ethics. An ethics of witnessing emerges from the doubled aporias of language and the 
messianic, in which the capacity of the human being to have language is predicated
57 Agamben, Remnants, p.159.
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on its not having language and the human being is crossed over with the human and 
the non-human and the related non-coincidence of the living and the speaking being. 
Further, since an ethics of witnessing can be understood as an ethics of survival 
insofar as what is borne witness to is bare life, then there is no fmal full 
appropriation in the human being’s having language. Instead, the human is infinitely 
abandoned to its expropriation in language and the double structure of 
subjectification and desubjectification that attends becoming a speaking being. This 
however is not the travesty of ethics, but rather the condition of ethics. An ethics of 
witnessing is an ethics of bearing witness to the human being’s expropriation in 
language.
6.3 Witnessing Violence: An Ethics of Bare Life
Given this account of an ethics of witnessing and the revision of messianism that it 
entails, I want to propose at this stage that Agamben’s account of witnessing can be 
extended from the specific context of Auschwitz and the aporia of testimony the 
camps present to accommodate a broader response to bio-sovereign violence. This 
extension is already implicit within Agamben’s account, and primarily requires being 
made explicit. However, it also requires further consideration of the position that 
Agamben takes vis-a-vis the concept of responsibility. On the one hand, Agamben 
rejects the concept of responsibility because of its juridical roots, but on the other, he 
develops an account of apostrophic address that indicates a more fundamental sense 
of responsibility that cannot be reduced to the juridical, although he ultimately gives 
little elaboration to this sense. Building on his figuration of apostrophic address, I 
show that Agamben’s ethics of witnessing can usefully extend on the accounts of 
responsibility and address given by Foucault and Buder. An ethics of witnessing 
providing a means of thinking through the ethical responsibility that obtains in the 
subject’s constitution in language and identifies an ethical responsibility subtending 
the political decision without determining it. To elaborate on this latter claim, I turn 
to a concluding discussion of Foucault and Agamben’s respective positions vis-ä-vis 
the political status of rights, which also helps illustrate the relation of an ethics of 
witnessing to the political determination of life worth living.
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Agamben makes two points in his argument that indicate the possibility of extending 
an ethics of witnessing beyond the particular aporetic circumstances of the camps. 
The first of these is the posited continuity of the rationality of the camps beyond the 
specific historical manifestation of Auschwitz and other camps of Nazi Germany 
with the conditions of politics per se. For Agamben, the rationality manifest in the 
camps is not marked by a radical break from the political traditions and systems of 
the West, as totalitarianism was for Hannah Arendt for instance. Instead, the camps 
expose the internal nomos of modern politics, revealing a fundamental continuity 
between totalitarianism and the political traditions of the West, including those that 
underpin the institutions and rationality of modern democracy. As Agamben argues 
in Homo Sacer and elsewhere, as the biopolitical space par excellence, the camp 
operates as the exception that reveals the general rule: the camp is not an isolable 
anomaly distinct from the general contemporary political conditions of existence, but 
instead exposes the biopolitical ‘nomos of the modern’.58
Hence, this is not precisely a matter of the comparability of the violence of 
Auschwitz and genocide more generally with other forms of violence, but of the 
extension of the rationality of the camps beyond their spatial limits into the political 
rationality of modern democracy. Agamben’s critical claim that democracy and 
totalitarianism are not entirely distinct because they converge in their modus operandi is 
not novel in itself, since this claim has been made in a number of guises in the post­
war period.59 However, the novelty of Agamben’s version lies in his explication of 
the concept of biopolitics, in which sovereignty is not distinct from biopolitics, but 
intimately linked to it through the capture of bare life in the sovereign ban. This 
suggests that biopolitical violence and the determination of life worth living that 
accompanies it are characteristic of a political rationality that aims to administer and 
control the biological life of populations and people, whether that rationality be 
realized within the extreme situation of the camps or in the seemingly less benign
58 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Camp as the Nomos of the Modern’ in Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, 
eds. Violence, Identity and Self-Determination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) pp. 106-118.
59 For a recent sociological version of this argument see Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); on the continuity of biopolitics in totalitarianism and modem 
democracy, see Mitchell Dean, Govemmentality: Power and Rule in Modem Society (London: Sage, 1999); 
Mitchell Dean, ‘Liberal Government and Authoritarianism’, Economy and Society 31:1(2002), pp.37-61. 
Also see the discussions of violence and modernity in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds. The 
Political Subject of Violence, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
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exclusions of modem democracy. Whether this is the case is in part an empirical and 
sociological question, and as such, is not one I can take up here. Yet, even with this 
caveat in mind, the theoretical possibility of extending an ethics of witnessing beyond 
the camps remains.
The second indication that an ethics of witnessing based on the aporia of testimony 
can be extended beyond the particular historico-empirical reference point cf 
Auschwitz lies in the ontological status of subjectivity as the event of the constitution 
of consciousness in language. Following on from the account of subjectification and 
desubj ectification and the biopolitical condition of contemporary politics discussed 
above, what becomes apparent toward the end of Remnants is that bare life is 
ultimately the irremediable condition of the subject that is exposed in 
desubjectification. Furthermore, if the task of witnessing is to bear witness to the 
impossibility of speaking and the exposure of bare life that this entails, then it follows 
that every subject is at least potentially a witness. In other wx>rds, to the extent tint 
desubjectification is a constitutive condition of subjectification and the subjects 
taking place in language, then the impossibility of fully entering into die enunciative 
place of the subject always calls to be witnessed. As Agamben suggests, ‘the authority 
of the witness consists in his capacity to speak solely in the name of an incapacity to 
speak — that is, in his or her being a subject’.60 This means that bearing witness to tie 
impossibility of speaking pertains to the subject as one of its fundamental tasks: tie 
task of the remnant, that is, of the subject of testimony.
However, if it is possible to extend the ethics of witnessing that Agamben develops 
in reference to the conundrum presented to testimony by Auschwitz to a broader 
scenario of biopolitical subjection, then it is first necessary to return to the concept 
of responsibility that subtends Agamben’s analysis. In this, it is necessary to give 
emphasis to an aspect of responsibility that is ultimately cmcial to the ethics tint 
Agamben elaborates though it ostensibly sits in tension with his rejection of tie 
concept of responsibility as fundamentally juridical. As I mentioned previously, tie 
aim of Agamben’s elaboration of an ethics of witnessing is the specification of an 
ethical domain before the legal codification of judgment and culpability, since the law
60 Agamben, Remnants, p.158.
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is only ever concerned with judgment and not with justice or truth .61 Agamben 
points out though that the necessity of elaborating an ethical domain apart from the 
juridical is not because a judgment cannot be made, but simply because it cannot be 
presumed that the law exhausts the question of responsibility.62 Moreover, it is 
precisely that which exceeds the law that concerns the survivor. Given this, Agamben 
rejects the concept of responsibility, claiming that it is founded in the Latin legal term 
of ‘spondeo’ or sponsor, meaning someone who offers legal guarantee for a course 
of action, and therefore always returns ethics to the problems of the law.63 It also 
because of this that Agamben attempts to move away from a Levinasian account of 
ethical responsibility, since Levinas’ ethical formulation ‘transformed the gesture of 
the sponsor into the ethical gesture par excellence’.64 Even so, it is not always clear 
how far Agamben can or does move away from such a formulation of ethics. While 
this is not the place to take up a full examination of the attempted divergence on 
Agamben’s part, several points can be made, which also help to clarify some of the 
implications of Agamben’s formulation of an ethics of witnessing.
Over and against this conception of responsibility, which is ‘irremediably 
contaminated by law’, Agamben suggests that ethics has seized terrain from the 
juridical not in order to assume another kind of responsibility, but to articulate ‘zones 
of non-responsibility’.65 By the idea of non-responsibility, Agamben indicates not a 
zone of impunity or amoralism, but rather, ‘a confrontation with a responsibility that 
is infinitely greater than any we could ever assume. At the most, we can be faithful to 
it, that is, assert its unassumability. ’66 Apart from this though, Agamben gives little 
further explication of the conception of non-responsibility that he posits to ground 
an ethics of witnessing. However, on the face of it, this conception of non­
responsibility set against the juridical delimitation of responsibility resonates strongly 
with Derrida’s conception of justice as that which exceeds the law, a point that 
reinforces the possibility of reading a shift or at least instability in the conception of
61 Agamben, Remnants, p.18.
62 Agamben, Remnants, p.17.
63 Agamben, Remnants, p.21.
64 Agamben, Remnants, p.22.
65 Agamben, Remnants, p.21.
66 Agamben, Remnants, p.21.
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the messianic operating in Remnants. It also closely resembles the conception of 
responsibility that Derrida elaborates in his engagements with Levinas in the 
development of an ethics of hospitality.
In response to the charge that deconstruction entails a retreat from questions of 
responsibility, Derrida claims in ‘Force of Law’ that exactly the reverse is true: 
deconstruction engages a ‘responsibility without limits, and so necessarily excessive, 
incalculable, before memory... a responsibility before the very concept of 
responsibility’ .67 Derrida gives further elaboration to the idea of an incalculable, 
excessive responsibility through the distinction he draws between justice and the law, 
in which justice precedes and exceeds the law: incalculable justice conditions the law 
but cannot be reduced to it. Hence, justice is not equivalent to judgment and the 
enforcement of the law that it entails and nor can it be reduced to the delimitation of 
culpability and guilt. Rather, Derrida suggests elsewhere in reference to Levinas’s 
elliptical suggestion that justice is equivalent to the relation to the Other, that justice 
is the absolute responsibility that is borne in relation to the absolute Other or tout 
autre, which requires that ‘one denounce, refute, and transcend, at the same time, all 
duty, all responsibility, and every human law’.68
Taking up the form of this argument again in his ethics of hospitality, Derrida argues 
that a pure hospitality exceeds and conditions the presentation of the Other ‘at the 
door’, such that the invitation or welcome to the stranger that hospitality entails 
always refers to a pure hospitality that cannot be realized in any given encounter.69 
Furthermore, Derrida suggests that the welcome of hospitality is the welcome of the 
other, where the genitive indicates an aporia inherent in the welcome, whereby the 
welcome both comes from the other and addresses the other. The aporia inherent in
67 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundations of Authority”’, in Drucilla Cornell, 
David Gray Carlson and Michel Rosenfeld, eds. Deconstruction and the Possibility o f  Justice (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp.3-67 at 19-20.
68 Jacques Derrida, The G i f  o f Death, tr. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p.66; 
also see John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears o f Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997), p.203; Simon Critchley, The Ethics o f Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought, (London: Verso, 1999).
69 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, O f  Hospitality, tr. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p.25; Paul Patton and Terry Smith, ed. Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction Engaged: 
The Sydney Seminars, (Sydney: Power Publications, 2001), p.93-104.
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the welcoming address means that cthe call is only called from the response. The 
response comes ahead of or comes to encounter the call, which, before the response, 
is first only in order to await the response that makes it come’.70 Hence, there can be 
no first call and subsequent response: the first call both precedes and comes from the 
response, such that the opposition of host and stranger is put into question: the 
stranger appears in the place of the host, and the host is ‘hostage’ to the stranger. O f 
course, this dynamic cannot be simply read into Agamben’s ethics of witnessing; 
nevertheless, there is a sense in which Derrida’s conception of welcoming the other 
does throw light on a critical gap in Agamben’s conception of bearing witness and 
the responsibility or non-responsibility that it entails.
In particular, it suggests that Agamben overemphasizes the theoretical need to move 
away from the concept of responsibility in his selective etymology of the term, for 
Derrida’s ethics of hospitality help bring out the sense of responsibility as response 
that subtends Agamben’s argument. While Agamben bases his rejection of the term 
of responsibility on its juridical origins in the Latin root of ‘spondeo’, he neglects that 
responsibility can also be traced to the term ‘responso’, meaning to give an answer, 
to reply or respond to another.71 This alternative etymology of responsibility as a 
capacity for address and response is of course central to the Levinasian precedent of 
Derrida’s formulation of an ethics of hospitality72. It is also given articulation in Kelly 
Oliver’s recent account of an ethics of witnessing, which she argues overcomes the 
perceived problems of recognition-based theories of subject-formation.73 Oliver 
argues that ‘response-ability’ must be central to an account of witnessing, as it brings 
to light the fundamental dependence of the subject on the dynamic of address and 
response entailed in bearing witness for its own emergence and survival. Witnessing 
necessarily involves a relation to the other, since it is essentially a question of the 
subject’s comportment and response to the address of the other.
70 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, tr. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), p.24.
71 Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford Latin Dictionary.
72 See in particular, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, tr. Alfonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1979).
73 Kelly Oliver, Witnessing. Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
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The ethical confrontation with legally delimited concepts of responsibility that 
Agamben suggests also seems to require a conception of response, which in turn 
presupposes a prior capacity7 for response, since his account of an ethics of 
witnessing is tied together through a figuration of the demand of ethical 
responsibility as apostrophe. The rhetorical device of apostrophe, by which the 
narrative convention of a text is disrupted in a figurative turn to an absent character 
or audience, marks an unavoidable call within a text, an authorial turning toward the 
reader or audience to call them into the text. Taking up this figuration, Agamben 
suggests that the Muselmänner of the camps present an apostrophic call for ethical 
response in their transformation from the human to the inhuman and the 
irreconcilable disjuncture between the speaking and living being which this marks. 
Hence, the non-responsibility or ethical confrontation with responsibility takes hold 
of the subject through the apostrophic address that emerges in the absolute exposure 
of bare life. The proper response to such a call is testimony, a task in which the 
inhuman is borne witness to and which thus allows the human to endure. Several 
points should be made about the apostrophic address of the Muselmann as the 
extreme figure of the biopolitical exposure of bare life.
First, the apostrophe of bare life is characterized and made possible not by what one 
has seen but by the sheer impossibility of seeing. From Levi’s suggestion that the 
Muselmänner are the one’s who have ‘seen the Gorgon’, that is, the Greek figure upon 
which it is impossible to look and remain human, Agamben suggests that the Gorgon 
does not indicate something that exists or takes place in the camps. Instead, the 
Gorgon figures the inhuman impossibility of seeing or knowing that belongs 
constitutively to the Muselmann. That is, the apostrophe of bare life does not arise 
from gazing on the face of the other, by looking upon the Muselmänner, but springs 
from the impossibility of seeing that constitutes the Muselmänner as such. As 
Agamben states,
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at the ‘bottom’ of the human being there is nothing other than an impossibility 
of seeing — this is the Gorgon, whose vision transforms the human into a non­
human. That precisely this inhuman impossibility of seeing is what calls and 
addresses the human, the apostrophe from which human beings cannot turn 
away — this and nothing else is testimony.74
Hence, the impossibility of seeing operates as the condition for ethical response to 
bare life in the form of testimony.
Second, just as apostrophe does not require that testimony arise from the possibility 
of seeing, nor does it require a temporally and spatially limited encounter with the 
other such that ethical response is limited to the inter subjective face-to-face 
encounter for instance. While Agamben’s account of apostrophe is not posed as an 
explicit critique of Levinas, this dimension of his account does allow the 
unassumable responsibility of testimony to be extended beyond the particular 
formulation given to this encounter by theorists more sympathetic to Levinasian 
ethics. Within such accounts, the immediacy of the face-to-face encounter presents a 
problem for establishing historical responsibility with regard to that encounter, since 
those involved in the encounter are not the subjects being held in responsibility. 
James Hatley addresses this in his Levinasian account of an ethics of witnessing by 
noting that while historical testimony exceeds the face-to-face encounter of ethical 
responsibility elaborated by Levinas, it constitutes a ‘wider, secondary circle of 
responsibility’.75 This secondary responsibility is mediated through language and the 
textuality of historical record, such that the face-to-face encounter is reconstituted 
through testimony. However, as Hatley recognizes without fully overcoming, such an 
account of historical testimony founders on the potential falsification of testimony 
introduced by the process of dissemination, such that the original encounter is 
increasingly obscured through the successive transmissions of testimony.
74 Agamben, Remnants, p.54.
75 James Hatley, Suffering Witness: The Quandary of Responsibility after the Irreparable (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), p.105.
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In distinction from this, the apostrophe is ‘flying through time to reach us, to bear 
witness’76 and calls for response without the constraint of historical mediation and 
attempted reproduction of the original face-to-face encounter. Again, Agamben is 
largely silent on the implications of this figuration for an understanding of 
responsibility — or non-responsibility in his formulation -  beyond the immediate 
temporality of the injury and violence inflicted in biopolitical subjection. However, 
two implications can be noted. First, it suggests that ethical responsibility does not 
diminish because of the temporal or spatial distance of the speaking subject from the 
event of violence. Because the conception of responsibility that Agamben aims at in 
the notion of a ‘zone of non-responsibility’ does not refer to the juridical category of 
culpability, and therefore does not require attribution of blame or admissions of guilt, 
it does not require that the subject held in the zone of non-responsibility be 
identifiable as the perpetrator or cause of violence. The unassumable responsibility of 
bearing witness falls upon the subject by virtue of being a subject, that is, by the 
living being’s entering into the ‘vacant place’ of enunciation. Response-ability takes 
hold in the grammatical shifters such as T  and ‘you’ that mark the disjuncture of the 
living and speaking being and not by virtue of the subject’s violent acts against other 
subjects strictly speaking.
Second, while the imperative to re-trace the original face-to-face encounter in bearing 
witness introduces the possibility of falsification of testimony, it also operates as a 
limitation on the truthfulness or veracity of testimony within the position indicated 
above. However, this cannot be the case in Agamben’s figuration of the apostrophic 
call to witness, since the aporia that he locates at the heart of testimony brings the 
veracity of testimony into question in a more radical way. The aporia of testimony 
undermines the attempt to establish the truthfulness of testimony by reference to an 
original event that provides the empirical delimitation and condition of that 
testimony. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no constraint on testimony, 
such that witnesses are not bound in what can be said in testimony or what counts as 
testimony. Instead, the imperative of bearing witness to the impossibility of speaking 
provides the delimitating condition of testimony, such that testimony that fails to
76 Agamben, Remnants, p.104; also see Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘On the Threshold’, Paragraph 16:2, pp. 111- 
121, which can be read as an illustration of the apostrophic call of the dead or dying body through 
history.
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address and respond to the desubjectivation effectuated in the impossibility of 
speaking appears as false witness. Hence, for Agamben, Levi’s paradox does not 
substantiate denials of the existence of the camps, but provides the only real means 
of refuting such denials. Witnessing effectively refutes the dehumanizing biopolitical 
experiment of the camps by bringing the impossibility of speaking to speech, — 
though not simply by speaking of it but by making it appear within speech — and 
thereby bearing witness to the Muselmann. Thus, apostrophe calls the subject into 
history to bear witness to the impossibility of speaking.
In addition to this, the Levinasian inflected ethics of witnessing elaborated by Hatley 
overlooks the implications of the unassumability of the experience of violence and 
trauma. How does one bear witness to the face-to-face encounter when that 
encounter is so deeply traumatic that one cannot fully assume the experience as an 
experience that one has endured and survived? In her analysis of trauma and 
historical narrative, Cathy Caruth argues that the traumatic wound has an ‘endless 
impact’ on life. As she states, ‘trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original 
event in an individual’s path, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature — 
the way it was precisely not known in the first place — returns to haunt the survivor 
later on .’77 Building on this, Caruth identifies a voice within the wound, understood 
as ‘a command to awaken.. .[to] the language of trauma and the silence of its mute 
repetition of suffering’.78 Interestingly, this ‘profound and imperative demand’ 
operates as a call to ethical response to and encounter with the other, a figuration 
that bears a close resemblance to the apostrophic call identified by Agamben. In line 
with this figural resemblance, the unendurability of the experience analyzed by 
Caruth can also be seen to inflect the paradox of bearing witness identified by Levi 
when he claims that the survivors of Auschwitz are not the true witnesses. It is not 
only that the survivors have not lived through the experience of the camps to the 
end, but also that the experience of having lived through internment at all is radically 
unendurable, unable to be borne witness to because it is in a sense unknowable. In 
this scenario, the shame that arises for the survivor appears as the shame of not 
being able to fully assume the task of bearing witness, but at the same time being
77 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), p.4.
78 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.9.
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unable to separate oneself from the responsibility to do so. In this sense, Agamben’s 
account of witnessing takes the unendurability of experience and unassumability of 
responsibility for testifying to that experience as its starting point.
This brings us to the third characteristic of Agamben’s notion of the unassumable 
responsibility brought to bear on the subject in the apostrophic address of bare life. 
While the responsibility indicated by Agamben is ultimately unassumable, it is also 
unavoidable: while ethical responsibility cannot be fully assumed or taken up as the 
task of the subject, nor can the subject turn away from it. The task of bearing witness 
to desubjectification in testimony is simultaneously unavoidable, since every 
subjectification is conditioned by a constitutive desub jectification, but also 
unassumable in that what one bears witness to is the impossibility of speaking and of 
bearing witness. In this light then, the ethical ‘non-responsibility’ that Agamben 
identifies appears to be closely related to the characterization of shame that he 
develops. As I discussed previously, shame arises in the situation of confrontation 
with a presentation or aspect of oneself that one cannot separate oneself from but 
cannot fully assume as one’s own being. Hence, shame appears to be the affectivity 
proper to the ethical, since responsibility is precisely that which one simultaneously 
cannot turn away from but cannot assume. Further, if shame is the fundamental 
affective tonality of the subject as Agamben argues, then ethical responsibility may 
itself be seen as one of the constitutive conditions of the subject.
Interestingly, Oliver makes a similar point in her account of witnessing, where she 
claims that the problems of testimony and bearing witness are central to subjectivity. 
For Oliver, the dependency of the subject on the possibilities of address and 
response means that witnessing appears as the dilemma at the heart of the subject.79 
The dynamic of address and response in testimony means that the subject is 
necessarily in relation with others, a condition that indicates that subjectivity itself 
entails a fundamental responsibility to and for others. Similarly, in Agamben’s 
account, the taking place of enunciation can itself be seen as always a matter of
79 Oliver, Witnessing pp.88-91.
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‘being-with’ others,80 insofar as grammatical shifters do not simply indicate the 
double movement of subjecdficadon and desubjectificadon, but also indicate the 
position of the subject in relation to others. That is, the living being’s entering into 
language through the designation of pronouns does not simply indicate the position 
of the individual vis-ä-vis language, but also necessarily indicates the position of the 
individual in relation to other living and speaking beings. Pronouns such as T , ‘you’ 
and ‘we’ necessarily position the speaking subject in relation with those being 
addressed or identified.81
While Oliver’s account of subject-formation is substantially different from 
Agamben’s then, her insight can still usefully be turned to Agamben’s analysis. This 
difference is particularly evident in that while she focuses on the interdependency of 
subjectivity and the affectivity of love, he focuses on the dynamic of subjectification 
and desub j ectification in the event of enunciation and the affectivity of shame. Yet, 
one consequence of placing Oliver’s analysis alongside Agamben’s is that the 
intersubjective dimension of ethical response is highlighted over and against 
Agamben’s analysis, which tends to theoretically neglect the implications of 
intersubjectivity within witnessing. This neglect is indicated by his limited etymology 
of responsibility, in which the capacity for response is obviated. Nevertheless, if this 
sense of responsibility does subtend Agamben’s analysis as I have suggested it does, 
then the intersubjective aspect of witnessing is not strictly foreclosed or wholly 
excluded by his account. While it is neither possible nor necessary to extend upon 
Agamben’s theorization in this direction here, the neglect of the implications of 
intersubjectivity within an ethics of witnessing does mark a limitation of his analysis, 
but one that could be overcome without the insights that he offers being rejected in 
their entirety.
80 On ‘being-with’ see in particular Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1991); Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘O f Being Singular Plural’, in Being Singular Plural.[ tr. 
Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp.1-100; Jean- 
Luc Nancy, ‘O f Being-in-Common’, in Miami Theory Collective, eds. Community at Loose Ends 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp.1-12.
81 For a discussion of the gendered dimensions of this see Luce Ingaray,y>, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of 
Difference (New York: Roudedge, 1993).
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Given these characteristics, two advantages of the conception of an unassumable 
responsibility within an ethics of witnessing can be made clear. The first of these is 
that such a conception of ethical response largely short-circuits the focus on 
culpability and judgment as the ultimate determinants of responsibility while allowing 
a consideration of the ethical responsibility that obtains in the subject’s constitution 
in language. The second is that it allows for the elaboration of an irreducible 
responsibility apart from the a priori determination of political strategy, that is, it 
allows for the recognition of a fundamental sense of responsibility that conditions 
but does not determine the content of the political decision required in response to 
the contingent conditions of political survival. These points can best be illustrated 
through returning to the problems that I identified in the work of Buder and 
Foucault, which also helps to draw out the ways in which Agamben’s formulation of 
an ethics of witnessing extends upon the conceptions of ethico-political response to 
biopolitical subjection suggested in their work.
Regarding the first of these, the distinction between legal and ethical responsibility 
that Agamben poses recalls a similar distinction suggested by Buder in her discussion 
of hate speech, but which was ultimately left undeveloped. As I argued in Chapter 4, 
for Buder, the linguistic constitution of the subject by which the subject is dependent 
on a discourse that is both ‘dominant and indifferent’ for its emergence and survival 
effectively calls into question the attribution of legal responsibility for speech to a 
speaking subject. This challenge to the attribution of culpability is further reinforced 
for Butler by the claim that speech is always out of the control of the speaker, insofar 
as the performative force of terms is conditioned by a ‘condensed historicity’ and 
potential for reappropriation and resignification. At the same time though, Butler 
adds that the linguistic constitution of the subject reinforces rather than undermines 
a sense of responsibility, but one that cannot be reduced to the attribution of legal 
culpability. Yet, while making this claim, Butler leaves the theoretical path opened by 
it unexplored. While she develops an account of political agency in her thesis on 
resignification as a necessary response to hate speech, ultimately, she does not 
provide an account of the ethical responsibility that bears upon the subject in its 
status as a speaking being. However, Agamben’s formulation of ethical responsibility 
dispatched in testimony and bearing witness allows recognition of the linguistic 
constitution of the subject — since subjectification is understood as the constitution 
of consciousness in language — while maintaining recognition of the necessity of
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ethical response and delimiting an arena of unassignable ‘non-responsibility’ apart 
from juridically defined responsibility and judgment.
Additionally, Agamben’s account of an ethics of witnessing as a response to 
biopolidcal subjection allows for recognition of a fundamental and irreducible 
responsibility as a limiting condition of the indeterminate political decision taken in 
response to contingent circumstances without determining political strategy in 
advance. In Chapter 2, I argued that Foucault’s ethics of the self were limited as a 
potential response to biopolitical subjection because his account did not allow 
sufficient ground for an elaboration of a necessary ethical responsibility. Insofar as an 
ethics of the self can be understood to provide a model of ethical practice over and 
against biopolitical subjection, such an ethics is limited in that it fails to elaborate a 
necessary concern for others as a guiding and limiting condition of concern for self. 
Foucault’s account of an ethics of the self is characterized by two levels of 
contingency, the first of which pertains to the contingent circumstances and practices 
by which one forms oneself as an ethical subject, while the second pertains to 
whether or not a concern for oneself in ethical self-formation requires concern for 
others at all. In discussing the second of these, I argued that insofar as ‘taking care of 
oneself can be understood as the normative principle informing an ethical practice 
of the self, then that formulation of ethical practice did not sufficiently allow for 
recognition of a fundamental responsibility to and for others.
In returning to the problem of political contingency in Chapter 4, where I discussed 
Butler’s conflicting commitments to the perceived political pragmatism of Foucault 
and the Derridean inflected politics of resignification, I suggested that it was 
necessary to distinguish between recognizing the contingency of political strategy and 
posing contingency as the necessary ground of political agency. I showed that in 
Excitable Speech, Butler posits resignification as a ‘necessary response’ to hate speech 
on the basis that the inherent instability and reversibility of signification provided the 
ground and occasion of political agency. However, in making this claim, Butler 
effectively moves away from recognition of the contingency of political strategy, in 
the sense that strategy cannot be determined in advance of the conditions under 
which such actions take place and instead posits contingency itself as the condition 
of political agency. In doing so, she posits resignification as the principal political
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strategy over and against legal recourse, in an a priori manner that does not maintain 
sufficient regard to the theoretical recognition of political pragmatism, which holds 
that such decisions can only be made in the circumstances to which they respond.
However, Agamben’s formulation of an irreducible ethical responsibility avoids both 
of these paths, in that it allows for a necessary obligation and responsibility to others 
without deriving a political program from that recognition. Witnessing does not 
constitute a particular path of action to be taken in relation to a set of circumstances, 
but instead, indicates the position of the subject in relation to others. As an internal 
element in the process of subjectification and desubjectification, bearing witness 
indicates the subject’s taking place in language and by dint of that, the living and 
speaking being’s being in the world with others. As such, it delimits an ethical 
relation to others, but does not determine the content of the political decision, 
understood as a form of judgment and delimitation of what must be done, here and 
now .82 The responsibility of witnessing is both unavoidable and unassurnable, such 
that it operates as a limiting condition of the political decision, but is neither 
exhausted by that decision nor fully taken up in it. This point can be made clearer 
through a brief consideration of political recourse to the discourse of rights, which I 
suggest is neither necessitated by nor incompatible with an ethics of witnessing.
6A Responsibility and Rights
Given the foregoing reading of instability within the conception of messianics 
operating in the ethics proposed in Remnants, which I have argued allows for the 
formulation of witnessing as an ethical response to biopolitical violence, I want to 
close this thesis with a brief consideration of the interaction of ethics and politics in 
relation to rights. To do this, I will focus on Agamben and Foucault’s comments on 
refugees and human rights, to draw out their respective positions and discuss those 
in relation to an ethics of witnessing. To be sure, these comments have quite 
different statuses within the respective oeuvres of Agamben and Foucault and are 
inflected by different theoretical and political aims: while Agamben’s are at one with 
the theoretical analysis of biopolitics and sovereignty, Foucault’s strongest comment 
on human rights appears in a short document drafted as a manifesto of response to a
82 See my earlier discussion of Derrida in Chapter 5.
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particular political situation. Nevertheless, they can be productively compared to 
bring out the relation of politics and ethics, particularly with regard to witnessing. In 
particular, I show that Agamben’s strong rejection of rights, to which he is 
committed to the extent that he holds to a position of strong messianics, is 
unjustified in light of the account of witnessing discussed above. Instead, I show that 
the moderated position of political vigilance that takes note of the possibility that 
politically, ‘everything is dangerous’ emerges from Foucault’s short document on 
human rights. This position allows for recognition of an ethical responsibility to bear 
witness that emerges in and subtends the decision of the political.
Agamben begins his reflections on human rights by reference to Hannah Arendt’s 
analysis of the relation between human rights and the rights of the citizen that she 
develops in The Origins of Totalitarianism, under the chapter heading of ‘The decline of 
the nation-state and the rights of man’.83 In this, Arendt argues that the rights 
outlined as inalienable human rights in the French ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen’ effectively prove to be rights of the citizen, as the massive 
groundswell of stateless people in Europe following the First World War revealed. 
Arendt argues that people without their own national government, that is, non­
citizens, were effectively people without rights, such that the existence of rights is 
determined by inclusion within a polity. From this, Agamben goes on to argue that 
the link between nativity and sovereignty evident in the Declaration means that 
natural life appears as the bearer of rights at the same time as it ‘vanishes’ into the 
figure of the citizen. He states, ‘rights are attributed to man (or originate in him) 
solely to the extent that man is the immediate vanishing ground (who must never 
come to light as such) of the citizen’.84 However, this distinction and the state form 
of sovereignty is brought to crisis by refugees, who break the continuity between 
man and citizen and nativity and nationality, thereby revealing the status of bare life 
within the politics of the nation-state.
83 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967); also see Balibar’s 
comment that the conjunctive in the phrase ‘Man and the Citizen’ in the French Declaration 
introduces a split between the named citizen and man and thus raises the question whether ‘...the 
rights declared [are] those of the citizen as man or those of man as citizen?’; Etienne Balibar, ‘Citizen 
Subject’, in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy, eds. Who Comes After the Subject? 
(New York: Roudedge, 1991), pp.33-57 at 44.
84 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.128; also see Giorgio Agamben, ‘Beyond Human Rights’ in Means without 
End: Notes on Politics, tr.Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University' of Minnesota 
Press, 2000), pp.15-25.
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In following the logic of strong messianism that structures the arguments of Homo 
Sacer.; Agamben claims in light of this that the only solution to the conundrum 
exposed by the refugee is the complete rejection of rights and reformulation of the 
founding concepts of Western politics. As he argues, the refugee is ‘nothing less than 
a limit concept that at once brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-state 
and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can no longer be delayed’.85 In 
particular, what Agamben argues for as part of this renewal is the radical separation 
of the concept of the refugee from that of human rights, and the consequent 
development of a politics in which ‘bare life is no longer separated and excepted, 
either in the state order or in the figure of human rights’.86 Further, in ‘Beyond 
Human Rights’, he lays out a schematic utopia of a Europe beyond the nation-state, 
in which each citizen is brought to recognize the refugee that they ultimately are: 
Europe conceptualized as ‘an aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the 
(citizen and noncitizen) residents of the European states would be in a position of 
exodus or refuge’.87
Whatever other problems there might be in such a formulation, the pertinent point 
here is that the strong rejection of rights that this entails derives from Agamben’s 
conviction that within the nation-state, rights are one of the central means by which 
bare life is politicized. Further, given his strong rejection of political potential internal 
to the nexus of bare life and politics that I discussed in the previous chapter, the 
strong messianic position that Agamben holds commits him to an outright rejection 
of political recourse to rights. However, if it is possible to read the messianic position 
in Remnants as substantially weaker than the earlier version, then the question arises 
o f whether such a rejection of rights can be maintained. Contrary to this strong 
rejection, as I outlined above, the weaker version of messianics allows for the 
formulation of ethical responsibility without a necessary commitment to a political a 
priori such as the rejection of rights that Agamben urges. While a weak messianic 
position does not entail any necessary commitment to a particular political stance, it 
does allow for the formulation of political strategies underpinned by an unassumable 
yet unavoidable ethical responsibility understood as the necessity of bearing witness.
85 Agamben, ‘Beyond Human Rights’, p.23.
86 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.134.
87 Agamben, ‘Beyond Human Rights’, p.24-25.
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This suggests that a more moderated position in relation to rights is required. 
Interestingly, at this stage, we can turn back to Foucault’s own comments on rights, 
and particularly his short document ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’ for a 
further elaboration of the dynamic I am suggesting here. I noted in the previous 
chapter that there is a particular ambiguity in Foucault’s remarks on rights, since he 
appears to hold at least three different positions at different times in that he:
(1) rejects a discourse of rights as a ‘blind alley’,
(2) suggests that what is required is a new form of rights and
(3) calls upon the notion of human rights vis-ä-vis Vietnamese boat people.
Both the latter positions -  though perhaps not the first — are compatible with the 
‘rule of tactical polyvalency’ that Foucault outlines in the first volume of History of 
Sexuality, where discourse is an element within the tactical confrontation of power 
relations and any given discursive element can be used both in the sendee of power 
or in the service of resistance. In line with this, Foucault’s various positions can be 
written off as the effect of a political pragmatics that allows recourse to rights as a 
tactic within the operations of power.88 Or, with Thomas Keenan, Foucault’s call to 
human rights can be seen as a gesture toward the enunciation of a new form of right 
beyond sovereignty as ‘the condition of a radically democratic politics, rights without 
limit and end, rights as the irreducible claim and gesture of the political as such’.89 
But what does the recourse to rights, even a new form of rights, indicate within 
Foucault’s work, particularly if these are understood as the condition of the political 
as such?
Foucault’s strongest call for rights comes in the short document translated as 
‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’, written on the occasion of the 
formation of an International Committee against Piracy in response to attacks on
88 See Duncan Ivison, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997) p.46.
89 Thomas Keenan, Tables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), p.171. Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, tr. Colin Gordon and others (New York: 
Pantheon Press, 1980), pp78-108 at 108. For a further discussion of Foucault’s speculation on the 
necessity of a new form of right in ‘Two Lectures’, see Kirstie McClure, ‘Taking Liberties in Foucault’s 
Triange: Sovereignty, Discipline, Govemmentality and the Subject of Rights’, in Austin Sarat and 
Thomas Kearns, eds. Identities, Politics, and Rights (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 
pp.149-192.
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Vietnamese refugees in the Gulf of Thailand.90 In this document, Foucault evokes 
the nodon of an intemadonal cidzenry with rights and duties, obliged to speak out 
against abuses of power in solidarity as members of die community of the governed. 
He goes on to say that, ‘it is the duty of this international citizenry to always bring the 
testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes and ears of governments’ .91 Thus in a 
surprisingly complex text, Foucault evokes some of the most potent figures of 
Western democracy: the citizenry, the people, and the community of the governed. 
What, then, are the posited relations between these figures? Foucault’s claim that it is 
the duty of the international citizenry to bring testimony of the suffering of the 
people to the ‘eyes and ears’ of government suggests a threefold separation between 
these figures, such that the citizenry and the people are not co-extensive and neither 
coincide with the government. The suffering of the people is brought to the eyes and 
ears of government by the citizenry that stands in testimony to that suffering. Thus, 
the suffering of which Foucault speaks introduces a caesura or break between the 
citizenry and the people that obliges the former to bear witness for the latter.
This returns us to the distinction between the rights of man as the rights of humans 
as such, and the rights of the citizen identified by Arendt. What Arendt’s analysis 
marks is that citizenship traces the line of belonging to political community, and that 
it is only within that political community that one can effectively speak of the rights 
of man, or human rights.92 In the terminology of Foucault’s text, citizenship marks 
the limit of the community of the governed. However, Foucault’s response to this 
break is not the radical rejection of rights that Agamben argues for. Instead, his 
radical call for rights seems in direct opposition to the political project that Agamben 
suggests. What arises in Foucault’s text though is a double movement: on the one 
hand a call for rights without limit and on the other, a reinscription of the distinction 
between forms of right. How can these be read together? With Keenan, Foucault’s
90 Michel Foucault, ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’ [1984] in Power. Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, tr. Robert Hurley and others (New York: New Press, 
2000), pp.474-475.
91 Foucault, ‘Confronting Governments’, p.474.
92 This analysis is confirmed by recent arguments of Foucauldian scholars who, albeit with different 
analytic purposes, have understood citizenship as a technology of government central to the control 
and management of populations and the movements within and between political communities. In 
short, citizenship marks the limit of the community of the governed. See for example, Barry Hindess, 
‘Citizenship in the International Management of Populations’, The A.merican Behavioral Scientist 
43:9(2000), pp.1486-1497.
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positing of a new right without limit can be seen as an attempt to overcome the non­
continuity between the rights of the citizen and the human rights, but in re-inscribing 
a break between the citizen and the people Foucault also appears to reinstate a 
scission between the rights of each. This suggests that Keenan’s cosmopolitan 
reading of Foucault's text must be supplemented to take account of this, since the 
scission that Foucault introduces here is an important one that should not be elided 
too quickly.
Indeed, it might be that it is precisely this scission that underlies Keenan’s claim that 
the rights that Foucault indicates can be seen as ‘the irreducible claim and gesture of 
the political as such’93 even if Keenan himself does not bring this entirely to light. In 
his deconstructive reading of the conjuncture of ethical and political, Keenan 
attempts to develop an account of the political and especially of democracy without 
foundation. He argues that rather than undermining ethico-political responsibility the 
absence of grounds enhances responsibility by laying bare the ethico-political 
decision in the moment of its occurrence, where politics is ‘the experience of risk, 
chance and the undecidable. Not the decisionist celebration of the pathos of pure 
resolution’.94 Keenan renders the undecidable decision of the political through the 
trope of ‘who’s there?’, particularly as it is cast in the opening lines of Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet
Barnardo: Who’s There?
Francisco: Nay, answer me. Stand and unfold yourself.
Barnardo: Long Live the King!
Franciso: Barnado?
Barnardo: He.
In Keenan’s reading, the interrogative ‘who’s there?’ provides a tropic rendition of 
the confrontation on the border of political community, while the imperative of 
‘stand and unfold yourself indicates the interpellation of the subject to the law and 
the necessary establishment of identity. As he states, ‘the address interpellates in the
93 Keenan, Fables o f Responsibility, p.171
94 Keenan, Fables o f  Responsibility, p.5
285
strict sense: it brings the other into the field of the law, constitutes him as subject in 
addressing him, opens him out of the question into the upright stability of the self .95
But Keenan moves too quickly in identifying the imperative as an interpellation that 
brings the subject into the field of the law, for the question of ‘who’s there?’ is 
implicitly reiterated in the imperative, such that the imperative foreshadows an 
interpellation and a decision but does not thereby effect it. The question of ‘who’s 
there?’ opens the space in which an interpellation can occur, but that interpellation 
does not occur, not until the proper name is spoken. The imperative to ‘stand and 
unfold oneself does not constitute the unknown arrivant as a unitary subject ‘in the 
field of the law’, but presents the law as a condition of the arrivant’s exposure to 
interpellation and the political decision. It demands that the arrivant step into the 
space of the decision, to unfold and expose themselves to the decision, which the 
arrivant does through the utterance of a password — perhaps an arbitrary one, but 
one which allows the possibility of identification and of passage into political 
community. Importantly, the imperative to identify oneself also falls back upon the 
speaker, for in demanding identification the speaker identifies himself. The demand 
for and subsequent locution of the password ‘Long Live the King’ indicates a 
dynamic of identification from which the speaker is not immune. He is always 
already identified in speaking, in comporting his body in relation to that of the 
arrivant and exposing his own vulnerability in demanding the password.
Following Jacques Ranciere, the decision of the political that follows from the 
presentation of the arrivant at the border of political community can be characterized 
as the decision on part-taking, on who takes part in the political.96 Although Ranciere 
has more in mind, in this context the decision on part-taking can be minimally 
limned as a decision on citizenship, or the interpellated status of the citizen-subject. 
It is a decision on whether the arrivant can be constituted as a citizen or as part of 
the people without the rights and freedoms of the citizen, abandoned to their fate 
outside the borders of ‘the community of the governed’. Further, if the normative 
judgments that attend the status of citizenship can effectively be understood as
95 Keenan, Fables of Responsibility, p.9.
96 Jacques Ranciere, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, tr. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p.9; Jacques Ranciere, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event 5:3(2001).
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judgments on the comparative value of ways of life,97 then the decision on part­
taking appears as a decision on life worth living. This might in fact be behind the 
particular acuity of Foucault’s comment at the end of The History of Sexuality, that it is 
life more than right that has come to be at stake in political struggles, even if these 
struggles are formulated on the basis of the affirmations of rights.98
In this way, the break or caesura that Foucault marks opens the space for an ethics of 
witnessing addressing itself to the determination of life worth living, for it precisely 
in the decision of the political that the undecidable emerges as its destabilizing 
ground. One of the key statements that Foucault makes in this document is the one I 
cited above concerning the duty of the citizenry to bring the testimony of the 
suffering of the people to the eyes and ears of government. In this formulation, 
testimony emerges as the ethical responsibility of the community of the governed in 
relation to the political decisions of governments that inflict suffering on the people. 
Thus, the ethical space for testimony is opened by the determinations of the political, 
which must be undertaken and negotiated in relation to the undecidable, the 
unassumable yet unavoidable responsibility of ethics. In short, the political decision 
must be negotiated in relation to the ethical task of bearing witness to 
desubjectification and the determination of life worth living that lies behind bio­
sovereign violence.
97 See Hindess, ‘Citizenship in the International Management of Populations’.
98Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol.1: A.n Introduction, [1976] tr. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin, 1981), p.145.
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